THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal have given careful and prolonged attention to the consideration of the documents offered by Dr. Siemers on behalf of the Defendant Raeder; and they, therefore, do not wish the documents which they propose to admit to be read because they have already read them all.
I will now deal with the documents individually.
Document 66 is admitted for the purposes of argument, and not as evidence; Document 101 is denied; Documents 102 to 105 are admitted; Document 106 is denied; Document 107 is admitted; Document 39 is denied; Document 63 is admitted; Document 64 is denied; Document 99 is denied; Document 100 is admitted; Documents 102 to 107 are admitted; Document 38 is denied; Document 50 is denied; Document 55 is denied; Document 58 is denied; Documents 29, 56, 57, 60, and 62 are denied. I should have included in that group Document 28, which is also denied. Documents 31, 32, 36, 37, and 39 are denied; Document 41 is admitted; Document 99 has already been denied, and Document 101 has already been denied; Document 59 is admitted; Document 68 is denied; Document 70 is denied; Document 72 is denied; Document 74 is denied; Document 75 is admitted; Document 77 is admitted; Document 79 is admitted; Document 80 is admitted; Document 84 is admitted; Document 85, which is on Page 82 of Volume V, is admitted; Document 87 is denied; Document 88 is admitted; Document 91 is admitted; Document 13 is admitted; Document 27 is admitted.
The Prosecution may, if they wish it, apply to cross-examine the witness who made that document.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Francis Biddle, Member for the United States): That is Admiral Boehm.
THE PRESIDENT: Admiral Boehm, yes.
Document 83 is admitted; Document 34 is admitted; Document 48 is denied.
Have I gone too quickly for you, Dr. Siemers? You have the last few?
DR. SIEMERS: Yes, I heard everything.
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MR. DODD: Mr. President, yesterday afternoon the Tribunal asked that we ascertain the origins, if possible, of Document 1014-PS. Some question was raised about it by Dr. Siemers. It is Exhibit USA-30.
I have had a search made, and I have some information that we are prepared to submit concerning this document. I should like to point out that 1014-PS and 798-PS and L-3 are documents all concerning this same speech made at Obersalzberg on 22 August 1939. They were offered in evidence by Mr. Alderman of the American staff on the 26th day of November 1945.
I should like to point out that L-3, to which Dr. Siemers made reference yesterday, was offered only for identification, as the record shows for the proceedings of that day on the 26th of November, and has received the mark Exhibit Number USA-28 for identification only. Mr. Alderman pointed out, as appears in the record, that he was not offering it in evidence, that it was a paper which came into our hands originally through the services of a newspaperman, and that later on the Documents 798-PS and 1014-PS were found among captured documents. They referred to the same speech in Obersalzberg. Mr. Alderman offered these two at that time.
Now Document 798-PS, Exhibit Number USA-29, and Document 1014-PS, Exhibit Number USA-30, were both found by the forces of the United States in this fashion:
They had been taken from the OKW headquarters in Berlin, and in the course of various journeys in those days they finally arrived at one place and were stored, it now appears, at various places by the OKW under the control of a General Winter of the German forces; and they were transported in three railway trains to Saalfelden in the Austrian Tyrol. Subsequently, General Winter ordered that all documents in his possession be turned over to the Allied forces and they were. These particular documents, together with some other papers, were turned over by General Winter and members of his staff at that time; and on the 21st day of May 1945, they were removed from Saalfelden where they were under the control of General Winter and taken to the Third U.S. Army Document Center at Munich. While at Munich they were sorted and catalogued by Department G-2 Supreme Headquarters of the American Expeditionary Force with the assistance of clerks from the OKW and OKH. On the 16th of June 1945 these documents, together with others, were removed on six trucks from the headquarters of the Third Army at Munich and were taken to the U.S. Group Control Council Number 32 at Seckenheim, Germany, which was located in the former offices of the I.G. Farben Company, and were placed on shelves on the third floor of the building and kept
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under guard. Between the 16th of June 1945 and the 30th of August 1945, the task of collecting, sorting, assembling and cataloging these documents was carried out under the supervision of the British Colonel Austin, with personnel of the Supreme Headquarters and the G-2 Document Center of the G-2 Operational Intelligence Section, 6889 Berlin Document Section, and the British Enemy Document Unit, and the British Military Intelligence Research Section. Beginning on the 5th day of July 1945, and continuing until the 30th of August 1945, these documents were screened at that place by members of the staff of the United States Chief Counsel. Lieutenant Margolies, who is here in the courtroom and a member of our staff, personally picked these documents out of your file 798-PS and 1014-PS from the OKW captured files, brought them to Nuremberg, and lodged them in the document room where they have been kept under strict security ever since.
Now, that is the history of these two documents about which Dr. Siemers raised some question yesterday-a considerable question I might say-and inferred there was something strange about their contents. I think the story which I have given in the form of a statement over the signature of Lieutenant Commander Hopper clearly establishes the source and where they have been ever since; and I think it is only fair to say that, since Dr. Siemers saw fit to point out that this language sounded extremely harsh and was attributed to Hitler, these documents were offered to show these people were actually talking about aggressive war. The reading of the three documents by the Tribunal will clearly show they are all in agreement in substance; of course, there are differences in phraseology, but the important thing and purpose for which they were offered was to show that these people were talking aggressive war. I might say I am not surprised to find my friend is sensitive about the remark, but I think the unanswered proof in the case thus far shows that not only were these things said but they were done.
M. DUBOST: May it please the Court. No doubt it is a mistake in translation. We understood 106 had been rejected the first time and admitted the second time in the Group 102 to 107.
THE PRESIDENT: I am afraid it was my mistake. I did say that the Group 102 to 107 were admitted; but I have also said 106 was rejected, and it is rejected. It is entirely my mistake. 106 is rejected.
M. DUBOST: 106 is thrown out and 102 to 107 are also rejected, are they?
THE PRESIDENT: No, I will state the exact numbers: 102, 103, 104, 105, and 107 are admitted.
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M. DUBOST: Very good. Mr. President, we want to offer further explanations on 102 to 107 during the course of the proceedings.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
DR. SIEMERS: Mr. President, may I say a few words concerning the statement made by Mr. Dodd?
I had no doubts, and I certainly have no doubt now, that since these documents were found they have been handled very correctly and Mr. Dodd spoke only about that. I believe it is important to establish: Whether one can determine the connection these documents had with other documents, because in that way one can see whether these were documents belonging to a certain adjutant. For instance, were they together with the Hossbach papers or together with the Schmundt file? If, for instance, the documents were with the Schmundt documents it is probable that they belonged to the adjutant.
THE PRESIDENT: That all goes to the weight of the document, does it not? No doubt, a document which is signed has more weight than a document which is not signed. All those matters the Tribunal will take into account when considering the documents, but the admissibility of the document depends upon its being a German document found and captured.
DR. SIEMERS: Mr. President, I wanted to say this only because it is unpleasant to have the American Delegation misunderstand my motion concerning the document. I make no charges concerning the manner in which the document was found, I merely say that it is undecided among which papers it was found. It came to my attention that Mr. Dodd treated the three documents concerned in quite the same way, whereas Mr. Alderman on Page 188 of the record (Volume II, Page 286), states that one of these three documents, L-3, was evidently not in order because of its doubtful origin. And therefore he withdrew the document.
May I then, if it please the Court, continue with the examination of the Defendant Raeder?
[Turning to the defendant.] Admiral, we have a few final questions concerning the conspiracy. I believe it will not take much time. I ask you to look at the Document C-155. That is Exhibit GB-214, in Document Book 10, Page 24-Document Book 10 of the British Delegation, Page 24.
It is your letter of 11 June 1940, which was sent to 74 Navy offices and which the Prosecution has called a letter of justification. The Prosecution wants to deduce from this that you knew that a war was to be expected as early as the summer of 1939. I should like you to answer this charge very briefly.
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RAEDER: There is manifold proof to show that I was not expecting a war in the fall at all, and in view of the small extent of rearmament of the German Navy this was quite natural. I have stated quite clearly in my speech before the U-boat officers in Swinemuende that we could not count on it.
DR. SIEMERS: And what was the reason for that letter, C-155?
RAEDER: The reason was that a number of torpedo boats had misfired and this could be traced to the fact that torpedoes had not yet been as perfectly developed as they should have been at the beginning of a war. An additional reason was that, now that the war had so suddenly broken out, many officers believed that it would have been better to have developed the submarine weapon as much as possible first, so that at least this weapon would be ready in large numbers in the event of a war. I objected to that opinion precisely because such a war was not to be expected. And on Page 6, 8th paragraph, I emphasize again-in the second line- that the Fuehrer hoped until the end to postpone the imminent dispute with England until 1944 or 1945. I am speaking here of an imminent dispute. An imminent dispute is not exactly something to strive for, it is rather to be feared.
DR. SIEMERS: There is another key document, that is, Document 789-PS, Exhibit USA-23, the very long speech made by Hitler on 23 November 1939 before the commanders-in-chief.
The document, Mr. President, is in Document Book 10a on Page 261. This is again a Hitler speech where there is no indication of who recorded it. Signature and date are missing.
[Turning to the defendant.] Since this is similar to the other documents I do not have to question you on that point. I would merely like to know, Admiral, did that speech also betray a definite background, a certain mental reservation on the part of Hitler?
RAEDER: Yes. There was at that time a rather severe conflict between Hitler and the commanders-in-chief of the Army, and also a difference of opinion with the leading generals concerning the offensive in the West. The Fuehrer assembled all the leaders in order to give them his opinion about this whole matter. He stated -and I was present myself-that up to that time he had always been right in his decisions and that he would also be right in the opinion that the western offensive had to be undertaken in the fall if possible. Toward the end he used very harsh words; in the third from the last paragraph of the document he states: "I shall not be afraid of anything and I shall destroy everyone who is against me." That was directed against the generals. Actually the western offensive did not take place until the spring because the weather conditions delayed them.
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DR. SIEMERS: We have heard details of that during previous proceedings, and I believe we do not have to go into that now. In this connection we come to the last document, that is C-126, which you also have in front of you, GB-45. It is in Document Book 10a on Page 92.
With regard to the preparation of the war against Poland, the Prosecution has submitted this document of the High Command of the Armed Forces dated 22 June 1939 and signed by Keitel, because that document contained a timetable for "Case White"; that is, the case of Poland. Did that document or that directive indicate to you a definite aggressive intention?
RAEDER: No. Not a definite intention of aggression at all. In all cases certain long-range questions had to be cleared up, such as, for instance, whether our training ships which used to put to sea in summer should leave, or whether they should wait. This decision, however, was only to be made in the beginning of August. In connection with that order I issued the order of 2 August also pertaining to that document, to the individual higher Naval offices, namely, an operational directive for the use of Atlantic submarines in the Case White. May I be permitted to read the first lines, because the wording is important:
"Attached is an operational directive for the employment of U-boats which are to be sent out into the Atlantic by the way of precaution in the event that the intention to carry out Case White should remain unchanged. F.d.U. (Commander of the U-boat fleet) is to hand in his operation orders to SKL by 12 August. The decision regarding the sailing of U-boats for the Atlantic will probably be made before the middle of August.
"If the operations are not carried out, this directive must be destroyed by 1 October 1939 at the latest." (Document C-126, Exhibit GB-45)
Thus it was not definite that such operations would take place. It was rather a precautionary measure which had to be taken under all circumstances in connection with the Case White.
DR. SIEMERS: Admiral, you have said that Hitler assured you repeatedly, particularly when you spoke to him personally, that there would not be a war?
RAEDER: Yes.
DR. SIEMERS: Particularly there would be no war against England?
RAEDER: Yes.
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DR. SIEMERS: Now, then, on 3 September 1939 war did start with England. In connection with this did you speak to Hitler about that question-and if so, when?
RAEDER: On the 3 September in the morning, I believe between 10 and 11 o'clock-I cannot remember the exact hour-I was called into the Reich Chancellery. The SKL had already informed me that the ultimatum had been received from England and France. I came into the study of the Fuehrer where a number of persons were assembled. I only remember that Deputy of the Fuehrer Hess was present. I could not say who else was there. I noticed that Hitler was particularly embarrassed when he told me that despite all his hopes, war with England was imminent, and that the ultimatum had been received. It was an expression of embarrassment such as I had never noticed on Hitler.
DR. SIEMERS: I come now to the charge made by the Prosecution that you, Admiral, agreed with National Socialism and strongly supported it.
May I be permitted to ask the Tribunal to look at Document D-481, which is GB-215 in Document Book 10a, Page 101. This deals with the oath of civil servants and the oath of soldiers.
[Turning to the defendant.] The Prosecution, with reference to this document, has stated that on 2 August 1934, in a special ceremony, you took an oath to Adolf Hitler, and not to the fatherland. In the transcript, of 15 January 1946, Page 2719 (Volume V, Page 262), we read, "The Tribunal will see that Raeder" -in his oath-"put Fuehrer in the place of fatherland."
I do not understand this and I will ask you to explain, whether it is correct that you had any part in changing the oath from "fatherland" to "Hitler."
RAEDER: No. I cannot understand that accusation at all. The entire matter was not particularly a ceremony. I do not know who is supposed to have observed it so that he could make such a statement. The Commander-in-Chief, Von Blomberg, and the three commanders-in-chief of the Armed Forces were called to Hitler on the morning of 2 August. We were in his study and Hitler asked us to come to his desk without ceremony or staging. There we took the oath which he, as Chief of State and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, read to us. We repeated that oath. None of us participated in the writing of that oath and no one had asked us to do so. That would have been quite unusual. The oath referred to the person of Hitler. No previous oath had ever been rendered to the fatherland as far as the words were concerned. Once I took an oath to the Kaiser as Supreme War Lord, once to the Weimar Constitution, and the third oath to the person of the
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Chief of State and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces- Hitler. In all three cases I took the oath to my people, my fatherland. That is a matter of course.
DR. SIEMERS: Admiral, when you were ordered to that meeting on 2 August, did you know before what it was to deal with?
RAEDER: Well, I would assume that his adjutant informed my adjutant that I was to come in connection with the taking of the oath. I could not speak with certainty now, but I assume so.
DR. SIEMERS: It was the morning after the death of Hindenburg?
RAEDER: Yes.
DR. SIEMERS: On the day after the death of Hindenburg?
RAEDER: Yes.
DR. SIEMERS: Did you know about the wording of the oath?
RAEDER: No, but the oath was written on a piece of paper and I assume that we were informed of the wording before, at the desk, there.
DR. SIEMERS: May I say at this time, Mr. President, that the wording is contained in the document that I have mentioned and represents a Reich law.
[Turning to the defendant.] The Prosecution asserts that on 30 January 1937 you became a Party member by virtue of the fact that you received the Golden Party Badge. Will you answer briefly to this point, which has been discussed previously in other cases?
RAEDER: When the Fuehrer gave me the Golden Party Badge he said, specifically, that this was the highest decoration which he could give at the time. I could not become a Party member at all because it had been stated that soldiers could not be members of the Party. That was generally known, and for this reason that assertion likewise is incomprehensible.
DR. SIEMERS: The membership of soldiers was prohibited by the Constitution?
RAEDER: Yes, prohibited. May I say one more thing to prevent any misunderstanding? It was prohibited both by the Weimar Constitution and the decrees which Hitler had issued.
DR. SIEMERS: Were you in opposition to the Party because of your staunch Christian and Church attitude, which was generally known? Briefly, how did it work out? Did you have any difficulties with the Party because of it?
RAEDER: In general I had no great difficulties with the Party, which I think is best explained by the fact that the Navy had
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considerable prestige in the Party, as it did in all Germany. I always had the higher officers, at least the chiefs of bases and fleet commanders, settle any friction which occurred in the lower echelons, through the proper authorities. If they were more important they were brought to my attention and I took care of them; if they dealt with matters of principle I passed them on to the OKW. Since I never let anything slip through, in case of incitement by the Party, the entire relations soon became very smooth and I could prevent all sorts of friction, so that before long they rarely occurred. In that respect we had the advantage in the Navy because there were no territorial matters to administer. We were concerned with the sea and only worked in the coastal cities where actually everything concerned the Navy. I did have difficulties because of Heydrich, whom I had removed from the Navy in 1928 or 1929 after a court of honor had sentenced him for unscrupulous treatment of a young girl. He was very resentful toward me for a long time and he tried on various occasions to denounce me to the leadership of the Party or to Bormann and even to the Fuehrer. However, I was always able to counteract these attacks so that they had no effect on my situation in general
This attitude of Heydrich communicated itself in some way to Himmler, so that here also, from time to time, I had to write a strongly worded letter; but it was precisely the strong wording of those letters which was of help in most cases.
I should not like to waste any time by mentioning various instances, such as the one with the SD; however, there were no direct attacks because of my position in regard to the Church. There was only the statement made by Goebbels, which I learned of through my Codefendant, Hans Fritzsche, that I was in disfavor with the Party on account of my attitude toward the Church; but, as I have said, I was not made to feel it in a disagreeable way.
DR. SIEMERS: I believe I do not need to ask you to waste any time in explaining the importance which you placed on religious matters in the Navy. I will submit an affidavit to this effect without reading it. It was made by Chief Navy Chaplain Ronneberger, whom you have known for many years and who described the situation and thus clarified everything. In that connection, however, may I put one question: Did you emphasize repeatedly to Hitler that a religious attitude was necessary for the soldiers and the Navy?
RAEDER: Yes, that happened frequently, and I kept to this course in the Navy until the end without hesitation.
DR. SIEMERS: In this connection, Mr. President, I might submit Exhibit Number Raeder-121 (Document Raeder-121). It is in my
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Document Book Raeder Number 6, Page 523. I should not like to take the time of the Tribunal by asking questions about the contrasting views between the Party and the Navy in matters of the Church. I believe that this document makes it sufficiently clear that a bond between Church and National Socialism was not possible. In this field Bormann is the most outstanding figure, and I should Like to read only the first paragraph of the expose which I have submitted:
"National Socialistic and Christian concepts are incompatible. Christian churches are built on the ignorance of man and are at pains to sustain the ignorance of as large a part of the population as possible, for only in this way can the Christian churches maintain their power. In contrast to this, National Socialism rests on scientific foundations."
In the second paragraph, the last sentence:
"If therefore in the future our young people do not learn anything more about Christianity, the teachings of which are far inferior to our own, then Christianity will disappear of itself."
And, on the second page at the end:
"Just as the harmful influence of astrologers, soothsayers, and other swindlers are eliminated and suppressed by the State, so the possibilities for the Church to exert its influence must also be entirely removed. Only when this has happened will the State leadership have full influence over the individual citizen. Only then will the existence of the people and the Reich be guaranteed for all time."
Since the religious and Christian attitude of the defendant is generally known, I believe this is enough to show the contrast between the Party and the defendant in these matters.
[Turning to the defendant.] Concerning the conspiracy, the Prosecution has also accused you of being a member of the Secret Cabinet Council and the Defense Council. Will you please answer quite briefly, because these questions have been discussed so often that I assume that no one in this Court wishes to hear anything further about these things. Were you a member of the Reich Government?
RAEDER: No.
DR. SIEMERS: According to Document 2098-PS, which is GB-206, Document Book 10, Page 39, a decree of the Fuehrer of 25 February 1938, you and the Commander-in-Chief of the Army were made equal in rank to the Reich Ministers. The Prosecution asserts that therefore you were a member of the Cabinet and were permitted to and did participate in the meetings. Is that correct?
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RAEDER: No. I was not a Reich Minister but only equivalent in rank. The reason for that was, I believe, that General Keitel was made equal in rank with the Reich Ministers because, in administering the affairs of the War Ministry, he was frequently in contact with them and had to be on the same level in order to negotiate with them. And since Brauchitsch and myself had seniority over General Keitel we also received the same rank. I was not a member of the Cabinet at all, but the decree states that on the order of the Fuehrer I could participate in a Cabinet meeting. It was probably intended that I was to come to the Cabinet when technical matters had to be explained. However, that never occurred, since after that time there were no Cabinet meetings.
DR. SIEMERS: May I point out that in Paragraph 2 of that decree by Hitler it states: "The commanders-in-chief... on my orders shall participate in the meetings of the Reich Cabinet."
RAEDER: Yes. And as far as the Secret Cabinet Council is concerned I need only confirm that, as Hitler told me himself the Secret Cabinet Council had only been formed in order to honor the retiring Foreign Minister, Von Neurath, in order to give the impression abroad and at home that Von Neurath would still be consulted on foreign policy in the future. However, that Secret Cabinet Council never met.
DR. SIEMERS: The Prosecution has made the charge that on 12 March 1939, on the day commemorating the heroes, you made a speech and that in that speech you came forth with a ruthless challenge to fight against Bolshevism and international Jewry.
May I state, if it please the Court, that unfortunately the speech was entered in the document book by the Prosecution only from an excerpt which was selected from a certain point of view; and I believe that it would be well to know the context of the entire speech. Of course, I shall not read it, but I should like to submit it as Exhibit Number Raeder-46. The sentence is in my Document Book Number 3, Page 235, the page from which the Prosecution took the quotation. Will you please briefly express your opinion of that.
RAEDER: May I in doing so read a few short sentences which will characterize the entire speech?
DR. SIEMERS: I have no doubt that the Tribunal will permit that. I only ask you to use only a few significant sentences, just as the Prosecution have done.
RAEDER: On Page 7, Line 6, it says. . .
DR. SIEMERS: Excuse me. That is on Page 235, the same page which contains the quotation of the Prosecution.
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RAEDER: Shortly before the quotation of the Prosecution we read on Line 6:
"He has given back self-confidence and confidence in their own ability to the German people, and thereby enabled them to retake, by their own strength, their sacred right refused to them during the time of their weakness and, beyond that, to approach the tremendous problems of the times with courage, and to solve them. Thus the German people and the Fuehrer have done more for the peace of Europe and the world than some of our neighbors are able to realize today." (Document Number Raeder-46)
Then we come to the sentence where I speak about the announcement of the fight against Bolshevism and international Jewry which has been quoted by the Prosecution. I should like to state briefly in connection with it that after the experiences of the years 1917 to 1919, communism and international Jewry had destroyed the resistance of the German people to a considerable degree and had gained an excessively large and oppressive influence in German affairs, in affairs of state as well as in economic affairs, as for example also in the legal field. Therefore, in my opinion, one could not be surprised that the National Socialist Government tried to loosen and, as far as possible, remove this large and oppressive influence. Although in pursuing this course the National Socialist Government took rather severe steps which led to the Nuremberg Laws-the exaggerations of which I regretted, of course-nevertheless, in the course of the speech which I made in public at the orders of the Reich Government, I could not find it compatible with my conscience to express my personal opinions, which were basically different. It must also be considered that such a speech had to fit into a general framework. That, however, was only one short sentence, whereas other points were considerably more in the foreground. In that connection I ask for permission to read two more short sentences:
"And this is the reason for the demand for equal rights and equal respect with all other nations which alone can guarantee that the nations will live peacefully together on this earth." Then the last sentence, on Page 235:
"Within the bounds of German national community the Fuehrer has assigned us our tasks as soldiers to protect our homeland and our peaceful national reconstruction and to train the young manhood, fit for military service, which was entrusted to us and which has to pass entirely through our hands."
The next sentence was quoted by the Prosecution, because there I spoke of the fact that we should not only train these young people
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technically in the sense of the technical use of arms but also educate them in the sense of National Socialist ideology and philosophy, and I stated that we had to march shoulder to shoulder with the Party.
I have always taken the view that the Armed Forces should not be a completely extraneous body in the State. It would be impossible to have a republican armed force in a monarchist state or an armed force with monarchist tendencies in a democratic state. Thus our Armed Forces would have to be incorporated into the National Socialist State to the extent necessary to create a real people's community, and it would be the task of the commanders of the Armed Forces to educate their branches of the forces in such a way that they would recognize and live up to the good national and socialist ideals of the National Socialist State. This would be done in the same way as I did it as Commander-in-Chief of the Navy. In this way it was possible to incorporate the Armed Forces in an orderly manner, to keep them from all exaggeration and excesses, and at the same time to form a people's community within the State.
And then on the bottom of Page 236:
"This nation needed a new, a true peace, the peace of justice and honor, peace without hatred. The world also needs peace. Because a weak Germany could not obtain peace, a strong one has won it for herself. It is the proud task of the German Wehrmacht, to secure this peace for the German nation against everybody."
And quite at the end of the document, the 11th or 12th line from the bottom of the page:
"But the soldier over there, whom we respect as the valiant representative of his country, may accept a soldier's word: What Germany needs and wants is peace. These are not just words but it has been proved by practical examples. The construction work of Germany requires many years of quiet development."
I think that this is sufficient...
DR. SIEMERS: I believe that is sufficient.
May I point out to the High Tribunal that in the English translation, on Page 236, as far as I remember, one sentence was underlined. That is: "The Wehrmacht and Party are one indivisible entity." The Prosecution has submitted that. Apart from that, nothing is underlined.
I wish to say in passing that in reality, in the original, many other passages are underlined, particularly those sentences which Admiral Raeder has just read which deal with peace.
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[Turning to the defendant.] Admiral, the Prosecution has accused you with having connections with all the political activities of National Socialism. Therefore I am compelled to ask you briefly concerning your participation in actions in those countries where participation by the Navy is certainly surprising.
In what way were you connected with the measures concerning the annexation of Austria?
RAEDER: The Navy had nothing to do with the Anschluss of Austria at all and did not take part in any way.
DR. SIEMERS: Did you make any preparations?
RAEDER: No. In the case of Austria, no preparations were needed. The case of Austria was mentioned in Document C-175, but that dealt only with the directive of 1 July 1937 for the unified preparation of the Armed Forces for war.
DR. SIEMERS: May I point out that C-175 is USA-69, in the Document Book of the British Delegation, 10a, Page 117.
[Turning to the defendant.] The Prosecution considers this document important and therefore I should like you to say a few words about it.
RAEDER: It deals with a statement, which, according to my knowledge, is made in every state for every year and in which, according to the political situation, such cases are mentioned which may arise in the course of the year and for which, of course, certain preparations have to be made. For the Navy, however, that document had no sequel as far as Austria was concerned.
DR. SIEMERS: So it is a document which numerous...
THE PRESIDENT: I am not sure that we have the reference to that right. It came through, I thought, C-157, USA-69, 10a, and then I did not get the page.
DR. SIEMERS: Page 117.
THE PRESIDENT: Is that C-157 or 175?
DR. SIEMERS: C-175.
[Turning to the defendant.] Does this concern strategic preparations for various eventualities?
RAEDER: Yes; various cases are mentioned here, for instance, the "Case Red" and the special "Case Extension Red-Green." All these had to be dealt with but they did not necessarily lead to any consequences.
DR. SIEMERS: Mr. President, in that connection I wanted to submit various documents, Raeder exhibits, from which it can be seen that the same type of preparations, since they are necessary for military and strategic reasons, were also undertaken by the
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Allies-only to show their necessity. At this moment I should like to forego that because I cannot determine so quickly which of these documents are admitted and which have been rejected. Perhaps I may therefore submit the connected documents at the end in order that no misunderstanding may occur now by my quoting the wrong figures.
[Turning to the defendant.] In what way did you and the Navy participate in measures concerning the Sudetenland?
RAEDER: In a directive...
DR. SIEMERS: I beg your pardon. May I ask you to look at the document of the Prosecution 388-PS. It is USA-126-no, excuse me-USA-26. It is in the Document Book of the British relegation, 10a, Page 147. It is a draft for the new directive "Gruen" of 20 May 1938.
RAEDER: Yes, I have the directive here. It is of 20 May 1938 and says with regard to the Navy:
"The Navy participates in the operations of the Army by employing the Danube flotilla. That flotilla is put under the command of the Commander-in-Chief of the Army. In regard to the conduct of naval warfare, at first only those measures are to be taken which appear to be necessary for the careful protection of the North Sea and the Baltic against a sudden intervention in the conflict by other states. Those measures must be confined to what is absolutely necessary, and must be carried out inconspicuously."
The entire course of action at the end of September and beginning of October made the special measures unnecessary, so the Danube flotilla which we had taken over from Austria was put under the command of the Army.
DR. SIEMERS: What was the size of the Danube flotilla?
RAEDER: It consisted of some small river craft, one small gunboat and minesweepers.
DR. SIEMERS: That is the total extent to which the Navy participated?
RAEDER: Yes, in which the Navy participated.
DR. SIEMERS: In what way did you and the Navy participate in the preparations for the occupation of what the document calls the "remainder of Czechoslovakia"?
This concerns Document C-136, USA-104 in the Document Book of the British Delegation, 10 a, Page 101. It is of 21 October 1938. The Prosecution points out that according to that you had already been informed in October that Czechoslovakia was to be occupied
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after some time, that is in March, as actually happened. Will you please tell us something about that?
RAEDER: That directive looks suspicious at first but the way in which it is drafted shows that this again refers to possible cases. Point 1 deals with the securing of the borders of the German Reich and protection against surprise air attacks.
Points 2 and 3 are "Liquidation of the remainder of Czechoslovakia," "Occupation of the Memel Country."
Number 2, "Liquidation of the remainder of Czechoslovakia": The first sentence. reads, "It must be possible to shatter the remainder of Czechoslovakia at any time if her policy should become hostile toward Germany."
That is the prerequisite in case of any action against Czechoslovakia; that did not mean that it was certain that any action would be taken.
In the same manner, under Number 3, mention is made of the occupation of the Memel country, where it says: "The political situation, particularly warlike complications between Poland and Lithuania, may make it necessary for the German Armed Forces to occupy the Memel country."
DR. SIEMERS: Excuse me. May I point out that, according to my document, the part which the witness has just read is missing in the English translation-so that you will not look for it unnecessarily.
[Turning to the defendant.] So here again this is a possible eventuality?
RAEDER: Yes.
DR. SIEMERS: On 3 September 1939, at the beginning of the war, the Athenia was sunk. From the military point of view that case has already been clarified by Herr Kranzbuehler, but I should like you as Commander-in-Chief of the Navy to state your position and give an explanation of the incident with special consideration of the fact that the Prosecution, especially in this case, has raised a very severe and insulting accusation. They have made the accusation that you, purposely and in violation of the truth, held England and Churchill responsible for the sinking of the Athenia, although you knew perfectly well that the Athenia had been sunk by a German U-boat. As proof, the Prosecution has submitted the article of 23 October 1939 from the Voelkischer Beobachter.
Mr. President, that is Document Number 3260-PS, GB-218. Document Book 10 of the British Delegation on Page 97.
[Turning to the defendant.] I would like you to explain that point.
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RAEDER: The fact is that on 3 September at dusk the young submarine commander of the submarine U-30 met an English passenger ship which had its lights dimmed and torpedoed it because he assumed, by mistake, that it was an auxiliary cruiser. In order to avoid misunderstanding I should like to state here that the deliberations of Kapitaenleutnant Fresdorf, which have been mentioned here concerning the torpedoing of dimmed ships in the Channel, did not yet play any part in the Naval Operations Staff at that time and that this commanding officer could not have known anything about these deliberations. He knew only that auxiliary criusers had their lights blacked out, and he assumed that this was an auxiliary cruiser at the entrance of the northwest channel, England-Scotland. He did not make a report since it was not necessary. The information that a German U-boat had torpedoed the Athenia was broadcast by the British radio, and we probably received the news during the night of the ad to the 4th, and transmitted it to the various news services.
In the morning of 4 September we received that news at the offices of the Naval Operations Staff, and I requested information as to how far our nearest submarine was from the place of the torpedoing. I was told, 75 nautical miles. At about the same time, State Secretary Von Weizsaecker in the Foreign Office, who had been a naval officer in the first World War, learned of this situation and made a telephone call to the Naval Operations Staff, asking whether it was true. He did not call me personally. He received the answer that, according to our information, it could not be right. Thereupon he sent for the American Charge d'Affaires -I believe Mr. Kirk-in order to speak to him about the matter because the radio broadcast had also mentioned that several Americans had been killed in that accident. From his experiences in the first World War it was clear to him how important it was that there should be no incident involving America. Therefore, he told him what he had heard from the Naval Operations Staff. I personally told the same thing to the American Naval Attache, Mr. Schrader, and that certainly in good faith. I believed that I could tell him that in good faith because we had no other information. State Secretary Von Weizsaecker then came to see me personally, if I remember correctly. We were very close friends, and he told me what he had told the American Charge d'Affaires. He apologized, I believe, for not having spoken to me personally and that concluded the case for the time being.
The matter was such that, if it had been reported in a normal way, we would not have hesitated to admit and to explain the reason. We would not have hesitated to apologize to the nations concerned. Disciplinary measures would have been taken against
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the officer. I also reported the incident to the Fuehrer himself in his headquarters and told him that we were convinced such was not the case, and the Fuehrer ordered that it should be denied. This was done by the Propaganda Ministry, which had been informed of the order by my press department.
The submarine returned on 27 September...
DR. SIEMERS: Excuse me if I interrupt. That date, Mr. President, is identified by Document D-659, which was submitted by the Prosecution, it is Exhibit GB-221 in Document Book 10 on Page 110.
RAEDER: The submarine commander returned on 27 September to Wilhelmshaven. Admiral Doenitz has already described how he received him and how he immediately sent him to me to Berlin by air.
The U-boat commander reported the entire incident to me and confirmed that it was a sheer mistake, that it was only through all these messages he had heard that he himself discovered that it was not an auxiliary cruiser that was concerned but a passenger steamer.
I reported the facts to the Fuehrer because they could have had severe political consequences. He decided that, as it had been denied once, we had to keep it utterly secret, not only abroad but also within official circles and government circles. Consequently, I was not in a position to tell State Secretary Von Weizsaecker or the Propaganda Ministry that the facts were different. My order to the Commander of the U-boat fleet reads:
"1. The affair is to be kept strictly secret upon orders of the Fuehrer.
"2. On my part, no court-martial will be ordered because the commanding officer acted in good faith and it was a mistake.
"3. The further political handling of the matter is to be attended to by the High Command of the Navy, as far as anything has to be done."
With that the commander returned to Wilhelmshaven and Admiral Doenitz has already reported that he was punished by disciplinary procedure. To our great surprise, about one month later that article appeared in the Voelkischer Beobachter in which Churchill was accused of being the author of that incident. I knew absolutely nothing about that article beforehand. I would certainly have prevented its appearance because, knowing that our submarine had torpedoed that ship, it was out of the question to lay the blame on the enemy, on the First Lord of the Admiralty of all people.
I found out later that the order to publish such an article was issued by Hitler and reached the Propaganda Ministry through the Reich Press Chief. As far as I remember I was told that the
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Propaganda Minister had himself drafted that article. Later I could not prevent it. I did not see the article nor did any of my officers of the High Command of the Navy see it. They would certainly have come to me at once so that I could have prevented its publication. We had no reason to expect such an article 4 weeks after the torpedoing of the Athenia. That is the case of the Athenia.
DR. SIEMERS: You just said that you had discovered that Hitler knew about the article. When did you discover this?
RAEDER: Here, from my Codefendant, Hans Fritzsche.
DR. SIEMERS: Not at that time then?
RAEDER: No, by no means.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will sit again at a quarter past two.
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DR. SIEMERS: In the meantime I have perused my documents and I am therefore in a position to carry out the original plan, that is, of submitting the documents during the examination.
In connection with the documents which we dealt with last, Document C-126, "Strategic Preparations," I should like to submit the following documents which are contained in the White Books, documents which have been granted me for my use and which also concern strategic preparations on the part of the Allies. We are dealing with Exhibit Number Raeder-33. It is the document dated 9 November 1939; and also Exhibit Number Raeder-34, General Gamelin to General Lelong, 13 November 1939; and also Exhibit Number Raeder-35, two extracts from the Diary of Jodl, 1809-PS, which concern the measures taken by the Luftwaffe regarding the Caucasus. It is not necessary for me to comment on this. I would just like to call your attention to the questions which I put to the witness Reich Marshal Goering on 18 March; he has already testified regarding the plans of the Allies for the destruction of the Caucasian oil fields. And finally in this connection, Exhibit Number Raeder-41, to be found in the Document Book 3, Page 205, and the following pages, a report of the Commander-in-Chief of the French Army, General Gamelin, dated 16 March 1940, it deals with the war plans for the year 1940 concerning the tightening of the blockade, the plans regarding the Scandinavian countries and, in addition, the plans for the destruction of the Russian oil wells in the Caucasus.
[Turning to the defendant]Admiral, before I deal with the separate campaigns of Greece, Norway, and so forth, I would like to ask you to answer a question which relates to you personally. What decorations did you receive from Hitler?
RAEDER: I received from Hitler in the autumn of 1939 in addition to the Golden Emblem, which I have already mentioned, the Knight's Order to the Iron Cross. Furthermore, in the year 1941 on the occasion of my 65th birthday I received a donation of 250,000 marks. This donation was given to me by Hitler through an adjutant and in connection with that he sent a document.
When I thanked him on the very first occasion, he told me that he was giving me this donation as a means of decoration in the same manner as the former rulers of Prussia had given their generals similar donations, whether as sums of money or as a country estate; then he emphasized that Field Marshals Von Hindenburg and Von Mackensen had received donations from him as well.
DR. SIEMERS: Now I shall turn to the passage "Greece." With regard to Greece, the Prosecution has quoted Document C-12, which
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is GB-226. This is to be found in Document Book Number 10, Page 1. This document deals with the decision on the part of Hitler which was transmitted through the OKW, dated 30 December 1939, signed by Jodl, and we read under Number 1.):
"Greek merchant ships in the area around England, declared by the United States to be a barred zone, are to be treated as enemy vessels."
This decision on the part of Hitler was made on the basis of a report by the SKL. What caused you to make this report even though Greece was neutral at the time?
RAEDER: At that time we had received a large number of intelligence reports from our intelligence service that Greek shipping companies apparently with the knowledge of the Greek Government were allowing Greek ships to be chartered by England under favorable conditions. Therefore, these Greek ships were in the service of England and thus were to be treated in the same way as we were treating the English merchantmen. These intelligence reports were confirmed later on to an even greater degree than had been the case in the beginning.
DR. SIEMERS: In this connection I would like to submit to the High Tribunal Exhibit Raeder-53, to be found in my Document Book 3, Page 258. This document deals with the War Diary kept by the SKL in the month of December 1939.
On Page 259, under the date of 19 December, the following entry is made:
"Greece has hired out about 20 vessels to ply between the United States, Le Havre and Liverpool."
This is confirmed by the reports just mentioned by the defendant. The next entry, on the same page under the date 30 December:
"Justified by the sales and chartering of numerous Greek ships to England it has been decreed, with the agreement of the Fuehrer, that Greek ships in the zone from 20 degrees West to 2 degrees East and from 44 degrees North to 62 degrees North shall be considered as hostile craft by U-boats. Attacks to be made invisibly as far as possible."
I also submit the following document, Number Raeder-54. This document is taken from the White Books. It is dated 23 January 1940, and it is a report from the German Embassy at the Hague to the Foreign Office. The heading is: "The Contemplated Chartering of 50 to 60 Greek Ships to the British Government." It is not necessary for me to read it. I should like merely to quote the beginning of the first sentence:
"After the British press brought reports at the end of November last year"-that is, 1939-"about the alleged charterings of Greek
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vessels to British companies"-and so forth-then follows the statement that these 50 to 60 ships are now chartered by British companies.
Even though it is not quite accurate historically, I would now like first of all to conclude the question of Greece. In historical sequence Norway should follow now first, but for the sake of coherence I should like to deal with Greece and the occupation of Greece first.
In the Document C-152, identical with C-167 or Exhibit GB-122, in the Document Book of the British Delegation Number 10, Page 23, the Prosecution has charged you with the Figure 9 of this lengthy document, specifically Figure 9.)B.)f.). It says there:
"The Commander-in-Chief of the Navy requests confirmation of the fact that the whole of Greece is to be occupied even in the case of a peaceful solution. The Fuehrer: Complete occupation is a stipulation for any settlement."
This document concerns your report to Hitler of 18 March 1941. What were the reasons for your making this proposal?
RAEDER: In the beginning I had but little knowledge of the political intentions of the Fuehrer as far as Greece was concerned, but I did know of his Directive Number 20, dated 13 December 1940.
DR. SIEMERS: I beg your pardon, I would like to mention for the assistance of the Court that we are dealing with Document 1541-PS, that is GB-117, Document Book of the British Delegation 10a, Page 270. This directive is dated 13 December 1940.
RAEDER: In this directive the Fuehrer, for the reasons given in Paragraph 1, said that his intention was, as set forth in Paragraph 2:
"b.) After the setting in of favorable weather, probably in March, to employ this group of forces to occupy the north coast of the Aegean by way of Bulgaria, and if necessary to occupy the entire Greek mainland ('Operation Marita'). The support of Bulgaria is to be expected."
The next time I heard about these things again was when I heard that the British had landed in southern Greece on 3 March. We learned that on about 5 or 6 March. For this reason I asked the Fuehrer that he occupy all of Greece in order to prevent the British from attacking us from the rear, by air, and from erecting air bases, all of which would hamper the conduct of our war not only in Greece but also in the eastern Mediterranean.
The fact was that when a political decision had been made by Hitler of his own accord and without having consulted anyone, I, as Chief of the Naval Operations Staff, always had to draw my strategic conclusions from this political decision and then had to
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make to him my proposals on naval and on other warfare as far as they concerned me.
Since in December he had already considered the possibility that all of Greece would have to be occupied, the case had now actually arisen for me to make this proposal to him for the reason I have already mentioned. When I said "all of Greece," that implied to me and the Naval Command the entire Greek coast, where the British forces might land.
DR. SIEMERS: Your proposal was made about 2 weeks after British troops had landed in Greece?
RAEDER: Yes.
DR. SIEMERS: In this same connection I would like to submit Exhibit Raeder-58, in my Document Book 3, Page 271. This is a document contained in the White Book, according to which on 4 January-I beg the Tribunal's pardon. Sir David is right. Document 58 has been rejected and I withdraw it.
In this connection I would like to submit Exhibit Number Raeder-59. It is to be found in Document Book 3, Page 273 and is an extract from the White Book. It is the minutes of the French War Committee of 26 April 1940. This document deals with the decision of the War Committee regarding Norway, the Caucasus, Romania, and Greece.
I also submit Exhibit Number Raeder-63, in Document Book 3, Page 285, which is an address by the British Secretary of State for India, Amery, dated 1 December 1940. This document also shows plans regarding Greece, a year and a quarter before the time just mentioned by the witness.
Now I shall turn to the topic of Norway.
[Turning to the defendant.] The British prosecutor, Major Elwyn Jones, considers the attack against Norway a special case in the series of aggressive wars waged by the Nazi conspirators. In this connection he pointed out that, in this case, Hitler did not think of this himself but rather was persuaded by you. Since his point is very important, I should like to ask you to describe this event exactly, and therefore I ask you first of all: When was the first conversation about this matter between you and Hitler?
RAEDER: The first conversation between Hitler and myself concerning the question of Norway was on 10 October 1939, and that was at my request. The reason for this was that we had received reports at various times during the last week of September through our intelligence service of the offices of Admiral Canaris that the British intended to occupy bases in Norway.
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I recall that after reports to this effect had reached me several times Admiral Canaris visited me himself on one occasion-something he did in very important cases only. And, in the presence of my chief of staff, he gave me a coherent explanation concerning the intelligence reports which had been received. In this connection air bases were constantly mentioned, as well as bases in the south of Norway. Stavanger was mentioned constantly with the airport Sola, and Trondheim was usually mentioned and occasionally Christiansand.
During the last days of September I had a telephone conversation with Admiral Carls who was the commander of Navy Group North and was therefore in charge of operations in the Skagerrak, the Kattegat and in the North Sea. This man had obviously received similar reports. He informed me that he had composed a private letter addressed to me, in which he dealt with the question of the danger of Norway's being occupied by British forces and in which he was in a general way dealing with the question as to what disadvantages such a step would have for us, and whether we should have to forestall such an attempt, and also what advantages or disadvantages the occupation of Norway-that is, of the Norwegian coast and the Norwegian bases-by our forces would have.
Up until that point I had not concerned myself with the Norwegian question at all, except for the fact I had received these reports. The arrival of this letter at the end of September or the beginning of October, it must have been about then, impelled me to show it to the Chief of Staff of the SKL and to instruct him to deal with all dispatch with the question of the occupation of Norwegian bases by England, and the other questions which Admiral Carls had dealt with, and to have the questions discussed in the SKL. The advantages and disadvantages of an expansion of the war towards the North had to be considered, not only of an expansion on our part but, above all, an expansion on the part of England; what value, what advantage would accrue to us if we acted first; what disadvantages would result if we had to defend the Norwegian coast?
The result of this was the questionnaire mentioned in C-122, GB-82, where the questions were asked: What places were to be used as bases; what the possibility of defense by us would be; whether these ports would have to be developed further; and also, what advantages would result so far as our U-boats were concerned?
These questions, as I have already stated, were put to Admiral Doenitz as well, but his answers arrived only after I had made the report on 10 October. I would like to say, by way of introduction, that it was entirely clear to me that if we undertook to occupy these bases we would violate neutrality. But I also knew of the agreement
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which existed between the German and Norwegian Governments of 2 September regarding neutrality, and I knew the concluding sentence, in this aide memoirs, which is Document TC-31, GB-79, dated 2 September 1939.
DR SIEMERS: I beg your pardon, but I should like to point out, Mr. President, that this document is found in the Document Book of the British Delegation 10a, at Page 330.
[Turning to the defendant.] You have that document before you?
RAEDER: Yes, I have it before me, and I would like to quote the concluding sentence.
DR. SIEMERS: It is the last document in the book, Your Honor, at Page 329.
RAEDER: [Continuing.] The last sentence:
"Should the attitude of the Royal Norwegian Government change so that any such breach of neutrality by a third party recurs, the Reich Government would then obviously be compelled to safeguard the interests of the Reich in such a way as would be forced upon the Reich Cabinet by the resulting situation."
Then, within the next few days, I asked the Chief of Staff of the SKL to submit to me the data which the SKL had prepared during the preceding days and I reported to Hitler on 10 October, because I considered this problem particularly important. It was entirely clear to me that the best possible solution for us would be that Norway should maintain a steadfast neutrality, and I expressed my opinion, as may be seen in Document C-21, GB-194.
This is an extract from the War Diary of the SKL.
DR. SIEMERS: It is in the Document Book of the British Delegation 10a, Page 6.
RAEDER: It says here, on Page 3 of the German version, the next but last paragraph, under the date of 13 January: "Situation discussion with the Chief of the SKL."
DR. SIEMERS: I beg your pardon, Mr. President. C-21 was not entirely translated by the Prosecution. This document may be found in my document book under Exhibit Number Raeder-69, and I should like to submit it herewith. It is in Document Book 3, Page 62.
THE PRESIDENT: Document Book 3 only goes to 64, is that not right? It must be Document Book 4.
DR. SIEMERS: There must be a mistake in the document book then. At first, due to an oversight, the table of contents was only completed as far as 64 by the Translation Section, but since that
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time it has been corrected and supplemented. It is in Document Book 4, Page 317. .
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, Page 317, at the top.
DR SIEMERS: [Turning to the defendant.] Please comment on this document.
RAEDER: In the next but last paragraph, it says:
"In complete agreement with this point of view, the Chief of the Naval Operations Staff is therefore also of the opinion that the most favorable solution would doubtless be the maintenance of the present situation which, if strictest neutrality is exercised by Norway, will permit the safe use of Norwegian territorial waters for the shipping vital to Germany's war effort without the attempt being made on the part of England to seriously endanger this sea lane." (Document Number Raeder-69)
I maintained this point of view when reporting to Hitler. In that report I first mentioned the intelligence reports which we had at hand. Then I described the dangers which might result to us from a British occupation of bases on the Norwegian coast and might affect our entire warfare, dangers which I considered tremendous. I had the feeling that such an occupation would gravely prejudice and imperil the whole conduct of our war.
If the British occupied bases in Norway, especially in the South of Norway, they would be able to dominate the entrance to the Baltic Sea from those points, and also flank our naval operations from the Helgoland Bight and from the Elbe, Jade and Weser. The second outlet which we had was also gravely imperiled, affecting the operations of battleships as well as the courses of our merchantmen.
In addition to that, from their air bases in Norway, they might endanger our air operations, the operations of our pilots for reconnaissance in the North Sea or for attacks against England.
Furthermore, from Norway they could exert strong pressure on Sweden, and that pressure would have been felt in this respect, that the supplies of ore from Sweden would have been hindered or stopped by purely political pressure. Finally, the export of ore from Narvik to Germany could have been stopped entirely, and it is known how much Germany depended on supplies of ore from Sweden and Norway. They might even have gone so far-and we learned about this subsequently that such plans were discussed' as to attack and destroy the ore deposits at Lulea, or to seize them.
All of these dangers might become decisive factors in the outcome of the war. Aside from the fact that I told Hitler that the best thing for us would be to have strict neutrality on the part of Norway, I also called his attention to the dangers which would
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result to us from an occupation of the Norwegian coast and Norwegian bases, for there would have been lively naval operations near the Norwegian coast in which the British, even after our occupation of bases, would try to hamper our ore traffic from Narvik. A struggle might ensue which we, with our inadequate supply of surface vessels, would be unable to cope with in the long run.
Therefore, at that time I did not make any proposal that we should occupy Norway or that we should obtain bases in Norway. I only did my duty in telling the Supreme Commander of the Wehrmacht about this grave danger which was threatening us, and against which we might have to use emergency measures for our defense. I also pointed out to him that possible operations for the occupation of Norwegian bases might be very expensive for us. In the course of later discussions I told him that we might even lose our entire fleet. I would consider it a favorable case if we were to lose only one-third, something which actually did happen later on.
There was, therefore, no reason for me to expect that I would gain prestige by such an enterprise-I have been accused of this ambition by the Prosecution. As a matter of fact, the exact opposite might easily result.
DR. SIEMERS: I should like to call the attention of the Tribunal to the fact that these things may be seen in documents which date from the time of the war, one of which is Exhibit Number Raeder-69, of 13 January 1940, which has just been handed over. This document is a study, and it is claimed that this study is based on the consideration that if England were to have the bases in Norway, the situation would be impossible for the conduct of the war by Germany and such a situation could be prevented only if we forestalled England by occupying Norway ourselves. What the witness has just said is stated in exactly the same way in the War Diary.
In the same connection, I should like to refer to the document of the Prosecution, Document C-66, GB-81, which may be found in British Document Book 10a, Page 35. This document is dated 10 January 1944. May I ask the Tribunal to take judicial notice of the fact that there, under the code name "Weseruebung" (Weser Maneuver)-that was the name covering this action-the substance of the statements the witness has just made is to be found. I do not wish to read all of them since we would lose valuable time thereby.
THE PRESIDENT: You mean C-66? That is about the Plan Barbarossa. Is that the one you mean?
DR. SIEMERS: The last page, under the heading "Weseruebung;" Page 39 of the English document book. Mention is made there of the letter by Admiral Carls, spoken of by the witness, and of his
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thoughts in connection with this matter. In the German original there is the heading, "Appendix 2."
A clearer version is found in Document Raeder-69, since that dates from January 1940, 3 months later, and in the meantime new reports had come in. This, on the other hand, is a description dating from October 1939.
[Turning to the defendant.] Admiral, I must once more refer to Document C-122, which you have already mentioned.
The Prosecution, in that document, accuses you of saying:
"The Chief of SKL deems it necessary to tell the Fuehrer as soon as possible of the ideas of the SKL on the possibility of expanding the sphere of operations in the North."
They think they may conclude therefrom that your primary thought was to expand the operational sphere of the Navy.
RAEDER: I have already said that by the possibility of expansion of the operational zone to the North I meant an expansion of British operations and its consequences, and also the possibility of our forestalling this, thus gaining bases which would be of certain importance to us.
DR. SIEMERS: What did Hitler reply at this discussion on 10 October 1939?
RAEDER: Hitler had not yet concerned himself with this question. The question was very far from his mind, for he knew very little about matters of naval warfare. He always remarked that he did not have an over-all picture of these things, and therefore felt somewhat uncertain. He said that he would deal with this question and that I should leave the notes with him, which I had worked out on the basis of statements made by the SKL, so that he might use them as a basis for his deliberations on this problem.
It was typical and really speaks very much against the character of the conspiracy, that on this occasion Hitler, when confronted with the problem of Norway, did not say a single word about the fact that previously, the last time evidently in the summer of that year, he had already dealt with Norwegian questions prompted by Rosenberg. I gather from a document which I saw for the first time here that on 20 June 1939, Rosenberg had submitted to the Fuehrer a comprehensive report about his connections with Norwegian political circles, but I heard of these connections for the first time on 1I December.
It would have been a matter of course for me if the Fuehrer, who was dealing with Norwegian strategical matters, had told me on this occasion: "I have such and such information about Norwegian matters." But he did not do that-there was always a considerable lack of collaboration. The Fuehrer told me that we should await the
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arrival of further reports and that he would deal with these questions.
DR. SIEMERS: In the subsequent period of October and November, up until 11 December, did you discuss this question with Hitler again?
RAEDER: No, the question was not discussed at all during those months, but in September Korvettenkapitaen Schreiber, who had first been appointed assistant attache in Oslo and later, naval attache, gave me further reports at that time about conditions in Norway, and so did the intelligence service. He told me of reports which were circulating there about a possible British landing. Later on Kapitaen Schreiber was actually my chief collaborator in these Norwegian problems, and he showed a particular understanding of the whole situation.
DR. SIEMERS: In this connection, I should like to submit to the Tribunal Exhibit Raeder-107, an affidavit of the naval attache who has just been mentioned, Richard Schreiber. This may be found in my Document Book 5, Page 464.
According to that document, Schreiber was drafted on 7 September 1939 as a reserve officer and was sent to Oslo as a naval attache. He states that he held that post there since the autumn of 1939.
With the permission of the Tribunal, I should like to read a portion of this, under I, on Page 465, at the bottom.
THE PRESIDENT: We told you that we had read all these documents which were objected to. We let in this document, so it is not necessary for you to read it again.
DR. SIEMERS: Very well. Then in this connection, may I refer to the first part of this affidavit, Part I?
Mr. President, I should like to point out a small but misleading error in translation on Page 466. In the second paragraph, second line, the word "deutsch," (German) is missing: ". . . there were clear directives of the German Foreign Office that Norwegian neutrality should be particularly respected by the Germans. .." In the English text it says: "of the Foreign Office." It should read "of the German Foreign Office." I should be very grateful if this mistake would be rectified.
[Turning to the defendant.] Admiral, you know the affidavit given by Schreiber?
RAEDER: Yes.
DR. SIEMERS: Different reports are contained therein. You have already referred to them in part. Did any additional special reports come in during those 2 months? Was Narvik mentioned in addition to the other ports already mentioned?
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RAEDER: As far as I remember it was Kapitaen Schreiber who expressly mentioned Narvik for the first time. Kapitaen Schreiber had very quickly made himself acquainted with conditions there. He had established good connections in Norwegian circles. A confirmation of all that I had known up to that point came on 11 December.
DR. SIEMERS: Now, would you please describe your meeting with Quisling on 11 December 1939?
RAEDER: May I first ask whether the Documents 004-PS and 007-PS, which I believe were submitted by the Prosecution, may be used in this connection? For example, the minutes of the conference of 11 and 12 December, an accompanying letter by Rosenberg referring to these minutes, and similar matters?
DR. SIEMERS: Admiral, I believe that you will be permitted to use these documents. But since they are known you only need to mention the points that you remember.
RAEDER: Yes.
DR. SIEMERS: On this occasion I should merely like to ask whether you did not know the documents by Rosenberg, 004-PS and 007-PS?
RAEDER: No, I did not know those documents.
DR. SIEMERS: Did you see them for the first time here?
RAEDER: I saw them for the first time here. But the reports contained in these documents were already known to us at that time as is proved by the dates of the documents.
DR. SIEMERS: Please tell us only what you heard at that time from Quisling.
RAEDER: Up until 11 December I had neither connections with Herr Rosenberg-except for the fact that I had seen him on occasion -nor, above all, did I have any connections with Quisling about whom I had heard nothing up to that time.
On 11 December my Chief of Staff, Schulte-Moenting, reported to me that Major Quisling, a former Norwegian Minister of War, had arrived from Oslo. He was asking for an interview with me through a Herr Hagelin, because he wished to tell me about Norwegian conditions.
Herr Hagelin had been sent to my chief of staff by Herr Rosenberg. Rosenberg had already known Hagelin for some time as I have mentioned before. Since reports from such a source on Norwegian conditions seemed to be of great value to me, I declared myself ready to receive Herr Quisling.
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He arrived on the same morning and reported to me at length about the conditions in Norway, with special reference to the relations of the Norwegian Government to England and the reports on the intention of England to land in Norway, and he characterized the whole situation as especially critical for, according to his reports, the danger seemed to be imminent. He tried to fix a date. He thought it should occur before 10 January, because then a favorable political situation would arise.
I told him that I was not really concerned with the political situation, but I would try to arrange to have him give his information to the Fuehrer. I would be concerned only with the military and strategic situation, and in that connection I could tell him right away that it would not be possible to take any measures from 11 December until 10 January, first because the time was too short and secondly because it was winter.
I considered his expositions to be of such importance that I told him I would try to arrange for him to report to the Fuehrer personally, so that these reports would reach and influence him directly.
Then on the 12th-that is on the next day-I went to Hitler and informed him of the conversation between Quisling and me, and I asked him to receive Quisling personally so that he might have a personal impression of Quisling. On this occasion I told him-and this is written down in one of the documents-that in cases of this kind one would have to be especially cautious, since one could not know to what degree such a party leader would try to further the interest of his party. Therefore our investigations would have to be especially careful. And I again called the attention of the Fuehrer to the fact that an attempt to occupy Norway would bring with it greatest risks as well as certain disadvantages for the future situation. In other words, I carefully presented both sides of the picture in a neutral manner.
Hitler then decided to receive Quisling together with Hagelin on one of the following days. The two gentlemen then were obviously in touch with Rosenberg. I believe they stayed with him, and Rosenberg sent me, by letter, a record of a meeting which had apparently been drawn up by Quisling and Hagelin and also a description of Quisling's personality.
In this letter, which is here as a document but which was not read by the Prosecution, it says specifically that Rosenberg knew what the political conditions were but that, of course, he would have to leave the military side entirely to me since I was the competent authority on that.
DR. SIEMERS: If it please the High Tribunal, in this connection I would like to submit Exhibit Raeder-67, to be found in my Document Book 4, Page 309. That is the letter from Rosenberg to Raeder
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dated 13 December 1939, which was not mentioned by the Prosecution. The Prosecution merely mentioned the appendix mentioned in the letter-that is, a note by Rosenberg, under Number C-65, the same as GB-85. According to its contents C-65 belongs to Exhibit Raeder-67.
THE PRESIDENT: You say there was another besides Raeder-67 which you were referring to?
DR. SIEMERS: Yes; I am referring to Raeder-67.
THE PRESIDENT: I got that. But you said some other document as well.
DR. SIEMERS: Yes, the document submitted by the Prosecution, C-65, and that is an appendix to this letter; the two belong together. The latter document, C-65, is to be found in the Document Book of the British Delegation 10a, Page 33. If these two documents are taken together, it can be seen that the political side is not mentioned in either document; and this explains what the witness meant when he said that he was not concerned with the political side of the question but only with the military side. It is for that reason that Rosenberg had sent it to him.
THE PRESIDENT: I think it would be a good time to break off.
[A recess was taken.]
MR. DODD: Mr. President, with respect to the case of the Defendant Seyss-Inquart, counsel and representatives of the Prosecution have been conferring with respect to his application for documents. We have agreed on a great number, but there are 20 upon which we are unable to agree.
THE PRESIDENT: 20?
MR. DODD: 20. I think we could do it in 30 minutes if the Tribunal will set some time aside; it might take a little more. Sir David has reminded me that the translators are waiting on us to go ahead with their translation work.
THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Dodd, I think the best thing would be to take it tomorrow morning at 10 o'clock.
MR. DODD: Very well, Mr. President. It has been suggested also that the case of Seyss-Inquart precede that of Defendant Von Papen. I understand that is the wish of the counsel, and it is very satisfactory to us as well.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well.
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DR. SIEMERS: We have to refer briefly to Document 1809-PS, the Diary of Generaloberst Jodl. It is GB-88 in the Document Book of the British Delegation 10a, Page 289.
May I first ask when were the plans for the occupation of Norway drafted?
RAEDER: I may say that on the basis of the conference which Quisling had with the Fuehrer in my presence- on 14 December the Fuehrer ordered the OKW to deal with the matter and study it. The Fuehrer had two more conferences with Quisling on 16 and 18 December at which I was not present. The matter was then handled by the OKW according to the directives and an initial plan known as "North" was drafted. Document C-21, which I have mentioned before, shows that this Plan North was received by SKL on 13 January and then, in the course of January, the date 27 January was mentioned, the draft of a directive for the Plan North was made. That draft was made in the OKW in the usual way. Kapitaen zur See Krancke as expert for the Navy took part in it. The directive was completed on 1 March 1940, and was issued to the three branches of the Armed Forces. In the meantime, a large number of reports had been received, and it was possible to use these as a basis for the drafting of the directive. These reports besides coming from Kapitaen Schreiber now also came direct from Quisling, who sent them to the Fuehrer. They mentioned the preparatory work carried out by the English and the French-special mention was made of the Navy Attache Kermarrec-in Norwegian ports for finding out the possibilities of landing, measurements of quays, and the height of the bridges between Narvik and the Swedish border and similar things.
These reports which reached us showed clearly that within a reasonable time a landing was intended. Also political reports reached us which Hagelin received through his connections in Norwegian circles, reports which in part came directly from members of the Storting-and from members of the Government and their entourage.
All of these reports confirmed that the pretext of aid for Finland in the dispute between Finland and Russia played a certain role. The danger was discussed that England under pretext of aid for Finland would proceed to a bloodless occupation of Norway. The directive for the case Norway, therefore, was issued on 1 March. In the further course of the month of March more reports were received. In the meantime, the Altmark incident had occurred, and it was observed by Hagelin too that the behavior of the Norwegian commander was a pretense, and it was clear that in the case of any encroachment on the part of Great Britain, the Norwegian Government would protest only on paper.
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DR. SIEMERS: You said just now the directive is dated 1 March. This is correct. The Prosecution submitted a quotation of 5 March from Document 1809-PS. That is an entry in Jodl's Diary: "1500 hours big conference with the three commanders-in-chief regarding Weseruebung. Field Marshal, having no knowledge about plans, is furious." How is it possible, Admiral, that Reich Marshal Goering had not been consulted at a time when the directive was already issued?
RAEDER: I cannot explain that at all. I had no authority to speak about it and I cannot say why he was not consulted.
DR. SIEMERS: It is in the nature of conspiracy that the second man in the Reich would be informed about it from the beginning. Has he not ever spoken to you about that matter?
RAEDER: No, not that I remember, but that shows how little, especially in the Fuehrer's entourage, one can speak of a conspiracy. The Foreign Minister, Von Ribbentrop, also was not present during any of the Quisling conferences or receptions and I had no authority to speak to him about these matters.
DR. SIEMERS: Then I should like to know your position regarding Jodl's entry of 13 March, in which he stated: "Fuehrer does not give the order for 'W' (Weseruebung). He is still trying to find a justification."
I ask you to explain these words to us as you understand them.
RAEDER: Yes. The English translation as far as I can remember says "Looking for an excuse." But he needed neither justification nor excuse, because in the first paragraph of the directive of 1 March -that is to say, 2 weeks before that-he had stated what circumstances made it necessary to occupy Norway and Denmark with certain forces of the Wehrmacht. British encroachments in Scandinavia and the Baltic were to be prevented thereby, our ore deposits in Sweden safeguarded, and the bases against England for the Navy and the Air Force were to be expanded.
DR. SIEMERS: Mr. President, may I point out that is the Document C-174; that is, GB-89, Document Book of the British Delegation 10a, Page 113. That is the directive for case "Weseruebung" of 1 March 1940, which as the witness has mentioned, already contains the justification for it.
May it please the Tribunal, to prove that the information received by the witness through the intelligence service of Admiral Canaris, through Kapitaen Schreiber and so on, is objective and in agreement with facts, may I be permitted to submit several documents-and that Exhibit Number Raeder-75 from the White Book dated 17 February 1940, which mentions the landing of British troops
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in Bergen, Trondheim and Narvik, and several appendices to it, which show the trends of thoughts at that time in regard to the Swedish ore; Document Exhibit Raeder-77...
THE PRESIDENT: This is 75, Pages 43 and 44?
DR. SIEMERS: I beg your pardon. Not page, but Exhibit Raeder-75. It is Page 340. Document Book 4.
Then Exhibit Number Raeder-77, also from the White Book: "The French Premier and Minister for Foreign Affairs Daladier to the French Ambassador in London, Corbin."
In Document Book 4, Page 352. I have seen that there is a mistake in the English document book. On Page 353 the heading is missing or rather on Page 354. I may point out that this document bears the date 21 February 1940. That is contained in the original document under the heading "Intervention in Scandinavia." It concerns the occupation of the most important Norwegian ports, et cetera, and mentions again the question of the Swedish ore.
Then I come to the Document Exhibit Raeder-78; Document Book 4, Page 357, an excerpt from the War Diary of the Naval Operations Staff of 4 March in which in connection with the case of the Altmark it is explained that a defense by Norway against British military action is not possible.
Then Exhibit Raeder-79, Document Book 4, Page 359, note by the Commander-in-Chief of the French Army, General Gamelin. Here also there is a mistake in the translation. The heading of the document was omitted on Page 360. I would be grateful if the Tribunal would note that the original document bears the date 10 March 1940. It is top secret and is based on the fact that the general plan for armed intervention in Finland existed since 16 January and therefore as a precautionary measure the ports and airfields on the Norwegian coast should be occupied. I refer to the remaining contents of document.
Then may I submit Exhibit Number Raeder-80, a report about negotiations of the Scandinavian Commission of the Inter-Allied Military Study Commission of 11 March 1940, top secret, concerning landing at Narvik.
[Turning to the defendant] Then, Admiral, we are finished with Norway. I believe you said already that the reports increased considerably in the month of March. When did Hitler give the final order for the occupation?
RAEDER: At the end of March or beginning of April. I cannot recall the exact date.
DR. SIEMERS: I believe that is sufficient.
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RAEDER: May I also mention a particularly important report which I remember now. Quisling reported in February that Lord Halifax had told the Norwegian Ambassador in London that an operation on the part of the British for the acquisition of bases in Norway was planned for the near future. That report also reached us at that time. I should like to add, as I emphasized before, that being fully conscious of my responsibility I always tried to show the Fuehrer both sides of the picture and that the Fuehrer would have to be guided by my documentary proof when deciding, to take or refrain from taking that tremendous step. But that does not mean to say that because I pointed out to my Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces that particular danger, I in any way decline to accept responsibility. Of course, I am in some measure responsible for the whole thing. Moreover, I have been accused because in a letter submitted here under C-155 I had told my officers' corps that I was proud of the way in which this extraordinarily dangerous enterprise had been executed. I should like to confirm this, because I believe I was entitled to be proud that the Navy had carried out that operation with such limited means and in the face of the entire British fleet; I still stick to that.
DR. SIEMERS: Did reports reach the SKI, in March about violations of the neutrality of Norway? That is incidents in territorial waters?
RAEDER: Yes. In the second half of March repeated attacks were made by British planes and naval forces against our merchant ships bringing the Swedish ore down from Narvik.
DR. SIEMERS: Mr. President, in that connection may I submit some more documents? Exhibit Raeder-81, Document Book 5, Page 372, War Diary of the Naval Operations Staff which contains several entries showing that towards the end these incidents became more and more frequent and that the Norwegian neutrality was violated by British air and naval forces. As that document is known there is no need to read anything from it.
Then Exhibit Raeder-82 in Document Book 5, Page 377, also War Diary of 27 March, also concerning violations of neutrality. Furthermore, Exhibit Raeder-83, Page 379, a draft resolution of the sixth session of the Supreme Council, dated 28 March 1940, which was already mentioned yesterday. It deals with vital interests from the standpoint of international law and with the laying of mines in territorial waters on 5 April.
Then Exhibit Raeder-84, Page 384, and Exhibit Raeder-85, Page 386, both of which are documents from the White Book. May I only point out that it mentions that the first transport is to leave on J.1. day, that is actually on 5 April; in other words, 4 days before the occupation by Germany.
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Exhibit Raeder-86 is an excerpt from the War Diary, of which I ask you to take official notice and which concerns the chartering by England of 90 percent of the Norwegian tankers.
To conclude Norway, may I ask you to look at two Documents, C-151 and C-115. Those are Exhibits GB-91 and GB-90, respectively, Document Book of the British Delegation 10a, on Pages 106 and 62. The dates are 30 March 1940 and 4 April 1940. The documents show that the ships which were to carry out the landing should carry the British flag for camouflage reasons. The Prosecution uses that document also to support its accusation.
[Turning to the defendant.] What do you say about it?
RAEDER: That is quite a regular ruse of war, that warships carry a foreign flag. A requisite for the legality of that act, however, is that at the moment of an enemy action, the moment fire is opened, their own flag must be hoisted in time. That has always been done in the German Navy, especially in the case of our auxiliary cruisers, which frequently sailed under a foreign flag in order to avoid being reported by merchant ships, but which always lowered that flag in time. That is a matter of honor. It must be added that in this case, as the War Diary shows. ..
DR. SIEMERS: 8 April.
RAEDER: ...that on 8 April, on account of certain considerations, we rescinded that order, because we had the report that an English action was underway, and we feared that complications would arise from that. So this order was not carried out in the long run. I believe the document can be found which contains that.
DR. SIEMERS: Mr. President, I submit, in this connection, Exhibit Number Raeder-89 (Document Raeder-89), Document Book 5, Page 400, where we find under 8 April: "The previous order is rescinded, the British flag is not to be used."
RAEDER: You also asked about Document C-115, which says that the blockade runners camouflaged as merchant ships with dimmed lights should enter Oslo Fjord unobtrusively. This too is quite a regular ruse of war against which, from the legal point of view, no objection can be made. Likewise there is nothing to be said against English names given in answer to signals of identity.
I did not finish answering one question because I was interrupted. That was the question concerning the expression "justification" or "excuse" in the War Diary of Generaloberst Jodl. As I have shown, it was not a question of the justification, which had been expressed a long time before by Hitler, but I believe that I am right in saying that the question was that the diplomatic note which, at the moment of the execution of the enterprise, had to be presented to the Norwegian and Danish governments, giving the
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reason for his action, had not yet been drafted, especially as he had not yet spoken to the Foreign Minister at that time at all. The Foreign Minister received the information, as he has said himself, only on 3 April.
DR. SIEMERS: With this I should like to conclude the question of the occupation of Norway. May I still submit the approved document, Exhibit Raeder-66, which was approved for the purpose of argument? It is an opinion expressed by Dr. Mosler, and it can be found in Document Book 4, Page 291; and in this connection, concerning the use of flags, may I draw special attention to Figure 7, Page 304, from which we may see the legal reasoning. Furthermore, may I submit Exhibit Raeder-90, Document Book 5, Page 402, and the series of documents as far as they are approved: Exhibit Raeder-91, Admiral Darlan to the French War Minister Daladier on 12 April 1940; Exhibit Raeder-92, Page 412. This document contains the English-French note to the Norwegian Government of 8 April 1940. I have submitted that document because this note expresses the same legal points of view as expressed in the legal opinion of Dr. Mosler.
Exhibit Number Raeder-97 and Exhibit Number Raeder-98: Number 97 concerns the White Book and the planning of 7 February 1940, concerning the Allied bases in Norway; and Number 98 is an excerpt from the War Diary concerning the orders which, at the time of the occupation of Norway, were found and from which it could be seen that an English landing was imminent and the so-called plan under the camouflage name "Stratford Plan," which was prepared by the British Admiralty.
[Turning to the defendant.] Concerning Norway, may I ask you the following: During and after the occupation did you intervene to see that the Norwegian population was treated decently, and what was your view of the political question in Norway with regard to the attitude of Germany to Norway?
RAEDER: From the very beginning I was for good treatment of the Norwegian population. I knew that Hitler had given Gauleiter Terboven, whom he had unfortunately appointed Reich Commissioner for Norway and to whom he had entrusted the civil administration, instructions that he, Terboven, should bring the Norwegian people to him; that is to say, make them favorably disposed, and that he had the intention, finally, to maintain Norway as a sovereign state in a North Germanic Empire.
Terboven was opposed to that. He treated the Norwegian population in a very unfriendly manner, and by his treatment he actually sabotaged the aims of Hitler. In close understanding with Admiral Boehm, who became the naval commander in Norway and
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who had taken Kapitaen Schreiber, the former attache, on his staff as liaison officer to the Norwegian population, I tried to counteract these intentions of Terboven. On the basis of the reports of Admiral Boehm I repeatedly approached the Fuehrer and told him that with Terboven he would never achieve his purpose. The Fuehrer designated Quisling chief of the Government. I cannot remember exactly when he became Minister President, but Terboven also sabotaged Quisling in his activities by making it extremely difficult for him, and even discredited him among the population. Terboven's chief reason was, in my opinion, that he wanted to remain Gauleiter of Norway. All our endeavors were unsuccessful, in spite of the fact that Admiral Boehm tried very hard to achieve with the help of the Navy what Hitler had expected, that is, to win over the Norwegian people.
I did not understand how on the one side one wanted to gain the sympathy of the Norwegians and on the other hand one sabotaged Hitler's intentions.
That went on until 1942, at which time Boehm made a final report to me, in which he explained that things could not go on like that, and that Hitler's intentions would never be realized. I submitted that report to Hitler, but since it did not bring about any change- it was in the late autumn of 1942-this failure of mine became one of the reasons which finally led to my retirement.
DR. SIEMERS: Did you ask Hitler specifically to dismiss Terboven?
RAEDER: Several times. And I suggested that he should appoint General Admiral Boehm as commander of the armed forces for Norway and give him far-reaching powers so that he could carry out his-Hitler's-aims. I suggested that the Fuehrer should as soon as possible conclude a peace with Norway because only in that way could he bring about co-operation between Norway and Germany and make the population turn to him. I told him the attempts of sabotage by the Norwegian emigrants would lose their meaning and cease and that possibly the Norwegian emigrants who were leaning toward England at that time could be induced to return, because they might be afraid that they might "miss the bus"; especially from the point of view of economic advantages. The task of defending Norway would be considerably easier if a state of peace could be brought about.
DR. SIEMERS: In conclusion, may I refer to Exhibit Raeder-107 which is already known to the Tribunal. It is the affidavit by Schreiber under Roman Numeral II. There Schreiber has mentioned in detail the utmost endeavors of the Navy to prevent the regrettable terror regime of Terboven and explained that Raeder, for the last
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time in 1942, used all his efforts to get Hitler to conclude a peace between Norway and Germany. I believe that the Navy had a good reputation in Norway, that I can assume this is historically known without my having to prove it. To be on the safe side I applied for a witness, but consent was not given.
May I also submit Exhibit Raeder-108 (Document Raeder-108), Document Book 6, Page 473, a letter from Raeder to Admiral Boehm of 23 October 1942. Raeder writes:
"To my regret I have to send you enclosed, for your personal information, a letter from Reich Minister Dr. Lammers to Prime Minister Quisling."
On Page 476 there is the letter from Lammers to Quisling which says-I quote only one sentence:
"The Fuehrer, therefore, desires that during the war there shall be no conferences or discussions concerning a final or a preliminary peace between the Greater German Reich and Norway, or concerning other measures fixing or anticipating Norway's position to the Reich after the end of the war."
This is the letter which the witness mentioned, which finally brought to nought all his endeavors and those of Admiral Boehm.
Admiral, you had little to do with France, and therefore we can be very brief. May I merely ask you, did you attempt at any time to influence the political relations between Germany and France?
RAEDER: This influence, when there was any, was in the first place directed as much as possible towards improving the defense of the country. In the second place, there were above all humanitarian reasons. I often visited naval and submarine bases in France. During these journeys I got some knowledge of conditions in France. I saw that in 1940 and still in 1941 the population lived just as if it were at peace, completely undisturbed. Consequently I believed, since the Fuehrer had shown so much moderation on the occasion of the Armistice, that a basis could be found which would draw France- whose government was after all collaborationist-closer to us.
I was informed that Laval was really sincere in his opinion that only co-operation between France and Germany could guarantee a lasting peace in Europe for the future. Therefore I suggested to him whether he himself could not try to do something in that direction. He did not intend to do this, and I referred to it again when I heard that Admiral Darlan was trying to work more closely with our naval commander in France, Admiral Schultze. That was first achieved in the field of intelligence, where his services were very useful to us.
At the end of the year 1941 he mentioned that he would like to speak to me. Admiral Schultze reported that to me and I told Hitler
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about it and recommended such a conversation because I thought it would do some good.
DR. SIEMERS: It would do what?
RAEDER: That it might bring some advantage. The Fuehrer approved this meeting and instructed me as to his views. The meeting took place near Paris on the occasion of an official trip which I made to the French bases at the end of January or beginning of February 1942. I had the impression that the meeting was very satisfactory, inasmuch as Darlan was of the opinion that a peace would be of advantage to both nations and he also appeared to be inclined to co-operate. He stressed, however, that the whole political situation would have to be settled before peace could be concluded. I also showed that I was prepared to meet him concerning the negotiations with the Armistice Commission with respect to heavy guns for big French ships. I reported to the Fuehrer on the results of the meeting. But in this case too the Fuehrer was again hesitant and did not want to make a decision. He said he had to see first how the war went before he could decide upon his final attitude toward France. Besides, that would be a precedent which might have an effect on other nations. So that also was a failure. I did not obtain the relief in the defense of France which I had hoped for and so, in the case of France, this failure was the second reason which contributed later to my asking for my release, because I could not carry my plans through.
DR. SIEMERS: Now I come to the next subject where accusations are made against you, and that is Russia. When did you hear for the first time that Hitler intended to wage war against Russia, although he had concluded a Nonaggression Pact with Russia?
RAEDER: May I first remind you that in the summer of 1940, that is to say, July, August, and September, we in the Navy were very much occupied with preparations for a landing in England; therefore it never entered our heads that there could be any plans for action in another direction. In August I heard from some Army office, possibly that of the Commander-in-Chief, that considerable troop transports were going to the East. I asked Hitler what that meant and he told me it was a grandiose camouflage for his intentions to invade England. He knew that I would be against it right away if he were to speak about an enterprise against Russia. In September-I cannot recall the date exactly-he finally admitted to me that he had certain intentions against Russia. In September I reported to him at least twice, my more important report was 26 September, when I did everything I could to dissuade him from any undertaking against Russia. In that report which I made in the presence of Field Marshal Keitel and Colonel General Jodl I emphasized particularly the strategic military side; first, because I could do
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that in all clarity in the presence of other people, and then because I assumed that such military reasons, that is, the possibility of failure of an operation against Russia at a time when the struggle was on against England, would impress him and dissuade him from that plan. On 26 September, after making this official report, I asked for a personal conference alone with Hitler. Keitel and Jodl can testify that I always did this when I wanted to discuss something particularly important with the Fuehrer, where I had to go beyond the conventional procedure and which I could only do if nobody else was present. One could tell Hitler a lot of things if one was alone with him, but one could not make any such statements in a larger group. Field Marshal Keitel and Colonel General Jodl know that very well, particularly well, because they were the ones who in such cases always had to leave the room. On that occasion I gave Hitler my views in detail; first, that it was not possible to break the pact myth Russia, that it would be morally wrong, that it would serve no purpose because the pact gave us great advantages and was a basis for a sound policy for Germany later on. Then I told him that under no circumstances could he start a two-front war, as it was he who had always emphasized that he would not repeat the stupidity of the government of 1914 and that, in my opinion, it could never be justified. Then I put to him again the difference of the forces on each side, the absolute necessity for the Navy to concentrate on the war against England and particularly at that moment when all resources were strained to the utmost to carry out the invasion.
On that day I had the impression that Hitler was inclined to listen to my argument because later, or the next day, the naval adjutant, Kapitaen Von Puttkamer, reported to me that Hitler had spoken in very much the same vein as I had spoken, and had appreciated my argument.
That went on for several months. I presented many such reports, returning always with the same arguments. I believed again in November that I had been successful. To my utter surprise, however, on 18 December, Directive Number 21 (Barbarossa) came out, which dealt with the case of a war with the Soviet Union before the termination of the war against England. It is true, of course, that it was a directive for an eventuality. It is Document 446-PS, USA-31, of 18 December 1940.
DR. SIEMERS: Mr. President, that is in Document Book 10a, Page 247.
[Turning to the defendant.] Admiral, the Prosecution asserted that the Navy and you assisted in drawing up this directive. Is that correct?
RAEDER: That is in no way correct. Such directives were drafted in the OKW after the Fuehrer had taken his political decision,
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in the Armed Forces Operations Staff; and in that Armed Forces Operations Staff there was also one naval officer and one or more Air Force officers who, under the Chief of the Armed Forces Operations Stay, dealt with matters concerning the Navy and Air Force when such directives were being drafted. The directive then went to the Commanders-in-Chief of the Armed Forces and they were ordered, for their part, to work out and present suggestions for the execution of the orders of the Fuehrer. They had no influence on the directive itself and did not see it at all beforehand.
May I add one more thing? I have been accused by the Prosecution that I used my influence with the Fuehrer not for moral and ethical reasons but that I tried in a cynical way first to settle the account with England and then to assail Russia. I have said before that I told all my reasons to the Fuehrer whenever I had the chance, but that I could not do that in a public meeting or in the presence of other people, nor could I write it down in my war diary, because the sharp words which fell there must not become known to other people by means of the war diary. I want to point to Document C-170, Exhibit USA-136, which dates from 23 August 1939 to 22 June 1941. It is a compilation of many excerpts from the War Diary of the Naval Operations Staff-and from my minutes of conferences with Hitler in which the Russian question was dealt with. This is not a literal reproduction of my statements or word for word excerpts from the War Diary, but it is a summary of excerpts by the naval archivist, Admiral Assmann. I will not read details from these many entries, but I should like to point out that precisely this document, C-170, shows in a large number of entries contained therein that, since the beginning of the war in 1939, I continuously used my influence with the Fuehrer to maintain good relations with Russia for the reasons which I have previously mentioned. It would lead us too far if I were to start quoting several entries here. But the document, I would like to emphasize, is entirely convincing.
DR. SIEMERS: You had nothing to do with the Directive 21, which is signed by Hitler, Keitel, and Jodl?
RAEDER: Absolutely nothing.
DR. SIEMERS: But following that, you made some preparations in accordance with the directive? As they concerned the Navy they were in any case not so important here.
RAEDER: Yes. We had the first conference in January, as can be seen from one of these entries in C-170. I had reported to the Fuehrer on 4 February about our intentions and in March the Navy began with certain preparations. I have said already that the Navy throughout the first period was hardly concerned with major operations, but only with the cutting off of the Gulf of Finland by
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mines and light naval forces. I do not know whether that is in Directive 21 or somewhere else but the Fuehrer, at my urgent request, had ordered that the center of gravity of the naval warfare should still be in the direction of England. Consequently, we could use only relatively small forces for the war against Russia.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Siemers, we had better break off now.
The Tribunal rather understood that you hoped to finish by midday today. We realize that you had 2 hours of today taken up with your documents, but when do you think you will be able to finish now?
DR. SIEMERS: I believe I will need only about three-quarters of an hour, between half an hour and an hour.
THE PRESIDENT: Tomorrow at 10 o'clock we shall deal with the documents of Seyss-Inquart, and we are told that will only last 30 minutes.
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