[The witness Von Weizsacker resumed the stand.]
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Siemers, I think yesterday we got to the stage whether any of the other defendants' counsel wished to ask any questions.
DR. SIEMERS: Yes, indeed; I believe Dr. Von Ludinghausen wishes to examine the witness.
DR. VON LUDINGHAUSEN (Counsel for Defendant Von Neurath): Witness, I should like to put a few questions to you about the activity of Herr Von Neurath in his capacity as Foreign Minister. You were at that time Director of the Political Department of the Foreign Office. What were the dates?
VON WEIZSACKER: I believe from late autumn of 1936, as a deputy, and from the spring of 1937 until the spring of 1938 with full capacity.
DR. VON LUDINGHAUSEN: But before then you had already had occasion to work with Herr Von Neurath? In the autumn of 1932 were you not together now and then at the Disarmament Conference at Geneva?
VON WEIZSACKER: Yes.
DR. VON LUDINGHAUSEN: What tendencies did Herr Von Neurath follow, and what attitude did Von Neurath adopt at the Disarmament Conference?
VON WEIZSACKER: The attitude of Herr Von Neurath was dictated by the provisions of the Covenant of the League of Nations which provided for disarmament. He followed those lines.
DR. VON LUDINGHAUSEN: In that he followed the same policy which his predecessors had followed at the Disarmament Conference?
VON WEIZSACKER: It was always the same.
DR. VON LUDINGHAUSEN: Yes, all the previous governments pursued a policy aimed at peace and unity, or understanding; and Herr Von Neurath continued this policy wholeheartedly, is that not correct?
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VON WEIZSACKER: I never noticed anything to the contrary.
DR. VON LUDINGHAUSEN: Did you at that time-that is in 1932-notice in any way that he had National Socialist tendencies or that he was at all in sympathy with the National Socialists?
VON WEIZSACKER: I had the impression that there was no common ground between him and National Socialism.
DR. VON LUDINGHAUSEN: Can you quite briefly summarize Herr Von Neurath's views with respect to foreign politics? Could he have been at that time in favor of belligerent action, or was he the representative, the acknowledged representative, of a policy of understanding and peace?
VON WEIZSACKER: I should say that Herr Von Neurath pursued a policy of peaceful revision, the same policy that had been carried on by his predecessors. His aim was good neighborliness with all, without binding himself politically in any special direction. I never noticed any bellicose tendencies in his policies.
DR. VON LUDINGHAUSEN: Was there any change in Herr Von Neurath's views in the year 1936, when you became one of his closest collaborators, or did they always remain the same?
VON WEIZSACKER: They were always the same.
DR. VON LUDINGHAUSEN: He was especially interested in bringing about an understanding with England, but also with France; is that right?
VON WEIZSACKER: I had the impression that Herr Von Neurath wanted to bring about an understanding with all sides.
DR. VON LUDINGHAUSEN: I should like to put a few more questions to you which more or less concern his relations with Hitler.
According to your knowledge of the circumstances, as his collaborator, can it be said that he had the confidence of Adolf Hitler at all times when he was Foreign Minister, and also that Hitler let himself be advised and led by him altogether?
VON WEIZSACKER: As far as I am in a position to judge, he was the adviser but not the confidant of Hitler.
DR. VON LUDINGHAUSEN: But there was a certain contact between those gentlemen; is that not right?
VON WEIZSACKER: I was hardly ever a witness of such contacts.
DR. VON LUDINGHAUSEN: Did you observe, when Von Neurath and Hitler met, whether they frequently discussed the political situation, what had to be done, and what should be done?
VON WEIZSACKER: I can only say that we of the Foreign Of lice regretted that the contact was not closer; all the more so as Hitler
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was frequently absent from Berlin. We considered the contact too loose.
DR. VON LUDINGHAUSEN: Then, one cannot speak of close relations or of very close collaboration with Hitler in the case of Von Neurath?
VON WEIZSACKER: In my opinion, no.
DR. VON LUDINGHAUSEN: And, in your opinion and according to your observation, how did the activity of Von Neurath affect foreign policy? Was he the leading man, or was he not perhaps a retarding element, that is a brake, so to speak, where matters contrary to his convictions were concerned?
VON WEIZSACKER: I have no actual proof that important foreign political actions of this period were influenced by Von Neurath. But I can well imagine that certain actions in the sphere of foreign politics were prevented...
THE PRESIDENT: Wait a minute. I do not think we can have the witness imagine. We cannot have the witness telling us what he can imagine. I think the question is too vague, and not a proper question to ask.
DR. VON LUDINGHAUSEN: During the time when Herr Von Neurath was Foreign Minister, did any authority in the Party also have an influence on the foreign policy which in effect was contrary to the tendencies of Von Neurath or at least was not shared by him?
VON WEIZSACKER: I believe there was not only one but many who acted in that way and had connection and influence with Hitler of course. That could not be verified, but it could be concluded from the results.
DR. VON LUDINGHAUSEN: Do you know why, for what reason, the Anti-Comintern Pact with Japan in November 1935 was not signed by Von Neurath but by the then Ambassador Von Ribbentrop in London?
VON WEIZSACKER: Was not that in 1936?
DR. VON LUDINGHAUSEN: 1936; yes that is right.
VON WEIZSACKER: I assume for the reason that Hitler always liked to put several persons on to certain work, and he would then select from among them the one he considered best suited to carry the work through
DR. VON LUDINGHAUSEN: Was Von Neurath at all in agreement with this Anti-Comintern Pact?
VON WEIZSACKER: That I do not know.
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DR. VON LUDINGHAUSEN: What was Von Neurath's policy regarding personnel? Did he try to keep old officials in office, or did he bring in National Socialist officials?
VON WEIZSACKER: Herr Von Neurath was very anxious to retain the old and familiar Foreign Of lice staff, in the Foreign Of lice, as well as in positions abroad.
DR. VON LUDINGHAUSEN: But that changed the moment he resigned?
VON WEIZSACKER: Not immediately, but later on to an increasing extent.
DR. VON LUDINGHAUSEN: Now, just two more questions. What was the attitude of Herr Von Neurath when he was no longer Foreign Minister and the Sudeten questions became acute, in the autumn of 1938; and what part did he play at the Munich Conference?
VON WEIZSACKER: I recall a scene in the Reich Chancellery, a day before the Munich Agreement, when Herr Von Neurath very strongly recommended pursuing a policy of appeasement and following the suggestion of Mussolini to hold a four-power conference.
DR. VON LUDINGHAUSEN: Do you know that after Von Neurath had left the Foreign Office that office was forbidden to give him any information about foreign politics?
VON WEIZSACKER: I think I remember that the successor of Herr Von Neurath kept to himself information his predecessor received about foreign political matters.
DR. VON LUDINGHAUSEN: I have no further questions.
DR. LATERNSER: Herr Von Weizsacker, you were German Ambassador to the Holy See in Rome from the summer of 1943?
VON WEIZSACKER: Yes.
DR. LATERNSER: At the same time the commander-in-chief in the Italian theater of war was Field Marshal Kesselring?
VON WEIZSACKER: Yes; that is, he was the commander-in-chief in that theater from 25 September 1943. Before that time an Italian general held the post.
DR. LATERNSER: Were you frequently called upon by Kesselring to settle differences between the German Army on one hand and the civil authorities on the other?
VON WEIZSACKER: There was constant communication between Weld Marshal Kesselring and my own office, not only in order to straighten out differences, but above all to prevent differences.
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DR. LATERNSER: Did you, through your frequent contacts with Field Marshal Kesselring, gain a personal impression with regard to the attitude of the military...
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Laternser, we are not trying Kesselring.
What relevance has this question got?
DR. LATERNSER: This question is relevant because in the crossexamination of Field Marshal Kesselring the Prosecution produced incriminating material to the effect that the military leadership in Italy did not observe the usages of war and the laws of humanity. I distinctly remember that you, Mr. President-and this may be seen on Pages 5803 and 5805 (Volume IX, Pages 234, 235)-said in reply to an objection by Dr. Stahmer that it was material incriminating the General Staff. I should like to ask the witness now present a few questions about this incriminating material.
THE PRESIDENT: If you wish to ask him anything that he knows about accusations which have been made by the Prosecution against Kesselring as a member of the General Staff, then you may do that.
DR. LATERNSER: Yes, Mr. President. I started and that was to be a preparatory question.
Herr Von Weizsacker, were the objects of art of Italy in the Italian theater of war spared and put in safekeeping?
VON WEIZSACKER: The German Wehrmacht, under the leadership of Field Marshal Kesselring, made the greatest efforts to spare and protect edifices, property, and objects of art belonging to the Church. This was a large chapter in the activities of the staff of Field Marshal Kesselring, and success was not wanting.
DR. LATERNSER: Can you give us one or two especially significant examples on this point?
VON WEIZSACKER: Yes, there are a lot of examples. I would like to mention that 6 months or a year ago an exhibition of manuscripts, incunabula, and similar things, was held in the Vatican. The German Wehrmacht is to be thanked for having saved a large part, if not the greater part of these objects.
DR. LATERNSER: That is sufficient, Herr Von Weizsacker. The high military command in Italy is accused of having treated the Italian population with especial harshness and cruelty. Can you tell us anything about the fact that precisely on the part of the high military command in Italy special measures were taken for the feeding of the population at a period when the food problem was difficult?
VON WEIZSACKER: Does this question refer especially to the food problem?
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DR. LATERNSER: Yes, the food problem in Rome.
VON WEIZSACKER: Well, my field of observation was only Rome. But there I can say that Field Marshal Kesselring told me one day that half his time was taken up with the question of feeding Rome. And I knew one of the higher military officials I believe his name was Seifert or something like that-who with great devotion concerned himself with this task and carried it through with success.
DR. LATERNSER: Now my last question, Herr Von Weizsacker: Through your observations of the activities of the high military leaders in Italy you must have gained a personal impression of these people. Did you get the impression that there was a sincere effort on the past of these military leaders to observe the laws of war and the laws of humanity?
VON WEIZSACKER: That is a matter of course, for otherwise certain results could not have come about. Perhaps it is not known here that in the autumn of 1943 the Holy See published a communiqué, an official communiqué, which especially praised the behavior of the German soldiers in Rome. Besides that, the sparing of the Eternal City could not have been realized if the German Wehrmacht had not behaved as it did.
DR. LATERNSER: And that was a special merit of Field Marshal Kesselring in particular?
VON WEIZSACKER: I would say that when the history of this time comes to be written first in the list of merit will be Pope Pius XII. Then praise will be accorded, in the second place to the German Wehrmacht under the leadership of Kesselring.
DR. LATERNSER: Thank you very much. I have no further questions.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: It has been asserted once that the Defendant Von Papen, who in the summer of 1934 had been appointed ambassador to Vienna, directed from that office a policy of aggressive expansion taking in the entire southeast up to Turkey; and that he, among other things, had offered neighboring states like Hungary and Poland territory to be gained from the intended partitioning of Czechoslovakia. Did this policy actually exist?
VON WEIZSACKER: I am sorry. I did not quite understand your question.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Did this policy, which I just outlined, actually exist?
VON WEIZSACKER: My observation dates only from the late summer of 1936, as before that time I was abroad. I did not notice later that Herr Von Papen had carried on a southeastern policy for
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Vienna, or that he was commissioned to do so. The Foreign Office could not entrust him with such a mission, for he did not come under the Foreign Office.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: And this policy, as just outlined, did that exist at all when you entered the Foreign Office?
VON WEIZSACKER: Please repeat the question.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: Did this policy of expansion on the part of Germany . . .
VON WEIZSACKER: Which policy?
DR. KUBUSCHOK: The aggressive policy of expansion on the part of Germany to the southeast as far as Turkey, the partitioning of Czechoslovakia, and the cession of parts of Czechoslovakia to Poland and Hungary.
VON WEIZSACKER: Yes. In 1939, no doubt?
DR. KUBUSCHOK: 1936-in 1936.
VON WEIZSACKER: No.
THE PRESIDENT: The Prosecution?
MAJOR JONES: Witness, I want to ask you one or two questions about the Athenia matter. You have told the Tribunal that you, yourself, saw the American charge d'Affaires and informed him, about the middle of September, that the Athenia could not have been sunk by a German U-boat. That is so, is it not?
VON WEIZSACKER: I did not see the American charge d'Affaires in the middle of September, but on the day on which I heard of the sinking, and that must have been, perhaps, 3, 4, or 5 of September.
MAJOR JONES: Were you already assuring the American representatives as early as that that a U-boat could not have been responsible?
VON WEIZSACKER: That is correct.
MAJOR JONES: And did you recommend, or rather, did the German Foreign Office recommend that the Commander-in-Chief of the German Navy should receive the American naval attaché and tell him the same thing, namely, that a U-boat could not have sunk the Athenia?
VON WEIZSACKER: That I do not know. I only dealt with the charge d'Affaires.
MAJOR JONES: I would like you to look at a new document, Document Number D-804, which will be Exhibit GB-477, which is an extract from the SKL on the Atheniacase. You will see that
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that is a report from Neubauer to the naval attaché and it reads as follows:
"The Foreign Of lice has had a report of the meeting between the Commander-in-Chief of the German Navy and the American naval attaché, on 13 September 1939, passed on to it by telephone. It is worded as follows:
" 'On the 16th of September, at about 1300 hours, the Commander-in-Chief of..."'
VON WEIZSACKER: I am sorry; I have not found the place as yet.
MAJOR JONES: Perhaps you would like to follow the English copy, Witness, if you would like.
I read the second paragraph:
" 'On the 16th of September, at about 1300 hours, the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy received the American naval attaché on the advice of the Reich Foreign Minister and told him more or less the following: He had intended for some days already-as he knew-to write him that he should visit him in order to tell him his opinion about the sinking of the Athenia, in view of the continued agitation about it. However, he had waited for the return of those of the submarines that had been employed in waging war against merchant ships at the time in question and which might possibly be concerned, in order to receive reports about their activity personally. He repeated most emphatically that the sinking of the Athenia was not caused by a German submarine. The ship nearest to the place of the incident was at the time actually situated about 170 sea miles away from the place of the sinking. Besides this, the instructions as to how the commanders were to wage war against merchant shipping, had after all been published. Up to date, in no case had these instructions been even slightly disregarded. On the contrary, an American captain reported a short time before about the particularly courteous and chivalrous behavior of the submarine commanders.' "
Well, now, it is clear from that, is it not, that the German Foreign Office was most anxious to cover up this matter of the Athenia as best it could; was it not?
VON WEIZSACKER: No; there was nothing to be covered up.
MAJOR JONES: When you discovered at the end of September that in fact it was the U-30 that had sunk the Athenia, there was then a good deal to be covered, was there not?
VON WEIZSACKER: I believe that I stated already yesterday that I had heard nothing to that effect.
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MAJOR JONES: Are you saying that you did not know at the end of September, on the return of the U-30, that the U-30 had in fact sunk the Athenia?
VON WEIZSACKER: I do not remember that in any way at all.
MAJOR JONES: When did you first discover that the U-30 had sunk the Athenia?
VON WEIZSACKER: As far as I remember, not at all during the war.
MAJOR JONES: But I understood you to say yesterday that you thought that the publication in the Volkischer Beobachter, accusing Mr. Winston Churchill of sinking the Athenia, was a piece of perverse imagination; is that right?
VON WEIZSACKER: Completely.
MAJOR JONES: Are you really saying to the Tribunal that -though you were in a responsible job-are you saying to the Tribunal that you did not discover the true facts about the Athenia until the end of the war, when you were directly concerned in the Foreign Office with this matter?
VON WEIZSACKER: I told you already yesterday what I know about this. It seems, does it not, that it was realized later by the Navy that the sinking of the Athenia was due to the action of a German submarine, but I cannot at all remember that I or the Foreign Office were informed of this fact.
MAJOR JONES: At any rate, the Defendant Raeder took no steps to correct the information that had been passed to the American diplomatic representatives, did he?
VON WEIZSACKER: I do not recall at all that Admiral Raeder advised me or the Foreign Office of the fact.
MAJOR JONES: Now, with regard to the Defendant Von Neurath.
If it please the Tribunal, I am not proposing to question the witness as to the earlier diplomatic history, as this Tribunal has indicated that it is desirable to reserve the matter for the defendants as they go into the witness box later.
[Turning to the witness.] But I want to ask you a general question. What was the earliest date at which responsible officials of the Foreign Office, like yourself, first realized that Hitler intended to wage aggressive war?
VON WEIZSACKER: That the foreign policy of Hitler's Government was a dangerous one I realized clearly for the first time in May 1933; the fact that an aggressive war was planned, perhaps, in the summer of 1938, or at least that the course pursued in foreign policy might very easily lead to war.
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MAJOR JONES: Already in April 1938, the foreign political situation was so tense that you sent a special memorandum to all German diplomatic representatives dealing with the situation-the critical situation of Germany.
VON WEIZSACKER: That may be. May I be permitted to read the document?
MAJOR JONES: I want you to look at Document Number 3572-PS, which is a memorandum of the 25th of April 1938, signed by yourself, and a copy of which was sent to all the German diplomatic representatives. It will be Exhibit GB-478. That document reads:
"Since the work in the field of preparation for the mobilization has made further progress within Germany in the Armed Forces and in all civil administrations including the Foreign Of lice, it is necessary now that in the case of government offices abroad corresponding measures also be taken in their area of jurisdiction without delay."
And then there follows a series of instructions as to the actions that are to be taken on the commencement of the period of crisis, or of actual mobilization, and there is an insistence in the last paragraph but one:
"I request the heads of offices, without waiting for further instructions, to start considering now the measures to be taken in their sphere of activity in the case of an emergency. In the interest of absolute secrecy it must be observed strictly that the number of people informed remains as restricted as possible."
That suggests, does it not, that as early as April 1938 you were conscious of the imminent approach of actual mobilization; is that so?
VON WEIZSACKER: May I ask, is this document really dated the year 1938, or is it 1939? I cannot quite distinguish the date.
MAJOR JONES: It is dated the 25th of April 1938.
VON WEIZSACKER: Well, that may be.
MAJOR- JONES: Now, you yourself were opposed to Hitler's aggressive foreign policy, were you not?
VON WEIZSACKER: I did not quite understand your question.
MAJOR JONES: You yourself were opposed to Hitler's aggressive foreign policy, were you not?
VON WEIZSACKER: I personally, completely.
MAJOR JONES: Did you endeavor to persuade the Defendant Von Neurath also to oppose Hitler's aggressive foreign policy?
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VON WEIZSACKER: Herr Von Neurath was not Foreign Minister at that time.
MAJOR JONES: But he continued to be a very important functionary of the Nazi State, did he not?
VON WEIZSACKER: I believe that his influence in that period was even smaller than before; but I kept in touch with him, and I think I agreed with his opinion and he with mine.
MAJOR JONES: And yet he continued to serve the Nazi State, in particular, in a territory which was acquired as a result of this policy of aggression; is that not so?
YON WEIZSACKER: I should be grateful if this question would be put to Herr Von Neurath rather than to me.
MAJOR JONES: If you please. Now, you were in Italy and in Rome, were you not, in March of 1944?
VON WEIZSACKER: Yes.
MAJOR JONES: You have given me some evidence as to the behavior of the German forces in Italy. Were you in Rome at the time of the massacres in the Hadrian Cave? You remember the incident, Witness, do you not?
VON WEIZSACKER: Yes.
MAJOR JONES: When 325 Italians were murdered and 57 Jews were thrown in as a bit of makeweight. You were there when that happened, were you not?
VON WEIZSACKER: I believe it was 320 prisoners who were murdered in this cave which you just mentioned.
MAJOR JONES: Yes. Were you consulted about that matter?
VON WEIZSACKER: No.
MAJOR JONES: That was an action by German forces, was it not?
VON WEIZSACKER: I believe by the German Police, and not by the German Armed Forces.
MAJOR JONES: And you know, Witness, that there were many murders of that kind carried out by the SS during the period of German activity in Italy, do you not?
VON WEIZSACKER: I do not know about many murders having taken place, but I believe that the German Police were quite capable of such things.
MAJOR JONES: You know that they left a record of terror and brutality wherever they left their mark upon Italy; is that not so?
VON WEIZSACKER: The German Police, yes.
MAJOR JONES: I have no further questions.
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THE PRESIDENT: Do you want to re-examine?
DR. SIEMERS: I have no more questions, Your Honor.
THE PRESIDENT: Then the witness can retire.
DR. SIEMERS: Mr. President, may I now call the witness Vice Admiral Schulte-Monting.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, go ahead.
[The witness Schulte-Monting took the stand.]
THE PRESIDENT: Will you state your full name?
ERICH SCHULTE-MONTING (Witness): Erich Schulte-Monting.
THE PRESIDENT: Will you repeat this oath after me: I swear by God-the Almighty and Omniscient-that I will speak the pure truth-and will withhold and add nothing.
[The witness repeated the oath in German.]
THE PRESIDENT: You may sit down.
DR. SIEMERS: Admiral, please tell us briefly what positions you held from 1925 to 1945, particularly in what positions you served immediately under Admiral Raeder.
SCHULTE-MONTING: From 1925 to 1928 I was naval adjutant to Reichsprasident Hindenburg and, as such, simultaneously second adjutant to the Chief of the Naval Command Staff. Consequently my first collaboration with Raeder dates back to 1928.
From 1929 until 1933 I had several front commands. From 1933 to 1937 I was first adjutant to Raeder. From 1937 to 1939 I had several front commands. From 1939 to 1943 I was Admiral Raeder's Chief of Staff; and up to 1944 I remained Admiral Doenitz' Chief of Staff. In January 1944 I was naval commander in southern France until the invasion; subsequently commanding general in North Trondheim. After the collapse I was employed for some months with the British Navy in winding up activities. Then in the autumn I was interned in a camp for generals in England.
DR. SIEMERS: Please tell me, if you can remember, in which month of 1939 you started to work with Raeder.
SCHULTE-MONTING: The first of January 1939.
DR. SIEMERS: Can you tell us briefly anything about Raeder's prestige as a navy expert, especially abroad? I mean only with regard to technical naval questions.
SCHULTE-MONTING: Yes. I believe that through the many years of service I had with Raeder, and the many conversations I had with foreigners, I have been able to form some idea. After all, Raeder was head of the Navy for 15 years. He was known, or rather had a name, as a naval officer and as Chief of Staff of the
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last Commander-in-Chief of the German Imperial Navy, Admiral Hipper, the opponent of the famous British Admiral Beatty in the Skagerrak battle. He was known...
THE PRESIDENT: Witness, will you kindly observe that light. When the yellow light goes on, you are talking too fast. When the red light goes on, you must stop.
SCHULTE-MONTING: He was known through his literary activity at the time of the "Tirpitz Era," when he edited the Nautikus, and later, after the first World War, through his two works on cruiser warfare in the last World War, for which he received an honorary doctor's degree and which, I should say, gained him a reputation among experts.
DR. SIEMERS: The defendant is accused of building up the Navy with the intention of carrying on an aggressive war, and this even after the Treaty of Versailles was already in force.
SCHULTE-MONTING: That is not correct. Never in all my conversations which I had with Raeder was the thought-much less the word-of an aggressive war mentioned. I believe that all his actions and his directives contradict this.
DR. SIEMERS: Were there possibly any ideas of a strategic nature under consideration, while the Versailles Treaty was in force, with a view to an aggressive war?
SCHULTE-MONTING: Never.
DR. SIEMERS: What was the basic reason for the maneuvers held by the Navy from the years 1932 until 1939?
SCHULTE-MONTING They were held exclusively with a view to the security, protection, and defense of the coastal waters and the coast itself.
DR. SIEMERS: Was a war with England taken as a basis for any of these maneuvers between 1932 and 1939?
SCHULTE-MONTING No, that was never made a basis, and I believe that would have appeared impossible and unreasonable to every naval officer. I remember that even at the beginning of the year 1939 Raeder issued a directive to the front commanders to hold maneuvers, in which he excluded a maneuver directed against England as an impossibility. It was forbidden to carry out that maneuver at all.
DR. SIEMERS: Admiral, it is now confirmed, as you know, that the Navy in the twenties, with the knowledge of the then parliamentary government, violated the Treaty of Versailles. These questions have been discussed a great deal here, therefore, we can be brief.
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I should like to ask you generally: Is it possible from these violations, which are known to you, to deduce aggressive intentions?
SCHULTE-MONTING: No, I consider that is completely out of the question. The violations were so insignificant and were based so exclusively on protection and defense that I think it is impossible to construe them as aggressive intentions.
DR. SIEMERS: Can you give us briefly a few instances or name a few cases where violations took place?
SCHULTE-MONTING: First of all, they were limited to the installation of coastal batteries, antiaircraft batteries, the procuring of mines and similar things, all of which were exclusively for the purpose of defense or protection.
DR. SIEMERS: Did these violations of the Treaty of Versailles -or, shall we say, the slight deviations-become known to the Inter-Allied Commission in whole or in part, and did that commission partly overlook these things because they were really trifles?
SCHULTE-MONTING: Yes. I would say it was an open secret.
DR. SIEMERS: May I ask you, Admiral, to pause between question and answer so that the interpreters can keep up. Just pause a moment after my questions before you reply. May I ask you to repeat the answer to my question with regard to the commission?
SCHULTE-MONTING: I would say that it was an open secret. It was just passed by.
DR. SIEMERS: As proof that these violations of the treaty were made with the intention of waging aggressive war the Prosecution has several times presented the book by Post Captain Schussler entitled The Navy's Fight against Versailles. It is Document C-156. I will have this document submitted to you in the original. In order to save time and not to burden the Tribunal again with details-I do not want to go into details-I shall just ask you: What do you know about this book, and what caused it to be written at all? When was it written and what is your general opinion about it?
SCHULTE-MONTING: I know this book. It came about as a result of the attacks of the National Socialist regime in the years 1934 and 1935, which blamed the preceding government and the Navy for not having done enough in the past to arm the nation and for not even having exhausted the possibilities of the Treaty of Versailles. Consequently, the idea arose at that time of publishing a sort of justification. This brochure is to be considered in that light; a sort of justification for, I might say, sins of omission.
This booklet was later never actually published, or rather it was withdrawn from circulation because it was, I might say, a rather
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poor attempt, for, after all, it contains no challenging points which might be classified as rearmament.
DR. SIEMERS: Was this booklet distributed within the Navy later on?
SCHULTE-MONTING: No. As I said, it was withdrawn from the circles which had already had it and it was also severely criticized.
DR. SIEMERS: Was the book withdrawn on Raeder's orders?
SCHULTE-MONTING: I believe so, yes.
DR. SIEMERS: Through this book and another document, by Assmann, a charge has been brought concerning the known endeavors made with a construction firm in Holland. And it was also said yesterday that, by order of Admiral Raeder, U-boats were built for Germany in Finland and in Spain. Is that correct?
SCHULTE-MONTING: That is not correct. The U-boats which were designed by the Dutch firm, and which were built abroad, were not built for the German Navy, but for foreign countries.
DR. SIEMERS: Do you know for whom they were built? Who received the boat which was built in Finland?
SCHULTE-MONTING: I believe Turkey received one, and one went to Finland.
DR. SIEMERS: Then the ships were constructed for foreign orders and for a foreign country?
SCHULTE-MONTING: Yes.
DR. SIEMERS: What advantages at all did the Navy have from their collaboration in the construction?
SCHULTE-MONTING: We were only interested in keeping alive the experiences gained in U-boat warfare during the last World War. Consequently the Navy was interested in seeing that constructors of U-boats continued along those lines.
DR. SIEMERS: In your opinion, was that prohibited according to the Treaty of Versailles?
SCHULTE-MONTING: No, I know of no paragraph which prohibits our activity in foreign countries along those lines.
DR. SIEMERS: In the beginning of February 1933 Admiral Raeder made his first naval report to Hitler. Do you know what Hitler, on that occasion, gave Raeder as the basis for rebuilding the Navy?
SCHULTE-MONTING: Yes, I remember it exactly, because it was the first report which the then Chief of the Naval Command Staff, Admiral Raeder, made to the Reich Chancellor Hitler.
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Hitler said to Raeder that the basis of his future policy was to live in peace with England and that he intended to demonstrate that by trying to conclude a naval agreement with England. In this he wanted the German Navy to be kept relatively small. He wished to recognize Britain's naval superiority because of her position as a world power. He would accordingly suggest an appropriate ratio of strength. He wanted an understanding with regard to the construction of our Navy; and we should take these, his political points of view, into consideration. Raeder was impressed with the statements, for they were completely in accordance with his own basic attitude.
DR. SIEMERS: Within the framework of this policy the German-British Naval Agreement was then concluded in 1935. Was the Navy as a whole and Raeder in particular pleased with this agreement, or did they see certain disadvantages in it?
SCHULTE-MONTING: Raeder and the Navy were very pleased with this agreement, although we had to impose voluntarily upon ourselves severe limitations for a certain length of time. By this agreement, in comparison with the Washington conference, I should say we ranged among the smallest sea powers. In spite of that, this agreement was generally welcomed, because friendly relations with the British Navy were desired, and it was believed that if we followed a wise and moderate policy, England in return would show her appreciation.
DR. SIEMERS: Do you know whether at that time Hitler as well approved of the agreement in that form and was pleased about it?
SCHULTE-MONTING: Yes, I can affirm that. Raeder and I happened to be together with Hitler in Hamburg the day this agreement was concluded, and Hitler said to Raeder when this fact was reported to him:
"This is the happiest day of my life. This morning I received word from my doctor that my throat trouble is insignificant, and now this afternoon I receive this very gratifying political news."
DR. SIEMERS: You have already stated, Admiral, that the naval agreement was welcomed by the Navy. You will recall that in the year 1937 a modified naval agreement was concluded with England. Was the attitude of the Navy to that question still the same at that time?
SCHULTE-MONTING: Yes, absolutely. The Naval Agreement of 1937 brought merely one, I might say, additional clause. This was for an exchange of information; and we had also reached an agreement with the British Navy with regard to a fixed U-boat tonnage. We had no reason...
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DR. SIEMERS: Admiral, referring to the U-boat tonnage, I remember the 1935 agreement: 100 percent of the British U-boat tonnage; Germany limited herself to 45 percent, but reserved the right to increase the tonnage up to possibly 100 percent, in which case she must, however, notify England and discuss it with the British Admiralty.
Was this notification about the increase to 100 percent given, and if so, when and in what way?
SCHULTE-MONTING: After we had reached 100 percent, Admiral Cunningham was in Berlin and on that occasion the fact was discussed once more. Whether a written confirmation was made in addition I no longer recall I take it for granted because that was the purpose of the agreement of 1937. On the occasion of his visit in December 1938, Admiral Cunningham explicitly gave Britain's agreement to the final 100 percent equality in U-boats. That is the way I, or rather all of us, interpreted his visit.
DR. SIEMERS: Do you remember whether there was a special conversation, or a conversation between Admiral Cunningham and Raeder, on the occasion of this visit, in which Admiral Cunningham discussed generally the relations between the German and the British Navy, and between Germany and England?
SCHULTE-MONTING: I had the personal impression that Cunningham and Raeder parted on very friendly terns. At Cunningham's departure there was a breakfast for a rather limited circle, and on that occasion Cunningham expressed his pleasure at the conclusion of the naval agreement, concluding his speech with a toast to the effect that now all these questions had been settled at last, and it was to be hoped that in the future there would be no war between our navies.
THE PRESIDENT: What is the date of this incident?
DR. SIEMERS: December 1938. I believe that is correct, Admiral?
SCHULTE-MONTING: As far as I remember, December 1938.
DR. SIEMERS: I remember the date from the testimony given by Admiral Raeder. I myself knew only that it took place in 1938.
THE PRESIDENT: What Admiral Cunningham is it?
DR. SIEMERS: I do not know, I am not a naval expert. Perhaps Admiral Schulte-Monting can tell us.
SCHULTE-MONTING: I did not understand the question, Doctor.
DR. SIEMERS: Which Admiral Cunningham is that?
SCHULTE-MONTING: The present Lord Cunningham. The elder of the two.
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DR. SIEMERS: Mr. President, may I point out that it must have been on 30 or 31 December 1938, as far as we, or rather as far as Raeder recalls.
[Turning to the witness.] From 1933 until 1939 was Raeder confident that Hitler would not start a war?
SCHULTE-MONTING: Yes. Raeder was completely confident of that. As proof of this I may say that actually nothing was changed in our building program within that period. That would have been necessary if one had had to prepare oneself, at least mentally, for an armed conflict.
DR. SIEMERS: In what respect would the building program have had to be changed if one had wanted to wage an aggressive war?
SCHULTE-MONTING: It would have been necessary to give priority at least to the U-boat building program.
DR. SIEMERS: Was it clear to you and to the leading naval officers that a real aggressive war started by Germany would perforce result in a war with England?
SCHULTE-MONTING: Yes. The knowledge of this fact is proof in my opinion that a war of aggression was not planned.
DR. SIEMERS: Admiral, now in 1938 and 1939 incidents took place which perhaps justified a certain amount of skepticism. I should like to remind you of the crisis in the autumn of 1938 concerning the Sudetenland which almost led to war, which was then prevented only at the last moment through the Munich Agreement. I should like to call your attention specifically to the occupation of the rest of Czechoslovakia in March of 1939, which was contradictory to the Munich Agreement.
Now, what was the attitude of Raeder to this incident, which you must know as you spoke to him practically every day.
SCHULTE-MONTING: As Hitler had stated expressly at Munich that he was interested only in the German areas of Czechoslovakia; and, even though perhaps he seemed exceedingly determined to the outside world, was actually willing to negotiate, Raeder and the leading circles in the Navy believed that these things would be adjusted politically.
With the occupation of Czechoslovakia a great disquiet certainly did arise among us. But we were firmly convinced that Hitler would not make any exaggerated demands, and that he would be prepared to settle these matters politically, because we could not imagine that he would expose the German people to the danger of a second world war.
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DR. SIEMERS: Did you know that before the agreement with Hacha was made, under rather strange circumstances, a bombardment of Prague had allegedly been threatened; or did Raeder know anything about that?
SCHULTE-MONTING: I do not believe that Raeder knew anything about this. I am hearing about it for the first time now.
DR. SIEMERS: Now I shall turn to the Document L-79. This is a speech delivered by Hitler on 23 May 1939; that is the socalled "Little Schmundt File."
Mr. President, this is Exhibit USA-27, and is to be found in Document Book Number 10, Page 74, of the British Delegation. I am submitting this document to the witness.
[Turning to the witness.] This speech delivered by Hitler on 23 May 1939 was recorded by the adjutant on duty, Lieutenant Colonel Schmundt. As far as I know, Raeder, on the same day, discussed this speech with you in detail. At that time you had been Chief of Staff for a period of about 6 months. From your later activity are you familiar with the type of recording which was customary for military speeches?
SCHULTE-MONTING: This record can really not be considered a true account. I have from this record...
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Siemers, in the first place, your question was very much leading. You did not ask him a question. You put into his mouth what had happened. That is altogether wrong. You ought to have asked him, if you wanted to prove a conversation he had with Raeder, whether he did have a conversation with Raeder. You have told him that he had a conversation with Raeder. The purpose of examination is to ask questions, and then he could tell us if he had a conversation with Raeder. He cannot tell us whether this is a true account or a true form of the account when he was not at the meeting himself.
DR. SIEMERS: I wish to thank the High Tribunal, and I shall try to put the questions properly. The witness...
THE PRESIDENT: Not only that, but the Tribunal cannot listen to this witness' account, or his opinion as to whether this is a true account of a meeting at which he was not present.
DR. SIEMERS: Mr. President, the witness, as Chief of Staff, has always seen the exact minutes on important meetings. They were delivered to him in accordance with the distribution list. Therefore, as this document is of a decisive nature, I should like to determine whether Schulte-Monting, as Chief of Staff, received the minutes or whether he just received knowledge of the contents
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through Admiral Raeder's immediate reporting. That was the purpose of my question.
THE PRESIDENT: I beg your pardon, you mean you want to ask him whether he ever saw this document. Yes, you may certainly ask him that. Ask him if he saw the document.
DR. SIEMERS: I beg your pardon, Your Honor, but I believe the answer of the witness was lost in the interpretation, and if I am correct...
THE PRESIDENT: Never mind about his answer; the question is what question you are to put to him, and he can answer whether he ever saw the document.
DR. SIEMERS: Yes, I shall put that question.
Admiral, did you get to see this document at the time?
SCHULTE-MONTING: No, I am just seeing it now for the first time, here in Nuremberg.
DR. SIEMERS: How did you hear about the contents of the speech of 23 May?
SCHULTE-MONTING: Raeder informed me fully, as a matter of principle, after every speech or conference, confidential or otherwise. Immediately after the speech, Raeder gave me his impressions which are in contradiction to these so-called minutes. Raeder did not have this, I might say, exaggerated bellicose impression which is apparent in this document. But, on the other hand . . .
THE PRESIDENT: The witness must tell us what Raeder said to him. That is what I told you before. He may tell us what Raeder said to him.
DR. SIEMERS: Admiral, I should like you to tell us just what Raeder said to you.
SCHULTE-MONTING: Raeder told me that Hitler in his speech said there was a prospect of a future conflict with Poland, and that this was in contradiction to those things which he had discussed with him alone. That the speech in itself was contradictory, was the impression he expressed to me at that time. He also told me that after the speech he had had a conversation with Hitler alone during which he called his attention to the contradictions contained in the speech. At the same time he reminded Hitler of what he had told him previously, namely that he would settle the Polish case under all circumstances in a peaceful way; and now he was considering a warlike solution possible. Hitler, he said, had reassured him and had told him that politically he had things firmly in hand. Then when Raeder asked him, or rather called
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his attention to this contradiction and asked him just what he really intended to do, Hitler had answered, Raeder told me, the following:
"I Hitler, have three ways of keeping secrets. The first, when we two speak alone; the second, when I, Hitler, keep them to myself; the third, for problems of the future, which I do not think out to an end."
Raeder called his attention to the impossibility of a warlike conflict. To that, according to Raeder, Hitler replied:
"It is as if you and I had agreed on a settlement of one mark. Now, I, Hitler, have already paid you 99 pfennig. Do you think that because of this last 1 pfennig you would take me to court?"
And Raeder said "No."
"You see"-Hitler said to Raeder-"I have got what I want by political means, and I do not believe that because of this last political question"-the solution of the Polish Corridor, as we called it-"we will have to anticipate a war with England."
DR. SIEMERS: And that was in a conversation between Hitler and Raeder after this speech had been made?
SCHULTE-MONTING: That took place after this speech.
THE PRESIDENT: We will break off now.
[A recess was taken.]
DR. SIEMERS: Admiral, with regard to the minutes which I have shown you, I have one final question: Did you personally, as Chief of Staff, also receive and read all minutes which were sent to Raeder?
SCHULTE-MONTING: Yes, as a rule I saw all minutes and reports before they were given to Raeder.
DR. SIEMERS: Was Admiral Reader of the opinion-excuse me, I should like to put the question differently.
What was Raeder's point of view concerning the Navy and politics?
SCHULTE-MONTING: Raeder's opinion was that we, the Navy, had nothing to do with politics. He adopted that attitude as an order and a trust received from the old Reich President, Von Hindenburg, who, when appointing Raeder to be head of the Navy, imposed that as a duty upon him.
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DR. SIEMERS: I now come to Norway. What were the reasons which induced Raeder, in September and October 1939, to consider a possible occupation of Norway?
SCHULTE-MONTING: The reasons were the reports which came from various sources about alleged intentions of an occupation of Norway by the Allies. These reports came from the following sources: First, Admiral Canaris, who was the chief of our intelligence service. He reported to Raeder, in my presence, once a week, the information that had come in. Secondly, the reports that came from the naval attaché in Oslo, Korvettenkapitan Schreiber, which indicated that rumors were increasing that the Allies intended to drag Scandinavia into the war in order to prevent, if possible, the iron ore exports from Sweden to Germany. We did not consider these reports altogether impossible, because, as documentary evidence from the last World War proves, Churchill had seriously considered the occupation of Norway.
DR. SIEMERS: Was there a further source for reports of that kind?
SCHULTE-MONTING: Admiral Carls, the Commander-in-Chief of Group North, had received similar reports which he passed on orally and in writing.
DR. SIEMERS: Do you remember any details from these reports which you could give us quite briefly?
SCHULTE-MONTING: Yes. There were reports concerning the presence of British air crews in Oslo, allegedly posing as civilians. There were reports about Allied officers making surveys of Norwegian bridges, viaducts, and tunnels all the way to the Swedish border, which was taken as an indication that the transportation of heavy material and equipment was planned. And last but not least there were reports about a secret mobilization of Swedish troops because of the alleged danger to the ore areas.
DR. SIEMERS: What danger arose for Germany on account of that?
SCHULTE-MONTING: If Norway were to have been actually occupied, the conduct of the war in the North Sea would have become almost impossible, and it would have been very difficult in the Baltic Sea. The ore imports most probably would have been stopped. The danger from the air would have become terrible for north Germany and the eastern territories. In the long run the North Sea and the Baltic would have been blocked completely, which eventually would have led to the total loss of the war.
DR. SIEMERS: What did Admiral Raeder do on the basis of these considerations?
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SCHULTE-MONTING: He reported to Hitler about his misgivings and called his attention to the dangers.
DR. SIEMERS: When was that report made?
SCHULTE-MONTING: If I remember correctly, in the autumn of '39.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Siemers, until the adjournment, will you go very slowly because, owing to the power of the electrical recording being off, what is happening here in Court is impossible to take and therefore we have to rely solely upon the shorthand notes which cannot be checked back against the electrical recording. Do you understand? Therefore I want you to go rather more slowly than usual.
DR. SIEMERS: When was the conference between Hitler and Raeder in which Raeder for the first time pointed out these dangers?
SCHULTE-MONTING: In October 1939.
DR. SIEMERS: According to the War Diary that conference took place, which of course you cannot remember offhand, on 10 October. At any rate you probably mean that conference.
SCHULTE-MONTING: Yes.
DR. SIEMERS: Did Hitler then, as a result of that conference, make a final decision?
SCHULTE-MONTING: No, in no way at all.
DR. SIEMERS: Did discussions about that subject then take place continually between Hitler and Raeder?
SCHULTE-MONTING: No. No further discussions along that line took place then until perhaps the end of the year. Only when the reports which I mentioned before were received in increasing numbers was that subject taken up again.
DR. SIEMERS: Is it known to you that in December 1939 Quisling came to Berlin and also talked with Raeder?
SCHULTE-MONTING: Yes, that is known to me, and I took part in that meeting.
DR. SIEMERS: What did Quisling tell Raeder?
SCHULTE-MONTING: Quisling came on a recommendation from Rosenberg and said he had important news of a military and political nature. He confirmed, more or less, the things which we knew already.
DR. SIEMERS: Were only the military dangers discussed in this conference?
SCHULTE-MONTING: Only these things were discussed; the conference was very short.
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DR. SIEMERS: No political questions were discussed?
SCHULTE-MONTING: No, not at all.
DR. SIEMERS: Do you know when Raeder met Quisling for the first time?
SCHULTE-MONTING: On the occasion of that visit.
DR. SIEMERS: Did Raeder have at that time any close connections with Rosenberg?
SCHULTE-MONTING- No, he knew him casually, having just seen him a few times.
DR. SIEMERS: Had Rosenberg informed Raeder before about the relations between Rosenberg and Quisling?
SCHULTE-MONTING: No, not to my knowledge.
DR. SIEMERS: What did Raeder do when Quisling confirmed the reports received from Canaris and other sources?
SCHULTE-MONTING: As the things we suspected were confirmed from Norway, Raeder considered this so serious that he went immediately to Hitler.
DR. SIEMERS: Do you also know what he suggested to Hitler?
SCHULTE-MONTING: Hitler wanted to talk to Quisling himself.
DR. SIEMERS: And that took place?
SCHULTE-MONTING: Yes, it did.
DR. SIEMERS: Was a final decision made then concerning Norway, in December 1939?
SCHULTE-MONTING: No, Hitler directed that as a countermeasure theoretical preparations should be made for a German landing in Norway. The order, the final order, as far as I know was not given until March.
DR. SIEMERS: Was the landing in Norway an undertaking which you and Raeder considered a risky one or was it considered absolutely safe to do so?
SCHULTE-MONTING No, Raeder and the gentlemen from the Naval Operations Staff and also the front commanders considered that undertaking very risky. I remember Churchill's speech in Parliament when he said, after he had been questioned about that matter, that he did not believe the German Navy would undertake that risk in face of the British Navy.
DR. SIEMERS: Do you know when Churchill made that statement, approximately?
SCHULTE-MONTING I believe it was between 7 and 9 April
DR. SIEMERS: 1940?
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SCHULTE-MONTING: Yes, 1940.
DR. SIEMERS: What was your estimate at the Naval Operations Staff of the risks of losses?
SCHULTE-MONTING: Raeder had told Hitler that he would have to reckon on the possible complete loss of the fleet, and that if the operations were carried out successfully he would have to be prepared for the loss of about 30 percent of the forces used.
DR. SIEMERS: And how much was lost?
SCHULTE-MONTING: About 30 percent.
DR. SIEMERS: In view of the risk of losing the entire fleet, was Raeder at first in favor of that operation?
SCHULTE-MONTING: No. He considered a neutral attitude on the part of Norway as much better than having to take this risk.
DR. SIEMERS: The Prosecution have asserted that Raeder and the Naval Operations Staff recommended the occupation of Norway out of the desire for fame and conquest. What do you say about that?
SCHULTE-MONTING: The desire for fame was not in Raeder's character. The plans for operations which came from his desk bore the mark of bold daring, but also of thorough planning. One does not work out plans to the minutes" detail covering the distance from German ports up to Narvik, which is about that from Nuremberg to Madrid, and one does not use the Navy against a superior British fleet for the sake of fame.
Raeder had told the Naval Operations Staff and the front commanders that he had to carry out that operation against all the rules of warfare because there was a compelling necessity to do so.
DR. SIEMERS: When did the actual drafting of the military operation take place at the Naval Operations Staff?
SCHULTE-MONTING: February 1940.
DR. SIEMERS: During the period from December 1939 until March 1940 did you continue to receive reports from the sources you have mentioned?
SCHULTE-MONTING: Yes.
DR. SIEMERS: Did these later reports contain a clearer indication as to the place of the landings, or did you not see the details about that?
SCHULTE-MONTING: Yes, they covered the areas between Narvik via Bergen to Trondheim, from Bergen to Oslo.
DR. SIEMERS: Did Raeder-excuse me, I want to put the question differently: What was the basis which Raeder suggested to Hitler for the relations between Germany and Norway?
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SCHULTE-MONTING: To that I would like to...
DR. SIEMERS: Excuse me, I mean in the period after the operation was carried out and Germany had occupied Norway.
SCHULTE-MONTING: Raeder in speaking to Hitler advocated a policy of peace. He suggested repeatedly that attempts should be made for peace with Norway. He was in agreement in that respect with the German Commander-in-Chief in Norway, Generaladmiral Bohm, while Terboven, who was directing political matters, was of a somewhat different opinion.
DR. SIEMERS: Did serious conflicts arise in that respect between Terboven and his civil administration on the one side, and Raeder and Bohm and his colleague, Korvettenkapitan Schreiber, on the other?
SCHULTE-MONTING: Yes, there were serious differences and quarrels all the way up the line to Hitler. Hitler at that time told Raeder that he could not make peace with Norway because of France.
DR. SIEMERS: Admiral, you said, '`because of France." Was it not possible to make peace with France also, and what was Raeder's attitude in that regard?
SCHULTE-MONTING: Raeder advocated the same thing concerning France.
DR. SIEMERS: And what did he say?
SCHULTE-MONTING: He tried to arrange a conference with Admiral Darlan in an effort to forward these matters. He had pointed out to Hitler, when the Atlantic Coast was fortified, that it would be better and more practical to make peace with France than to make great though inadequate sacrifices for defense. Hitler replied that he fully agreed but out of consideration for Italy he could not conclude a peace treaty with France.
DR. SIEMERS: Did the conversations between Raeder and Darlan take place?
SCHULTE-MONTING: Yes, near Paris.
DR. SIEMERS: Were you present?
SCHULTE-MONTING: No, Admiral Schultze, the Commanding Admiral in France.
DR. SIEMERS: Did Raeder tell you whether the results of the conversation were favorable?
SCHULTE-MONTING: Yes, he told me about the very favorable results.
DR. SIEMERS: Did Raeder report on that to Hitler?
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SCHULTE-MONTING: Yes.
DR. SIEMERS: And in spite of that, Hitler refused?
SCHULTE-MONTING: Out of consideration for Mussolini.
DR. SIEMERS: According to your knowledge, did the Party or the leadership of the SS through Heydrich attempt to fight Raeder?
SCHULTE-MONTING: Heydrich repeatedly attempted to bring Raeder and the Navy into discredit with Hitler through defamatory remarks and by spying, either by posting spies in the officers corps or the casinos, or by misrepresenting or distorting news. Against these attacks, Raeder defended himself tenaciously and successfully.
DR. SIEMERS: Why was the Party against Raeder?
SCHULTE-MONTING: That is a question which is very difficult to answer. I believe mainly because, first of all, there were differences in the religious field. Many commanders before they put to sea for combat turned to Raeder for help so that during their absence their relatives would not have their religious freedom curtailed.
DR. SIEMERS: When did the first differences occur between Raeder and Hitler, and during what period did Raeder ask for his dismissal?
THE PRESIDENT: We have had that from that defendant himself, have we not? Raeder told us when he asked for it. No crossexamination about it.
DR. SIEMERS: Then may I ask you for what reasons Raeder remained?
SCHULTE-MONTING First, because Hitler himself had asked him to stay, and gave him assurances for the integrity of the Navy. Furthermore, at that time, there were discussions about combining the Navy and the merchant marine into one ministry and putting Party people into that ministry. In that event we did not see a strengthening but a weakening of our fighting force. Besides, during that period there occurred a gap in the line of successors, due to illness and losses.
And last but not least, Raeder remained in the war out of a sense of responsibility and patriotism.
DR. SIEMERS: Did you yourself ask Raeder to remain in of lice?
SCHULTE-MONTING: Yes. I had to ask Raeder frequently and very seriously. I myself was once ordered by Hitler to come to the Reich Chancellery.
DR. SIEMERS: When was that?
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SCHULTE-MONTING: In the beginning of 1939, when he explained his standpoint to me in a long conversation and asked me to convince Raeder that he had to stay. Moreover, he enjoyed the confidence of the Navy. The senior officers and officials of the Navy had asked me orally and in writing to try to persuade Raeder not to leave his office prematurely. Since 1928 he had led the Navy with a firm hand through all political vicissitudes.
DR. SIEMERS: Admiral, may I return again to your conversation with Hitler in the beginning of 1939? Did you speak with Hitler alone?
SCHULTE-MONTING: Yes, that was a private conversation of about an hour and a half.
DR. SIEMERS: Did Hitler tell you anything about his political plans on that occasion?
SCHULTE-MONTING: No; not about political plans in the sense of what is called politics, but he tried once more to bridge political differences with Raeder. He told me one should not weigh each individual word of his. His visitors were right, but only after they had left; he would put forward records and witnesses; all he wanted was to appeal to the emotions of his listeners and to stir them up to do their utmost, but not to commit himself with words. In the future he promised he would try to give the Navy independence in all technical questions.
DR. SIEMERS: You just said "not to weigh each individual word." Admiral, were the speeches of Hitler ever taken down accurately, that is, by stenographers?
SCHULTE-MONTING: Yes, but as far as I know only in the later part of the war. Hitler was against having his words put on record, because everyone who listened to him returned home with his own opinion. He himself did not stick to his text; he thought out loud and wanted to carry his listeners away, but he did not want his individual words to be taken literally. I spoke about that to Raeder very frequently. We always knew what was expected of us, but we never knew what Hitler himself thought or wanted.
DR. SIEMERS: If Hitler did not want to be taken at his word, how did it come about that he agreed in the war to have his speeches taken down by stenographers?
SCHULTE-MONTING: I told you before that too many misunderstandings had occurred, and that Hitler as well as those who reported to him believed that everyone had convinced the other of his opinion. Thereupon they started keeping minutes. The minutes kept up to then were personal impressions of those who were not instructed to keep them but who did so on their initiative.
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THE PRESIDENT: What time is the witness speaking of? He said up to then the minutes had been kept on the personal initiative of the person who took them. What time is he speaking of?
DR. SIEMERS: From what time, according to recollection, were these minutes taken by the stenographers?
SCHULTE-MONTING: From 1942, I believe.
DR. SIEMERS: From 1942?
SCHULTE-MONTING: It might also be 1941. During the war, at any rate.
DR. SIEMERS: But your conversation with Hitler was in January 1939?
SCHULTE-MONTING Yes, January 1939.
DR. SIEMERS: Admiral, what did the stenographic minutes look like later on? Did you ever see them?
SCHULTE-MONTING: We repeatedly asked for excerpts from the minutes and tried to compare them with the prepared text and they too contained contradictions.
DR. SIEMERS: Now, I come to the period when Hitler prepared for war against Russia, and I am going to show you the Directive Number 21, of 18 December 1940, concerning the Case Barbarossa.
Mr. President, that is Document Number 446-PS, Exhibit USA-31, in the Document Book of the British Prosecution Number 10a, Page 247.
[Turning to the witness.] The Prosecution have asserted that Raeder or the Naval Operations Staff had taken part in the drafting of that directive; is that correct?
SCHULTE-MONTING: No, that is not correct. The Navy had nothing to do with the drafting of that directive.
DR. SIEMERS: Did Raeder have any previous knowledge of Hitler's plan to attack Russia, before he received that directive?
SCHULTE-MONTING: Yes, by an oral communication from Hitler to Raeder, about the middle of August 1940-or October 1940.
DR. SIEMERS: October 1940. Did Raeder inform you about his conferences with Hitler concerning Russia, and what attitude did he adopt in these conferences?
SCHULTE-MONTING: Raeder informed me fully, because the prospect of war with Russia was much too serious to be taken lightly. Raeder opposed most energetically any plan for a war against Russia; and, I should like to say, for moral reasons because Raeder was of the opinion that the pact with Russia should not be broken as long as the other side gave no cause for it. That, as far
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as Raeder knew, was not the case in October. That economic treaty -as we called it at that time-to our knowledge was about 90 percent at the expense of the Navy. We gave Russia one heavy cruiser, heavy artillery for battleships, artillery installations, submarine engines, submarine installations, and valuable optical instruments for use on submarines. Besides, Raeder was of the opinion that the theater of operations should not be allowed to be carried into the Baltic Sea. The Baltic Sea was our drill field, I might say. All our recruits were trained there; all our submarine training took place in the Baltic Sea.
We had already partly stripped the Baltic coast of batteries and personnel for the purpose of protecting the Norwegian and the French coasts. We had very small oil reserves at our disposal, the synthetic oil production was not yet in full swing. The Navy had to turn over some of its reserves to industry and agriculture. Consequently, Raeder was strongly opposed to waging war against Russia.
DR. SIEMERS: Admiral, the Prosecution believe that Raeder was only opposed to the date set for the war against Russia and concludes this from the War Diary in which actually the entries refer to the date. Is that correct?
SCHULTE-MONTING: No, that is not correct. After the receipt of Directive 21, called Barbarossa, Raeder approached Hitler again with reference to the war against Russia, and also put down his thoughts in a memorandum. He tried to convince Hitler of the following: Poland had been crushed, France had been occupied, and, for military reasons, an invasion of England was out of the question. He said clearly that now the time had arrived when the further conduct of the war could not be decisive on the Continent, but in the Atlantic. Therefore, he told him that he had to concentrate all forces at his disposal on one objective: To hit the strategic points of the Empire, especially the supply lines to the British Isles in order to compel England to sue for negotiations or, if possible, to make peace. He suggested, as has been mentioned before, that the policy of peace with Norway should be pursued, peace with France, and closer co-operation with the Russian Navy, such as was provided for in the economic treaty, and the repurchase of submarine equipment or submarines. He said that the decision or the date for a decision no longer rested with us because we did not have the necessary sea power and that in case of a long duration of the war the danger of the participation of the United States had also to be considered; that therefore the war could not be decided on the European continent and least of all in the vastnesses of the Russian steppes. That point of view he continued to present to Hitler as long as he was in office.
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DR. SIEMERS: Admiral, you said at first that Raeder had protested, in principle as you have expressed it, for moral reasons, that is, for reasons of international law.
SCHULTE-MONTING: Yes.
DR. SIEMERS: Why was not that entered into the War Diary when the other reasons that you have mentioned can be found in the War Diary? At least they are alluded to.
SCHULTE-MONTING: That I can answer, or at least give you an explanation. Raeder, as a matter of principle, never criticized the political leadership in the presence of the gentlemen of the Naval Operations Staff or the front commanders. Therefore, he did not speak to me and the others about the private conversations which he had with Hitler, except when it was necessary for military reasons.
DR. SIEMERS: When were the preparations by the Navy, on the basis of Directive 21 that you have in front of you, made? Do you remember that?
SCHULTE-MONTING: I believe about 3 months later.
DR. SIEMERS: At any rate, certainly after the directive?
SCHULTE-MONTING: Yes, after the directive.
DR. SIEMERS: Were they made on the basis of that directive?
SCHULTE-MONTING: On the basis of that, yes.
DR. SIEMERS: Was that directive already a final order or was it just a precautionary strategic measure?
SCHULTE-MONTING: In my estimation it should not be considered as an order, and that can be seen from Points IV and V.
DR. SIEMERS: In what way?
SCHULTE-MONTING: Point V says that Hitler was still waiting for reports from commanders-in-chief. And Raeder still reported to Hitler after he had received the directive.
DR SIEMERS: Is Point IV, if you will look at it once more, also in accordance with your opinion?
SCHULTE-MONTING: Yes, absolutely. The words "precautionary measures" are underlined.
DR. SIEMERS: Precautionary measures for what?
SCHULTE-MONTING: In case of war against Russia.
DR. SIEMERS: Well, I think, Admiral, since you have mentioned it yourself, you should read the sentence which follows the words "precautionary measures."
SCHULTE-MONTING: "In case Russia should change her attitude, she is..."
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THE PRESIDENT: You cannot argue with your own witness about the meaning of the words. He has given his answer.
DR. SIEMERS: Very well.
[Turning to the witness.] Was Raeder of the opinion, at any time, that he had succeeded in dissuading Hitler from the unfortunate plans against Russia?
SCHULTE-MONTING: Yes. After he had made his report at that time, he returned and said, "I believe I have talked him out of his plan." And at first we did have that impression because in the following months there were no more conferences about it, to my knowledge, not even with the General Staff.
DR. SIEMERS: May I ask you quite briefly then about Greece. According to Document C-152, which I will have shown to you, Raeder made a report to Hitler on 18 March 1941, in which he asked that the whole of Greece should be occupied What were the reasons that caused the High Command, that is, Raeder and you, to make that suggestion?
SCHULTE-MONTING: When Raeder asked for authorization, as it says here in the War Diary, for the occupation of the whole of Greece, even in the event of a peaceful settlement, we, according to my recollection, had already been for 3 months in possession of the directive which was concerned with the occupation of Greece, and when . . .
DR. SIEMERS: Excuse me. Was that Directive Number 20? I will have it shown to you. Is that the one you mean?
SCHULTE-MONTING: Yes, "Marita," that is the one.
DR. SIEMERS: Mr. President, that is Document Number 1541-PS, Exhibit GB-13, in the Document Book of the British Prosecution 10a, Page 270. That is Directive Number 20, Case Marita of 13 December 1940.
[Turning to the witness.] Admiral, what caused Raeder, apart from that point which Hitler had already explained, to ask that specific question again in the month of March, that is to say, on 18 March?
SCHULTE-MONTING: A British landing had already occurred in the south of Greece a few days before.
DR. SIEMERS: Did this landing make it necessary to occupy the whole of Greece?
SCHULTE-MONTING: Yes, for strategic reasons, absolutely. The menace of an occupation from the sea or from the air, or the formation of a Balkan front against Germany, or the menace from the air to the oil fields, had to be eliminated under all circumstances. May I only remind you of the Salonika operation in the first World War. I believe that was a similar situation.
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DR. SIEMERS: Here again the Prosecution say this was governed by the desire for conquest and fame. Is that correct?
SCHULTE-MONTING: I should like to answer that fame requires achievements, and I do not know what the Navy could have conquered in the Mediterranean. We did not have a single man or a single ship down there; but Raeder, of course, for the strategic reasons I have mentioned, had to advise Hitler in that direction.
DR. SIEMERS: Were breaches of neutrality on the part of Greece known to you before this time, before we occupied Greece?
SCHULTE-MONTING: We had been informed that in 1939, certain Greek political and military circles had been in the closest connection with the Allied General Staff. We knew that Greek merchantmen were in British service. Therefore we were compelled to consider the Greek merchantmen which sailed through the prohibited zone to England as enemy ships. And, I believe, in the beginning of 1940, or the middle of 1940, we received information that the Allies intended to land in Greece or to establish a Balkan front against Germany.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn now.
[The Tribunal recessed until 1400 hours.]
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Afternoon Session
DR. SIEMERS: Admiral, as the last point in my questions dealing with Russia, I should like to show you the document submitted by the Soviet Prosecution, Document USSR-113. This document is a communication from the Naval Operations Staff of 29 September 1941 to Group North, that is, Generaladmiral Carls. Under II it states as to the result of a conversation between Admiral Fricke and Hitler: "The Fuehrer is determined to make the city of St. Petersburg disappear from the face of the earth." Raeder has been accused of not having done anything to oppose such a monstrous intention and has been accused because the Naval Operations Staff passed on this communication. I ask you, Admiral, did you know of this communication in 1941?
[Turning to the President.] I beg your pardon, Mr. President, I should like to remark that at this moment, I am sorry to say, I have no photostatic copy of this document. I tried to procure it. I have this very moment received it, and I should like to submit the photostatic copy at this point, instead of the written copy.
SCHULTE-MONTING: This seems to be the original which I have before me?
DR. SIEMERS: No, Admiral, it is a copy, an exact copy of the photostatic copy with all paragraphs and names, made for my own special use.
Were you acquainted with this piece of writing in 1941?
SCHULTE-MONTING: I did not know it in 1941, it is submitted to me at this moment for the first time.
DR. SIEMERS: Do you believe that Admiral Raeder saw this communication before it was sent off, even though you yourself had not seen it?
SCHULTE-MONTING: That would have been a miracle. Communications which were submitted to Admiral Raeder all went through my hands. They always had the notation, either "the Commander-in-Chief has taken due note," and were initialed by me personally in order to certify this notation, or "this order or this directive is to be submitted to the Commander-in-Chief," and in this case too my initials were affixed. This order and this copy which you have just shown to me I have never seen before; I am not acquainted with it; and I consider it impossible that Admiral Raeder should have seen it, because on 29 September 1941 I was in good health and exercising my duties in Berlin.
DR. SIEMERS: Admiral, what do you know about this question of Leningrad and the Navy?
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SCHULTE-MONTING: I recall that at the so-called daily discussions regarding the general situation one of the officers of the Naval Operations Staff reported on the intentions of the Army regarding the future of Leningrad-not Petersburg. Whereupon Raeder expressed the desire that it be kept in mind during the operations that Leningrad should, under all circumstances, fall intact into our hands, for he needed shipyards and adjoining territory for naval construction; and he wished that the Army be informed of the urgency of this desire, because in view of the ever-increasing danger of air attacks, we intended to shift part of our shipyard facilities to the East.
At that time we had already begun, if I remember correctly, to move installations from Emden to the East and wanted, furthermore, as Raeder wished, to evacuate Wilhelmshaven subsequently and move the installations there as far to the East as possible. He emphasized expressly that the city should also be left as undamaged as possible because otherwise there would be no place for the workers to live. This is all I can truthfully tell you about the case of Leningrad.
DR. SIEMERS: Do you know that this wish of Raeder's was rejected by Hitler because he said it was not possible?
SCHULTE-MONTING: No, I do not recall that this case was taken up again. For the operations in the North soon came to a standstill, I believe.
DR. SIEMERS: Did other high officers tell you anything at all about this document?
SCHULTE-MONTING: No, I never heard anything about this document, nor did I see any reason to discuss it with anyone.
DR. SIEMERS: Mr. President, if it is agreeable to the Tribunal, I should like to submit a document which was granted me, Exhibit Raeder-111, because of its connection with this problem. It is to be found in my Document Book 6, Page 435. It is an affidavit by Rear Admiral Hans Butow, dated 21 March 1946. I should like to read this document since it is very brief.
THE PRESIDENT: What page is this?
DR. SIEMERS: Page 435 in Document Book 6, Exhibit Number Raeder-111. It reads as follows:
"During the period from 20 June 1941 to 20 October 1941, namely, the period to which Document USSR-113, (l), UK-45, refers, I was stationed in Finland as Naval Commander. I was under Generaladmiral Carts, the Commander-in-Chief of Group North. I declare that the document in question, USSR-113, (1), UK-45, a communication of 29 September 1941
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sent by the Naval Operations Staff to Group North, and its contents have never come to my knowledge, as it doubtless would have if Generaladmiral Carls had passed on the letter to the offices subordinate to him. As far as I know, no one else in my command received this communication.
"I myself first obtained knowledge of this order of Hitler's in November 1945 on the occasion of a conversation with Dr. Siemers, the defense counsel for Admiral Raeder.
"Other officers, especially other naval commanders, have never spoken to me about this order. It is thus clear that the other commanders likewise had no knowledge of this order."
Then there is the certification and the signature of the senior naval judge before whom this affidavit was made.
Admiral, then I should like to turn to a new topic, the alleged war of aggression which Raeder is supposed to have planned against America. Did Raeder at any time try to instigate Japan to a war against America?
SCHULTE-MONTING: No, never. We never had any military discussions with Japan at all before her entry into the war. Quite on the contrary, he warned Hitler against war with America in view of England's naval superiority and her co-operation with America.
DR. SIEMERS: For what reasons did you, Raeder, and the High Command especially, warn Hitler?
SCHULTE-MONTING: First of all, for the reasons which I outlined before, reasons of over-all strategy which motivated Raeder during the entire course of the war. Raeder considered the enemy on the sea primarily, and not on land. If the largest sea power in the world were added to England, which was already superior, then the war would have taken on unbearable proportions for us.
Besides, through the reports of our naval attaché in Washington, Vice Admiral Witthoft, Raeder was very well informed about the tremendous potential at the disposal of the United States.
I might also say with reference to the conversion of the normal economy into a war economy, that the tremendous outlay of shipyards and installations, as Witthoft stated a few months before the war, permitted the construction of a million tons of shipping each month. These figures were very eloquent and were naturally at the same time a terrible warning to us not to underestimate the armament potential of the United States.
DR. SIEMERS: The Prosecution believes it must draw a contrary conclusion from the fact that Raeder on 18 March 1941, according to the War Diary, proposed that Japan should attack Singapore.
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SCHULTE-MONTING: In my opinion, that was an absolutely correct measure and a correct proposal, which was in line with Raeder's reasoning. He was interested in dealing blows to England's important strategic centers. That he tried to ease our situation is understandable and self-evident. But at no time did he propose that Japan should enter into a war against America, but rather against England.
DR. SIEMERS: Were there any discussions about these strategic questions at that time between you and Raeder on the one hand and Japanese military authorities on the other?
SCHULTE-MONTING: No, I have already stated that before Japan's entry into the war no military discussions with Japan had ever taken place. The Japanese attitude was very reserved.
DR. SIEMERS: Did Raeder ever discuss the fact that Japan should attack Pearl Harbor?
SCHULTE-MONTING: No. We heard about this for the first time over the radio.
DR. SIEMERS: Admiral, during the time of your activity in the High Command of the Navy or during your activity as a commanding admiral at Trondheim did you have any knowledge about
the treatment of Allied prisoners of war by the German Navy?
SCHULTE-MONTING: I might reply that I know of no case in which Allied prisoners of war, as long as they were under the control of the Navy, were treated other than properly and chivalrously. I could refer to the testimony given by the English commander of the midget U-boat, which attacked the Tirpitz in the Alta Fjord, who after his return to England from imprisonment, gave a press interview on the occasion of his being awarded the Victoria Cross. In this interview he mentioned the particularly chivalrous and correct treatment he had received at the hands of the commander of the Tirpitz.
From my own command in Norway I could mention a case in which members of the Norwegian resistance movement dressed in civilian clothing were treated just as chivalrously and correctly. I had to investigate these cases in the presence of British authorities, and the correctness of the treatment became evident.
DR. SIEMERS: When did you have to investigate this at the order of the British Military Government?
SCHULTE-MONTING: After the capitulation.
DR. SIEMERS: I beg your pardon, not the Military Government, but the British Navy.
SCHULTE-MONTING: The British Navy at Trondheim, while I was a commanding admiral.
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DR. SIEMERS: And the cases which were investigated there, first by you and then by the competent British admiral, were not contested?
SCHULTE-MONTING: Were not contested. The naval officer handed them over to me for safekeeping, and I had to present the findings of the courts of inquiry in writing.
DR. SIEMERS: And the result...
SCHULTE-MONTING: The result was good, proper, and occasioned no protests.
DR. SIEMERS: And the result was presented to the competent British officer?
SCHULTE-MONTING: Yes, it was on his very order that I had to do it.
DR. SIEMERS: Admiral, the case of the Athenia has been dealt with here in detail and is known to the Tribunal. Therefore, in order to save time, I should like merely to touch this case in passing. I should like you to tell me: Did the High Command know, did you and Raeder know, at the beginning of September 1939 that the Athenia had been sunk by a German U-boat?
SCHULTE-MONTING. No. The Commander of U-boats reported on the ad that the Athena could not have been sunk by a German U-boat since, if I remember correctly, the nearest boat was about 70 nautical miles away.
DR. SIEMERS: When did you learn that a German U-boat had sunk the Athenia?
SCHULTE-MONTING: I believe 2 or 3 weeks afterwards, after this U-boat returned.
DR. SIEMERS: Mr. President, I should like to refer to a document, according to which the date was 27 September.
[Turning to the witness.] Do you know that a declaration had been made by State Secretary Von Weizsacker on 3, 4, or 5 September to the effect that it was not a German U-boat? When it was established that it actually had been a German U-boat, what did Raeder do about it?
SCHULTE-MONTING: The assumption that it had not been a German U-boat was at first justified and State Secretary Von Weizsacker therefore acted in the best of faith, as did we. After this regrettable mistake became known, Raeder reported this fact to Hitler. Hitler then gave the order that he did not want the statement which had been made by the Foreign Office denied. He ordered that the participants, that is those who knew, should give their oath to remain silent until, I believe, the end of the war.
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DR. SIEMERS: Did you give your oath of silence?
SCHULTE-MONTING: I personally did not give my oath of silence, and neither did Admiral Raeder. In the High Command we were the only ones, I believe, with the exception of Admiral Fricke who had knowledge of that, and we should probably have taken the oath.
DR. SIEMERS: At Hitler's order you were obliged to administer an oath to the others who knew about this?
SCHULTE-MONTING: Yes. I am of the opinion that it was the crew of the U-boat, insofar as they knew about this mistake.
DR. SIEMERS: The Prosecution accuses Admiral Raeder of not having gone to Freiherr Ton Weizsacker to tell him that it actually was a German U-boat and of not having said to the American naval attaché, "I am sorry; it was a German U-boat after all."
SCHULTE-MONTING: Such thoughts occurred to us as well, but we thought that any discrepancies which might arise and lead to political ill-humor in America were to be avoided as much as possible. Stirring up this case once more would have greatly aroused public feeling. I remember, for instance, the Lusitania case during the first World War. To have stirred up this case again after a few weeks and to arouse public opinion, and then to force entry into the war would have had little sense.
DR. SIEMERS: And that was the train of thought which caused Hitler to issue this decree?
SCHULTE-MONTING: It was the train of thought which we also shared.
DR. SIEMERS: You said it was not to be stirred up again but regrettably, as you know, this case was stirred up again. On 23 October 1939 in the Volkischer Beobachter a very unfortunate article appeared with the heading "Churchill Sinks the Athenia." Do you remember that article?
SCHULTE-MONTING: Yes, of course. That article was published without Raeder's knowledge and without the knowledge or complicity of the Navy. Even today I do not know yet who the author of the article was. It originated in the Propaganda Ministry, and Raeder and the rest of us in the High Command of the Navy were most indignant, not so much because this topic was being stirred up again, but rather because of the tenor of the article for whether deliberately or unintentionally-we did not know which it was-there was a misrepresentation.
We were obliged to keep silence. To what extent the Propaganda Ministry had been informed about this matter by Hitler, we
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did not know. We also had no opportunity to speak with the Propaganda Ministry about this case and we were completely surprised when this article appeared several weeks later in the Volkischer Beobachter. We were therefore deeply indignant, especially Raeder, because it was fundamentally against his principles that leading foreign statesmen be attacked in a caustic manner; and, in addition, the facts were completely distorted. And besides-this may also be important-this involved Raeder's opponent whom Raeder did not in the least wish to disparage before the German public, for Raeder took him only too seriously; and this was, I believe, no other than Churchill.
DR. SIEMERS: Now, one last question: Did the Propaganda Ministry call you or Raeder up before this article appeared?
SCHULTE-MONTING: No, no.
DR. SIEMERS: Then I should like to turn to the last question of my examination. This is the last point.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Siemers, that is about the sixth final question you have asked.
DR. SIEMERS: I beg your pardon, Mr. President, the translation must have been wrong. The previous question was the final question on the Athenia problem. Now, this is actually the final question which I wish to put.
[Turning to the witness.] The Prosecution accuses Admiral Raeder of not supporting Generaloberst Freiherr Von Fritsch after the latter had been exonerated and acquitted in court and accuses Raeder of not having used his influence to reinstate Fritsch in office and restore his dignity. Is that correct?
SCHULTE-MONTING: No, that is not correct. Raeder gave me all the files of the legal proceedings against Generaloberst Von Fritsch sometime in the beginning of 1939 to be kept in the safe. At that time he told me how the course of the proceedings had impressed him and also of the fact that he had made Generaloberst Von Fritsch the offer of a complete reinstatement, going so far as to have him reinstated in his previous of lice. Von Fritsch thanked him for that and told him personally that he would never assume his former office again, that he would not even consider returning after what had happened, for which reason he was requesting Raeder not to make any efforts in this direction.
Besides, Fritsch and Raeder were on good personal terms-to say that they were friends is going perhaps too far, but I have often seen Fritsch at Raeder's house even after his dismissal.
DR. SIEMERS: Thank you, Admiral.
Mr. President, I have no further questions.
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THE PRESIDENT: Does any other member of the defendants' counsel want to ask any questions?
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUHLER : Admiral Schulte-Monting , you just spoke about the correct treatment of prisoners in connection with a U-boat attack on the Tirpitz. Do you mean by that the attack in November 1943 in the Alta Fjord?
SCHULTE-MONTING: Yes, that is the one I mean.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUHLER: Was it a two-man U-boat?
SCHULTE-MONTING: Whether it was a two-man or three-man U-boat, I do not know, but it was a midget U-boat. Several U-boats attacked simultaneously. Some of them were sunk, and the commander who successfully, I believe, placed his magnetic mine was taken prisoner.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUHLER: And this commander was treated according to the Geneva convention?
SCHULTE-MONTING: Absolutely.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUHLER: Thank you.
THE PRESIDENT: Does the Prosecution wish to cross-examine?
MAJOR JONES: Witness, I want to ask you first about the Athenia episode. I take it you agree that the article in the Volkischer Beobachter was thoroughly dishonorable, lying, and discreditable.
SCHULTE-MONTING: I heard nothing at all in German.
MAJOR JONES: I will repeat my question. With regard to the Athenia-do you hear me now?
SCHULTE-MONTING: Yes.
MAJOR JONES: With regard to the Volkischer Beobachter article on the Athenia, do you agree that it was a thoroughly dishonorable publication?
SCHULTE-MONTING: Yes, I agree that it was a dishonorable publication, untrue and dishonorable.
MAJOR JONES: Perhaps if you keep your headphones on-I have a number of questions to ask you, I am afraid-it might be more convenient for the work we have to do.
And you say that the Defendant Raeder thought it was dishonorable?
SCHULTE-MONTING: Yes, he did as wed.
MAJOR JONES: What action did he take to manifest his displeasure?
SCHULTE-MONTING: In this case he valued the interests of the State more than a newspaper article. The interests of the State
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required that in any event all complications with the United States were to be avoided.
MAJOR JONES: That appears to be a characteristic on the part of Raeder that runs throughout the history from 1928 to 1943, that throughout he put what he thought were the interests of the Nazi State before conditions of morality, honor, and public decency, is that not so?
SCHULTE-MONTING: That I do not believe. I believe that in this he acted consistently as a good patriot would act.
MAJOR JONES: You see, with regard to the invasion of Russia, for example, you said to the Tribunal that on both moral and strategic grounds, Raeder was against the invasion of Russia. Why did he not resign?
SCHULTE-MONTING: By way of reply I must mention first Hitler's answer to Raeder's statements against a war with Russia. This answer was to the effect that he saw no possibility of avoiding a conflict for the following reasons:
First, because of the personal impression which he, Hitler, had received from Molotov's visit, which had taken place in the meantime. By "in the meantime" I mean between the directive and the carrying through of the directive.
Secondly, the fact that allegedly the economic negotiations had not only been dragged out by the Russians but, as Hitler expressed it, had been conducted with blackmail methods.
Thirdly, as he had been informed by the German General Staff. Russian troop deployment had taken on such threatening proportions that he, Hitler, could not wait for the first blow from the other side because of the air threat to Brandenburg and the capital and to the Silesian industry. Raeder then, of course, had to realize that he could not refute these arguments or prove the opposite.
MAJOR JONES: You are not suggesting that you thought that the war between Germany and Russia was a defensive war so far as Germany was concerned, are you?
SCHULTE-MONTING: No, we were of the opinion that the deployment of troops on both sides had reached such an extreme point that it would not take long for the storm to burst, and that from the military point of view anyone who sees that a conflict is inevitable, naturally likes to have the advantages which result from dealing the first blow.
MAJOR JONES: The invasion of Russia was a brutal aggression on the part of Nazi Germany, you admit that now, do you not?
SCHULTE-MONTING: Yes, I do admit that.
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MAJOR JONES: I want you to turn your mind for a moment, if you will, to Document L-79, which is in the British Document Book 10, Page 74. Those are the minutes of the Hitler conference on 23 May 1939 which you discussed in your evidence-in-chief this morning. I take it that you have read those minutes, Witness?
SCHULTE-MONTING: May I look at them now? I have never seen these minutes before. If I were to be asked about them, I would first have to read them in toto.
MAJOR JONES: Well, you need not trouble to do that, Witness. You gave evidence this morning as to Raeder's discussion with you about this conference. Did Raeder tell you that Hitler had said on 23 May 1939, for instance:
"There is no question of sparing Poland, and we are left with the decision to attack Poland at the first suitable opportunity. We cannot expect a repetition of the Czechoslovakian affair. There will be war."
Then further, Page 76 of the report:
"The Fuehrer doubts the possibility of a peaceful settlement with England. We must prepare ourselves for the conflict.... England is therefore our enemy, and the conflict with England will be a life and death struggle."
And then the next paragraph but one:
"The Dutch and Belgian air bases must be occupied by armed force. Declarations of neutrality must be ignored."
Now, I am suggesting to you that those statements of Hitler's represented Hitler's considered policy, and that that policy was in fact carried out in the field of action. Is that not so?
SCHULTE-MONTING: First of all, I must correct a mistake. I thought that you had shown me a record on Russia and not the one on Poland. I saw it in different writing, and I thought it was another record. If it is the same record which I mentioned this morning, then I must state again that Raeder did not agree with the belligerent wording of these minutes as written down by Schmundt.
MAJOR JONES: Just one moment, Witness, if you please. I have read out certain extracts from that document, which I take it that you heard interpreted. Do you agree with me that those extracts represented Hitler's considered policy at the time and that that policy was in fact carried out in the field of action?
If you keep your headphones on-I know it is difficult. Just move them back if you wish to talk. Now, see if you can answer my question.
SCHULTE-MONTING: I should like to remark in this connection that Hitler in his speeches pursued a certain purpose. In preparations
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for war he saw a means of political pressure, and in the phrase "war of nerves" (which was not used in Germany only, but went everywhere through the ether far beyond Europe's boundaries) he tried to find a means of preventing war as well as a means of exerting pressure. This document itself contains contradictions which lead to the conclusion that he himself could not seriously have thought that a war would develop. I can prove this by saying, for example, that he states that the General Staff or the general staffs are not to concern themselves with this question; but toward the end he says that all the branches of the Wehrmacht must get together to study the problem. He says that a war with Poland must in no event result in war with England; politics must see to that. But in the next paragraph one reads: "But if a war actually does arise, I shall deal short sharp blows for a quick decision." In the next paragraph it says again, "But I need 10 to 15 years to prepare," and in the concluding paragraph it says: "The construction program of the Navy will in no wise be changed."
If, therefore, Hitler at that time had really been serious in his speech, that is, that an armed conflict with Poland would result shortly, then he would not have exclaimed first that we would have time until 1943 and, secondly, that there were to be no changes as far as the Navy was concerned. Rather he would have said to Raeder, privately at least: "In all haste prepare a strong U-boat program because I do not know what course events will take."
MAJOR JONES: But it is a fact that at about this time, the Fall Weiss operation was being prepared to the very last detail, was it not? That is the operation against Poland.
SCHULTE-MONTING: The operation was prepared to such a stage that when it was canceled at the last minute we thought that we would not be able to reach our forces at sea by wireless. We considered this an extreme policy of exerting pressure in the form of a war of nerves. Since at the last minute everything was canceled we believed without doubt that it was only a means of pressure and not an entry into war. Not until we heard the cannons were we convinced that the war was no longer to be prevented. I personally believe . . .
MAJOR JONES: If you would shorten your answers as best you can, it would be very convenient.
I want to go from Poland to Norway. The first conference of the Defendant Raeder with regard to Norway took place on 10 October, you have told us. I want you to hear the record of that conference, which is found in Admiral Assmann's headline diary. It is dated 10 October 1939:
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"The Commander-in-Chief of the Navy states conquering the Belgian coast no advantage for U-boat warfare; refers to value of Norwegian bases."
I suggest to you that the interests of the German Navy in Norway from the point of view of requiring submarine bases was manifesting itself at that time; is that not so?
SCHULTE-MONTING: May I look at this document first? It is unknown to me.
MAJOR JONES: You shall see the original diary, if you want to reassure yourself that I am reading it correctly.
[The document was handed to the witness.]
SCHULTE-MONTING: In this sentence, I do not see any belligerent intentions. It says expressly that he attaches importance to the winning of Norwegian bases.
MAJOR JONES: That is all I am putting to you at the moment And do you know that on 3 October the Defendant Raeder was sending out a questionnaire upon the possibility of extending the operational base to the north, and upon the bases that it would be desirable for German power to acquire?
I am referring to Document C-122, My Lord. The document C-122 is in Document Book 10a at Page 91.
If you will look at that document, Witness, you will see in the second sentence:
"It must be ascertained whether it is possible to gain bases in Norway with the combined pressure of Russia and Germany, with the aim of improving fundamentally our strategic and operational position. The following questions are to be examined . . ."
And then there follow these questions:
"What places in Norway can be considered as bases?
"Can bases be gained by military force against Norway's will, if it is impossible to achieve this without fighting?
"What are the possibilities of defense after the occupation?
"Will the harbors have to be developed completely as bases, or do they possibly have decisive advantages simply as supply centers? (The Commander of U-boats considers such harbors extremely useful as equipment and supply bases for Atlantic U-boats on temporary stops.)"
And then finally:
"What decisive advantages would there be for the conduct of the war at sea in gaining a base in North Denmark, for instance, Skagen?"
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Now, I suggest to you that those documents are the clue to the German invasion of Norway. Do you not agree with that?
SCHULTE-MONTING: No, I do not see any aggressive intentions in these purely operational plans and considerations when thinking of what bases might come into consideration for the conduct of the war. This morning I said that, to the best of my knowledge, Generaladmiral Carls as early as September sent a letter to this effect to Raeder in which he expressed his concern and stated his strategical ideas and plans in case of an Allied occupation of Norway.
MAJOR JONES: The source of the information which the Defendant Raeder was receiving you discussed this morning, but one source that you did not give was the Norwegian traitor Quisling. The relations between the Defendant Raeder and him were very close, were they not?
SCHULTE-MONTING There was no contact at all between Raeder and Quisling until December 1939; then Raeder met Quisling for the first time in his life and never saw him again.
MAJOR JONES: But after December Quisling's agent Hagelin was a very frequent visitor of the Defendant Raeder, was he not?
SCHULTE-MONTING: I do not believe that Hagelin ever went to Raeder before Quisling's visit, unless I am very mistaken. I think he visited Raeder for the first time when he accompanied Quisling.
MAJOR JONES: Yes, but thereafter Raeder was in very close touch with the Quisling movement, the Quisling treachery, was he not?
SCHULTE-MONTING: No. Raeder had nothing at all to do with the Quisling movement. ~
MAJOR JONES: Do you know a man, Erich Giese, Walter Georg Erich Giese, who was an administrative employee of the adjutancy of the supreme commander of the Navy in Berlin?
SCHULTE-MONTING: I did not quite catch the name.
MAJOR JONES: Giese, G-i-e-s-e. He was a-part of his duties were to receive the visitors of the supreme commander. He was an assistant of the supreme commander's adjutant and he was dismissed from his post in April 1942. And no doubt you recollect the man.
SCHULTE-MONTING: Will you please tell me the name again? Although it was spelled to me I did not catch it. Is this a Norwegian?
MAJOR JONES: This is a German subject, an employee of the supreme command of the Navy. Part of his duties were to receive all the supreme commander's visitors, to accept applications for
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interviews, and draw up the list of callers for the supreme commander. Now you are looking at an affidavit from this man, Document D-722, to be Exhibit GB-479.
THE PRESIDENT: Has the witness answered the question yet?
MAJOR JONES: Not yet, My Lord.
SCHULTE-MONTING: Now I have the name. The man of whom you are talking was in the reception room of the adjutant's office. It was not up to this man, who was to be admitted to the Admiral; that was up to me. I asked the callers for what reason they had come. Mr. Hagelin did not visit Raeder before Quisling's visit, that is, not before December 1939.
MAJOR JONES: I am not suggesting that but what I am suggesting is that after December 1939 there was a very close link between Raeder and the' Quisling movement. I just read out to you this extract from the affidavit of this man. From Page 3, My Lord, of the English text:
"I can state the following about the preparations which led up to the action against Denmark and Norway: An appointment with the Commander-in-Chief was frequently made for a Mr. Hagelin and another gentleman; whose name I cannot recall at present, by a party official of Rosenberg's Foreign Political Office; as a rule they were received immediately. I also had received instructions that if a Mr. Hagelin should announce himself personally, I should always take him to the Commander-in-Chief at once. Shortly afterwards I learned from the minute book and from conversations in my room that he was a Norwegian confidential agent. The gentleman from the Foreign Political Office who frequently accompanied him and whose name I do not remember at the moment also conversed with me and confided in me, so that I learned about the Raeder-Rosenberg discussions and about the preparations for the Norway campaign. According to all I heard I can say that the idea of this undertaking emanated from Raeder and met with Hitler's heartiest approval. The whole enterprise was disguised by the pretense of an enterprise against Holland and England. One day Quisling, too, was announced at the Commander-in-Chief's by Hagelin and was received immediately. Korvettenkapitan Schreiber of the Naval Reserve, who was later naval attaché in Oslo and knew the conditions in Norway very well, also played a role in all these negotiations. He collaborated with the Quisling party and its agents in Oslo."
SCHULTE-MONTING: It is not true that Mr. Hagelin was received by Admiral Raeder. Herr Giese cannot possibly have any
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information about that because he was stationed two rooms away. If he had perhaps noted down that he was received by me, that would in a certain sense be correct. The fact is that at the time, after the Quisling-Hagelin visit, I had said that if he were to pass through Berlin again and he had any naval political information in this connection, I should like him to make this information available to me.
MAJOR JONES: Are you saying that Defendant Raeder never met Hagelin?
SCHULTE-MONTING: He did not meet him before Quisling's visit in December. Later he did not receive him any more.
MAJOR JONES: But he in fact received Hagelin and took him to Hitler on 14 December 1939, did he not?
SCHULTE-MONTING: He was accompanied by Quisling, that is correct. But he did not have any special discussion with Raeder alone.
MAJOR JONES: You said-you spoke this morning as to a conference between Quisling and Raeder on 12 December 1939 and suggested that politics were not discussed at that conference.
SCHULTE-MONTING: By the word "politics" I mean politics in the National Socialistic sense, that is, National Socialistic politics on the Norwegian side and on our side. The matters discussed were only naval political questions.
MAJOR JONES: But I will not go into a discussion of the question of politics with you. I will consider the familiar German definition that politics is a continuation of war by other means. But if you look at the Document C-64 you will see that political problems were discussed on 12 December. You see that is a report of Raeder to Hitler. It is found on Page 31 of the Document Book 10a, in which Raeder writes in Paragraph 2:
"As a result of the Russo-Finnish conflict, anti-German feeling in Norway is even stronger than hitherto. England's influence is very great, especially because of Hambro, the President of the Storting (a Jew and a friend of Hore-Belisha) who is all-powerful in Norway just now. Quisling is convinced that there is an agreement between England and Norway for the possible occupation of Norway, in which case Sweden would also stand against Germany. Danger of Norway's occupation by England is very great-possibly very shortly. From 11 January 1940 on, the Storting and thereby the Norwegian Government is unconstitutional since the Storting, in defiance of the constitution, has prolonged its term for a year."
Politics was very much under discussion at that conference, was it not? You have said that the Defendant Raeder was anxious for
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peace with Norway. Was it for peace with a Norway ruled by the traitor Quisling?
SCHULTE-MONTING. In reply to your first question I should like to say that in the minutes it says:
"The Commander-in-Chief of the Navy points out that in connection with such offers we can never know to what extent the persons involved want to further their own party aims, and to what extent they are concerned about German interests. Hence caution is required."
This entry in the document which you have just presented to me corroborates what I was trying to say, that is, that no party matters or matters depending on agreement along ideological lines were to be settled between Admiral Raeder and Quisling. For this reason I said that Raeder did not discuss politics with him, but merely factual matters. That Quisling, at the time of his introduction, should mention certain things as a sort of preamble is self-evident. But he points out the factor of caution and asks: "What does this man want? Does he want to work with the Party or does he really want to remain aloof?"
MAJOR JONES: At any rate, the Defendant Raeder was preferring the reports of Quisling to the reports of the German Ambassador in Oslo which were entirely different from the reports of the traitor Quisling. That is so, is it not?
SCHULTE-MONTING: I believe that Raeder never saw the reports from the German Ambassador in Oslo. I at any rate do not know these reports.
MAJOR JONES: Now the Tribunal has the documents with regard to that matter. I will not pursue it. I want to ask you next about the relations with the United States of America. When did the German Admiralty first know of Japan's intention to attack the United States?
SCHULTE-MONTING: I can speak only for Raeder and myself. As far as I know, it was not until the moment of the attack on Pearl Harbor.
MAJOR JONES: But you had received a communication from your German naval attaché at Tokyo before the attack on Pearl Harbor, indicating that an attack against the United States was pending, had you not?
SCHULTE-MONTING: Pearl Harbor? No.
MAJOR JONES: But against the United States forces. Just look at the Document D-872, which will be Exhibit GB-480. You see that those are extracts from the war diary of the German naval attaché in Tokyo. The first entry is dated 3 December 1941:
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"1800 hours. The naval attaché extended an invitation to several officers of the Japanese Naval Ministry. It transpires from the conversation that the negotiations in Washington must be regarded as having broken down completely and that, quite obviously, the beginning of actions to the south by the Japanese Armed Forces is to be expected in the near future."
And then on 6 December 1941:
"Conversation with Fregattenkapitan Shiba."
The outcome of the conversation is reported to Berlin in the following telegram:
"Naval Attaché, 1251. Military Secret:
"1. Last week America offered a non-aggression pact between the United States, England, Russia and Japan. In view of the Tripartite Pact and the high counterdemands, Japan rejected this offer. Negotiations have therefore completely broken down.
"2. The Armed Forces foresaw this development and consented to Kurusu's being sent only to impress the people with the fact that all means had been exhausted.
"3. The Armed Forces have already decided 3 weeks ago that war is inevitable, even if the United States at the last minute should make substantial concessions. Appropriate measures are under way."
And then-I will not read the whole document, and at the end it says:
"A state of war with Britain and America would certainly exist by Christmas."
Assuming that signal reached you before 8 December, you became familiar with the plans of the perfidious Japanese attack upon the United States, did you not?
SCHULTE-MONTING: I do not quite grasp it. I have already said that we had no contact with the Japanese experts or attaches in Berlin. I asserted that we first learned of the Pearl Harbor incident by radio, and I cannot quite see what difference it makes whether on 6 December the attaché in Tokyo told us his predictions, or whether he was drawing conclusions about a future conflict from information sources which we could not control. That has nothing to do with our having advised the Japanese in Berlin to attack America.
MAJOR JONES: Are you saying that you had no conversations in Berlin with the Japanese attaché?
SCHULTE-MONTING: To my knowledge there were no official conferences between the two admiralty staffs, that is, official
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operational conferences between the Naval Operations Staff and the Japanese admiralty staff.
THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Elwyn Jones, before you part from that document, I think you ought to read Paragraph 5.
MAJOR JONES: Paragraph 5, My Lord, reads:
"5. Addition-Naval Attaché.
"No exact details are available as to the zero hour for the commencement of the southern offensive. All the evidence, however, indicates that it may be expected to start within 3 weeks, with simultaneous attacks on Siam, the Philippines and Borneo.
"6. The Ambassador has no knowledge of the transmission of the telegram, but is acquainted with its contents."
Now I want to...
THE PRESIDENT: With reference to what the witness has just said, I do not know whether I understood him right before, but what I took down he said was that the German Admiralty first knew of Japan's intention to attack, after Pearl Harbor, not that it first knew of Pearl Harbor by radio. It was the first indication they had of an intention to attack.
MAJOR JONES: That is so, My Lord.
[TURNING to the witness.] I am suggesting to you, Witness, that you knew perfectly well of the Japanese intention to attack the United States before the incident of Pearl Harbor.
SCHULTE-MONTING: I do not know whether you are stressing Pearl Harbor, or the fact that 2 days before the attack on Pearl Harbor we received a telegram from Tokyo to the effect that a conflict was to be counted on. I was asked whether we had known of the fact of the attack on Pearl Harbor, and to that I said: "No." I said that we had had no conferences in Berlin between the Naval Operations Staff and the Japanese admiralty staff. What you are presenting to me...
MAJOR JONES: I just want to deal with that, but I want to read out to you what your Commander-in-Chief said about that, because it is not what you are saying, you know. On the interrogation of Admiral Raeder on 10 November 1945 (Document D-880, GB-483) he was asked:
"Question: Would such matters be accomplished by Foreign Office people alone, or would that be in collaboration with the High Command of the Navy and OKW?"
And Defendant Raeder's answer was:
"No, the negotiations were conducted by the Foreign Office and on the part of the Japanese diplomats there was this
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delegate, Oshima, who was an officer. He negotiated with the Foreign Office in his capacity as delegate, but apart from that he was enough of an expert to look at this thing from a military standpoint as well. Military authorities had long before that carried on negotiations with military and naval attaches about the needs and other things that the Japanese needed... This was all talked about and thrashed out with the military and naval attaches."
That is a very different version of the fact from the version you have given, Witness, is it not? Now, there are two more matters which I want to deal with.
I do not know whether it will be convenient, My Lord, to have a brief adjournment.
[A recess was taken.]
MAJOR JONES: May it please the Tribunal, with regard to the extract from the interrogation of the Defendant Raeder which I read I wanted to be clear that the defendant was then dealing with the relationship generally between the German authorities in Berlin and the Japanese representatives. I do not want to have given the Court the impression it was a direct negotiation with regard to intervention against America itself. I do not want to mislead the Court in any way with regard to that matter.
[Turning to the witness.] Did you know of the shooting in December 1942 by a naval unit belonging to the German naval officer in command at Bordeaux of two British Royal Marines who took part in a raid on shipping in the Gironde estuary?
SCHULTE-MONTING: I learned of that later.
MAJOR JONES: Did you see the entry with regard to that shooting in the SKL War Diary?
SCHULTE-MONTING: No, here in Nuremberg the defendant's counsel showed me an entry, but I do not know whether it was the War Diary of the Naval Operations Staff.
MAJOR JONES: It has been suggested by both counsel for the Defendant Doenitz and counsel for the Defendant Raeder that the entry in D-658 which contained the sentence: "The measure would be in accordance with the Fuehrer's special order, but is nevertheless something new in international law since these soldiers were in uniform," that that entry was not from the SKL War Diary. Now, you are familiar with the initial of the Defendant Raeder, are you not?
I want you now to look at the original of D-658, so that it may be established beyond peradventure that this matter was entered
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in the SKL War Diary. I will put in a photostatic copy of the original if the Tribunal will allow me, because the original is required for other purposes. D-658 was GB-229, and it may be convenient to call the photostats of the originals D-658(a) and GB-229(a). That is the War Diary of the SKL, is it not?
SCHULTE-MONTING: Yes, I recognize it as such.
MAJOR JONES: And the SKL was perfectly familiar with that dreadful murder of the men at Bordeaux, was it not?
SCHULTE-MONTING: From the War Diary I can see-such is my impression-that afterward on 9 December they were informed about the fact of the shooting.
MAJOR JONES: And their laconic comment was...
SCHULTE-MONTING: In the Armed Forces communiqué it says: "According to the Armed Forces communiqué, the two soldiers have been shot in the meantime." This can be seen in the War Diary of the SKL and I acknowledged it. -
MAJOR JONES: And the humane comment of the SKL is, "It is something new in international law, since the soldiers were in uniform."
There is one final matter which I wish to ask you about: Is it your contention that the German Navy fought a clean war at sea?
SCHULTE-MONTING: I contend that the German Navy fought a very clean war and that has nothing to do with the fact that it is said here in the Diary of the SKL, as taken from the Armed Forces communiqué, that two soldiers were shot and that this was in accordance with the special order given by the Fuehrer which has been cited but, as the Naval Operations Staff adds, was something new in the history of naval warfare. This too...
MAJOR JONES: I am turning to another matter, but you say generally . . .
SCHULTE-MONTING: May I just say in conclusion that this postscript has been confirmed and that the Navy, in this case Raeder, had no influence on these matters. If you ask me whether I approved that order or something of the sort I would give you my personal opinion of the matters which Raeder and I discussed.
MAJOR JONES: But you know Raeder was Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, and who would have influence in Germany if the commanders-in-chief did not have influence? Here was a matter directly reflecting on the honor of German Armed Forces and despite that deliberate denial of the protection of the Geneva Convention for those British marines he continued in office, after they were deliberately murdered.
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SCHULTE-MONTING: That is a matter of opinion. I may take the following stand: The fact is that in this war, for the first time, a form of sabotage was applied, whether behind the lines by means of air landings or otherwise.
MAJOR JONES: Just a moment. These were marines in uniform. Your own report in the SKL War Diary says so.
SCHULTE-MONTING: I have to comment on that order which was issued earlier. The preamble of that order said that, since there w as knowledge of orders to the Allied soldiers or-I do not remember the exact wording any more-since these soldiers were given orders not to bother taking German prisoners but rather to shoot them while carrying out their work in the so-called Commando raids, the following directives had to be issued.
At that time I discussed this matter with Raeder, of course, and I can merely state my personal opinion. I felt that I could believe this preamble because I am of the opinion that if I resorted to, let us say, sabotage behind the lines then of course I could not be bothered with taking prisoners, because then the element of surprise would be excluded. If, therefore, a troop of three to five men, a so-called Commando undertaking, is sent behind the lines in order to destroy enemy installations, then of course they cannot burden themselves with prisoners without running the risk of being killed themselves or of being recognized before they can carry out their undertaking. Therefore I considered this preamble quite credible and I expressly said so at that time.
MAJOR JONES: And you think that that shooting of those two marines was therefore perfectly justified? That is your position on this matter, is it not? Just say "yes" or "no" on that; I will not argue with you.
SCHULTE-MONTING: I have not asserted that in any way.
Rather I said, here is a fact of which we were informed only by the Armed Forces communiqué, and that Raeder and the High Command had not been heard on this point. That is what I stated.
MAJOR JONES: Now, the final matter I wanted to ask you about, you have indicated that in your opinion Germany fought a clean war at sea. I want you to look at the new Document D-873 which will be GB-481, which is the log book of U-boat U-71, under the date line 21 June 1941, when the Defendant Raeder was Commander-in-Chief of the German Navy. You see the entry reads:
"Sighted lifeboat of the Norwegian motor tanker John P. Pederson drifting under sail. Three survivors were lying exhausted under a tarpaulin and only showed themselves as the U-boat was moving away again. They stated that their ship had been torpedoed 28 days before. I turned down their
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request to be taken aboard, provisioned the boat with food and water and gave them the course and distance to the Icelandic coast. Boat and crew were in a state that, in view of the prevailing weather, offered hardly any prospects of rescue."-Signed: "Flachsenberg." Is that your conception of a clean war at sea?
SCHULTE-MONTING: I observe that the commanding officer did what he could, in view of the weather which he described when he said that in view of the bad weather he could not rescue them. He threw provisions to them in a sack and gave them the course to the coast. I do not know what there is about that that is inhumane. If he had left without giving them food and the Course, then you might make that accusation.
MAJOR JONES: But he could have taken them aboard, you know. These were three men who did...
SCHULTE-MONTING: No, I believe you cannot judge that. Only the commanding officer himself can judge that, the man in charge of the U-boat. I would have to look at the weather, because it says here "Medium swell.'' That could also...
MAJOR JONES: But you see here the U-boat commander must have spoken to these people and physically it must have been possible to take them aboard, but he left them to their fate, you know, knowing quite well he was leaving them to die.
SCHULTE-MONTING: No, not at all. Then he would not have needed to give them any food and to give them the course to the coast. What makes you think that they had to die? By the way...
MAJOR JONES: The last sentence is a clear indication that the U-boat captain knew he was leaving them to die. I am suggesting to you that he could have taken them aboard and should have done so if he had the elements of humanity in him.
SCHULTE-MONTING: No; I do not know the condition of the U-boat, whether the boat was in a position to take prisoners on board. I believe that you have never seen conditions on a U-boat; otherwise you would not judge it like that. Considering that the crew of a U-boat is under water for weeks and uses every last bit of space and is exposed to the greatest dangers day and night, one cannot simply say that it would have been a humane act to take these additional men aboard. Besides, the commander himself says there was hardly a chance of rescue in view of the prevailing weather.
MAJOR JONES: I have no further questions, My Lord.
DR. SIEMERS: Admiral, I have some questions concerning a few points which Mr. Elwyn Jones put to you. An entry was shown
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to you from the document by Assmann of 10 October 1939 with the assertion that from this it can be seen that Raeder wanted to occupy Norway only in order to have Norwegian bases. I should like to read to you the full entry and I should like you then to take position to the entire document:
"The Fuehrer agrees that full use of the only two battleships which we have at the time should not be made for the time being. Russia offered bases near Murmansk...
"Question of siege of England: Fuehrer and Commander-in-Chief of Navy agree that all objections by neutrals have to be rejected, even in view of the danger of entry of U.S.A. into the war which seems certain if the war keeps on.
"The more brutally the war is conducted the sooner the effect, the shorter the war.
"Capacity for large U-boat production program. Fuehrer rejects suggestion to have submarines built by or bought from Russia for political reasons. Commander-in-Chief of Navy states no advantages to be won for the U-boat war by conquest of Belgian coast; refers to the value of winning Norwegian bases-Trondheim-with the help of Russian pressure. Fuehrer will consider the question." (Document D-879, Exhibit GB-482)
Admiral, according to the entire contents, is this a complete clarification of the Norwegian problem?
SCHULTE-MONTING: No, not at all.
DR. SIEMERS: Am I right in concluding that here a great number of questions are treated and only one strategic question with reference to Norway...
MAJOR JONES: If your Lordship pleases, the translation came through as, "no advantage of occupation of Norwegian bases" and the translation which is in the document is "Raeder stresses importance of obtaining Norwegian bases." Perhaps if there might be a careful-I am not saying this in any critical sense-a very careful translation of the entry, it might be important.
THE PRESIDENT: What is the-did you give that an exhibit. number?
MAJOR JONES: No, My Lord. That is the entry from Assmann's headline diary.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, I know it is. But I want to know the exhibit number.
MAJOR JONES: I will have an extract made and the exhibit number given this evening, My Lord.
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THE PRESIDENT: It would be GB-482, would it not?
MAJOR JONES: Yes, My Lord, that is it; GB-482.
DR. SIEMERS: Mr. President, it is the same date; I beg your pardon if it does not agree; but the document from which I read I received through the courtesy of Mr. Elwyn Jones.
THE PRESIDENT: You had better go into the question of translation and get that settled.
MAJOR JONES: Yes, Your Lordship.
DR. SIEMERS: At any rate, Admiral, both entries are 10 October, that is, of the same conference. Am I right in saying that consequently there were many strategic questions, not one of which can be said to have been treated completely and conclusively?
SCHULTE-MONTING: No, I believe that this complex of questions has nothing to do with the comprehensive discussion between Hitler and Raeder concerning the occupation of Norway. The Norwegian question was touched upon, the occupation of Norway, and then a few points brought up for discussion which Raeder usually jotted down in his notebook. Apart from the question whether an occupation of Norway was necessary or not, the possibility of conquering bases outside German territory was accidentally touched on the same day.
DR. SIEMERS: Therefore, Murmansk which had been offered by Russia was discussed.
SCHULTE-MONTING: From Russia to Belgium-all along the coast, wherever there were possibilities and advantages for our submarine strategy.
DR. SIEMERS: If in the War Diary a sentence in connection with a conference between Raeder and Hitler is in quotation marks, does that mean that these words were used by Hitler? Can one assume that?
SCHULTE-MONTING: If it says...
MAJOR JONES: If your Lordship please, the translation has now been checked, and the original reading of "Raeder stresses the importance of obtaining Norwegian bases" appears to be a perfectly correct translation.
THE PRESIDENT: Go on, Dr. Siemers.
SCHULTE-MONTING: I understood, Dr. Siemers; shall I speak about that?
DR. SIEMERS: Yes, did you want to add something to that point?
SCHULTE-MONTING: Yes. I understand that the other gentleman just pointed out that Raeder allegedly called Hitler's attention
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to the necessity of acquiring submarine bases and in that connection once spoke about Russian assistance and also about the possibility of acquiring bases from Norway. But that does not reveal any aggressive intentions.
DR. SIEMERS: Mr. President, in order to save time, I also asked Dr. Kranzbuhler to check the translation. The German text as I should like to point out right now says: "The Commander-in-Chief of the Navy points out the value of winning Norwegian bases." That is something different from the English translation. But I should like to come back to this later.
[Turning to the witness.] Admiral, Mr. Elwyn Jones then submitted the affidavit of Walter Giese. I should be grateful if you would look at it again. It is D-722. The first line reads:
"I was born at Steffln on 24 November 1900, the son of a bricklayer's foreman, Ernst Giese." Then it says:
"I sat in the reception room of the Commander-in-Chief as assistant to the adjutant." Then it says, in the same paragraph: "I received the minute book from the adjutant at midday after the conferences had ended and locked it up in the general safe."
Then it says on the second page:
"I did not have much contact with the Commander-in-Chief personally. This consisted merely in my submitting to him or fetching from him top-secret correspondence."
Admiral, am I right in assuming, therefore, that Giese was a sort of messenger?
SCHULTE-MONTING: Yes. In order to save officers we fired a large number of unimportant positions with civilians, people who we thought were worthy of our confidence. The care of a safe or guarding the key was really the task of the second adjutant, who later had to be used elsewhere.
Giese had been a sergeant in the Navy for many years and for 12 years had been a clerk in the Navy, and therefore had had a certain amount of practice in keeping files.
THE PRESIDENT: All this is stated in the document. If there is anything inaccurate in the document, you can put it to him. But it all is set out in the document, exactly as the Admiral said. You are wasting the time of the Tribunal by repeating it.
DR. SIEMERS: Mr. President, I believe what Mr. Elwyn Jones presented was also in the document. What matters is the question of interpretation and the witness has been referred to very definite
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points. If I should be mistaken, I beg your pardon. I believed that I also had the right in re-examination to refer to certain points in the document.
THE PRESIDENT: If you want to, you can draw our attention to the paragraphs.
SCHULTE-MONTING: I can be very brief.
Giese had no inside information about the facts, and even if he had, without permission, looked into the minutes of the adjutant, which were not a shorthand record but merely notes to aid the memory of the adjutant, he could never have received the right impression without having taken part in the conference. And it was not up to him in the reception room to decide who should be admitted to the Commander-in-Chief, but rather up to the adjutant or to me. He did not even know who was to be admitted. And it is a bold statement or assumption when he says that a man like Hagelin saw Raeder each time instead of seeing me first. By the way, Hagelin came to me perhaps four or five times.
DR. SIEMERS: Do you believe Giese was present when Raeder talked to Hitler?
SCHULTE-MONTING: Giese? No, never. Giese sat in the reception room and took care of Raeder's telephone calls.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Siemers, nobody here suggests that he was. Mr. Elwyn Jones was not putting it that this man Giese was present at talks between Raeder and the Fuehrer or Raeder and Hagelin.
DR. SIEMERS: Mr. President, this is his affidavit, and in the affidavit, it says, as I should like to point out now, on Page 5, "According to all I heard, I can say that the idea of this undertaking emanated from Raeder and met with Hitler's joyous agreement."
How could he know that?
SCHULTE-MONTING: I might stress that even I as chief of staff was not present at these private conferences, and Herr Giese had to stay with the telephone and had no other way of gaining an insight than by giving his imagination free rein.
DR. SIEMERS: That is enough, thank you. I come now to Document D-872. That is the war diary of the naval attaché in Japan, in connection with which you were told that you must have known that Japan would attack America on 7 December. The telegram which is mentioned here is of 6 December. When could that telegram have arrived in your office?
SCHULTE-MONTING: You mean, when could I have received it personally?
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DR. SIEMERS: Yes; or Raeder.
SCHULTE-MONTING: Not before the next morning.
DR. SIEMERS: That would be 7 December.
SCHULTE-MONTING: At the earliest. In this case, the Chief of Staff of the Naval Operations Staff would decide whether for operational reasons that telegram should be presented at once, or not.
DR. SIEMERS: Admiral, do you remember that document?
SCHULTE-MONTING: Yes.
DR. SIEMERS: Is Pearl Harbor mentioned in the document?
SCHULTE-MONTING: No. I tried to explain that Pearl Harbor had no connection with that telegram from Admiral Wennecker at all and that Wennecker depended on sources of information and on his assumptions or formulated his assumptions in a telegram on the basis of his information without having any definite facts. Such telegrams were received continuously. Sometimes these assumptions were correct; sometimes they were incorrect.
DR. SIEMERS: Admiral, the Prosecution has submitted it to prove that military negotiations had taken place with Japan. Am I correct in saying that that was only a message concerning possible developments?
SCHULTE-MONTING: Yes, of course. I have tried before to explain that there were no military negotiations between the admiralty staffs. Rather the naval attaché was charged with examining and transmitting all information of value which came to him.
DR. SIEMERS: Then a document was shown you which was not submitted, an interrogation of Raeder of 10 November 1945. May I ask to look at the bottom of Page 5 of this document which I am handing to you and the passage which was read on Page 6?
THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Elwyn Jones, that ought to have a number, ought it not?
MAJOR JONES: That will be GB-483, My Lord.
DR. SIEMERS: On that document, Page 5 at the bottom, is Document C-75 mentioned?
SCHULTE-MONTING: No.
DR. SIEMERS: I believe you are mistaken, Admiral, or else I have made a mistake.
SCHULTE-MONTING: I have an English copy-do you mean the English one?
DR. SIEMERS: Yes, the English copy because it does not exist in German.
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SCHULTE-MONTING: You mean the last paragraph?
DR. SIEMERS: I believe the last line or the line before the last. The page numbers are very hard to read. Maybe you have the wrong page.
This interrogation, Mr. President, concerns Document C-75. I believe the witness will find it soon. Mention has been made of this document recently and in accordance with the wish recently expressed by the Tribunal, I am submitting C-75; that is Directive Number 24 about the co-operation with Japan, and the full text is Document Number Raeder-128. The Tribunal will recall that the British Delegation...
THE PRESIDENT: Has it already been put in, C-75, has it already been put in?
DR. SIEMERS: I submit it now, C-75.
THE PRESIDENT: No, has it already been put in? Has it already been offered in evidence?
DR. SIEMERS: You may recall that the Prosecution has submitted Document C-75 as USA-151 ...
THE PRESIDENT: Well, that is all I wanted to know. If it has already been put in, it does not need a new number, is that not the position?
DR. SIEMERS: Mr. PRESIDENT, may I remind you that it needs a new number because only the first part was submitted by the Prosecution.
MAJOR JONES: It has already been exhibited as USA-151, My Lord.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, I think we are not giving fresh numbers, Dr. Siemers, to parts of documents which had already been put in. If the document has been put in, then where you want to use a fresh part of the document it has the same number as the old number; that is all.
DR. SIEMERS: But, Mr. PRESIDENT, if the Prosecution in their document put in only the first three paragraphs then I cannot...
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, I know; I know that perfectly well, but you are perfectly entitled to put in any part of the document. It is only a question of what number is to be given to it and I think- I may be wrong-that up to the present we have not given new numbers to documents once that they have been put in, although fresh parts of the documents are put in.
MAJOR JONES: My Lord, the position with regard to C-75 is that the whole of the original has been put in as USA-151, but only
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an extract from the original was included in the English document which was put before the Court.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, I see. All I was concerned with was the number of the thing. It has got the number USA-151 and I thought our practice had been that it should continue to have that number. You can put in any part of it you like, and if it is a question of translation, no doubt the Prosecution will hand it to the translation department and have it translated for you; but you are attempting to give it a new number, that is all.
DR. SIEMERS: I beg your pardon, once more, but I was asked recently to submit the document anew and that is where the misunderstanding arose. Under these circumstances, now that I hear that it. has been submitted in its entirety, I can withdraw it; I should be grateful if the Tribunal were also to receive the complete translation of the document in English and not only the first two paragraphs.
[TURNING to the witness.] Admiral, have you found it in the meantime?
SCHULTE-MONTING: Yes, it is on Page 7 as you thought and not on Page 5. The document refers...
DR. SIEMERS: I apologize. It is right then that the interrogation refers to Document C-75?
SCHULTE-MONTING: Yes.
DR. SIEMERS: Document C-75, Admiral, is Directive Number 24 concerning collaboration with Japan, and it says: "The following rules apply: Our common war aim is to defeat England quickly and thereby keep the U.S.A. out of the war."
Besides that the document also mentions the fact I referred to recently, that Singapore should be occupied by Japan.
Now Raeder, on 10 November '45 stated his position in respect to this and, according to the next page of the document, he said that which Mr. Elwyn Jones has just put to you. May I ask you to look at it again? It says there, on Page-I thought it was at the top of Page 6, maybe it is at the top of Page 8...
SCHULTE-MONTING: The top of Page 8. I do not know English as well as German, but I would translate it: "If that which Japan needs . . ."
DR. SIEMERS: If I remember correctly, the word is "need."
SCHULTE-MONTING: Yes, he uses the word "need"-"and other things, things that the Japanese need."
DR. SIEMERS: That is to say, Japan's needs and other things which Japan requires. Therefore, the conversations mentioned by Raeder were not concerned with strategic points?
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SCHULTE-MONTING: No, these are two entirely different things.
DR. SIEMERS: So that Raeder's answer is concerned purely with questions of supplies and material.
SCHULTE-MONTING: Yes, purely questions of supplies and material . . .
DR. SIEMERS: Thank you.
SCHULTE-MONTING: . . . which we had with all the navies, not only with the Japanese.
DR. SIEMERS: Then I come to the Commando Order about which you testified already I want to put to you the following: You have been shown Document D-658, which says that according to the Armed Forces communiqué the soldiers were executed, that the soldiers wore uniforms and that the Fuehrer's Order was something new in international law. I believe that the naval commander in western France reported this and that this was contained in the Armed Forces communiqué. The man who compiled the War Diary wrote: "A new thing in international law." I am not a military man, but I should like to ask you, would you consider such a reference a criticism of the order?
SCHULTE-MONTING: I believe that I have to answer the question in the following manner: Normally, the fact of an execution is not entered in a war diary on operational matters.
THE PRESIDENT: I do not think that is really a matter which we can go into, whether he thinks this is an entry which is a criticism of the order.
SCHULTE-MONTING: I believe he wanted to establish that it was something new.
DR. SIEMERS: Never mind, Admiral. A factual question. The Prosecution asserts again that it concerns soldiers in uniform. The Wehrmacht communiqué announced the execution on 9 December. The execution, as I have already shown in another connection, did not take place until 11 December. I am presenting to you now Document UK-57, and ask you to look at the second paragraph under Figure 4. The heading Figure 4 reads: "Sabotage against German ships near Bordeaux"; then it says: "December 12, 1942"; and further on we read:
"From the submarine the participants went two by two in paddle boats up the Gironde estuary. They wore special olive gray uniforms. After carrying out the blastings they sank their boats and tried, with the aid of French civilians, to escape to Spain in civilian clothes."
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Did these soldiers behave correctly according to the provisions of international law?
SCHULTE-MONTING: In my opinion, no.
DR. SIEMERS: Then I have no more questions.
SCHULTE-MONTING: If they had had a clear conscience, they
would not have needed to wear civilian clothes.
DR. SIEMERS: Excuse me, just this final question:
Did you personally in the High Command receive an inquiry or any information before this execution which was carried out at the direct order of the Fuehrer?
SCHULTE-MONTING: No, neither an inquiry nor any information.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUHLER: Mr. President, the question as to whether a document concerning Norway had been translated correctly was just discussed. I shall find out what number
it is. The English translation which I have before me is not identical with the German original. It deviates considerably. It is Document GB-482.
I shall read the German text which in-my opinion differs from the English translation.
"The Commander-in-Chief of the Navy states: Conquest of Belgian coast provides no advantage for our submarine warfare; points out value of winning Norwegian bases (Trondheim) with the help of Russian pressure. The Fuehrer will consider the question."
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Kranzbuhler, would it not save time, really, if we have the sentence which is said to have been wrongly translated referred to a committee of experts in the translating division?
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUHLER: Mr. President . . .
THE PRESIDENT: It really is not a matter which it is worth while wasting time over.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUHLER: I beg your pardon, I did not know that it was to be examined again.
THE PRESIDENT: I think we had better have it examined and then the translation certified to.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUHLER: I beg your pardon, Mr. President. I, myself, have a question to put to the witness.
Admiral, Document D-873 has been put to you before. That was a war diary of U-71 and concerned the supplying of three Norwegians in a lifeboat. The entry was on 21 June. I have already
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submitted it to the Tribunal under Doenitz Number 13, on Page 23 of my document book, a statement by the above-mentioned commanding officer Flachsenberg. According to that statement this submarine put to sea on 14 June. It was west of Norway. Can you tell me if that U-boat, therefore, on 21 June, was putting out for operations or returning from operations?
SCHULTE-MONTING: You mean from memory?
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUHLER: No, considering the dates, put out to sea on 14 June, this entry on 21 June.
SCHULTE-MONTING: Putting out.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUHLER: Putting out. As you know, this submarine was a 500-ton vessel. Is a boat of that size in a position to carry out an operation over several weeks with three additional people on board?
SCHULTE-MONTING: I believe not. I am not enough of an expert to be able to judge definitely what the extra weight of additional persons on board might mean as far as trimming experiments and such things are concerned; but aside from that, I do not believe that such a small boat, which is putting out to sea for an operation, can load itself on the way with prisoners. I do not consider that possible.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBUHLER: Thank you.
THE PRESIDENT: The witness can retire.
DR. SIEMERS: Then, with the permission of the Court, the witness may retire.
[Turning to the President.] Mr. President, in accordance with my statement at the beginning of this case, I have already submitted the majority of my documents during the examination. With the permission of the Tribunal, may I proceed now to submit as quickly as possible the remainder of the documents with a few accompanying statements.
I submit to the Tribunal Exhibit Number Raeder-18, an excerpt from the Document Book 2, Page 105, an excerpt from a book which Churchill wrote in 1935 called Great Contemporaries. I ask the Tribunal to take official notice of the contents. Churchill points out that there are two possibilities, that one cannot say whether Hitler will be the man who will start another world war or whether he will be the man who will restore honor and peace of mind to the great German nation and bring it back serene, helpful and strong to a galaxy of the European family of nations.
As Exhibit Number Raeder-20 I submit a short excerpt from Adolf Hitler's Mein Kampf with reference to the fact that the Prosecution has said that from that book one could see that Hitler
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intended to wage aggressive wars. I shall show in my final pleadings how much one can see from that book. I ask that the Tribunal take judicial notice of the short excerpt on Page 154: "For such a policy there was but one ally in Europe, England."
Exhibit Number Raeder-21, a speech made by Hitler to the German Reichstag on 26 April 1942, is to show how rights were increasingly limited in Germany and how the dictatorship became more and more powerful.
Document Book 4, Exhibit Number Raeder-65, intended to facilitate my arguments, is the Hague Agreement about the rights and duties of neutrals in naval warfare. I need that for my final pleadings in connection with Exhibit Number Raeder-66, the statement of opinion by Dr. Mosler in Document Book 4, Page 289, the first document.
THE PRESIDENT: Can you give us the pages?
DR. SIEMERS: Page 289, Mr. PRESIDENT. It is the first page of the Document Book 4.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
DR. SIEMERS: Then I ask the Tribunal to be kind enough to take up Document Book 5, since the remaining documents have already been submitted. I submit as Exhibit Number Raeder-100, Document Book 5, Page 437, a document from the White Book concerning the "top-secret" meeting of the French War Commission on 9 April 1940, with Reynaud, Daladier, Gamelin, General Georges, the Minister of the Navy, the Minister of the Colonies and the Air Minister present. It concerns the suggestion by Admiral Darlan of moving into Belgium. The suggestion was supported by General Gamelin and also by the Minister for National Defense and War. On Page 442 there is mention of the march into Holland and finally of Luxembourg. Since the High Tribunal has knowledge of the contents from the discussion of the documents, I do not want to read any details. I simply ask the Tribunal to take judicial notice of it. I should also like to point out that on Page 443 of this very long document mention is made of the occupation of the harbor of Narvik and of the intention to get hold of the mines of Gallivare.
I now submit Exhibit Number Raeder 102, in the same document book, Page 449. This is an order of the 2d Belgian Infantry Regiment of 13 April 1940 concerning information about friendly troops and the building of a fortified position. It can be seen from the document that the friendly troops mentioned are the Allies.
Then I submit Exhibit Raeder-103, Page 452, which is a French document of 16 April 1940 from headquarters concerning measures about the rail transportation of French troops in Belgium.
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I ask the Tribunal to take judicial notice of all these documents, which I shall not read in detail.
The same applies to Exhibit Number Raeder-104, Document Book 5, Page 455, which is the order of 19 April 1940 of the 2d British Division concerning security measures in Belgium. There we find a directive similar to one in a document which has been submitted by the Prosecution, a directive to establish contact with Belgian civilian authorities.
Exhibit Number Raeder-105, Document Book 5, Page 459, is the statement of a Luxembourg citizen which shows that 200 men, French soldiers in uniform, entered Belgium in armored cars 7 days before the outbreak of the German-Belgian hostilities.
May it please the Tribunal, I originally intended not to submit anything in this Trial concerning the character of my client because I was of the opinion that Admiral Raeder, both at home and abroad, enjoyed great respect. The first trial brief against Raeder did not affect that intention. Shortly before the presentation of that trial brief it was changed, becoming considerably more severe and containing moral accusations which seriously injure and insult Raeder's honor. I have no doubt that the High Tribunal will understand why under these circumstances I ask to be permitted to submit some of the documents granted me which concern Raeder's character. I submit Exhibit Raeder-119, Document Book 6, Page 514. That is a letter from Frau Von Poser addressed to me. It is not an affidavit and quite purposely I have submitted the original because in my opinion it will make a more immediate and direct impression than an affidavit which I would first have to ask for in my capacity as defendant's counsel.
Similarly, there is a fairly long letter from Professor Dr. Seibt who approached me on his own initiative. I submit Exhibit Number Raeder-120, Document Book 6, Page 517. I would be grateful to the Tribunal if it would take judicial notice of that letter. In order to save time I refrain from reading it since it is six pages long.
Then I submit Exhibit Raeder-122, Document Book 6, Page 526, a letter from Herr Erich Katz, which I submit with its appendices and I ask the Tribunal to take judicial notice of it. This presents one of the cases in which Raeder intervened personally, using his influence and position-he used the official stationery of the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy to intervene on behalf of Herr Katz who had been attacked as a Jew-and actually succeeded in protecting him. Herr Katz has sent me these documents on his own initiative in order to show his gratitude.
As Exhibit Raeder-123 I submit a letter from Gunter Jacobsen that concerns a similar case. Jacobsen also, without my asking it, approached me in order to testify that Raeder rescued his father,
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who as a Jew had been accused of race defilement, from the concentration camp Fuhlsbuttel-I believe it was still a prison at that time-so that Jacobsen could emigrate to England where he is living now.
I submit as Exhibit Number Raeder-124, an affidavit...
GENERAL RUDENKO: Mr. President, I must make the following statement. All four exhibits mentioned just now by Dr. Siemers are personal letters from various persons to Dr. Siemers. They are not sworn affidavits. They are not interrogations. Therefore these documents have little probative value, and I hold the view that they ought not to be admitted as evidence. Many letters are received, and if they were all to be submitted to the Tribunal, the Tribunal would have great-difficulty in establishing the truth and how far they are of probative value. In that connection, I personally object to the fact that these documents should he accepted as evidence in Raeder's case.
DR. SIEMERS: My Lord, may I . . .
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal does not think that the matter is of sufficient importance to insist upon evidence being upon oath. The documents are admitted.
DR. SIEMERS: As Exhibit Number Raeder-124 I submit an affidavit by Konrad Lotter. The affidavit is very short and with the permission of the Tribunal, I should like to read this one page:
"Grand Admiral Raeder has always appeared to me a man who embodied the finest traditions of the old Imperial Navy. This was true particularly in regard to his philosophy of life. As a man and as an officer he was at all times the best model imaginable.
"In 1941, when the anti-Christian policy of the Hitler regime was in full force in Bavaria, when cloisters were closed and in the education of the youth intolerance against every creed became crassly manifest, I sent a memorandum of 12 pages to the Admiral in which I presented to him my objections to this policy. Admiral Raeder intervened at once. Through his mediation, I was called to the Gauleiter and Minister of the Interior, Wagner, in Munich. After a series of discussions between the clerical, governmental, and Party authorities an agreement was reached which had the following results: The school prayer was retained, the crucifix was allowed to remain in the schools, et cetera; furthermore, 59 clergymen who had been fined 500 marks each were pardoned.
"The closing down of cloisters was also stopped at that time. Gauleiter Wagner had to..."
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THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Siemers, all these documents have, been read by us very recently.
DR. SIEMERS: Very well. Then I just ask the Tribunal to take judicial notice of the remainder.
I submit also the two documents, Exhibit Number Raeder-125 and Exhibit Number Raeder-126. Number 125 is an affidavit by the former Reich Defense Minister, Dr. Otto Gessler, and Number Raeder-126 is an affidavit by the Navy Chaplain Ronneberger. I ask you to take judicial notice of this latter document.
I should like to be permitted to read the short affidavit by Dr. Gessler since it contains not only something of a purely personal nature, but also remarks concerning the accusations against Raeder.
"I, Gessler, have known the former Admiral Dr. Raeder personally since about the middle of the 20's when I was Reichswehrminister. Raeder was then inspector of the educational system in the Navy. I have always known Raeder as a man of irreproachable, chivalrous character, as a man fully conscious of his duty. As to the subject of the Indictment, I know very little.
"Raeder visited me repeatedly after my release from imprisonment by the Gestapo in March 1945 when I lay in the Hedwig Hospital in Berlin and he also made arrangements for me to get home, as I was ill and completely exhausted. I told him then about the ill-treatment I had suffered, especially the torture. He was obviously surprised and incensed about this. He said he would report this to the Fuehrer. I asked him at once to refrain from that, for I had been told before the torture, and officially, that all of this was taking place at the explicit order of Hitler. Moreover, I knew definitely that I would immediately be rearrested, since on my release I had signed the well-known declaration and could not even obtain a confirmation of my detention in order to get a ticket for my trip home.
"I heard nothing about secret rearmament in the Navy, neither during my term of office nor later. During my term of office, until January 1928, Admiral Raeder would not have been responsible either, for at that time he was not Chief of the Naval Command.
"At the time of the National Socialist regime I was ignored by my former department and snubbed. One of the few exceptions was Dr. Raeder. Before 1939 among other things he invited me three times to visit on the cruiser Nurnberg although I had refused twice. During the visit in June 1939 he came to Kiel personally to pay his respects to me. At that
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time we also discussed the political situation. I expressed the apprehension that an attack on Poland would mean a European war. Raeder declared positively that he considered it out of the question that Hitler would attack Poland. When this did happen later, I explained this to myself on the grounds that Hitler liked to place even the highest military leaders face to face with accomplished facts."
Then there is the statement "under oath" and the signature of the notary.
As to the last Exhibit Number Raeder-126, from the Navy Chief Chaplain Ronneberger, I ask the Tribunal to take judicial notice of it since it is too late to read it. It is a factual description and survey of church questions and of religious matters in the Navy.
Mr. PRESIDENT, with that, with the exception of three points, I can conclude my case. There are still two interrogatories missing which have not yet been returned. I ask permission to submit these as soon as they are received.
Then, there is the witness Generaladmiral Bohm, who has already been approved, but who on account of illness has not yet been able to appear. The British Delegation, through Sir David, has been kind enough to agree that if necessary this witness can be interrogated at a later date. May I be permitted to ask the Tribunal to keep this open and if possible to permit Admiral Bohm to be questioned at a later date. I want to point out now that it will not be so large a complex of questions as in the case of Admiral Schulte-Monting, which the Tribunal knows from the material I have submitted.
This concludes my case Raeder.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn.
[The Tribunal adjourned until 23 May 1946 at 1000 hours.]
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