GENERAL R. A. RUDENKO (Chief Prosecutor for the U.S.S.R.): Gentlemen of the Tribunal. I already indicated in my opening statement that the action of forcibly deporting peaceful civilians -- men, women, and children -- for forced labor into Germany was one of the most important in the chain of foul crimes committed by the German fascist invaders. The decisive role in this sinister crime was enacted by the Defendant Fritz Sauckel. During cross-examination in this courtroom, Defendant Sauckel could not help but admit that during the war about 10 million slave laborers, originating both from occupied territories and from the ranks of the prisoners of war, were utilized in German industries and partly for German agricultural labor.

While admitting the deportation to Germany and the utilization for the war industries of Hitlerite Germany of millions of workers from the occupied territories, Sauckel denied the criminal character of this action, affirming that the recruitment of labor was allegedly carried out on a voluntary basis. This assertion is not only a lie but a slander against the millions of honest patriots of the Soviet Union, of Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, Poland, France, and Holland who, devoted to their country, were forcibly sent for labor into Hitlerite Germany.

The attempts of Defendant Sauckel to depict his part of Plenipotentiary General for the Allocation of Labor as consisting merely in the co-ordination and control of other government labor organizations are futile. As the Plenipotentiary General for the Allocation of Labor, Sauckel was invested by Hitler with supreme and all-encompassing powers and was in these activities directly and personally subordinated to Goering. And Sauckel extensively used these full powers in order to deport to Germany labor from the occupied territories.

There is no need to refer to the extensive documentary evidence presented to the Tribunal, which irrefutably establishes the criminal character of the methods of mass deportation into slavery of the population of occupied territories, nor to the role of the Defendant Sauckel in organizing these crimes.

How far these crimes extended is shown in the operation carried out by the German military and civil authorities, coded under the name "Hay Action," which provided for the forced deportation of children from the age of 10 to 14 into slavery, as well as for the deportation of Ukrainian girls destined by Hitler for Germanization.

The Defendant Sauckel has tried to assure the Tribunal that he had complied strictly with the provisions of the Geneva and Hague Conventions concerning the utilization of labor of prisoners of war. His own instructions, however, fully expose his lies. The Defendant Sauckel had planned beforehand the forced utilization of Soviet war prisoners for the war industry in Germany and never made any distinction between them and civilian labor.The inhuman conditions under which the foreign workers and prisoners of war deported for slavery lived, are testified to by the numerous documents submitted as evidence. The Defendant Sauckel himself was obliged to admit that foreign workers were kept in camps with barbed wire and were obliged to wear special identification badges. The witness Dr. Wilhelm Jöger, summoned to the Tribunal by the defendant's counsel for Sauckel, was obliged to give a picture of the awful conditions under which the enslaved workers at Krupp's works existed. After all this, the deposition of the other witness, Fritz Wieshofer, seems actually ridiculous when, in trying to exonerate Sauckel, he manifestly overdid it by informing the Tribunal that he, himself, allegedly saw foreign workers walking and enjoying themselves in the Prater in Vienna.

The Defendant Sauckel displayed great activity in committing all these crimes. In April 1943 he personally visited the towns of Rovno, Kiev, Dniepropetrovsk, Zaporozhie, Simferopol, Minsk, Riga, and in June of the same year Prague, Kraków, and again Kiev, Zaporozhie, and Melitopol in order to speed up the deportation of labor. And it was as a result of his journey to the Ukraine in 1943 that Sauckel expressed his gratitude for the successful mobilization of labor forces to the Reich Commissioner for the Ukraine, Koch, known for the drastic, cruel measures which he applied to the fullest extent to the Ukrainian population.

And it is not mere chance that the criminal activities of Sauckel's were so highly appreciated in Hitlerite Germany. On 6 August 1942 the Defendant Goering declared at the conference of the Reich commissioners for the occupied territories:

"I do not wish to praise Gauleiter Sauckel. He does not need it. But what he has done in so short a time in order to gather

workers and to have them brought to our enterprises is a unique achievement. I must tell everybody, gentlemen, that if each of you applied but one-tenth of the energy applied by Gauleiter Sauckel, it would be easy indeed to fulfill the tasks imposed upon you..."

In the article published in the Reichsarbeitsblatt for 1944 and dedicated to Sauckel's fiftieth anniversary it was said:

"True to his political task, he pursues his responsible course with unyielding consistency and tenacity, with a fanatical belief. As one of the most faithful adherents of Hitler, he draws his creative and spiritual strength from the Föhrer's trust in him."

When estimating Sauckel's criminal activity, Your Honors will surely consider the tears shed by the millions of people who languished in German slavery, of the thousands of people tortured in inhuman conditions in the workers' camps-you will consider this and will judge accordingly.

The Defendant Arthur Seyss-Inquart was appointed by Hitler Chief of the Civil Administration in southern Poland at the beginning of September 1939, and since 12 October of the same year Deputy Governor of Poland. He occupied this post till May 1940.

For 7 months Seyss-Inquart, under the leadership of Frank and jointly with him, had personally conducted a regime of terror in Poland, and he took an active part in elaborating and realizing the plans for the extermination of many thousands of people, for the economic plunder and enslavement of the people of the Polish State.

On 17 November 1939 Seyss-Inquart addressed the chiefs of the administration and departments of the Warsaw Government, mentioning among other things that:

"When the German administration acted in the Government General its guiding principle should be the interests of the German Reich. By means of a severe and unrelenting administration this region should be utilized for German economy; and, in order not to show any undue leniency, one should try to visualize the consequences of Polish penetration into German territory."

Two days later Seyss-Inquart instructed the Lublin Governor, SS Brigadefuehrer Schmidt, on the same question in the following way:

"The resources and the inhabitants of this country should serve Germany, and they may prosper only within these limits. The development of independent political thinking cannot be permitted. Perhaps the Vistula will have an even greater significance for the fate of Germany than the Rhine" (Exhibit USA-706).

From the report on an official journey of Seyss-Inquart we learn that the Governor of Warsaw, Fischer, informed the defendant that all valuables of the Warsaw Bank in gold, precious metals, and bills of exchange had been transferred to the Reichsbank, while the Polish inhabitants were obliged to leave their deposits in the banks; that the German administration was employing forced labor; that the Lublin Governor Schmidt declared in the presence of Seyss-Inquart: "This territory with its strongly-marked swampy nature could serve as a reservation for the Jews; this measure would possibly lead to a decimation of the Jews."

I draw the attention of the Tribunal to the fact that it was exactly at Maidanek near Lublin where the Hitlerite hangmen erected an enormous extermination camp in which they killed about a million and a half human beings.

It is also known that Seyss-Inquart, as Frank's deputy, carried out "special tasks" on his behalf. On 8 December 1939 Seyss-Inquart took part in a conference at which the following subjects were discussed: The appointment of Frank as deputy to the Delegate for the Four Year Plan and the economic exploitation of the Government General for the best interests of the Reich; the arrival of numerous trains with Jews and Poles from the newly-acquired territories, which transportations would continue-according to SS Obergruppenfuehrer Krueer-till the middle of December; the issuing of a supplementary order extending labor duty to the age group 14 to 18. On 21 April 1940 the defendant took part in the conference at which plans for forced deportation of Polish workers to Germany were elaborated. On 16 May 1940 the defendant took part in the elaboration of the "AB Action," which was nothing but a premeditated plan of mass extermination of the Polish intellectuals. In connection with the appointment of Seyss-Inquart as Reich Commissioner for the Netherlands, Frank and his worthy deputy exchanged farewell speeches:

"I am exceedingly glad"--said Frank--"to assure you that the memory of your work in the Government General will live forever when the future German Reich of peace has been created ...

"I have learned much here"-answered Seyss-Inquart "... and this because of the initiative and firm leadership of the kind I saw in my friend, Dr. Frank....

". . . all my thoughts are connected with the East. In the East we have a National Socialist mission, in the West we have a task."

Seyss-Inquart's task in the West, as well as that of the other Reich ministers and commissioners in all territories occupied by the Germans, is well known: It is the function of hangman and plunderer. My colleagues have given the details about the criminal part played by Seyss-Inquart when annexing Austria and realizing other aggressive plans of the Hitlerite conspiracy. They have clearly shown how Seyss-Inquart applied in the Netherlands the bloody experience gained by him while collaborating with Frank in Poland. For this reason I fully support the charges against Seyss-Inquart as formulated in the Indictment.

- As early as 1932, while still Reich Chancellor of the German Republic, the Defendant Franz von Papen actively contributed to the development of the fascist movement in Germany.

Papen rescinded the decree of his predecessor Bruening prohibiting the activities of the SA. It was he who had overthrown the Braun-Severing Social Democrat Government in Prussia. These measures greatly strengthened the position of the fascists and contributed to their accession to power. Thus Papen cleared the way for Hitler. Having secured the power for the Nazis, Papen himself assumed the post of Vice Chancellor in Hitler's Cabinet. In this capacity Von Papen participated in the elaboration and the promulgation of a series of legislative acts aimed at the consolidation of German fascism. And later on, for many years, until the collapse of Hitlerite Germany, Von Papen remained true to his fascist friends and participated to the utmost of his abilities in the realization of the criminal conspiracy.

The Defendant Von Papen is attempting now to explain his role in the development of the fascist movement and in Hitler's seizure of power in terms of the political situation of the country which, he says, made Hitler's accession to power unavoidable. The real motives which guided Von Papen were different: They were that he himself was a convinced fascist devoted to Hitler.

Speaking at Essen on 2 November 1933, during the election campaign for the Reichstag, Papen declared:

"Ever since Providence called upon me to become the pioneer of national resurrection and of the rebirth of our homeland, I have tried to support with all my strength the work of the National Socialist movement and its leader; just as I, at the time of taking over the chancellorship, have helped pave the way to power for the young, fighting, patriotic movement, just as I on 30 January was selected by a providential fate to place the hands of our Chancellor and Fuehrer into the hand of our beloved Field Marshal, so do I today again feel the obligation to say to the German people and all those who have kept confidence in me: The kind Lord has blessed Germany by giving her in times of dire need a leader who will lead her with the unerring instinct of the statesman through distress and weaknesses, through all crises and dangers, into a happy future."

The International Military Tribunal will fully estimate the criminal activities of the Defendant Von Papen, who played a decisive part in the seizure of power by Hitler and in so doing contributed in creating the dark powers of fascism which plunged the world into bloody wars and caused unspeakable misery.

Long before the Nazis came to power the architect Albert Speer was a personal friend of the draftsman Hitler and remained so until the end. Not only common professional interests, but political interests also brought them together. Speer began his career in 1932 with the reconstruction of the Brown House, the headquarters of the NSDA-P in Berlin, and in 10 years' time he was at the head of all military construction and war production in fascist Germany. Starting with the construction of the buildings of the Reichsparteitag, Speer ended by setting up the Atlantic Wall.

Speer held an important post in the Government and military machinery of Hitler's Germany and played a direct and active part in planning and realizing the criminal conspiracy.

What is Speer's line of defense at the Trial? Speer presents his case in the following way: He was pressed by Hitler to take on the post of Minister; he was an intimate friend of Hitler's, but he knew nothing about his plans. He had been a member of the Nazi Party for 14 years, but he was far from politics and he'd never even read Mein Kampf. It is true that upon being given the lie Speer confessed that he had lied during his preliminary interrogation. Speer lied when he denied that he had ever belonged to the SA and then to the SS. The Tribunal possesses the original file of the SS man Albert Speer, who belonged to the personal staff of the Reichsfuehrer SS Himmler.

Speer also held a rather high rank in the Nazi Party. In the Party Chancellery he was a delegate for all technical questions; he headed the Main Office for Engineering of the Party; he directed the union of German National Socialist technicians; he was deputy for the staff of Hess, and a leader of one of the major German Labor Front organizations.

After all this can Speer's declaration that he was a specialist indifferent to politics be given credence? In reality, as a close collaborator of Hitler, Hess, Ley, and Goering, he directed German engineering not only as Reich Minister, but also as a fascist political leader.

Upon succeeding to Todt, Speer, as he expressed himself in his speech before the Gauleiter, devoted himself completely to war tasks. By means of the pitiless exploitation of the population in the occupied territories and of the prisoners of war of the Allied countries, at the expense of the health and lives of hundreds of thousands of people, Speer increased the production of armament and ammunition for the German Army.

By plundering the raw materials and other resources of the occupied territories, Speer, by all possible means, increased the war potential of Hitler's Germany. His powers grew with every month of the war. By Hitler's decree of 2 September 1943 Speer became plenipotentiary and the responsible man for the supply of raw materials, for the direction and production of war industry. He was even commissioned to regulate the turnover of commodities, and by Hitler's decree of 24 August 1944 Speer was practically made dictator of all German offices, in Germany as well as in the occupied territories, whose activity was in any way connected with the strengthening of the German war potential.

And when the fascist fliers bombed peaceful towns and villages, thereby killing women, old men, and children, when the German artillery bombarded Leningrad, when the Hitlerite pirates sank hospital ships, when English towns were bombed by th

e V-weapon -- all this came as a result of Speer's activity. Under his leadership the production of gas and of other weapons of chemical warfare had been greatly increased. The defendant himself, when interrogated by Justice Jackson at the Trial, confessed that three factories were producing gas and that they were working at full speed till November 1944.

Speer not only knew of methods used by Sauckel for deporting the population from the occupied territories for slave labor, but he himself took part, together with Sauckel, in conferences with Hitler and of the Central Planning Board where decisions were taken to deport millions of people to Germany from the occupied territories.

Speer kept up a close contact with Himmler; he received from Himmler prisoners for work in war factories; branches of concentration camps were organized in many factories subordinated to Speer. In recognition of Himmler's services, Speer supplied the SS with experienced specialists and with supplementary war equipment.

Speer has spoken quite a bit here about his having sharply criticized Hitler's close circle, that he had allegedly had very serious differences with Hitler and that, in his letters to Hitler, he had written about the futility of continuing the war. When the representative of the Soviet Prosecution asked Speer which of the persons close to Hitler he had criticized and in what connection, the defendant answered, "I shall not tell you."

It is quite evident that Speer not only did not want to, but that in fact he could not tell, for the simple reason that he had never criticized anyone who was close to Hitler and could not do so as he was a convinced Nazi himself and belonged to this close circle. As to the so-called serious differences, they began, as Speer admitted, when it became clear to him that Germany had lost the war. Speer's letters to Hitler are dated March 1945. At that time Speer could without great risk depict Germany's hopeless condition. It was apparent to everyone and was no longer a subject of discussion. And it was not by accident that after these letters Speer still remained Hitler's favorite. It was precisely Speer whom Hitler appointed on 30 March 1945 to direct measures for the total destruction of the industrial enterprises by obliging all Party, State, and military offices to render him all possible help.

That is the true picture of the Defendant Speer and the real part played by him in the crimes committed by the Hitler clique.

Constantin von Neurath's part in the consolidation of the Nazi conspirators' power and in the preparation and realization of aggressive plans is a remarkable one.

Over a period of many years, whenever traces had to be covered up, when acts of aggression were to be veiled by diplomatic manipulations, Neurath, fascist diplomat and SS general, came to the help of the Hitlerites, bringing them his long experience of world affairs.

May I remind you of the high official appraisal of Neurath's activity which appeared in all the newspapers of fascist Germany on 2 February 1943:

"Germany's leaving the Geneva Disarmament Conference on 14 October 1933, the return of the Saar territory, and the denunciation of the Locarno Treaty will rank among the most outstanding political events since the inauguration of the Nazi regime. In these Baron von Neurath played a decisive part and his name will always be connected with them."

In his capacity of Reich Protector of Bohemia and Moravia Neurath represented to the Nazi conspirators those "firm and reliable hands" of which General Friderici wrote in his memorandum, which were to transform the Czechoslovak Republic into an "indissoluble part of Germany." In order to attain that object Neurath established the notorious "New Order," the nature of which is now known to all.

Neurath attempted to assert here that all the atrocities were committed by the Police and Gestapo, upon Himmler's direct order, and that he knew nothing of them. It is quite comprehensible that Neurath should say so, but one can hardly agree with him.

Interrogated on 7 March 1946, Karl Frank testified that Neurath received regularly the reports of the Chief of Security Police, as well as those of Frank himself, regarding the "most important events in the Protectorate" pertaining to the Security Police. He stated also that it was possible for Neurath to issue directives to the Reich Security Police, and that he did indeed do so; while, as far as the SD was concerned, his powers were still greater, depending in no way upon the consent of the Reich Security Main Office.

I wish also to recall to your memory Paragraphs 11, 13, and 14 of the decree, issued on I September 1939 by the Reich Defense Council, which proves that the Reichsfuehrer SS and Chief of the German Police carried out administrative measures in Bohemia and Moravia with the knowledge of the Reich Protector, and that the German Security Police agencies in the Protectorate were obliged to inform the Reich Protector as well as the offices subordinated to him and to keep them aware of all major events.

If I add that on 5 May 1939 the Defendant Neurath appointed an SD Leader and Plenipotentiary of the Security Police to the post of his political reporter; if we recall the testimony read to the court of Richard Bienert, the former Czech Minister President under Neurath, in which it says that the Gestapo carried out arrests on orders of the Reich Protector, we can hardly have any doubt but that Neurath gave his sanction to the mass arrests, summary executions, and other inhuman acts committed by the Gestapo and Police in Czechoslovakia.

I will pass on to the events of 17 November 1939 when nine students were shot without trial, while over a thousand were thrown into concentration camps and all the Czech high schools and universities were closed for 3 years.

Neurath said that he heard of these acts of terror post factum. But we have submitted to the Tribunal a public announcement of the shooting and arrests of the students which bears Neurath's signature. Neurath then seeks another loophole. He declares that Frank signed this announcement in his -- Neurath's -- name, and to be more convincing he even adds that later he heard from an official that Frank often misused his name in documents. Are Neurath's statements to be credited? One has only to analyze briefly the actual facts in order to answer this question in the negative. Neurath says that Frank misused his name. What did Neurath do in answer to this? Did he demand Frank's resignation or his punishment for forgery? No. Did he, perhaps, report this forgery officially to somebody? No. On the contrary, he continued to collaborate with Frank as before. Neurath says that he heard of Frank's misuses from an official. Who is that official? What is his name? Why was no application made to call him to the witness stand or at least to secure his written testimony? This is simply because nobody spoke to Neurath of Frank having forged his signature on the documents, and nobody could have done so, for there was no forgery. On the contrary, the Tribunal has evidence which confirms the fact that the announcement of 17 November 1939 was signed by Neurath and that the terroristic measures mentioned therein were actually sanctioned by him. I am speaking of two statements of Karl Frank who directly participated in these bloody events.

During his interrogation on 26 November 1945 Karl Frank testified:

"This document, dated 17 November 1939, was signed by Von Neurath, who did not protest either against the shooting of the nine students or against the deportation of numerous students to the concentration camps."

I quote Karl Frank's second testimony on this matter, dated 7 March 1946:

"By signing the official announcement which informed the public of the shooting of the students Reich Protector Von Neurath sanctioned this action. I informed Von Neurath in detail of the course of the investigation and he signed the announcement. Had he not agreed and had he demanded a modification of the penalty, or its mitigation-and he had a right to do so -- I would have been obliged to accede to his opinion."

In August 1939, in connection with the "extraordinary situation" by which he proclaimed Bohemia and Moravia to be an integral part of the Greater German Reich, Neurath issued a so-called warning. Therein he stipulated that "not only individual perpetrators but the entire Czech population would be responsible for all acts of sabotage" (Document USSR-495). Thereby he established the principle of collective responsibility and introduced the hostage system. The events of 17 November 1939, considered in the light of this directive of Neurath, supply more irrefutable proof against the defendant.

Starting from 1 September 1939 some 8,000 Czechs were arrested as hostages in Bohen-Aa and Moravia. The majority were sent to concentration camps; many were executed or died of hunger and torture. On this subject you have heard, Your Honors, the testimonies of Bienert, Krejci, and Havelka. There is no doubt that these terror acts against the Czech intellectuals were carried out in conformity with Neurath's warning.

I need not relate in detail all the events which took place at Lidice and later in the village of Lestraki as they are already well known. Were not the German invaders acting in accordance with Neurath's warning? Did they not conform to his principle that the entire Czech population, and not the individual persons, must bear the responsibility?

It was Neurath who initiated mass terror against the Czechoslovak population in August 1939. He has on his hands the blood of many thousands of women and men, children and old people, murdered and tortured to death. And I see no difference between Baron von Neurath and the other ringleaders of the criminal fascist regime.

The Defendant Hans Fritzsche's part in the conspiracy, the War Crimes, and the Crimes against Humanity is certainly greater than it might appear at first glance.

The criminal activity of Fritzsche, Goebbels' closest assistant, carried out systematically day after day, constitutes a very important link in the Common Plan or Conspiracy and contributed effectively to the creation of the conditions under which the numerous crimes of the Hitlerites were conceived and nurtured.

All the attempts made by the defendant himself and his counsel to minimize his importance and the part he played in the perpetration of these crimes have clearly failed.

In Mein Kampf Hitler describes the very special part attributed to mendacious propaganda in Nazi Germany. He wrote:

"The problem of the revival of German might is not how we will make weapons but how we will create the spirit which will make our people capable of bearing weapons. If this spirit pervades the people, the will power shall discover thousands of ways and each of them will lead to weapons."

I am quoting from Pages 365 and 366 of Mein Kampf, sixty-fourth edition, 1933.

Neither is it by chance that the following slogans were proclaimed at the Congress of the Nazi Party in 1936 at Nuremberg:

"Propaganda helped us to come to power; propaganda helps us to keep power; propaganda will help us to conquer the world."

Owing to his position, the Defendant Fritzsche was certainly one of the most outstanding propagandists and also one of the best-informed persons in Nazi Germany. He enjoyed Goebbels' particular confidence.

As we know, from 1938 till 1942 Fritzsche, was head of one of the key departments of the Propaganda Ministry, that of the German Press. And from 1942 until the defeat of Hitler's Germany he was head of the German radio communication service.

Having grown up as a journalist of the reactionary press of Hugenberg, Fritzsche, who was a member of the Nazi Party since 1933, in his capacity of Government spokesman played an important part in the dissemination of fascist propaganda throughout Germany and in the political and moral disintegration of the German people. This was testified to in detail by witnesses such as former Field Marshal of the German Army Ferdinand Sch"rner and former Vice Admiral Hans Voss. The Defendant Fritzsche's broadcasts, intercepted by the BBC, and submitted to the Tribunal as Document 3064-PS and Exhibit USSR-496, fully confirm these charges of the Prosecution.

German propaganda in general, and the Defendant Fritzsche in particular, made full use of provocative methods, lies, and slanderous statements, and this was especially the case when Nazi Germany's acts of aggression had to be justified. For did not Hitler himself write in Mein Kampf, Page 302:

"With the help of a propaganda skillfully and continually applied even heaven can be represented as hell to the people and on the contrary, the most miserable life can be represented as heaven."

Fritzsche turned out to be the best man to carry out this dirty work.

In his affidavits, submitted to the Tribunal and dated 7 January 1946, Fritzsche gave a detailed description of the provocative methods applied on such a vast scale by German propaganda and by him personally in connection with the acts of aggression against Austria, the Sudetenland, Bohemia and Moravia, Poland, and Yugoslavia.

On 9 April and 2 May 1940 Fritzsche broadcast mendacious explanations of the reasons which led to the occupation of Norway by Germany. He declared, "Nobody was wounded, not one house was destroyed, life and work continued unhindered as before." Meanwhile, the official report presented by the Norwegian Government states:

"The German attack against Norway on 9 April 1940 brought war to Norway for the first time in 126 years. For 2 months war was fought throughout the country, causing destruction. Over 40,000 houses were damaged or destroyed, and about 2,000 civilians were killed."

German propaganda and Fritzsche personally spread insolent lies in connection with the sinking of the British passenger steamer Athenia. But German propaganda was particularly active on the occasion of Hitler Germany's treacherous attack upon the Soviet Union.

The Defendant Fritzsche has attempted to assert that he first heard of the attack upon the Soviet Union when he was called on 22 June 1941 at 5 o'clock in the morning to a press conference held by Foreign Minister Von Ribbentrop. As far as the aggressive purposes of this attack were concerned, he allegedly had learned of them only through his personal observations, in 1942. However, these statements are refuted by such documentary evidence as the report of Defendant Rosenberg. This document establishes the fact that a long time before the attack upon the U.S.S.R., Fritzsche knew of the appropriate measures which were being taken and that in his capacity of representative of the Propaganda Ministry he participated in the elaboration of propaganda measures for the East by the Ministry for the Occupied Eastern Territories.

In answer to the questions put to him by the Soviet Prosecution during his cross-examination Fritzsche stated that he would not have gone with Hitler had he had knowledge of the Hitler Government's criminal orders, of which he heard for the first time here in court. And here again, Fritzsche told the International Military Tribunal an untruth. Thus he was compelled to admit that he had knowledge of the criminal Hitler orders regarding the extermination of Jews and the shooting of Soviet commissars as early as 1942. And yet he continued thereafter to remain at his post and to spread mendacious propaganda. In his broadcasts on 16 June and I July 1944, Fritzsche ballyhooed the new weapons being used, doing his best to, incite the Army and the people to further senseless resistance.

And even on the eve of the collapse of Nazi Germany, on 7 April 1945, Fritzsche broadcast an appeal to the German people to continue their resistance to the Allied armies and to join in the Werewolf movement.

Thus, the Defendant Fritzsche remained true to the last to the criminal Hitlerite regime. He gave his entire self to the task of realizing the fascist conspiracy and of perpetrating all the crimes which were planned and carried out in order to put that conspiracy into effect. As an active participant in all the Hitlerite crimes, he must bear the fullest responsibility for them.

Your Honors, all the defendants have passed before you-m

en without honor or conscience; men who hurled the world into an abyss of misery and suffering and brought enormous calamities upon their own people; political adventurers who stopped at no evil deed in order to achieve their criminal designs; brummagem demagogues who concealed their predatory plans behind a veil of mendacious ideas; hangmen who murdered millions of innocent people-these men formed a gang of conspirators, seized power and transformed the German State machinery into an instrument for their crimes.

Now, the hour of reckoning has come. For the past 9 months, we have been observing the former rulers of fascist Germany. In

the dock before this Court they have suddenly become meek and humble. Some of them even actually condemned Hitler. But they do not blame Hitler for waging a war or for the exterminating of peoples and plundering of states; the only thing they; cannot forgive him is defeat. Together with Hitler, they were ready to exterminate millions of human beings, to enslave civilized mankind in order to achieve their criminal aim of world domination.

But history decided otherwise. Victory did not follow upon the steps of crime. Victory came to the freedom-loving nations. Truth triumphed and we are proud to say that justice meted out by the International Military Tribunal will be the justice of the righteous cause of peace-loving nations.

The Defense spoke about humanity. We know that the concepts of civilization and humanity, democracy and humanity, peace and humanity are inseparable. But we, the champions of civilization, democracy, and peace we positively reject that form of humanity which is considerate to the murderers and indifferent to their victims. Counsel for Kaltenbrunner also spoke here of love for mankind. In connection with Kaltenbrunner's name and actions all mention of love for mankind sounds blasphemy.

Your Lordship, Your Honors, my statement concludes the case for the Prosecution. Speaking here on behalf of the peoples of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, I consider all the charges against the defendants as fully proven. And in the name of the sincere love of mankind which inspires the peoples who made the supreme

memory of the millions of innocent human beings slaughtered by a gang of murders who are now before the court of civilized mankind, in the name of the happiness and the peaceful labor of future generations, I appeal to the Tribunal to sentence all the defendants without exception to the supreme penalty-death. Such a verdict will be greeted with satisfaction by all progressive mankind.

THE PRESIDENT (Lord Justice Sir Geoffrey Lawrence): Now we will deal with the applications for witnesses and documents by counsel for the SA.

MAJOR J. HARCOURT BARRINGTON (Junior Counsel for the United Kingdom): May it please the Tribunal, there were initially seven witnesses applied for for the SA: four for the General SA; two for the Stahlhelm, and one for the SA Reiterkorps (Riding Corps). Since then there has been an eighth application for a witness for the Stahlhelm, who, I understand, is to be a substitution for the other two for the Stahlhelm. That would reduce the total number of witnesses applied for for the SA to six. All those originally applied for have already been heard by the Commission, but the one recently applied for, by the name of Gruss, has not yet been heard by the Commission; and if the Tribunal approve of that witness, it would involve his being heard by the Commission now.

I apprehend that the Tribunal will have the recommendation of the Commission before them when they are deciding this. In the circumstances, the Prosecution only desire to say that they have no objection to these applications.

THE PRESIDENT: That means no objection to any of them?

MAJOR BARRINGTON: No objection to any of them, on the understanding, My Lord, that Grass is applied for in substitution for the other two Stahlhelm witnesses, Waldenfels and Hauffe.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, Dr. Böhm?

HERR GEORG BÖHM (Counsel for SA): I have applied for the witnesses Juettner, Bock, Kldhn, Schdfer, Van den Borch, and primarily Waldenfels and Hauffe to be heard as witnesses for the SA.

The witness Hauffe has been applied for because it has not been possible to bring one witness, who had been allowed, to Nuremberg; that was the witness Gruss. Concerning the witness Grass, I should like to apply for him to be questioned before the Commission so that he can also be heard before the Tribunal. Grass could be called only a few days ago, although my application to hear him had already been made in the month of May, and a search had to be made for him for 2 months. He is an important witness for the Stahlhelm in the SA, and because of his position of Treasurer in the Stahlhelm he knows about conditions throughout Germany, particularly for the period after 1935. But as I can make the application for the witness. to be heard here only after he has been before the Commission, I beg that it be granted that this witness be heard by the Commission. I will not, however, give up the witness Waldenfels, on that account, so that the situation will be that for the SA not six but seven witnesses are to be heard, as had been provided for originally.

THE, PRESIDENT: Well, what would be the names?

HERR BÖHM: Juettner, Bock, Klähn, Schdfer, Van den Borch, Waldenfels, and Grass.

But I should like to ask, Mr. President, since I do not as yet know the extent of the testimony of the witness Grass, to be permitted to choose between the two witnesses Grass and Hauffe. That is, after the witness Grass has been heard by the Commission, I should like to be permitted to decide whether, besides the witness Waldenfels, I shall want to apply for the witness Hauffe or the witness Grass for questioning.

THE PRESIDENT: Is that all you wish to say, Dr. Böhm?

HERR BÖHM: In connection with the witnesses, yes, Mr. President, but I should like to speak in connection with the document book for the SA, if I may be permitted.

THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Barrington, do you wish to say anything more about the application which Dr. Böhm now has, which is for seven, and not for six?

MAJOR BARRINGTON: Well, the Prosecution are of the opinion that one witness for the Stahlhelin would be enough, but Your Lordship will, of course, have the Commission's recommendation on that. They will have been heard. On the question of the choice between Gruss and Hauffe after Gruss has been heard, there would be no objection to that, of course.

HERR BÖHM: Mr. President, may I say that the Stahlhelm within the SA comprised about one-fourth of the members of the SA. There were about one million people who had transferred from the Stahlhelm into the SA. And I believe that it would be in the interest of many that the evidence be confirmed by two witnesses before this Court.

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will consider that matter. Now will you deal with the documents.

MAJOR BARRINGTON: Would it be convenient to Your Lordship if I started on the documents?

THE PRESIDENT: Yes.

MAJOR BARRINGTON: Agreement has been reached on the document books with the exception of one group of five documents to which the Prosecution object.

Before dealing with that group I ought to mention to the Tribunal that among the other documents -which were agreed to be excluded there were a considerable number of photographs of members of the SA Reiterkorps in civilian clothes. The great majority of those photographs were excluded; a few have been included. But I just want to say this, that those photographs were intended to show that the object of the Reiterkorps was purely that of sporting activities. Of course, the Prosecution admit that the object of the Reiterkorps included sporting activities, -although naturally the Prosecution say that was not their only object.

With regard to the group of five documents, I think I can take that quite briefly. I have prepared a short summary, which I think the Tribunal have at the back of that sheaf of papers.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes.

MAJOR BARRINGTON: These five documents are all extracts from writings by English writers and publicists during the period, I think, from 1936 to 1939, and they all represent, in my submission, the unofficial opinions and arguments of those writers. Your Lordship can see roughly what they are about.

The first one, SA-236, is by Mr. Dawson, in The Nineteenth Century, to the effect that Hitler's policy to the statesmen of Europe is for peace and not war, and that Hitler has saved Germany from chaos and collapse, that he does the same for Europe by his peace proposals.

And then SA-237, by Dr. A. J. McDonald, from the book Why I Believe in Hitler's Germany and the Third Reich, says:

"Perhaps the best guarantee for the stability of Hitler's regime is his own moral purity and that which he has imposed on Germany. He has tackled the problem of youth..."-and so on.

SA-242 is an extract from Das Archiv, quoting Professor Cornell Evans and Professor Dawson again:

"Hitler's withdrawal from Locarno and the occupation of the Rhineland was a good thing..."

"Hitler's peace proposals are very valuable..."

"The Versailles Treaty was unjust...'~-and so forth.

And SA-246, another extract from the The Nineteenth Century, illustrates "Germans marching into parts of their own country," and maintains that this is justified.

And SA-247, an extract from a book by A. P. Lorry, The Case for Germany, which says, "the complaint that Germany applies force is wrong, and the attack on Austria cannot be called an attack."

Now, My Lord, insofar as those extracts are intended to prove facts, they clearly don't prove any direct evidence of facts, but are purely conclusions of fact, and as such they prejudge the issues which are for the Tribunal to decide. If on the other hand, as is possible, they are intended to show that these writings led the SA to believe that the Nazi regime was a thing to be admired or was well thought of abroad, I only need to say two things: First, these were unofficial writings; secondly, there is no evidence to show that they were even read by the SA. There is no evidence in any case that they influenced the SA at all, if they were read. That is all I can say.

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Böhm?

HERR BÖHM: Mr. President, originally I did not intend to discuss the contents to the extent to which the representative of the Prosecution has done it now. I should not like to be accused of trying to make National Socialist propaganda. But we are confronted here with short quotations from English and American writers which cause no difficulties in translating, and from which I did not intend to read anything here in Court as it is. Neither do I intend to read the contents of these documents during my presentation of evidence, but I wanted at least to have the opportunity to refer to them during my final argument.

These quotations have appeared in German newspapers. They also appeared in collections as, for example, Das Archiv. Thus they were accessible to the German public and became quite well-known. It is not as if these excerpts were translated only now, and were not previously known to anybody in Germany. They appeared in the Vuelkischer Beobachter and in Das Archiv, and every German could read them and acquaint himself with them.

Without regard to the importance of the writers themselves or the people who ' made those statements in their own country, these statements are important for the Germans because the authors were men who expressed their opinions in leading foreign countries on current German problems. I would regret very much if the Court could not decide that I may be permitted to enter them into my document book. They present very little work for translation. They are not extensive and there are no obstacles connected with them.

THE PRESIDENT: Have all the documents been translated?

HERR BÖHM: I don't think they have already been translated. A considerable number were requested.

THE PRESIDENT: Are they very long?

HERR BÖHM: These five are not very long. The greater part are extracts.

THE PRESIDENT: I don't mean the five. I mean the other things.

MAJOR BARRINGTON: They vary, but for the most part they are short extracts.

HERR BÖHM: In my document book only a few documents have been translated entirely, only excerpts which I shall refer to for support during my presentation of evidence and during my final argument. Therefore, the translation of the entire document book will create very little work, and these documents which I shall also have translated certainly will not present any difficulties.

THE PRESIDENT: Is there anything further you wish to say, Dr. Böhm?

HERR BÖHM: Mr. President, unfortunately I have to make another application, which I would rather not have made, but circumstances are such that it has to be put in. I request that the witnesses Fuss, Lucke, Waldenfels, Von Alvensleben, Dr. Geyer, and Dr. Meder should also be heard before the Commission. I have already made applications for these witnesses, for the witness Fuss on 25 April; for the witness Lucke, on 7 May; for the witness Waldenfels, on 21 May; for the witness Von Alvensleben, on 20 May; for the witness Dr. Geyer, on 25 April; and for the witness Dr. Meder, on 25 April of this year.

These witnesses are important witnesses. To give only one example, the questioning of the witnesses Fuss and Lucke would mean a rebuttal of one of the most important documents in this Trial. That is Document 1721-PS in which it is charged that the Brigadeff1hrer of Brigade 50 had reported to the Gruppenfuehrer the burning down of about 38 synagogues.

The other witnesses whose evidence, in order to shorten proceedings, I will not discuss now, whom Colonel Neave has permitted me to question, have not yet arrived. I believe I heard yesterday that possibly Dr. Geyer arrived a few days ago. The subjects of evidence are important, and the length of time for the questioning before the Comn-Assion will be very short. I cannot possibly forego these witnesses whom I have repeatedly requested. These witnesses must be heard, and I believe that they can be brought here in time so that it would be possible still to hear them during the presentation of evidence.

THE PRESIDENT: How many is it you are asking for?

HERR BÖHM: Seven witnesses who are to be heard by the Commission-no, six witnesses.

THE PRESIDENT: How many have you already had heard before the Commission? I am told it is 16; is that right?

HERR BÖHM: Sixteen. I could not give the exact number just yet, but I am prepared to find out at once.

THE PRESIDENT: And how many have been brought to Nuremberg for the purpose of being questioned by you?

HERR BÖHM: The witnesses who have come to Nuremberg to be heard here were primarily the wrong witnesses. A number of witnesses had to come two or three times until we got the right one, for instance the witness Wolff.

THE PRESIDENT: I asked how many.

HERR BÖHM: Altogether, all the witnesses who have come only to give an affidavit, or just the witnesses who were heard by the Commission?

THE PRESIDENT: How many witnesses have been brought? How many persons have been brought to Nuremberg for the purpose of being questioned?

HERR BÖHM: Mr. President, I believe there is a matter which has to be cleared up. Witnesses have been brought here in order to be questioned by the Commission or by the Tribunal. But witnesses have also been brought here merely to make an affidavit about a particular subject that appeared important, witnesses who would not necessarily have to be heard before the Commission or the Tribunal. These witnesses have been sent back after they had signed an affidavit.

THE PRESIDENT: I am asking you how many. How many? Can't you answer?

HERR BÖHM: Altogether? I would like to know whether the question is designed to mean the people who have been heard by the Commission, or all the witnesses who came here.

THE PRESIDENT: Well, out of the people who have come here, some of them have been examined before the Commission and others have made affidavits, and possibly t

here may be others who have done neither. I want to know how many in all.

HERR BÖHM: I believe 16. 1 cannot give the exact figure because I did not question all of them. I would like permission to determine the exact number after the recess.

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn.

[A recess was taken.]

THE PRESIDENT: I will deal first with the documents. The documents to which no objection has been made will be translated and will be admitted, subject to objections as to their admissibility. The documents to which objections have already been made, namely SA-236, 237, 242, 246, and 247, are all rejected and will not be translated.

With reference to the witnesses applied for, the following witnesses who have been examined before the Commission may be examined before the Tribunal: The witness Schäfer, the witness Aittner, either the witness Bock or the witness Klähn according as counsel for the SA decides; and one out of the three witnesses, Waldenfels, Hauffe, and Gruss-to be examined before the Commission. Van den Borch is not allowed, but his evidence may be given by affidavit. With reference to the other six witnesses for whom application has been made, every effort is being made to trace them and if they arrive within a week from today, that is to say, on or before Tuesday of next week, they will be heard before the Commission. That is all.

HERR BÖHM: Mr. President, may I make a brief explanation? The Court has just approved the witnesses Waldenfels, Hauffe, and Gruss to be examined before the Commission.

THE PRESIDENT: No, the witnesses Waldenfels, Hauffe, and Gruss have already been examined. before the Commission, have they not?

HERR BÖHM: Yes.

THE PRESIDENT: What I said was that you must choose one out of the three witnesses: Waldenfels, Hauffe and Gruss-after Gruss has been examined before the Commission. One out of the three, so that in all you will have four witnesses: Schäfer, Jiittner, one out of Bock and Klähn, and one out of Waldenfels, Hauffe, and Gruss, making' four. And you will have Van den Borch on affidavit.

HERR BÖHM: Yes.

THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Barrington, with reference to the Reich Cabinet, I see there is one witness that has not yet been granted as a witness, and that is the witness Schlegelberger, who has not yet appeared before the Commission. Yes, Dr. Kempner?

DR. ROBERT KEMPNER (Assistant Trial Counsel for the United States): Schlegelberger was questioned before the Commission yesterday.

THE PRESIDENT: Is there any objection...

DR. KEMPNER: No.

THE PRESIDENT: Then, are there any other witnesses for the Reich Cabinet?

DR. KEMPNER: Not that I know of.

THE PRESIDENT: It would perhaps save time if we granted him now. Are there any documents not agreed on for the Reich Cabinet?

DR. KEMPNER: We already examined all the documents.

THE PRESIDENT: You agreed? Well, very well.

DR. KEMPNER: Thank you.

THE PRESIDENT: And now we will hear the witnesses for the political leaders.

DR. ROBERT SERVATIUS (Counsel for Leadership Corps of the Nazi Party): Mr. President, according to the decision of 25 and 26 July, I am first to offer the documents and affidavits so that they may be incorporated into the record. Should I do that first or should I first examine the witness? According to the decision I should do it first and that is what I prepared.

THE PRESIDENT: Very well, do it that way.

DR. SERVATIUS: According to the decision of 25 July, the evidence is first to be submitted. The evaluation of the evidence is to follow the final presentation, so that I will submit only the evidence now without any special comment. I act according to the decision. First, I present a list of the witnesses examined before the Commission which I submit in evidence. There are 20 witnesses. They are the following, if I may read the list. Does the Court consider it necessary for me to read the list of witnesses?

THE PRESIDENT: I do not think you need read the names of the witnesses. If you would offer, formally, the transcripts of their evidence before the Commission, that will be sufficient.

DR. SERVATIUS: Yes, very well. I submit the copies of the records in evidence, the originals of which the Commission has. The record of the witness Mohr is still missing. He is Number 7 on the list. I have not yet received this record. I will submit it later.

THE PRESIDENT: Then the General Secretary will file the original of the transcripts.

DR. SERVATIUS: Yes.

THE PRESIDENT: And you will give it some number, I suppose, some exhibit number?

DR. SERVATIUS: Yes, I will adjust the exhibit numbers after consulting the General Secretary since it is not yet clear how the documents will be arranged.

THE PRESIDENT: Very well.

DR. SERVATIUS: Then I submit ...

THE PRESIDENT: Wait a minute. You will adjust that with the General Secretary as to whether or not it is ne cessary to give these transcripts on evidence before the Commission an exhibit number or not?

DR.SERVATIUS: Yes, I will adjust it.

Then I will submit a list of affidavits which have been approved by the Commission. There are 52 of them. The list contains those documents the translation of which was approved by the Commission and thought especially important. The affidavits themselves are in the hands of the Commission and I will discuss with the General Secretary in what form they should be submitted as an exhibit.

According to the decision, I have summed up these affidavits in writing. If the Court wishes, I will read this summary which contains an explanation of this document, but I do not believe that it will be of great use at the moment; it will be better if it is read later in the proper connection.

THE PRESIDENT: Very well.

DR. SERVATIUS: Then I would like to submit further affidavits which are not yet available and which have not yet been dealt with before the Commission. There are 139,000 affidavits which are divided into definite groups. These groups have been gone over by members of the organizations who are in prison here, and one collective affidavit has been made for each group. Three especially important and typical affidavits have been added to these collective affidavits. I could submit the majority of the pertinent documents' to the Tribunal, and will offer them to the Court if I am given the opportunity. I would like to discuss with the General Secretary as to how they should be submitted.

In effect, there are 12 different groups-that will be 12 affidavits with three appendixes to the most important ones: On the Church question, on the question of low-level flying, and on the question of concentration camps. Those are nine groups.

Then I have two groups-that is to say, a survey of two camps in which there are many thousands, so that one can get a clear picture of the. opinion of the inmates of the camp. They are also summed up in an affidavit with a few appendixes.

I have attempted to compile this great amount of material so that the Court will be in a position to take judicial notice of it, and I would like to submit it in its entirety so that the Court will perhaps be able to examine some picked at random and be convinced of its correctness.

THE PRESIDENT: As I understand it, there are 139,000 affidavits. You have divided them into 12 groups?

DR. SERVATIUS: Yes.

THE PRESIDENT: And you have 12 collective affidavits for these 12 groups?

DR. SERVATIUS: Yes.

THE PRESIDENT: To be appended to each of these 12 collective affidavits are two or three ...

DR. SERVATIUS: There are three. As I have just seen, a larger number is appended. I will go over them again and reduce them so that there will be no more than three to each group.

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Servatius, then the Tribunal thinks that the whole 139,000 should be deposited with the Tribunal, and the 12 collective affidavits with the appended affidavits will doubtless be of great convenience to the Tribunal. The Commission will receive them and approve them, yes, and then they will be deposited before the Tribunal.

DR. SERVATIUS: Then I have to submit the document books which the Tribunal has; I have the originals of the -documents here and I submit them. There are two documents which I cannot submit in the original-two, to be explicit, which are at the University of Erlangen. The first one, Document PL-15, is the book Die Amtstrdger der Partei (The Officials of the Party). And Document PL-78 is the book Das Recht der NSDAP (Law of the NSDAP) by Dr. Hein and Dr. Fischer. All the others I have submitted. A large part of the documents are taken from collections of documents and from books which are already in the library of the Prosecution. The title of these collections of documents is shown by the heading of the document concerned in the document book. I ask that these collections of documents and books, to be found in the library of the Prosecution, be designated as the originals.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, subject to any objections.

DR. SERVATIUS: Then I have finished with the presentation of evidence submitted before the Commission, and now, with the permission of the Court, I shall call my witnesses. With the permission of the Court, I will call the witness Gauleiter Kaufmann.

IThe witness Kaufmann took the stand.]

THE PRESIDENT: Will you state your full name, please?

KARL OTTO KURT KAUFMANN (Witness): Karl Otto Kurt Kaufmann.

THE PRESIDENT: Will you repeat this oath after me: I swear by God-the Almighty and Omniscient-that I will speak the pure truth-and will withhold and add nothing.

IThe witness repeated the oath in German.]

THE PRESIDENT: You may sit down.

DR. SERVATIUS: Witness, you were a Gauleiter from 1925 to 1926 in the Gau Ruhr and from 1928 to 1945 in the Gau Hamburg?

KAUFMANN: Yes.

DR. SERVATIUS: How many people lived in these Gaue?

KAUFMANN: In the Ruhr about 7 to 8 million; in the Gau Hamburg about 1.8 million.

DR.SERVATIUS: Do you know anything about conditions in other Gaue?

KAUFMANN: More or less, yes.

DR. SERVATIUS: In 1921 you joined the Party and after the dissolution of the Party again in 1925?

KAUFMANN: Yes.

DR. SERVATIUS: And in the meantime you were a laborer, from 1921 to 1925, in the Ruhr district and in Upper Bavaria?

KAUFMANN: No, from 1923 to 1925.

DR. SERVATIUS: According to National Socialist terminology, when is a person a political leader?

KAUFMANN: A man holds this position when he has been nominated for it, when he is in possession of the appropriate documents and has the right to wear a uniform.

DR. SERVATIUS: Were Block- and Zellenleiter among the political leaders?

KAUFMANN: Yes.

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Servatius, will you ask the date of the witness' birth?

DR. SERVATIUS: Witness, when were you born?

KAUFMANN: I was born on 10 October 1900.

DR. SERVATIUS: Were not the Block- and Zellenleiter a different type of political leader from the political leaders in higher position?

KAUFMANN: The Block- and Zellenleiter were small executive organs of the Ortsgruppenleiter.

DR. SERVATIUS: Was the activity of the Block- and Zellenleiter subordinate in significance to that of the Amtsleiter in the local groups, or in their staffs?

KAUFMANN: Under the Amtsleiter of the local groups'there were essential tasks and nonessential tasks. Those in charge of the essential tasks were more important than those in charge of the nonessential tasks.

DR. SERVATIUS: Were not the Block- and Zellenleiter officials

and especially important political leaders? -

KAUFMANN: I have already said that they were officials, but only small executing organs of the local group leader.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE (Deputy Chief Prosecutor for the United Kingdom): My Lord, I wonder if I might make a suggestion for the consideration of the Court. I think it would be more helpful if the translator could use the German term, because we are all used to it in this context, and 'continue to use the Ortsgruppenleiter instead of "leader of a local group," because when we use a term like "local group" there may be some difficulty as to what the reference is. I just put it for a suggestion. Personally, it would be helpful to me. I don't know if the Court will agree.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, certainly.

DR. SERVATIUS: What was the general practical activity of the political leaders? How was it before the war and how was it after the beginning of the war?

KAUFMANN: The activity of the political leaders was according to the office they held. There were political leaders who were purely technical experts and there were political leaders who had tasks of political leadership. The tasks before the seizure of power were, as in any party, essentially to make propaganda for the Party idea, to organize the Party, and in election campaigns to recruit votes among the p9pulation for the success of the Party. After the seizure of power, the essential activity of the political leaders consisted primarily in social welfare work for the population and in the realization of the social aims. In addition, there were organizational questions, training tasks, and propaganda questions. During the war these tasks were determined by the course of the war itself and in addition to the large social problems in peacetime we had the food and shelter problems brought about by the war.

DR. SERVATIUS: How large was the number of political leaders before the war and during the war?

KAUFMANN: I can only give figures from my Gau. I estimate the number of political leaders in the Gau Hamburg before the war at about 10,000, without auxiliary branches. The number was greatly curtailed by the fact that many were drafted during the war.

DR. SERVATIUS: How large was the percentage of political leaders in your Gau who were -drafted for military service?

KAUFMANN: Aside, from armament-for many political leaders were only honorary officials maximum of 10 percent of the Party were classed as indispensable at the beginning of the war.

DR. SERVATIUS: Who, therefore, remained in the Gau?

KAUFMANN: In 1944, in the age groups of 1900 and younger, there were 12 for the whole Party in Hamburg, with the exception of administration and armament.

DR. SERVATIUS: Do you mean 12 percent?

KAUFMANN: No, 12 men.

DR. SERVATIUS: And in percentage?

KAUFMANN: I estimate 6,000 political leaders.

DR. SERVATIUS: On the staffs of the Gau, Kreis, and Ortsgruppenleiter were also tie heads of the technical offices. Did these officials of the technical offices (Amtswalter) have political leadership tasks?

KAUFMANN: No. The great majority of political leaders in the technical offices were concerned exclusively with technical matters of their organizations.

DR. SERVATIUS: Did the officials of the technical offices take part in all staff discussions or were there smaller and bigger staffs?

KAUFMANN: That depended on the subject of the discussion. If it was of general political interest a larger circle was included; if it was a discussion which concerned only special offices, the circle was limited to these.

DR. SERVATIUS: Was the office of political leader taken voluntarily, or as a duty, or on a compulsory basis?

KAUFMANN: Here again one must distinguish between two periods; before the seizure of power, of course, it was voluntary. After the seizure of power every Party member was obliged, as a matter of principle, to co-operate. I personally considered it important to maintain the principle of volunteer work in the Gau under all circumstances because, as you can understand, I did not expect any political success from forced co-operation. I know that the matter was dealt with in a similar way in other Gaue.

DR. SERVATIUS: Why did Party members refuse to take honorary offices as political leaders; was this done for political reasons or for personal reasons?

KAUFMANN: The reasons varied. Some refused because they were too busy in their occupation-that is especially true of many professions during the war; and others refused. because they did not want to expose themselves politically.

DR. SERVATIUS: What was the activity of the Blockleiter?

KAUFMANN: T

he Blockleiter were the assistants of the Ortsgruppenleiter. When it was necessary in peace and in war to approach the population, usually in the case of social measures, the Ortsgruppenleiter used the services of the Blockleiter. In the Gau Hamburg the Block and Zellenleiter as well as the whole Party, in war and peace, were primarily concerned with social work and welfare measures.

DR. SERVATIUS: From where did the Gauleiter get their instructions?

KAUFMANN: The Gauleiter received their instructions from the fuehrer. They were directly subordinate to the Fuehrer. Upon his order they received instructions from the Deputy of the Fuehrer and in some cases from the Party Chancellery on behalf of the Fhrer.

DR. SERVATIUS: Could the Reichsleiter also give instructions to the Gauleiter?

KAUFMANN: No, the Reichsleiter were limited to their specialized offices in the Gaue. The Gauleiter had the right to stop measures transmitted through this channel and originating from a Reichsleiter if he considered them inexpedient. In the case of differences, the Deputy of the Fuehrer or the Fuehrer himself decided.

DR. SERVATIUS: How were the Gauleiter instructed on political intentions and measures?

KAUFMANN: The basic political intentions and measures of the Fuehrer were known to us through the Party program and in part through his book Mein Kampf. Accordingly, the propaganda and practical training of our co-workers was effected. After the seizure of power, the Gauleiter were informed of intended political actions, especially foreign political ones, but also domestic ones, only after the action had taken place.

DR. SERVATIUS: Were there orders, instructions, or conferences? What can you say about that?

KAUFMANN: There were conferences which took place comparatively seldom.

DR. SERVATIUS: In which form did these conferences take place?

KAUFMANN: For the Party leaders, in the form of Reichsleiter and Gauleiter conferences. I must correct myself-not conferences but meetings.

DR. SERVATIUS: What is the difference between a conference and a meeting?

KAUFMANN: In a conference I see a possibility of discussion. This possibility of discussion in Fuehrer conferences existed without restriction up to the resignation of Strasser in 1932, in a limited form until the departure of Hess, but it altogether disappeared when Hess was no longer there. From this time on, the meetings consisted exclusively of the issuing of orders, at which there was no possibility for discussion or for inquiry. These meetings were directed by Bormann.

The other way was through circular letters. Through circular letters, direct orders of the Fuehrer or orders in the name of the Fuehrer were transmitted to us-at first through the Deputy of the Fuehrer and later through the Party Chancellery. That was essentially the channel of command that was customary.

DR. SERVATIUS: Did conferences with the Reichsleiter take place?

KAUFMANN: I do not recall any conference at which all Gauleiter were present with all Reichsleiter.

DR. SERVATIUS: Did leading political leaders have special tasks outside of their activities as political leaders?

KAUFMANN: There were high functionaries of the Party who, besides their Party office, had State and other offices. There were also those who were limited exclusively to their Party office.

DR. SERVATIUS: What was the content of the instruction which the political leaders received through official Party channels? Must one make a distinction between various periods-up to the seizure of power, up to the war, and during the war?

KAUFMANN: I have already partially answered that question. I can sum up briefly: Before the war they were of an organizational and propagandistic nature and during the war they were determined by the tasks of war, in the main dealing with social measures.

DR. SERVATIUS: Did the political leaders receive instructions on Point I of the Party program, which in effect contained the Anschluss of Austria to Germany, and did such instructions refer to the preparation of war of aggression?

KAUFMANN: The political leaders were in no way informed about the Anschluss of Austria, the way in which it was done, or the time. The Anschluss of Austria was, of course, the goal of the Party, because Austria's desire for an Anschluss was known or became known to the political leaders from 1918 on, through the law of the then Chancellor Renner as a result of the plebiscite in 1921 of the Federal State of Salzburg and Tyrol, and later through Austrian reaction to the entry of German troops or to the Anschluss.

DR. SERVATIUS: Did you receive instructions on Point 2 of the Party program which refers to the denunciation of the Versailles Treaty? Did these instructions refer to the preparation of a war of aggression?

KAUFMANN: The revision of the Versailles Treaty-and I emphasize revision-was an essential part of our political aims. The political leaders were, before the war and even before the seizure of power, of the firm conviction that this aim would have to be achieved by way of revision, that is, by way of negotiation. The political leaders never received any other instruction on methods by which to attain this goal in all the time before the war.

DR. SERVATIUS: Did you receive instructions on Point 3 of the program, which demands land for settlement? Did such instructions refer to the preparation for a war of aggression?

KAUFMANN: This point of the program -- I believe it is a point of the program -- was understood by the political leaders-and they were instructed to that effect-to mean the return of the German colonies. The discussions on other territories did not arise before the war, but only during the war. I emphasize, discussion.

DR. SERVATIUS: What instructions did you receive on the Jewish question, which is dealt with from Point 4 to 8 of the Party program? Did such instructions refer to the removal of the Jews because they would interfere with the war of aggression?

KAUFMANN: The program points on the Jewish question were definitely set up. The attitude on the Jewish question varied greatly. The political leaders with whom I was in contact were instructed by me, at least, that this question could be solved only in a constructive way, that is, by a basic change in the existing system. Training and propaganda on this point never had anything to do with wars of aggression.

DR. SERVATIUS: What instruction did you receive on the Church question, Point 24 of the Party program? Did you receive instructions to eliminate the Church as an enemy of war?

KAUFMANN: I never received such instructions based on such reasoning, nor did my political leaders. In spite of the interpretation which the different personalities of the Party gave this point, the program point acknowledging positive Christianity remained binding until the end for my political leaders. That is proved by the fact that the majority of the political leaders were and remained members of the Church.

DR. SERVATIUS: What instructions did you receive on Point 25 of the Party program on the dissolution of labor unions? Were they to be removed as opponents of war?

KAUFMANN: No. We, and that includes my political leaders, saw in the dissolution of the labor unions only a demonstrative act of an organic development which was taking place. The mass of union members, even before the dissolution of the unions, were members of the NSBO, and thus members of the National Socialist Labor Organization.

DR. SERVATIUS: I would like to break off here. The witness Hupfauer will be questioned more closely on this subject.

Did not the Anschluss of Austria take place with the entry of German troops? Did the political leaders approve of this?

KAUFMANN: I have already mentioned that the political leaders were neither informed nor questioned on the entry of German troops into Austria and that they welcomed the Anschluss all the more because it is a historical fact that the Austrian people desired it.

DR. SERVATIUS: Was not Alsace-Lorraine again incorporated into the German Reich, and did the political leaders approve of it?

KAUFMANN: The question of the incorporation of disputed areas is a question of peace treaties. The political leaders were of the opinion that Alsace-Lorraine, for the duration of the war, was under special German civil administration, and after the victorious end of the war it was very possible that the incorporation of this territory into the German Reich could and would be a German demand, just as it was a French one after the first World War.

DR. SERVATIUS: Were not the occupied territories in the East claimed as Lebensraum and did the political leaders approve of this?

KAUFMANN: The war against Russia was described to the political leaders by the political leadership as a preventive war. And so this information for the benefit of the political leaders did not-at least at the beginning of this war-contain anything concerning intentions of annexation.

DR. SERVATIUS: Were not the churches in fact persecuted and did the political leaders approve this?

KAUFMANN: It is quite possible that, in spite of the Party program to acknowledge positive Christianity, deviation from this particular point occurred in some Gaue and the Church was exposed to some persecution in these Gaue. The Fuehrer himself never deviated from this point of the program in his statements.

DR. SERVATIUS: Then you did not approve of this persecution?

KAUFMANN: Not only did I disapprove of the persecution, but

I prohibited it in my Gau.

DR. SERVATIUS: Were not the unions actually abolished and did not the political leaders approve of it?

KAUFMANN: The political leaders and I saw in the German Labor Front the development toward a great unified labor organization. If there were any doubts, the social achievements for the German worker caused them to disappear.

DR. SERVATIUS: Were the political aims thus realized not contained as aims in the book Mein Kampf, and thus generally known and approved by the leaders?

KAUFMANN: The book Mein Kampf was certainly known to part of the political leaders, and so was the Party program. The opinion about both in the Nazi Party was like in any other party. Some points are approved and they are the reasons for joining. Other points do not seem to interest anybody, and the third group of program points can even be rejected. In every party, and in the NSDAP as well, much thinking and discussing centered around the final aims of the Party, and this process was by no means completed.

DR. SERVATIUS: Were there then various tendencies in the Party?

KAUFMANN: In important questions of interpretation of the program points, yes.

DR. SERVATIUS: What groups were they?

KAUFMANN: I should like to differentiate between three large groups-the socialistic group, which in my opinion included most of the members and followers, a more nationalistic group, and a negative anti-Semitic group.

DR. SERVATIUS: What do you mean by a negative anti-Semitic group? Is that the Streicher tendency?

KAUFMANN: If you ask me, yes.

DR. SERVATIUS: To what party tendency did you belong in the Party?

KAUFMANN: I was and am a socialist.

DR. SERVATIUS: To what group did the majority of the Reichsleiter belong?

KAUFMANN: That is very difficult to say.

DR. SERVATIUS: The Gauleiter?

KAUFMANN: The Gauleiter from the industrial areas were for the most part socialists.

DR. SERVATIUS: How about the Kreisleiter?

KAUFMANN: That depended essentially on their home district.

DR. SERVATIUS: The same is true of the Ortsgruppenleiter, Block-, and Zellenleiter?

KAUFMANN: That is true of most of the political leaders and for the mass of Party members.

DR. SERVATIUS: What was the political influence of the various groups and where was the emphasis put?

KAUFMANN: That is very difficult to say. If you speak about influence, I -presume that most of the Party members like me believed in the socialistic ideals of the Fuehrer. But that there were men in his entourage who were less interested in socialism than in other aims seems to me probable.

DR. SERVATIUS: Did you as a socialist agree with the Party leadership?

KAUFMANN: I absolutely agreed with the socialistic aims of the Milirer. On the other hand I did not agree with some men in leading positions and their ideas.

DR. SERVATIUS: Why did -you and other political leaders who did not agree with these aims remain in office when you saw that the main policy was deviating from socialist fields, and the persecution of the Church and Jews started?

KAUFMANN: To begin with, at no time up to the collapse did I or my associates have the impression that the socialist aims had been given up. I have already emphasized that if an old National Socialist has worked almost 25 years for his Party, -it is his duty to fight as long as possible for the realization of the aims as he understands them, and that is not possible outside the Party but only within the Party. That is one of the essential reasons why I remained in the Party.

DR.SERVATIUS: How were the subordinate Kreis- and Ortsgruppenleiter instructed?

KAUFMANN: To answer this question one must make a distinction between the city Gaue on the one hand and the provincial Gaue, on the other. In the city Gau of Hamburg the political leaders were frequently called together and received their instructions and directions orally. For the provincial Gaue this was mostly done, because of the distance, in writing, that is, their instructions were issued orally and in writing.

DR. SERVATIUS: Were the Kreisleiter instructed to the same extent as the Gauleiter or did they receive knowledge of only less important matters?

KAUFMANN: Up to the beginning of the war I do not recall any case in which my Kreisleiter-and I assume it was similar in the other Gaue-did not learn of everything that I knew about. During the war that did not hold entirely true for reasons of secrecy.

DR. SERVATIUS: Did the political leaders receive instructions to commit war crimes or to permit them? How about the lynching of low-level flyers?

KAUFMANN: Such orders as you mention were not known to me in a direct form, that is as a direct demand. I assume you are speaking, first, of the newspaper article by the former Reichsminister Dr. Goebbels; second, of the well-known decree of the Reichsfuehrer SS to the Police; and third, of the repeatedly mentioned circular letter of Reichsleiter Bormann.

DR. SERVATIUS: Yes.

KAUFMANN: These orders were not clearly formulated in the sense of your question. I admit that their interpretation could lead to a development which then did lead in individual cases to the events described here. These orders came through the Gaustabsamt and were then sent from there to the competent Kreisleiter. The order, that is, the circular letter by Bormann, was stopped by me in my Gau-as I assume that it was done in other Gaue too-in view of the fact that, because of the intensity of air warfare and its results, I wanted to keep my political leaders from giving a dangerous interpretation to this order. In addition, in view of the Goebbels article and in view of Himmler's decree, I sent the Kreisleiter and Police presidents distinct counterorders. I hope that similar steps were taken in other Gaue.

DR. SERVATIUS: What about the treatment of foreign workers? Did you receive instructions tending toward war crimes in that regard?

KAUFMANN: All instructions which I know of in this field refer exclusively to a demand for support of the social welfare work. For me, as a socialist, it was a matter of course that my agents-that is in this case the Labor Front and the Kreisleiterwere instructed to take care of foreigners also, and I visited the camps to ascertain whether this was done.

DR. SERVATIUS: What about the concentration camps with regard to foreigners? Did you have instructions to put or help put foreigners in concentration camps? Did you know of what happened in the concentration camps?

KAUFMANN: I assume that the question of competence for the concentration camps is known to the T

ribunal. As the supreme political leader of the Gau ...

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Servatius, I do not know what the witness means by that, that the question of competence with reference to the concentration camps is known to the Tribunal.

DR. SERVATIUS: He did not want to say that he, as a Gauleiter, was not responsible for the concentration camps themselves. He only wanted to explain that he will immediately discuss his responsibility and will not give a long explanation on competency. For that reason he said that he assumed the Tribunal was informed on that matter.

THE PRESIDENT: Then, are you saying that you were in charge of the concentration camps or responsible for them?

KAUFMANN: No, by no means.

THE PRESIDENT: Well, what do you mean by the competency for the concentration camps?

KAUFMANN: I wanted to indicate or say that I might assume that the Tribunal knows of this competency. If not, I am prepared to explain it briefly.

THE PRESIDENT: Well, will you explain it briefly?

KAUFMANN: Yes. The concentration camps, during the whole period of their formation and their management, were completely outside any knowledge or influence of the political leaders, who consequently had no authority as far as concentration camps were concerned and no idea of what actually happened in them. I myself, if I wanted to enter a camp, had to have a special written approval from the Reich Security Main Office. I believe that that is sufficient explanation.

DR. SERVATIUS: Were not flyers actually lynched and was that not so well known that every political leader knew about it and approved it by remaining in office?

KAUFMANN: I have already stated that in the Gau Hamburg such things did not take place and since I myself learned of such

cases only as a prisoner, I must assume that my political leaders, like myself, learned of these things only in captivity.

DR. SERVATIUS: Was not the ill-treatment of foreign workers throughout the Reich so well known that every political leader must have known about it and approved it by remaining in office?

KAUFMANN: The political leaders were bound to their own districts, especially during the war. They could supervise only their sphere of activity and what I and my political leaders in Hamburg saw of these camps only made a favorable impression. The Kreisleiter had the obligation, where there were deficiencies and poor conditions, to take steps together with the Labor Front and industrial leaders to remedy them immediately.

DR. SERVATIUS: What was the relationship of the political leaders to the State organizations, administrations, and other institutions?

KAUFMANN: The functions were completely varied and separate, except in those cases in which one person held two or more positions.

DR. SERVATIUS: And what relationship did the political leaders have to the SA and General SS?

KAUFMANN: The SA and the General SS were independent organizations with their own chain of command. The political leaders could ask them to support their work.

DR. SERVATIUS: Did the political leaders have any executive powers?

KAUFMANN: None at all. If they had no state function, as I said, they were exclusively limited to their Party sphere.

DR. SERVATIUS: Could the political leaders give instructions to the Gestapo or the SD?

KAUFMANN: That is shown from the answer to the previous question. However, the fact that in the State Police and the SD the vigilance over their own organizations was even more severe than in other formations was a matter of course.

DR. SERVATIUS: Witness, what was your relationship to the Fuehrer?

KAUFMANN: In the first years I venerated the Fuehrer. Later on I still venerated him but did not understand him on many points, and the measures which are now ascribed to the Fi1hrer I would formerly not have considered possible.

DR. SERVATIUS: Can the political leaders, who believed Hitler an idealist and who had no knowledge of the extermination of the Jews and other events, essentially be considered of good faith?

KAUFATANN: In the correct judgment of their functions and their attitude and what they had to know or could know, this good faith must, in my opinion, be granted to the political leaders without reservation.

DR. SERVATIUS: I have no more questions to put to this witness.

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn.

[The Tribunal recessed until 1400 hours.]

Afternoon Session

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Witness, do you remember Hitler saying in his Reichstag speech on 20 February 1938: "National Socialism possesses Germany entirely and completely. There is no institution in this State which is not National Socialist.'?

Do you remember these words, or if you do not remember the exact words do you remember the sense of these words being stated by Hitler?

KAUFMANN: I remember the sense of the words, but not the words themselves.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, the extract from the speech is in Document Book 5, in Document 2715-PS.

[Turning to the witness.] Do you agree with the sense of these words?

KAUFMANN: No.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Do you think it was an exaggeration?

KAUFMANN: I am convinced that not all institutions were at that time National Socialist.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: But you would agree that the vast majority of institutions were National Socialist?

KAUFMANN: They were in the process of becoming National Socialist, but that process had not been completed.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: So you would agree that what Hitler states as a fact was the aim for which he was working?

KAUFMANN: Yes.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And the method by which he was working for that aim was through the system of political leadership conducted by the Leadership Corps?

KAUFMANN: By that means the aim could be reached only in part.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: It was one essential method of possessing Germany in the sense of getting complete control of the minds and hearts and feelings of the population of Germany, was it not?

KAUFMANN:, No, in my opinion only at the beginning.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Only at the beginning? But that was the work which had gone on from 1933 up to 1938, when these words were spoken by Hitler?

KAUFMANN: It was part of the success of the Party before the seizure of power and after the seizure of power.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Let me just put a few more words of Hitler's to show you how he expresses it:

"But above all, the National Socialist Party"-it is the same

speech-"has not only made the nation National Socialist but

has also made of itself that perfect organization..."

Is Hitler correct in giving that description of the leadership?

KAUFMANN: Yes; I would say "yes."

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, now I just want to take the matters which Dr. Servatius has referred to and ask you about the share of the Leadership Corps in them. Let us take the question of the Jews first.

Speaking generally and not with sole reference to your own Gau of Hamburg, did the Political Leaders take an active part in the demonstration of November 1938?

KAUFMANN: The information I received about that action from other Gaue gave me the impression that such actions had indeed taken place, but that, with exceptions, the men responsible for these actions had in no case been Political Leaders.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, if you say that, will you look at Heydrich's order of 10 November.

My Lord, Your Lordship will find that on Page 79 of the Document Book 14.

THE PRESIDENT: What page?

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: 79, My Lord.

Witness, you will find it on Page 96 of the German document book. If it is not 96, it is 97. Have you found it?

You see, this was an order from Heydrich issued at 1:20 in the morning of the 10th, and I just want you to look at Paragraph 1:

"The chiefs of the local State Police offices or their deputies must get in contact by telephone with the Political Leaders (Gauleitung or Kreisleitung) who have jurisdiction over their districts and have to arrange a joint meeting with the appropriate inspector or commander of the Order Police to discuss the organization of the demonstrations. At these discussions the Political Leadership has to be informed that the German Police has received from the ReichsFuehrer SS and Chief of the German Police the following instructions in accordance with which the Political Leaders should adjust their own measures."

Now, you remember the general instructions were as to the burning of synagogues, the arrest of 20,000 Jews to be taken to concentration camps, and the destructions or appropriation of Jewish property. What were "their own measures" which the Political Leadership were to take with regard to that?

KAUFMANN: First, may I point out that in the German text of that document the passage which says that the Gauleiter had jurisdiction is not included. I do not find it.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: The point I am asking you about-we will deal with that in a moment, but what I want to know from you is, what were "their own measures" which the Political Leaders were to take with regard to this attack on the Jews?

KAUFMANN: I can only say the following: I myself did not take part in the meeting of 9 November 1938. 1 was not informed from Munich about the proposed action, but in the evening of 9 November I heard from the chief of the Hamburg State Police that an action of that kind was imminent.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: That is, the leader of the Hamburg State Police was carrying out the instructions of this paragraph after getting in touch with you. I thought you were able to speak for Gauleiter generally, apart from Gau Hamburg, and I want you to tell the Tribunal what were their own measures which the leadership of the Party were to carry out? I mean, you must have heard it discussed afterwards. Tell us what they were. What were the leaders of the Party to do?

KAUFMANN: You asked me in your previous question about my personal experiences. I had to answer that I myself was informed by the chief of the State Police that it was proposed to carry out this action. For the Gau Hamburg-that is what I was asked about just now-I gave the order that officials of the State and Criminal Police were immediately to safeguard the business streets and residential districts of Jews in Hamburg. This measure was in the hands of Commissioner Winke of the Criminal Police, to whom I sent a Gau inspector to assist him. After receiving the information through the State Police I immediately called up all the Kreisleiter and made them responsible for the prevention of this action in their districts.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Did you, in your Gau, burn the synagogues?

KAUFMANN: No, I ...

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I want to be exact. Were the synagogues burned in Hamburg? That is what I should have asked you.

KAUFMANN: As a result of my measures, no excesses took place during the first night, that is the night from the 9th to the 10th. There were minor, insignificant disturbances in the night from the 10th to the 11th, and in spite of my measures, one synagogue was set on fire, I assume by elements from outside.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: All over Germany generally, if my memory is right, there were at least 75 synagogues burned. In general, apart from your own Gau, is it not right that following this order of Heydrich the Leadership Corps co-operated with the Police to see that synagogues were burned, Jews were arrested, and Jewish property affected, and that non-Jewish property was left secure?

KAUFMANN: I know of no order and no directive which commanded the Corps of Political Leaders, even outside the Gau Hamburg, to take part in that action. I was only informed that after the meeting of the 9th of November, Reichsn-dnister Dr. Goebbels made a request which then in practice led to excesses in individual Gaue, or in many Gaue. I also know that the Delegate for the Four Year Plan at that time said, a few days after that action, at a meeting in Berlin, that this measure, which he condemned in the strongest terms, was not in conformity with the intentions of the Fuehrer and his own intentions, and he mentioned the Gau Hamburg as an exception.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You remember that you said a few moments ago to me that this was an occurrence which only took place in individual instances. Here is the order of Heydrich, telling the Police generally to get in touch with the Leadership Corps so that they could co-operate with the Police to carry out his orders, which were, broadly: Attack the Jews and see that you do not do any harm to non-Jews while you are doing it. It is quite wrong what you said a few moments ago, that this was an individual matter. The Leadership Corps were brought into this through the order of Heydrich, who was then Himmler's lieutenant-chief of the Secret Police, is that not so?

KAUFMANN: No, that is not correct, the Corps of Political Leaders was not required to accept orders from Heydrich. Orders to the Political Leaders could be issued solely by the Gauleiter, who received his directives from the Fuehrer or from the Deputy of the Fuehrer, or from the Party Chancellery.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, do you remember what took place after that occurrence? Do you remember a meeting of the Party Court?

KAUFMANN: No.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Let me remind you about the Party Court. You will find that in Document 3063-PS at Pages 81 to 88 of the same document book. Witness, it is Page 105.

KAUFMANN: Yes, I have found the page.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You have found the page -- Page 81. A meeting of the Supreme Party Court of the Party, and it begins with a report about the events and judicial proceedings in connection with the anti-Semitic demonstrations of 9 November 1938. If you look just after it says "Enclosure 2" it reads:

". . . it was understood by all the Party Leaders present from the oral instructions of the Reich Propaganda Minister that the Party should not appear outwardly as the instigator of the demonstrations but in reality should organize and execute them.

"Instructions in this sense were telephoned immediately-thus a considerable time before transmission of the first teletype-- the bureaus of their districts (Gaue) by a large part of the Party members present."

And if you will look on to the next paragraph but one:

"At the end of November 1938 the Supreme Party Court, through reports from several Gau Courts, heard that these demonstrations of 9 November 1938 had gone as far as plundering and killing of Jews to a considerable extent and that they had already been the object of investigation by the Police and the public prosecutor."

And then after that it says:

"The deputy of the Fuehrer agreed with the interpretation of the Chief Party Court, that known transgression in any case should be investigated under the jurisdiction of the Party:

"I) Because of the obvious connection between the events to be judged and the instructions which Reich Propaganda Minister Party member Dr. Goebbels gave in the town hall at the evening party of comrades. Without investigation and evaluation of these connections a just judgment did not appear possible. This investigation, however, could not be left to innumerable State courts."

And then Paragraph 2 says that matters which concerned the vital interests of the Party should also receive Party clarification first and that the Fuehrer should be asked to cancel the, proceedings in the State courts. Now ff you look on-I do not want to take too much time-you will see that there were then 16 cases which came up before the Supreme Party Court, and the first three cases are matters-oh, yes, there is just one point I should have drawn attention to. Just before you come to the first case:

"Gau leaders and group leaders of the branches served-, as jurors at the trials and decisions. The decisions, which, for reasons to be discussed later, contain only in part the statements of the facts, are attached."

The first three cases, which come from Rheinhausen, Niederwerrn, and Linz, are concerned with theft and rape. They are

allowed to go on to the State courts. The next 13-which come from al

l over Germany, very different places like Heilsberg, Dessau,

Lesum, Bremen, Neidenburg, Eberstadt, Lilnen, Aschaffenburg, Dresden, Munich, and all over Germany-are 13 cases of murdering

Jews. Two of the perpetrators get the very mild sentence of a warning and not being able to hold public office because of disciplinary violation, and as for the remaining 11, the proceedings are suspended against them.

Now, I just want you to look at 102. If you will look at 6, that is the shooting of a Jewish couple called Goldberg; Number 7, the shooting of the Jew Rosenbaum and the Jewess Zwienicld; Number 10, shooting the Jewess Susanne Stern; and there is Number 5. Number 5 is the shooting of the 16-year-old Jew, Herbert Stein.

Now, you say that you did not deal with any of these situations yourself, is that so?

KAUFMANN: I explained clearly that I gave orders to the contrary in my Gau.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes. I asked you, as I said at the beginning-I want you to tell the Tribunal about it generally how it is that the Court of your Party, which is supposed to deal with the discipline and decency of its members, passed over 13 cases of murder with two suspensions from public office for 3 years, and the remaining 11 cases with all action suspended. Do not you think that that was a disgraceful way to deal with murder?

KAUFMANN: May I say first that among the 13 cases which are quoted here, there is only one Political Leader.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, you are not right, you know. Cases 9 and 10 involve Ortsgruppenleiter; case 11 involves a Blockleiter. It is true that cases 2 to 8, 12, and 15 involve people with various ranks in the SA, and cases 11, 14, and 16 involve cases with people in the ranks of the SS. But actually I think you will find that cases 9, 10, and 11 involve the Political Leadership. But that is not my point, Witness; my point is this: Here are these members of the Party brought up before the Court of the Party, and the Court of the Party is condoning and conniving at murder. That is my point, and I want you to give your explanation as to why you connive and condone at murder.

KAUFMANN: I saw this document which has just been submitted to me for the first time only after I was brought here to the Palace of Justice as a witness. In view of my attitude toward the Jewish question and the Jewish measures, I did not under any circumstances approve such handling of cases as is mentioned here. I would never have approved of it if I had known about it.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: But, Witness, if that is your personal view, then let us leave your personal view for the moment. The Tribunal are considering the Leadership Corps of the Party. Here is the highest Court of the Party. If the highest Court of the Party gives decisions of that kind - of which you intensely disapprove, does not it show that the highest Court of the Party was rotten to its foundations?

KAUFMANN: The Supreme Party Court should have adopted a strong attitude toward the Fi1hrer. It apparently neglected to call to account the creator of the whole action, the instigator of all these excesses.

SIR DAVID MAXW-ELL-FYFE: I am not going to take it in complete detail; but I just want you to look at one paragraph of the explanation which the Party Court gives. The full explanation is there, on Page 87.

[Turning to the Tribunal.] My Lord, that is the second paragraph.

[Turning to the witness.] Will you turn to that? I am not sure where that will be. It will be a few pages on-112, I think, Witness. I just want you to try and help us on this point. Have, you got a paragraph that begins, "Also in such cases as when Jews were killed without an order (Enclosures 13, 14, and 15) or contriary to orders (Enclosures 8 and 9)..."? Now, mark the numbers...

KAUFMANN: No, I have not found that paragraph.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Would you try at Page 113? The sergeant will help you.

KAUFMANN: Yes.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Do you see:

"Also in such cases"-it begins-"as when Jews were killed ,without an order (Enclosures 13, 14, 15) or contrary to orders (Enclosures 8 and 9) ignoble motives could not be determined. At heart the men were convinced that they had done a service

to their Fuehrer and to the Party. Therefore, exclusion from the Party did not take place. The final aim of the proceedings executed and also the yardstick for critical examination must be, according to the policy of the Supreme Party Court, on the one hand, to. protect those Party comrades who, motivated by their decent National Socialist attitude and initiative, had overshot their mark and, on the other hand, to draw a dividing line between the Party and those who for personal reasons misused the Party's national liberation battle against Jewry ...

Do you say that it is decent National Socialist attitude and initiative to murder Jewesses and children of 16?

KAUFMANN: My opinion in this matter is quite clear. I objected to the action, and I do not at all approve the viewpoint of the Party Court. I am convinced that the majority of the Party members are of the same opinion.

SIR DAVID ALAXWELL-FYFE: But it must mean, must it not, Witness-your own denunciation must mean that on the Party Court there were a number of men who were completely devoid of any moral sense whatever; is that so?

KAUFMANN: I cannot accept this rather far-reaching characterization. I personally never had anything to do with the Supreme Party Court, and I never had insight into its measures and judgments, particularly in these and similar cases.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I do not want to take time in trying to persuade you to condemn your old colleagues too highly, and therefore I will leave it at that, if you agree so far that you disapproved strongly of the action that was taken by that Party Court. I think you said that. If I understand you correctly, I shall not go into it further. Is that right?

KAUFMANN: I disapprove and reject the opinion of the Party Court as expressed in this document.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, I just want to show you that that was not an isolated example, and -- My Lord, if Your Lordship would be good enough to turn to Page 45 of the same book-no, My Lord, it is Page 46, 1 am sorry; and My Lord, the document begins on Page 45, but actually what I would like Your Lordship to, look at is on Page 47. It is either on Page 50 or 51, Witness, in the German copies.

Now, that is a document dated the 7th of June 1933, issued by the Gau propaganda leader of the Gau Koblenz-Trier. You will see that it is issued to all Kreis directorates, and the subject is "Jew baiting." The first paragraph says that they will receive a list of Jewish firms and businesses, and the second paragraph says:

"Jew baiting.

"The district directorate (Kreisleitung) will set up a committee which has the task of directing and supervising the communities in the whole district. The strength of this committee will be determined by the Kreisleiter. You are to inform the

Gau propaganda directorate at once of the committees named. The Gau propaganda directorate will then contact these committees through you."

Then it goes on to suggest a considerable number of measures against Jews, including refraining from trading with them, and action against anyone who does trade.

Now, that just happens to be a document which we captured from the Gau Koblenz-Trier. I want you to tell us just how that fits into the Party machinery. That goes from Gau propaganda to Kreis; then, I suppose, when the Party Leaders in the various Kreise would set up their committees, they would employ the Ortsgruppenleiter, or the Zellenleiter and the Blockleiter to form these committees. Is that how it would work?

KAUFMANN: The document which I have before me is a copy of a radio message. I did not know that it was common usage in the Gaue in 1933 to send such directives by radio, but assuming that this directive was actually issued, then it was a measure in the Gau Koblenz-Trier, which, to my knowledge, was not based on any order.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: But you are not suggesting that out of the 42 Gaue, Koblenz-Trier is the only Gau in which there was Jew baiting in 1933, are you?

KAUFMANN: No.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE:, But what I asked you was, assuming the instructions from the Gau were carried out by the Kreis, would these committees be formed out of the Zellenleiter and Blockleiter of the various parts of the Kreis?

KAUFMANN: I must assume so from the document, if I can take it to be correct.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes, assuming that it is a verified captured document, am I right in assuming that the Kreisleiter of Koblenz-Trier carried out these instructions? Did they form the Jew baiting committees out of the Zellenleiter and Blockleiter?

KAUFMANN: Under no circumstances was that method, that measure, common usage throughout the Reich. Under no circumstances did the Reich authorities issue a directive to this effect, otherwise I would have known about it.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: If that is your answer I would not occupy the time. I just wanted to show what happened in 1933 and 1933. We will now take something that happened during the war-My Lord, if you will be good enough to turn to Page 27 and 28-Page 29 and 30, Witness.

KAUFMANN: Yes.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You see that it is a document issued on the 5th of November 1942 regarding jurisdiction over Poles and Eastern nationals, and you can see that the jurisdiction

is to be placed over-if I may just read the first paragraph to you to explain it:

"The ReichsFuehrer SS has come to an arrangement with the Reich Minister of Justice, Thierack, whereby the courts will not ask for the usual legal procedure in the cases of Poles and Eastern nationals. These persons of alien race are in future to be handed over to the Police. Jews and gypsies are to be treated in the same way. This agreement has-been approved by the Fuehrer."

And then it goes on to explain that the reason for the handing over of the Poles and for not giving them a trial is, you see that in

Paragraph 2, because Poles and Eastern nationals are alien and racially inferior people living in the German Reich territory.

I would like you to look at the end of it where it develops the fact that considerations for trying Germans do not apply to considerations for trying Eastern nationals. Then Paragraph 3 says:

"Above expositions are for personal information. In case of need, h6wever, there need be no hesitation in informing the Gauleiter in suitable form."

My Lord, it is the last sentence of the document, that: "... there need be no hesitation in informing the Gauleiter in suitable form."

Now, tell the Tribunal, Witness, how did the Gauleiter come to deny Eastern nationals a trial and handing them over to the Police? What had he to do with it?

KAUFMANN: Firstly, this document refers, in the beginning, to a directive of the ReichsFuehrer SS to his subordinate offices, that is, not to the Gauleiter. Secondly, it remained at the discretion of the persons who received this document, whether they would instruct the Gauleiter in cases of need.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: That is what I want you to help us on. How did it become necessary for these Police officers and the officers of the R.S.H.A_ to consult the Gauleiter about refusing a trial. What I want you to tell the Tribunal is how the Gauleiter came into it, unless they were helping the Police to perpetrate this injustice like many others. How did they come into it?

KAUFMANN: The Gauleiter did not have anything at all to do with these things. With the permission of the Tribunal, I would like to mention my own experience in this matter...

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I would rather not. I am not interested in your experiences. What I am interested in is why the Police should be instructed to inform the Gauleiter if necessary? Tell us the sort of circumstances in which the Police would go to the Gauleiter-that is what I want to hear.

KAUFMANN: I do not know that; the Gauleiter did not participate in these things.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: So it is your answer that you cannot tell the Tribunal. You cannot imagine any circumstances which would cause Herr Streckenbach to send these instructions to the Higher SS and Police Leader and one-half dozen Police districts? You cannot think of anything that would cause that paragraph to come in?

KAUFMANN: I have already said that the writer of this document leaves it to the discretion of the recipients whether they will instruct the Gauleiter or not. I cannot judge in which cases the Gauleiter were instructed and in which cases they were not ...

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: All right,, let us look at something else.

My Lord, if Your Lordship will turn to Page 24.

Witness, it is 26-Page 26 in your book. Now, that is a report from Herr Abetz, who was the Reich Ambassador in Paris and it has a very large distribution to the Foreign Office and other places, and it is dealing with Jews who had left Austria and had not changed their Austrian passports for German passports, and also Reich German Jews who had not reported when they were abroad. I want you to look at the end of the first paragraph where Abetz says:

"Suggest for the future a collective expatriation procedure for the occupied territory of France based on lists made here in agreement with Hoheitstrdger in which should be listed primarily the members of the following groups..."

And then he has listed the ex-Austrians and Jews who have not reported.

KAUFMANN: May I ask where I can find the word Hoheitstrdger?

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You see the Number 1-well, about three lines before that:

"Suggest for the future a collective expatriation procedure for the occupied territory of France based on lists made here in agreement with Hoheitstrqger"-high Party leaders-"in which should be listed primarily the members of the following groups..."

Now, is Herr Abetz suggesting that the Hoheitstrager should make the lists of the Jews who have not complied with the regulations, and therefore are to be expatriated from comparative safety in France and brought into the Reich where, in 1942, they would probably take a journey into the East and then be gassed? Now, is that a normal type of duty which the Hoheitstrdger did-to make lists of offending Jews for the Reich authorities?

KAUFMANN: Firstly, this is concerned, apparently, with the Hoheitstr"ger of the Auslands-Organisation. As a Gauleiter ...

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes, that is evident from the word here.

KAUFMANN: I, as Gauleiter, have never been expected to perform such work or such services and if I had been asked to perform them, I would have refused to do so.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Just one other point on the Jews. Would you look at "Die Lage"?

[The document was submitted to the witness.]

My Lord, this will be Exhibit GB-534. My Lord, there are copies of the relevant extracts. "Die Lage" is the situation report giving the military political situation of the day.

[Turning to the witness.] You will see, if you will just look back at the beginning, Witness, for a moment-if you will look back to the front. Would you be good enough to look back to the front? You will see that it is for August 1944, and it begins with an article by the Defendant D"nitz on sea warfare. Now, you notice that at the front it is referring to H"ngen which, I understand, is somewhere near Aachen-NSDAP H"ngen. Now, did you get that? Did you get "Die Lage"?

KAUFMANN: Yes.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well now, just look at Page 23, dealing with the Jewish problem in Hungary:

"It was a matter of course that the German offices in Hungary did everything possible after 19 March to eliminate the Jewish element as rapidly and as completely as was at all possible. In view of the proximity of the Russian front, they commenced with the cleaning up of the northeastern area-north Transylvania and the Carpathian province-where the Jewish element was the strongest numerically. Then the Jews were collected in the remaining Hungarian provinces and transported to Germany or German controlled territories. A hundred thousand Jews remained in the hands of the Hungarians to b

e employed in labor battalions."

And then it tells of the question of getting the command of the Hungarians and of the slight difficulty of the definition of "Jew" in Hungarian law.

It goes on to say, toward the end of the first paragraph:

"Up to 9 July approximately 430,000 Jews from the Hungarian provinces had been handed over to the German authorities. The handing over takes place on the Hungarian national frontier up to which point the carrying out of the measures against the Jews, and with it also the responsibility for it, is a matter for the Hungarians."

Then I would like you to note the next paragraph, about Budapest. It says:

"As a last stage the Jews from Budapest were to be deported. It is a question of approximately 260,000. But in the meantime pressure from enemy and neutral countries (Hull"-I suppose that is Mr. Cordell Hull-"the King of Sweden, Switzerland the Pope) has become so strong that those circles in Hungary that are friendly to the Jews attempted to influence the Hungarian Government to prevent any further measures against the Jews..."

Now, Witness, whoever else in Germany was ignorant about the action taken against Jews in Hungary, everyone who got "Die Lage" knew what the Germans were doing with regard to the Hungarian Jews, did they not?

KAUFMANN: I have to disappoint you, Mr. Prosecutor, because I myself see this magazine today for the first time. I do not deny that it was sent to me but I never read it, maybe through lack of time. I do not know to what extent other circles of the Party received it. I myself am hearing of the measures against the Jews in this form and of these numbers for the first time.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, just let us get the distribution of "Die Lage". It may have been bad luck that you did not read it-or good luck; but still, it went to all Gauleiter, it went to all Army and Navy and Air Force commands. Did it go to the Kreis and the Ortsgruppenleiter?

KAUFMANN: May I ask you to tell me where it says so?

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I am asking you whether that is not right. You know it as well as I do, do you not, that it went to all Gauleiter and to Army Command?

KAUFMANN: I said to you, Mr. Prosecutor, just now that it is for the first time-that it is possible that this booklet was sent to me, but that I see it here in this courtroom today for the first time. I have never read it and have never seen it.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You never read it at all, do you say?

KAUFMANN: I do not know this magazine "Die Lage"; I see it for the first time here today.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: So that you cannot say whether there was any distribution to Kreisleiter or Ortsgruppenleiter?

KAUFMANN: I think this distribution is improbable, because my attitude to the Jewish question was well known and my Kreisleiter would, I am sure, have drawn my attention to this article.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: But, as I understood you a few moments ago, you said that it was quite possible that you might have got "Die Lage" but you had not read it?

KAUFMANN: Yes, I am saying this under my oath.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Why did you think it was quite possible that you might have got it, if there was not a distribution to Gauleiter?

KAUFMANN: I did not claim that there was no distribution.

I merely asked where it said that the Gauleiter received this magazine.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, you see, I have referred you to the front page, to what was put on the copy which we happened to capture. It has got "NSDAP H"ngen." It does not look as if it was a very restricted distribution if it got to the NSDAP at H"ngen. I am right, am I not, that H"ngen is a village near Aachen? Is that not right?

KAUFMANN: I do not know whether it is a village near Aachen. I can only see a note in handwriting here, I do not know who wrote it. I see this for the first time today.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: All right. Well, we must not take

up too much time. I will take you on to another point which Dr. Servatius referred to. I want to ask you just one or two questions about the lynching of Allied airmen.

My Lord, if Your Lordship will look at Page 41 of the book.

Witness, it is Page 43 for you. That is an order signed by the Defendant Hess, of the 13th of March 1940.

My Lord, it is Document 062-PS, Exhibit USA-696, and the subject is: "Instructions to civilian population regarding appropriate behavior in case of landings of enemy planes or parachutists in German territory."

It says:

"The French civilian population was directed officially and by radio how to behave in case of landings of German planes. Because of this fact the Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force has requested me to instruct the civilian population correspondingly by means of Party channels. The attached directions as to procedure are to be disseminated only orally via Kreisleiter, Ortsgruppenleiter, Zellenleiter, Blockleiter, leaders of the incorporated and affiliated organizations of the Party. Transmittal by official orders, posters, press, or radio is prohibited."

Then it says: "Official stamp: Top Secret."

And the various matters, instructions as to the treatment of top secret documents.

Now if you will look on to the next page where the document occurs, it says: "One-planes to be put under protection; two-the airmen are to be arrested at once and restarting or destruction prevented; three-no looting or taking of souvenirs." Now look at Paragraph 4: "Likewise, enemy parachutists are immediately to be arrested or made harmless."

My Lord, I think that is a better translation of "unsch"dlich gemacht."

ITurning to the witness.] Now, what was "making harmless" -- murdering?

KAUFMANN: The expression "unsch"dlich machen" in this connection is, I think, a bad choice, a dangerous choice, considering the situation at that time and the fact that this letter emanated from the Deputy of the Fuehrer whose humane and decent attitude was well known.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, you see it is used. You have already got "arrested." The "made harmless" must be something different from "arrested." Do you not think, on consideration, that the ordinary Blockleiter to whom this message was orally given would take it that he was to murder the parachutist if he could not arrest him? What is the purpose of all this secrecy if "unsch"dlich gemacht" had not that meaning? Why have you got about 15 different provisions as to the secrecy of this order if it did not mean murder? There is nothing else secret in the order, is there? Nothing else that you could not put in the hands of a Sunday school?

KAUFMANN: The order contains other points, too, apart from Point 4. In the situation of that time, the expression "unsch"dlich machen" meant that if there was any resistance, the person resisting should be made harmless; but I admit that without an explanation to those who received the order, the choice of words was rather dangerous.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, now, that is the Defendant Hess. Now just look at Himmler's order of the 10th of August 1943.

My Lord, Your Lordship will find it on Page 89 ... [turning to the witness] and it is 116 or 117 of your document book.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: That is sent on the 10th of August 1943. It is sent at Himmler's request by one Brandt, an ObersturmbannFuehrer, and you will see that again-look at the orders for distribution:

"At the request of the ReichsFuehrer SS I am sending you the enclosed order, with the request that the Chief of the Order Police and of the Security Police be informed; they are to make this instruction known to their subordinate offices verbally. In addition, the ReichsFuehrer SS requests that the Gauleiter concerned be informed verbally of this order. It is not the task of the Police to interfere in clashes between Germans and English and American terror-fliers who have bailed out."

Why, again-why were Gauleiter to be informed verbally if it was not that they were to connive at the murder of the airmen?

KAUFMANN: The intention of this order in its details is not clear to me. I, too, received the order through the Higher SS and Police Leader and I issued- directions both to the Party, that is to say, to the Kreisleiter, with the request to have them transmitted to their subordinates, and to the Police president, that, under all circumstances, the fliers should not be maltreated, but only seized and handed over.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: But that was not what the order said, you know, if you passed it on. The order said that the Police were not to interfere in clashes between Germans and the fliers.

In other words, they were to stand aside and let the fliers be lynched. If you passed that on, that meant that the Leadership Corps were going to assist and encourage no interference with lynching of Allied airmen. That is what it comes to is it not? Well, now, I just want to remind you, that was not the end.

My Lord, if Your Lordship turns to Pages 39 and 40-that is 41, Witness, in your document book. That is on the 30th of May 1944.

THE PRESIDENT: Did not the witness say then that according to his understanding these "terror-fliers" were to be seized and turned over?

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes, My Lord. That is quite different from the order.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, but to whom were they to be turned over?

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Witness, to whom did you understand were the "terror-fliers" to be handed over according to your orders?

KAUFMANN: The Political Leaders, if they participated in the arrest, were to turn the captured fliers over to the Police, and the Police was to turn them over to the Air Force authorities concerned.

SIR DAVID MAXVTELL-FYFE: Your orders were that the Political Leaders who participated were to hand them over to the Police. Was that the Ordnungspolizei or the Sicherheitspolizei?

KAUFMANN: To the Ordnungspolizei.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, now the next order is one of Bormann7s on the 30th of May 1944, and you will find it on Page 41.

It is Page 39 of Your Lordship's.

You will see the first paragraph says:

"In the last few weeks low-flying English and American fliers have repeatedly, from a low altitude, machine-gunned children playing in squares, women and children at work in the fields, peasants plowing, vehicles on the highways, trains, et cetera, and have thus murdered defenseless civilians-particularly women and children-in the vilest manner. Several instances have occurred where members of the crews of such aircraft who have bailed out or have made forced landings were lynched on the spot immediately after capture by the populace which was incensed to the highest degree. No Police measures or criminal proceedings were invoked against the German civilians who participated in these incidents."

And you will see that that goes to Reichsleiter, Gauleiter, and Kreisleiter, and you will see that on the next page:

"The leader of the Party Chancellery"-that is Bormann-"requests that the Ortsgruppenleiter be instructed concerning the content of this circular letter orally only."

KAUFMANN: That order of Bormann is well known to me. I had it stopped by the Chief of the Gau Staff Office, and beyond that, for safety reasons and in view of this letter, I repeated the order which, as I have already mentioned here, I issued to the Party and to the Police or rather to the Police President; although in Hamburg, too, casualties had been caused in the ways listed in this document.

SIR DAVED MAXWELL-FYFE: But you do not dispute, do you, Witness, that the purpose of that order was to encourage everyone down to Ortsgruppenleiter not to interfere with the lynching of airmen?

KAUFMANN: No, that is quite evident from the wording ...

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I am not going to argue with written document. I prefer to show you how it was interpreted h another Gau. Would you turn to Page 27?

If Your Lordship will be good enough to turn to Page 25 you will find the Document L-154, Exhibit USA-335.

That is the Gauleiter Service, 25 February 1945, for southen Westphalia-the Gauleiter and National Defense Commissioner o the Gau Westphalia South signed by one Hoffmann-and there is distribution to county counsellors, Kreisleiter, and staff chiefs of th Volkssturm. It says:

"Any fighter-bomber pilots shot down are on principle not to be protected against the indignation of the people. I expect from all Police offices that they will refuse to lend their protection to these gangster types. Authorities acting in contradiction to the popular sentiment will be taken to account by me. All Police and gendarmerie officials are to be informed immediately of this, my attitude. Signed, Albert Hoffmann."

It is quite clear that in some Gaue it was interpreted as a direct order to hold off and not interfere in any way if these fliers were being lynched.

However, you say that in the Gau Hamburg you gave orders that they were to be handed over to the Police.

KAUFMANN: The document shows that the order was interpreted in that way in several Gaue-and I have to admit that in view of the experiences of the last months. But I am convinced that in some Gaue the order was handled in the same manner as in mine

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Witness, there is one point ther I would like you to explain to the Tribunal, though it is not strict on the Leadership Corps. Why would an SA OberstunnbannFuehrer initial that document on 25 February -1945; why would he be initialing it?

KAUFMANN: I did not understand the question.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: If you look at your Page 27, you will see that it is initialed by Buckemiiller, SA ObersturmbannFuehrer and country staff chief of the Volkssturm; why would he be initialing it?

KAUFMANN: That I do not know.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I would not trouble you.

Now, I want to take the next subject and again, I hope, deal ver shortly with what Dr. Servatius mentioned-the churches. Do you agree that it was the general policy of the Nazi Party to do everything in its power to weaken the influence of the Christian churches?

KAUFMANN: No.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, now, would you look at Page I of that last book. It is Page 7 of your book and Page 1 of the English book. That is dated the 12th of December 1941 and it deals with a secret decree of the Reichsleiter Bormann regarding the relationship of National Socialism to Christendom. If you would look at the first paragraph, that deals with the finding of this decree, a copy of a letter on the "relationship," in the papers of a Protestant priest called Eichholz at Aix-la-Chapelle, which is supposed to originate from Reichsleiter Bormann; and then the second paragraph says:

"As far as this document is concerned it does in fact, as I have ascertained, represent a secret decree of the Party Chancellery signed by Reichsleiter Bormann, in which Reichsleiter Bormann clearly points out that National Socialism and Christendom are incompatible and that the influence of the churches in Germany, including the Protestant Church, must be eliminated. The decree was addressed to Gauleiter Dr. Meyer at Mnster on 6 June 1941."

And then it gives the reference: "I have ascertained that on 7 June 1941 the decree was also sent to the remaining Gauleiter ... "

And it says that since this first paragraph of the circular decree addressed to all Gauleiter is missing from the document in possession of Priest Eichholz, it appears it was known to the Church.

Now, do you remember getting the decree of Bormann about the 7th of June 1941? If you cannot remember the decree, you will find it in the next two pages and I just remind you of one or two of the worst pieces in it. At the end of the second paragraph it says:

"Our National Socialist ideology is far loftier than the concepts of Christianity, which in their essential points have been taken over from Jewry. For this reason also we do not need Christianity."

And it says that if the youth does not learn about it, Christianity will disappear; and then there are-some very odd utterances and it talks about a vital force; and if you will look toward the end of Bormann's document, it says in the third from last paragraph:

"For the first time in German history the Fuehrer consci

ously

and completely has the leadership of the people in his own hand. With the Party, its components, and attached units the Fuehrer has created for himself and thus the German Reich leadership an instrument which makes him independent of the Church."

And it goes on to develop that and if you will look at the penultimate paragraph, in the second sentence, it says:

"Just as the deleterious influences of astrologers, seers, and other fakers are eliminated and suppressed by the State, so must the possibility of Church influence also be totally removed."

Now that it is recalled to your memory, I should not think that you should have forgotten a decree couched in such, shall we say extraordinary language as that; do you remember it?

KAUFMANN: Yes.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Do you still say that the National Socialist Party leadership was not doing everything in its power t attack Christianity?

KAUFMANN: Yes. This is a statement by Bormann which, to my knowledge, was withdrawn a few days later upon- orders of the Fuehrer as a personal opinion of Bormann.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: That cannot be so, because if you notice, the decree was -issued on the 7th of June and this decree which, after all, is going to the RSHA, to Mller, is the 12th of December, which is 6 months after the decree was opened and there is nothing in that decree about its being withdrawn. Surely, if it had been withdrawn on the 14th of June there would have been something in this decree to the Security Service and Intelligence Office of the Reich, surely they would have enough intelligence and information to know that a decree had been withdrawn 6 months before.

KAUFMANN: I am speaking here under oath and I say that this decree of May was hot only withdrawn, but had actually to be sent back.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, how do you account for the fact that the Security Police never heard about its being withdrawn-and we discuss it in detail-let us take it in that way. I do not know if you had heard or you may have read that the Defendant Fritzsche here said that "even Goebbels was afraid of Bormann," so is it not correct that Bormann was a man who had great influence, especially in the last years?

KAUFMANN: That is correct, but it is not correct that there was nobody who was not afraid of him.

SIR DAVID ALAXWELL-FYFE: But there would be many who would be influenced if Bormann was to give an anti-Christian lead to the National Socialist Party, would there not?

KAUFMANN: Only the cadre of the Party, possibly.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, I will only take two examples and we will try to take them well spaced out. I suggest to you that yours is typical. Let me take one in 1935.

My Lord, it is Document Number 1507-PS, and it is a new document.

I cannot remember, Witness, whether you are a Catholic or a Protestant. I have no ulterior motive. I am going to deal with an incident in a Catholic church. Of which are you?

KAUFMANN: I was a Catholic.

SIR DAVJD MAXWELL-FYFE: I take it quite surely you will follow it. You will know who the people are and so forth. This is an incident on the 27th of March 1935, when Cardinal Faulhaber was preaching in the cathedral at Freising and the local branch of the Party wanted to take a record of the sermon in case His Eminence was saying anything which might offend the Party; and they did so by breaking one of the windows of the church and inserting a cable which would pick up the sound so that a record could be taken, and there were various happenings and a lot of discussion with which I shall not trouble the Tribunal, but one of the priests of the cathedral brought the incident to the attention of the local Wehrmacht commander and it is with regard to what he says in relation to the functioning of the Leadership Corps that I want to draw your attention. You may take it from me that that is the general incident which is described at great length and which has accusations of exaggeration on both sides and therefore, I am only going to take you to the passage in which the local commandant deals with the situation.

My Lord, it is at the bottom of Page 4. My Lord, it says "Page 5, continued at the top." Has Your Lordship got that?

THE PRESIDENT: Yes.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, it is in the bottom paragraph on Page 5. This is after the occurrence when the Wehrmacht officer is making his report; he says:

"On Monday, the 18th of this month, there came to the house of the staff paymaster Grueber the district leader of the Nazi women's organization, Dr. Kreis, and asked the wife of the staff paymaster, Grueber, to come immediately with her to the cathedral to listen to the sermon of Cardinal Faulhaber, implying that this was Frau Grueber's duty as a member of the Party and the Nazi women's organization Frau Grueber's objection that she was a Protestant was rejected as unimportant; instead it was ordered that every member of the Nazi women's organization has to attach herself to an SA man in civilian clothes, in which way they would be considered as audience and not as Party members sent out for a purpose. There is no doubt that this measure shows the intention of disturbing the service and of causing uproarious incidents."

And on that, the Wehrmacht officer, very wisely you may think, told her to rely on the fact that Herr Grueber was a paymaster or something of that sort and he need not be mixed up with the Party matters. But what I want to ask you about is this: The Kreisleiterin, leader of the district women, she would be the women's leader on the Kreis staff of the Party, would she not? If I am wrong, correct me. Is that her position?

KAUFMANN: Yes.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And she would not have taken that action of collecting the women of Munich to come and form a: group when Cardinal Faulhaberwas preaching, without the orders of the Kreisleiter, would she? She would not, would she? It must have been on the Kreisleiter's orders; is that not so?

THE PRESIDENT: Answer the question, please.

KAUFMANN: The incident described here is completely unknown to me and I really cannot imagine that a serious man-in this -case a Kreisleiter-would order a measure which in its effects must turn against the Party.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: What I am referring to, you see,

is this: Here is a report of a responsible officer in the Wehrmacht. I think he is regimental commander, and it is countersigned by his adjutant. He is saying that the Kreisleiterin who is the women's leader has come to this paymaster's wife and got her to do it. What I am putting to you is: Assuming that Mr. Grueber and this regimental commander are correct-it must do for the moment-, assuming they are correct, the kreisleiterin would not have acted without orders from the Kreisleiter, would she?

KAUFMANN: That is probable. In my Gau, this Kreisleiter would have been dismissed.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: But are you telling the Tribunal that ...

THE PRESIDENT: Sir David, I think this document speaks for itself.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: If Your Lordship please, I think so. My Lord, I am only going to give another example. I have to deal with just the points raised by Dr. Servatius and limit the examples as much as I can. -

THE PRESIDENT: Perhaps we had better adjourn now.

[A recess was taken.]

THE PRESIDENT: Sir David, the Tribunal thinks, with reference to any documents which you may have, perhaps it would

save time, if they are not documents made by the witness who is in the box if you would just put the documents in without cross examination.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I will do it. It will save time. I will welcome this. I will be glad to do as Your Lordship suggests. It suits my purpose much better.

DR. SERVATIUS: Mr. President, the introduction of new evidence unknown to me is, I think, inadmissible; I have no opportunity to comment on these documents, since my own documentary evidence is completed. All my material, affidavits, and documents have been submitted, and my witnesses have been examined. I do not know how I can reply to these new documents.

THE PRESIDENT: I am sure Sir David will let the counsel for the defense have the documents as soon as possible, and if it is impossible for the counsel to re-examine them when he comes to them, he can reply on the document later.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: There are copies available, and they will be given to Dr. Servatius right away. The next one I was going to refer to on the question of churches is Document D-901, which is a new document. That contains four reports by Ortsgruppenleiter. I should have said Exhibit GB-536.

THE PRESIDENT: You gave a number to that other document, did you, the other one you put in? Was there not another new document you put in, 1507-PS?

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: GB-535, My Lord.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, very well.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, this document consists of four reports from Ortsgruppenleiter and the comments made upon them by the Kreisleiter. My Lord, I shall only quote to the Tribunal the first sentence of the first two reports, which will show what they are.

The first is the Ortsgruppe Darmstadt-Schlossgarten, 20 February 1939, "Point 9, Ecclesiastical questions." I quote:

"As the caretaker of the parish hall of the parish of St- Martin, Blockleiter and Party Member Keil informs me that meetings of the Confessional Front are again taking place at the St. Martin's House, Mllerstrasse (Ortsgruppe Gutenberg), the public being excluded. Only bearers of red passes are admitted."

And then he makes his objection to the fact that the Bible class is being carried on behind closed doors and he mentions the Gestapo.

The second one refers to a statement by an ecclesiastic. That is from the Ortsgruppe Pfungstadt, 17 February 1939:

"Whoever leaves the Church has different taxes imposed on him, so our much-discussed confessional pastor, Strack, said once again on the occasion of a mothers' evening. This gentleman should really be rapped on the knuckles seriously for once."

And then the third one sends a poem of the Confessional Front and a fourth deals with the continued existence of a Protestant youth club.

My Lord, the comments of the Kreisleiter, which are on the third page-I will just read I and 2:

"Report on the political situation for the month of February 1939.

"I. The report of Ortsgruppenleiter Wimmer, St. Martin's parish. The SD, Gestapo, and the competent Ortsgruppenleiter will be instructed by me.

"2. 1 shall request Ortsgruppenleiter Frick, Who reports from Pfungstadt, to go to the Kreisleiter tomorrow and shall get him to name his witnesses. This will be communicated to you and to the Gestapo (to, the latter with a report of the case). The pastor Strack is sufficiently well known and ripe for the concentration camp or the Special Court. His reported statement before fellow-Germans constitutes an infringement of the law against malice. In any case, the fellow must disappear from the territory of the Kreis or Gau."

My Lord, I do not think I need trouble the Tribunal with any more. That is the essential point.

Now, My Lord, I have two documents on slave labor which are also new. My Lord, the first is Document 315-PS, Which will become Exhibit GB-537. My Lord, that is the minutes of a conference on the treatment of foreign labor, on 12 March 1943.

My Lord, the object of this document is to show that it was a deliberate and general change of policy and if Your Lordship will look at the middle of the second paragraph, Your Lordship will find the sentence:

"In this instance the hitherto prevailing treatment"-now that is the point I want to emphasize-"the hitherto, prevailing treatment of the Eastern Workers has led not only to a diminished production but has also most disadvantageously influenced the political orientation of the people in the Occupied Eastern Territories and has resulted in the well-known difficulties of our troops. In order to facilitate military operations the morale has to be improved by a better treatment of the Eastern Workers in the Reich."

Now, My Lord, the importance of that is shown when you get that coming into the Party channels, which is shown in the next Document 205-PS. My Lord, that will become Exhibit GB-538.

My Lord, you see, that is from a decree of the Defendant Bormann. It comes from the Party Chancellery and it says:

"The Reich Propaganda Ministry and the RSHA have together issued a memorandum concerning the treatment of foreign laborers employed within the Reich.

"I request in the attached copy that the necessity for a firm but just treatment of the foreign workers be made clear to members of the Party and to fellow Germans."

And the distribution is to Reichsleiter, Gauleiter, Kreisleiter, and Ortsgruppenleiter.

My Lord, on Page 2, Number 1 on Page 2, the third paragraph on Page 2, it begins:

"Everyone, even the primitive man, has a sensitive perception of justice. Consequently, every unjust treatment has a very bad effect. Injustices, insults, trickery, maltreatment, et cetera, must be discontinued. Punishment by beating is forbidden. Concerning the severe measures for insubordinate and seditious elements, the workers of foreign nationality are to be informed correspondingly."

My Lord, the importance the Prosecution attaches to this is the word "discontinue" in that directive.

My Lord, as Your Lordship sees the two documents together, the connection shows that there is a definite change.

Now, My Lord, the third document is D-884, which will become Exhibit GB-539 and, My Lord, that is dated 28 March 1944. It is a Party order, issued in the Gau Baden-Alsace, issued from Strasbourg on 28 March 1944 and you will see it is headed "Gaustabsamtsleiter" and is "secret" and it deals with sexual intercourse between foreign workers and Germans. And, My Lord, it explains the course that is to be taken with the foreign worker and in the case of a child resulting from the intercourse and, Your Lordship, on the top of the second page of the document, it says:

"The following principles exist with regard to sexual intercourse between German men and female foreign workers:

"Should the foreign female worker have been induced to sexual intercourse by the German man (for instance by taking advantage of a condition of dependency) she will be taken temporarily into protective custody and then sent to another place of work. In other cases, the foreign female worker will be sent to a women's concentration camp. Women in the state of pregnancy will be sent to the concentration camp only after delivery of the child and the period of nursing. The treatment of-the German man concerned is also the subject of special directives. If he has seriously violated his supervisory or disciplinary duties, female foreign workers will be taken away from him and no more allotted to him ~n the future. Further measures, depending on the circumstances of the case, will be taken by the State Police."

It applies to the Polish race, people from the Government General, Lithuania, former Soviet territory and Serbia.

And then Paragraph 2 deals with the child, and first of all Your Lordship will see at the end of the first paragraph that the heading is:

"Regarding the treatment of pregnant foreign female workers and children given birth to by the same in the Reich."

The last sentence in the first paragraph says:

"The procedure for an application for abortion is once more explained below..."

And then there are various health and racial investigations.

In Paragraph 5 it says:

"If the investigations show that the progeny will be racially satisfactory and hereditarily healthy, they will, after birth, go to homes for foreign children to be looked after by the NSV (National Socialist Welfare Organization)"-That is the Party organization-"or will be looked after by families.

"In negative cases the children will be lodged in foreign children's nurseries."

And then the last paragraph:

"I request the Kreisleiter to record immediately through the channels indicated above, in conjunction with the Kreisobmarm of the German Labor Front and the Kreis peasant leader, all cases of pregnancy which have hitherto occurred and all children hitherto born. An examination in accordance wit

h the new directives of all children of foreign female workers who were taken under the care of the NSV already before the issue of the new instructions is also necessary."

Your-Lordship will see the distribution. It is to Gauobmann of the German Labor Front, that is the representative of the DAF in the Gau, Gau propaganda chief, press chief, and then the Gauamtsleiter, the person in the office of the Gau dealing with racial policy, national health, the peasantry, national welfare, questions of race, the Gau women's leadership, and! the Gau Labor Office, and then Kreisleiter and the Kreis of the DAF and the Kreis peasant leaders. It goes, also, My Lord, to the Security Police and SD and the Office of the Commissioner for the Reichskommissar for the consolidation of German race.

My Lord, I am very grateful to Your Lordship for that. It saves a considerable amount of time.

DR. SERVATIUS: Mr. President, I must raise a question with regard to the evidence. Document 205-PS, which has just been submitted, as a new document; the witness was not questioned on it at all. I assume that the evidence as such is completed and that no new documents can be introduced by the Prosecution. I request, therefore, that this document be struck out. It should have been brought before the Commission and shown to the witness; then I would have had an opportunity of producing further evidence.

This is a fundamental question which will arise repeatedly. The document was not submitted to the witness; its authenticity was therefore not tested.

THE PRESIDENT: It was not submitted to the witness because of the order that the Tribunal has just made. In order to save time, the Tribunal suggested to Sir David Maxwell-Fyfe that he should put the document in in that way. I said I understood you to assent to it-that the document should be shown to you and that you should have an appropriate opportunity to comment upon it.

DR. SERVATIUS: I know the document, but I would like to clarify the fundamental question of whether the evidence of the Prosecution is finally closed or whether new documents can still be introduced into the proceedings.

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal considers that the Prosecution can certainly call evidence and use documents if they wish to rebut the evidence which has been called on behalf of the organization.

DR. SERVATIUS: Without showing them to the witness?

THE PRESIDENT: The only reason for not showing it to the witness was that the document was not a document which the witness made, and in View of that it appeared to the Tribunal to be a matter of comment upon the document, and if you have got an opportunity to put the document to the witness yourself or to comment upon the document, you have got a full opportunity to deal with it.

DR. SERVATIUS: Then I would also be permitted, if necessary, to submit a counterdocument?

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, certainly. You can ask this witness anything you like about the document.

DR. SERVATIUS: Mr. President, at the end the witness was asked less about facts; rather he was confronted with an argument, on which I think I can comment in my final speech.

THE PRESIDENT: I did not quite understand what you said then about an argument.

DR.SERVATIUS: The witness was asked about things which were unknown to him. Examples were put to him of events in individual Gaue, of which he knows nothing. He only had to draw conclusions as to what interpretation was to be given to the documents.

THE PRESIDENT: On general principles, you can ask him anything in re-examination which properly arises out of his cross examination. If he was cross-examined upon a document, or if the document was put in now, in the way it has been, you can ask him any question upon the document or upon his cross-examination upon the document.

DR. SERVATIUS: Yes; I have a few questions.

Witness, the document, the order of the Deputy of the Fuehrer, Hess, of 13 March 1940 was shown to you. It is Page 43 in the German document book. The order contains instructions to the civilian population on their conduct in the event of landings of enemy planes or parachutists on German Reich territory. You were referred to Number 4, where it says, "Likewise enemy parachutists are immediately to be arrested and made harmless." You observe that the letter is dated 1940; what was the situation in the air at that time?

KAUFMANN: I no longer have the letter at the moment, but I remember that it was dated 1940. My first answer to this question was meant to express that the air situation and the whole war situation at that time permitted only a humane interpretation of this term, if it was looked upon as misleading.

DR. SERVATIUS: Was there not a danger that airmen would land for espionage purposes and do not the words "to make them harmless" refer to this type of parachutist?

KAUFMANN: In air war all sorts of people parachuted from planes-fliers in distress, sabotage units, agents in civilian clothes, and so on. To which of those groups these words refer, is not clearly indicated in the text.

DR. SERVATIUS: May I call your attention to Number 2 which says, "Fliers are to be arrested immediately and, before all, restarting or destruction of the plane is to be prevented," and Number 4 says, "Enemy parachutists are likewise to be arrested and made harmless.1 Does not the use of the term "likewise" show that the order is concerned primarily only with the arrest of the airmen?

KAUFMANN: I repeat that in the war situation of 1940 1 understood the term "unsch"dlich" to mean solely to disarm them, but in no case to maltreat or to kill them.

DR. SERVATIUS: I have no further 4uestions to put to the witness.

THE PRESIDENT: Witness, were these Political Leaders paid -- paid salaries by the Party?

KAUFMANN: No. A very small percentage, less than 1 percent, were, in my estimate, paid officials. The majority of them were honorary, unpaid officials.

THE PRESIDENT: That applies to all the ranks of the Party officials, does it?

KAUFMANN: No. The amount of work involved in the higher positions was too great to be discharged in one's spare time in an honorary capacity along with one's own professional duties.

THE PRESIDENT: Were all the Gauleiter paid?

KAUFMANN: After the seizure of power, yes; if they did not hold a State office.

THE PRESIDENT: And what were they paid-how much?

KAUFMANN: I myself never received a salary as a Gauleiter. Up to 1928 1 earned my own livelihood. From 1928 on, I was a parliamentary delegate, and from 1933 1 was a Reich Governor. The cases of most of my comrades were similar.

THE PRESIDENT: You mean from 1933 on most of them had State offices which carried salaries?

KAUFMANN: Yes.

THE PRESIDENT: And what about the Kreisleiter?

KAUFMANN: Up to the seizure of power, all Kreisleiter were, on principle, honorary and unpaid officials.

THE PRESIDENT: And after?

KAUFMANN: And later also for a number of years. I estimate that the majority of them became officials and received salaries from 1937 or 1938 onwards. But even then there were exceptions.

THE PRESIDENT: Became State officials you mean?

KAUFMANN: No, not State officials-Party employees.

THE PRESIDENT: And received salaries; I see. And the lower ranks, the Ortsgruppenleiter and the Blockleiter?

KAUFMANN: No; from Kreisleiter down, all were honorary officials.

THE PRESIDENT: Even after 1933?

KAUFMANN: Yes.

THE PRESIDENT: And after 1937?

KAUFMANN: Also. Some of the most important members of the staff of the Kreisleiter were paid, but the majority of his staff were honorary officials. From Ortsgruppenleiter down, including Ortsgruppenleiter, all were honorary and unpaid officials.

THE PRESIDENT: From what source were they paid when they were paid?

KAUFMANN: By the Reich Treasurer of the Party.

THE PRESIDENT: And from what source did he get the money to pay them?

KAUFMANN: From the contributions of members of the Movement.

THE PRESIDENT: The funds of the Party were kept separate, were they?

KAUFMANN: The Reich Treasurer's financial administration was completely separate.

THE PRESIDENT: Were the accounts of the Party published?

KAUFMANN: No. I know only that occasionally at conferences with the Fuehrer the Reich Treasurer made a brief financial report, but that was not published.

THE PRESIDENT: Was there any reference to Party funds in the State budget or the State accounts?

KAUFMANN: No. On the contrary, I had the impression that the Reich Treasurer disposed of very extensive funds from the revenues of the Party insurance, and from the dues of members.

THE PRESIDENT: Will you call your next witness, Dr. Servatius?

DR. SERVATIUS: With the approval of the Tribunal, I shall call the witness Kreisleiter Willi Meyer-Wendeborn.

[The witness Meyer-Wendeborn took the stand.]

THE PRESIDENT: Will you stdte your full name?

WILLI MEYER-WENDEBORN (Witness): Willi Meyer-Wendeborn.

THE PRESIDENT: Will you repeat this oath after me: I swear by God-the Almighty and Omniscient-that I will speak the pure truth-and will withhold and add nothing.

[The witness repeated the oath.]

THE PRESIDENT: Sit down.

DR. SERVATIUS: Witness, when were you born?

MEYER-WENDEBORN: 24 June 1891.

DR. SERVATIUS: You were a Kreisleiter in Cloppenburg, Oldenburg, in Gau Weser-Ems for 12 years, from 1934-1945; on repeated occasions you acted temporarily as head of the neighboring Kreis Vechta; before that time you were an Ortsgruppenleiter for about a year and a half; is that correct?

MEYER-WENDEBORN: I was in Cloppenburg for 11 years.

DR. SERVATIUS: That was from 1934 until when?

MEYER-VVENDEBORN: From 1934 to 1945.

DR. SERVATIUS: Did you have knowledge of conditions in the administration of other districts beyond your own?

MEYER-WENDEBORN: Yes, as Ortsgruppenleiter, and later as Kreisleiter, I was in a position to gain information, sinice I repeatedly met the political leaders and the Kreisleiter.

DR. SERVATIUS: Were you, as Kreisleiter, paid a salary or were you an honorary official?

MEYER-WENDEBORN: During the first half of my term of office I was an honorary official; later I received a salary.

DR. SERVATIUS: What other political leaders in the Kreisleitung received a salary?

MEYER-WENDEBORN: The Kreis executive, the propaganda director, the training director, and the head of the financial department.

DR. SERVATIUS: Did the paid political leaders in the Kreis receive special secret instructions?

MEYER-WENDEBORN: No, never.

DR. SERVATIUS: Did they have better insight into conditions?

MEYER-WENDEBORN: They saw and heard more than the others.

DR. SERVAT1US: Of what persons did the Kreisleitung consist?

MEYER-WENDEBORN: Firstly, the main or leadership offices; these were organization, propaganda, training, and personnel. Secondly, the social and technical, offices, such as the Kreis peasant leader, the Obmann of the DAF (German Labor Front), the head of the NSV, the head of the office for -educators, and the head of the office for civil servants.

DR. SERVATIUS: Did the members of the Kreisleitung when appointed become members of the Corps of Political Leaders?

MEYER-WENDEBORN: An appointment as a member of the Corps of Political Leaders did not exist. When a Party member was appointed to an office, he became a Political Leader.

DR. SERVATIUS: Do you know of an order of Hess forbidding the use of the designation "political organization" or "Corps of Political Leaders"?

MEYER-WENDEBORN: The designation "political organization" was forbidden by the then Deputy of the Fuehrer.

DR.SERVATIUS: As Kreisleiter, you held conferences in the Kreisleitung. Who took part in these conferences?

MEYER-WENDEBORN: There were two kinds of conferences: One, among a narrow circle, the Kreis staff, and the second, among a larger circle, in which State and community representatives and others who wished to bring up special matters took part.

DR. SERVATIUS: Were the subjects of the conferences purely economic, or were political questions also discussed?

MEYER-WENDEBORN: Primarily social questions affecting the inhabitants of the Kreis were discussed. At the end of the conferences I usually gave a brief account of events in the past few weeks.

DR. SERVATIUS: Were not critical political questions discussed and instructions issued which might have had a reference to the removal of obstacles in the way of waging a war of aggression, for example, instructions on the Jewish question, the Church question, the trade union question, and the arrest of political opponents?

MEYER-WENDEBORN: I did not have to give special instructions. We were strictly forbidden to carry on our own policies. We never heard anything about preparations for war. When any measures had to be taken against political opponents, it was the affair of the State.

DR. SERVATIUS: What instructions were given on the Jewish question and what was their aim?

MEYER-WENDEBORN: With regard to the Jewish question, which did not have great significance in our rural Kreis, we were concerned primarily with the basic objective, namely, the reduction of Jewish influence to a perc6ntage of Jews corresponding to their total strength in Germany.

DR. SERVATIUS: What directions on the Church question did you issue in your capacity as Kreisleiter, and what was their aim?

MEYER-WENDEBORN: The fight against the churches was forbidden on principle. There was no need to give any instructions on that subject, for my men were all Catholic and had remained members of the Church.

DR. SERVATIUS: What about the anti-Jewish actions on 9 and 10 November 1938? What instructions were given at that time?

MEYER-WENDEBORN: I received no instructions, and was faced with the accomplished fact. In agreement with the Landrat I immediately freed Jews who had been arrested, and subsequently I received strict instructions from my Gauleiter not to allow Political Leaders or Party members to take part in these things in any way. That is all that happened in our district.

DR. SERVATIUS: What instructions were given on the question of the trade unions, and what was their aim?

MEYER-WENDEBORN: The measures of Reichsleiter Dr. Robert Ley on 1 or 2 May were a complete surprise to us. We ourselves, as Political Leaders, had nothing to do with them and no instructions were issued.

DR. SERVATFUS: What instructions did you as Kreisleiter give with regard to political opponents?

MEYER-WENDEBORN: The treatment of political opponents was primarily the task of the State authorities. If I suspected anyone of being an opponent, I always took the opportunity of having a discussion with him, and as a result it was not necessary to take more than a few measures.

DR. SERVATIUS: Was there not, in fact, such a close relationship between the State Police and the Kreisleitung that, in practice, the Kreisleiter could at any time arbitrarily order the arrest of political opponents?

MEYER-WENDEBORN: That would have been a good thing. When I repeatedly suggested that to the Gauleiter, at the time Karl Roever, I was told that these were measures of the State which did not concern us as Political Leaders.

DR. SERVATIUS: Witness, you misunderstood me. My question was, did your close connections with the State Police enable you to order arrests?

MEYER-WENDEBORN: No, I could not order arrests. I had no close connections with the State Police, and I never had occasion or opportunity to have anybody arrested.

DR. SERVATIUS: Was not a card index of opponents kept on orders of the superior Party offices?

MEYER-WENDEBORN: We never kept such a card index, either in the Kreis or in Ortsgruppe.

DR. SERVATIUS: Did the Gestapo keep such a card index, and did you assist in keeping it?

MEYER-WENDEBORN: I cannot tell you. I was never told about it; I do not know. In any case, I certainly did not assist in keeping it.

DR. SERVATIUS: Did you not, as Kreisleiter, ask for general reports on the feeling and political views of the inhabitants who were listed in a local card index for the individual households, and were

these not reports of spies?

MEYER-WENDEBORN: There was no local card index for households in my Kreis. It was intended to set up one, but that was never done. I never asked for spy reports, and I would never have received them; but I did ask for reports on the feeling of the people with regard to measures taken by the State and the Party.

DR. SERVATIUS: And what was the purpose of these reports?

MEYER-WENDEBORN: We wanted to know what effect the new laws and directives would have on the mass of the people.

DR. SERVATIUS: How did you receive your instructions from the Gauleiter?

MEYER-WENDEBORN: I received my instructions -in writing, and also orally.

DR. SERVATIUS: Did the Kreisleiter take part in conferences with the Gauleiter? And who was present at such conferences?

MEYER-WENDEBORN: We did not always take part; we were there only when something of special interest to our own Kreis was being discussed. At the conferences of the Gauleitung, the members of the Gau offices and the consultants took part.

DR. SERVATIUS: What was discussed at these conferences? Were they similar to the Kreisleiter conferences which you mentioned earlier?

MEYER-WENDEBORN: They were roughly similar, but on a larger scale ranging over the whole of the Gau.

DR. SERVATIUS: How did you instruct the Ortsgruppenleiter? Was that done on the basis of the Gau and Kreis conferences, or was the information which was passed on to them somewhat changed, that is, false?

MEYER-WENDEBORN: After conferences with the Gauleiter, I regularly passed on to my men what I had heard there, and I passed it on in the form in which I had heard it from my Gauleiter.

DR. SERVATIUS: How did you co-operate with the SA? Was the SA represented in the Kreisleitung?

MEYER-WENDEBORN: I left it to the discretion of the SA to take part in our conferences. The local leader came occasionally and listened to what we were generally discussing.

DR. SERVATIUS: Could you give orders to the SA or request its aid?

MEYER-WENDEBORN: I could not give any orders to the SA. I could only, through its superior officers, ask for its aid in any propaganda measures, collections, employment assistance, and so on.

DR. SERVATIUS: What sort of co-operation existed between you and the General SS? Was it represented in the Kreisleitung?

MEYER-WENDEBORN: We had no local SS leader. The SS itself did not ask to be represented in the Kreisleitung.

DR. SERVATIUS: Did you have any insight into the measures which the SS took with regard to protective custody and concentration camps?

MEYER-WENDEBORN: No, I had no insight into that.

DR. SERVATIUS: Did you ever attempt to obtain such insight?

MEYER-VTENDEBORN: Yes. It was about 1935, but I did not succeed in obtaining it. I was refused a visit to a concentration camp, which I did not want to visit because of any suspected atrocities, but because it was new to me.

DR. SERVATIUS: And what reason were you given?

MEYER-WENDEBORN: I was told to get permission through the RSHA. I asked the Gauleitung to do that because I was not permitted to contact the RSHA personally. The Gauleitung then advised against it, because it would be very complicated.

DR. SERVATIUS: Do you know whether the RSHA was the competent authority?

MEYER-WENDEBORN: No, I do not know.

DR. SERVATIUS: Did you in your Kreis receive or issue instructions with regard to the lynching of fliers who had made forced landings?

MEYER-WENDEBORN: We had many forced landings. I never issued and was never told to issue any instructions on this subject.

DR. SERNTATIUS: But you surely know the Bormann letter and other documents which deal with this matter. Did you, as Kreisleiter, not learn of these?

MEYER-WENDEBORN: I did not receive the Bormann letter, but I heard the article of -the Reich Propaganda Minister on the radio.

DR. SERVATIUS: And then what happened in your Kreis? Was any action taken in the spirit of Goebbels' statements?

MEYER-WENDEBORN: We continued to act according to the ' general rules of warfare, and the men who landed were always treated very well. The population regarded that as natural.

DR. SERVATIUS: Did you receive or issue instructions ordering bad treatment of prisoners of war or foreign workers, or did you permit such treatment?

MEYER-WENDEBORN: I could not issue instructions for prisoners of war; only the Armed Forces could do that. But I carefully saw to it that foreign workers in our district were well treated. And if a beating or some such incident occasionally occurred, I immediately had the workers removed through the Labor Office, and the people for whom they had been working were on purpose left without help for some weeks.

DR. SERVATIUS: Instructions about unjust treatment of these foreign workers did not reach you?

MEYER-WENDEBORN: No. On the contrary, I was asked to see to it that they were well treated.

DR. SERVATIUS: Was the attitude of the Political Leaders in your Kreis with regard to the critical political problems which we mentioned earlier an exceptional one, or was that also the attitude outside your Kreis, as far as you could judge? Was it a general attitude?

MEYER-WENDEBORN: Before the war, I had the feeling that that attitude was general. Also during

the war; and then while I was in the Fallingbostel Camp and helped to obtain affidavits, I was able to convince myself finally that what I am saying here was generally true for those thousands.

DR. SERVATIUS: You checked and collected these affidavits?

MEYER-WENDEBORN: Yes.

DR. SERVATIUS: Did you not reject -unfavorable ones?

MEYER-WENDEBORN: No, I never did that. There were no unfavorable ones.

DR. SERVATIUS: Then how do you explain the incidents which actually happened, for example, in connection with the Church question and the Jewish question?

MEYER-WENDEBORN: We never knew of the whole extent of these things; we heard very little. It did happen that one man or another who had not forgotten some-experience from the period of the struggle to power misunderstood some instructions and wanted to do stupid things. But in general we did not experience such incidents and knew nothing about them.

DR. SERVATIUS: Then none came to your knowledge?

MEYER-WENDEBORN: No.

DR. SERVATIUS: Did not the attitude of the SS, and particularly the refusal to give you permission to visit a concentration camp, cause strong misgivings? You heard rumors about these concentration camps, did you not?

MEYER-WENDEBORN: I did not consider this refusal to let me visit a concentration camp as an attempt to conceal crimes, but in view of the character of the SS, I assumed that it was a form of self-glorification, and that the SS thought: These camps are in our charge and are not the affair of the Political Leaders.

DR. SERVATIUS: Did you approve the methods of the Party in every way?

MEYER-WENDEBORN: No, I did not always approve, and I discussed this mattei7 with my old-time Gauleiter.

DR. SERVATIUS: Did you have serious objections?

MEYER-WENDEBORN: No, my objections were not serious objections, but after this Jewish affair in November, I had to point out the effect which it would have abroad. I had heard that men in high positions did not at all approve, and that gave me courage to voice my own misgivings.

DR. SERVATIUS: Did you ever consider whether you should continue in office or resign?

MEYER-WENDEBORN: If I had resigned, I would not have improved matters, but only aggravated them; for I had been in the Kreis for 20 years and my successor could not have known my men so well; as it was, I could recognize mistakes in time and correct them.

THE PRESIDENT: Is that all you want to ask?

DR. SERVATIUS: I wanted to put one or two more questions in the morning.

THE PRESIDENT: Well, the Tribunal will adjourn.

[The Tribunal adjourned until 31 July 1946 at 1000 hours]