SEVENTH DAY
Wednesday, 28 November 1945

Morning Session

THE PRESIDENT: I call upon counsel for the United States.

MR. ALDERMAN: May it please the Tribunal, at this point we distribute document book lettered "N'', which will cover the next phase of the case, as I will not undertake to present it. Of the five large phases of aggressive warfare, which I undertake to present to the Tribunal, I have now completed the presentation of the documents on the first phase, the phase lasting from 1933 to 1936, consisting of the preparation for aggression.

The second large phase of the program of the conspirators for aggression lasted from approximately 1936 to March 1939, when they had completed the absorption of Austria and the occupation of all of Czechoslovakia. I again invite the Court's attention to the chart on the wall. You may be interested in glancing at it from time to time as the presentation progresses.

The relevant portions of the Indictment to the present subject are set forth in Subsection 3, under Section IV (F), appearing on Pages 7 and 8 of the printed English text. This portion of the Indictment is divided into three parts: First, the 1936 to 1938 phase of the plan, planning for the assault on Austria and Czechoslovakia; second, the execution of the plan to invade Austria, November 1937 to March 1938; third, the execution of the plan to invade Czechoslovakia, April 1938 to March 1939.

As I previously indicated to the Tribunal, the portion of the Indictment headed "(a) Planning for the assault on Austria and Czechoslovakia" is proved for the most part by Document Number 386-PS, which I introduced on Monday. That is Exhibit USA-25. That was one of the handful of documents with which I began my presentation of this part of the case. The minutes taken by Colonel Hossbach of the meeting in the Reich Chancellery on 5 November 1937, when Hitler developed his political last will and testament, reviewed the desire of Nazi Germany for more room in central Europe, and made preparations for the conquest of Austria and Czechoslovakia as a means of strengthening Germany for the general pattern of the Nazi conspiracy for aggression.

I shall present the material on this second, or Austrian phase of aggression, in two separate parts. I shall first present the

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materials and documents relating to the aggression against Austria. they have been gathered together in the document book which has just been distributed. Later I shall present the material relating to the aggression against Czechoslovakia. They will be gathered in a separate document book.

First, we have the events leading up to the autumn of 1937, and the strategic position of the National Socialists in Austria. I suggest at this point, if the Tribunal please, that in this phase we see the first full flowering of what has come to be known as Fifth Column infiltration techniques in another country, and first under that, the National Socialist aim of absorption of Austria.

In order to understand more clearly how the Nazi conspirators proceeded, after the meeting of 5 November 1937, covered by the Hossbach minutes, it is advisable to review the steps which had already been taken in Austria by the Nazi Socialists of both Germany and Austria. The position which the Nazis had reached by the fall of 1937 made it possible for them to complete their absorption of Austria much sooner and with much less cost than had been contemplated at the time of the meeting covered by the Hossbach minutes.

The acquisition of Austria had long been a central aim of the German National Socialists. On the first page of Mein Kampf Hitler said: "German Austria must return to the Great German Motherland." He continued by stating that this purpose of having common blood in a common Reich could not be satisfied by a mere economic union. Moreover, this aim of absorption of Austria was an aim from 1933 on and was regarded as a serious program which the Nazis were determined to carry out.

At this point, I should like to offer in evidence our Document Number 1780-PS, which, if admitted, would be Exhibit USA-57. This document is an affidavit executed in Mexico City on 28 August of this year by George S. Messersmith, United States Ambassador, now in Mexico City. Before I quote from Mr. Messersmith's affidavit, I should like to point out briefly that Mr. Messersmith was Consul General of the United States of America in Berlin from 1930 to late spring of 1934. He was then made American Minister in Vienna where he stayed until 1937.

In this affidavit he states that the nature of his work brought him into frequent contact with German Government officials, and he reports in this affidavit that the Nazi Government officials, with whom he had contact, were on most occasions amazingly frank in their conversation and concealed none of their aims.

If the Court please, this affidavit, which is quite long, presents a somewhat novel problem of treatment in the presentation of this case. In lieu of reading this entire affidavit into the record, I

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should like, if it might be done in that way, to offer in evidence, not merely the English original of the affidavit, but also a translation into German, which has been mimeographed. This translation of the affidavit into German has been distributed to counsel for the defendants.

DR. EGON KUBUSCHOK (Counsel for Defendant Von Papen): An affidavit of a witness who is obtainable has just been turned over to the Court. The content of the affidavit offers so many subjective opinions of the witness, that it is imperative we hear the witness personally in this matter.

I should like to take this occasion to ask that it be decided as a matter of principle, whether that which a witness can testify from his own knowledge may, without further ado, be presented in the form of an affidavit; or whether if a witness is living and can be reached the principle of oral proceedings should be applied, that is, the witness should be heard directly.

MR. ALDERMAN: If the Tribunal please, I should like to be heard briefly on the matter.

THE PRESIDENT: You have finished what you had to say, I understand?

DR. KUBUSCHOK: Yes.

THE PRESIDENT: Very well, we will hear Mr. Alderman.

MR. ALDERMAN: May it please the Tribunal, I recognize, of course, the inherent weakness of an affidavit as evidence where the witness is not present and subject to cross-examination. Mr. Messersmith is an elderly gentleman. He is not in good health. It was entirely impracticable to try to bring him here; otherwise, we should have done so.

I remind the Court of Article 19 of the Charter:

"The Tribunal shall not be bound by technical rules of evidence. It shall adopt and apply to the greatest possible extent expeditious and non-technical procedure, and shall admit any evidence, which it deems to have probative value."

Of course, the Court would not treat anything in an affidavit such as this as having probative value unless the Court deemed it to have probative value; and if the defendants have countering evidence, which is strong enough to overcome whatever is probative in this affidavit, of course the Court will treat the probative value of all the evidence in accordance with this provision of the Charter.

By and large, this affidavit and another affidavit by Mr. Messersmith which we shall undertake to present cover background material which is a matter of historical knowledge, of which the Court could take judicial notices Where he does quote these

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amazingly frank expressions by Nazi leaders, it is entirely open to any of them, who may be quoted, to challenge what is said, or to tell Your Honors what they believe was said. In any event, it seems to me that the Court can accept an affidavit of this character, made by a well-known American diplomat, and give it whatever probative value the Court thinks it has.

As to the question of reading the entire affidavit, I understand the ruling of the Court to be that only those parts of documents, which are quoted in the record, will be considered to be in the record. It will be based upon the necessity of giving the German counsel knowledge of what was being used. As to these affidavits, we have furnished them complete German translations. It seems to us that a different rule might obtain where that has been done.

THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Alderman, have you finished what you had to say?

MR. ALDERMAN: Yes, sir.

DR. KUBUSCHOK: The representative of the Prosecution takes the point of view that the age and state of health of the witness makes it impossible to summon him as a witness. I do not know the witness personally. Consequently, I am not in a position to state to what extent he is actually incapacitated. Nevertheless, I have profound doubts regarding the presentation of evidence of such an old and incapacitated person. I am not speaking specifically now about Mr. Messersmith. I do not think the Court can judge to what extent old age and infirmity can possibly influence memory and reasoning powers; so, personal presence would seem absolutely indispensable.

Furthermore, it is important to know what questions, in toto, were put to the witness. An affidavit only reiterates the answers to questions which were put to the person. Very often conclusions can be drawn from unanswered questions. It is here a question of evidence solely on the basis of an affidavit. For that reason we are not in a position to assume, with absolute certainty, that the evidence of the witness is complete.

I cannot sanction the intention of the Prosecution in this case to introduce two methods of giving evidence of different value; namely, a fully valid one through direct evidence of a witness, and a less complete one through evidence laid down in an affidavit. The situation is this: Either the evidence is sufficient, or it is not. I think the Tribunal should confine itself to complete and fully valid evidence.

THE: PRESIDENT: Mr. Alderman, did you wish to add anything?

MR. ALDERMAN: I wish to make this correction, perhaps of what I said. I did not mean to leave the implication that Mt. Messersmith is in any way incapacitated. He is an elderly man,

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about 70 years old. He is on active duty in Mexico City; the main difficulty is that we did not feel we could take him away from his duties in that post, combined with a long trip and his age.

THE PRESIDENT: That is all, is it?

MR. ALDERMAN: Yes.

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal has considered the objection which has been raised. In view of the powers which the Tribunal has under Article 19 of the Charter, which provides that the Tribunal shall not be bound by technical rules of evidence, but shall adopt and apply to the greatest possible extent expeditious and nontechnical procedure and shall admit any evidence which it deems to have probative value, the Tribunal holds that affidavits can be presented, and that in the present case it is a proper course.

The question of the probative value of an affidavit as compared with a witness who has been cross-examined would, of course, be considered by the Tribunal. If, at a later stage, the Tribunal thinks the presence of a witness is of extreme importance, the matter can be reconsidered. I add this: If the defense wish to put interrogatories to the witness, they will be at liberty to do so.

MR. ALDERMAN: Thank you, Your Honor. I offer then our Document 1760-PS as Exhibit USA-57, affidavit by George S. Messersmith. Rather than reading the entire affidavit, unless the Court wishes me to do so, I intend to paraphrase and state the substance of what is covered in various parts of the affidavit.

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal think it would be better to adhere to the rule which we have laid down: That only what is read in the court will form part of the record.

MR. ALDERMAN: I shall read then, if the Tribunal please, from the fourth paragraph on the third page of the English copy, the following list of names, headed by President Miklas of Austria and Chancellor Dollfuss:

"From the very beginnings of the Nazi Government, I was told by both high and secondary government officials in Germany that incorporation of Austria into Germany was a political and economic necessity and that this incorporation was going to be accomplished 'by whatever means were necessary.' Although I cannot assign definite times and places, I am sure that at various times and places, every one of the German officials whom I have listed earlier in this statement told me this, with the exception of Schacht, Von Krosigk and Krupp von Bohlen. I can assert that it was fully understood by everyone in Germany who had any knowledge whatever of what was going on that Hitler and the Nazi Government were irrevocably committed to this end, and

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the only doubt which ever existed in conversations or statements to me was how and when."

In connection with that paragraph, I invite your attention the list of German officials to whom he refers on Page 2 of the affidavit. They are listed as Hermann Goering, General Milch, Hjalmar Schacht, Hans Frank, Wilhelm Frick, Count Schwerin von Krosigk, Joseph Goebbels, Richard Walter Darre, Robert Ley, Hans Heinrich Lammers, Otto Meissner, Franz von Papen, Walter Funk, General Wilhelm Keith, Admiral Erich von Raeder, Admiral Karl Doenitz, Dr. Bohle, Dr. Stuckert, Dr. Krupp von Bohlen, and Dr. Davidson. The affiant states he was sure that at various times and places, everyone of those listed German officials had made these statements to him, with the exception of Schacht, Von Krosigk, and Krupp von Bohlen. I shall continue with the next paragraph:

"At the beginning of the Nazi regime in 1933, Germany was, of course, far too weak to permit any open threats of force against any country, such as the threats which the Nazis made in 1938. Instead it was the avowed and declared policy of the Nazi Government to accomplish the same results which they later accomplished through force, through the methods which had proved so successful for them in Germany: Obtain a foothold in the Cabinet, particularly in the Ministry of the Interior, which controlled the police, and then quickly eliminate opposition elements. During my stay in Austria, I was told on any number of occasions by Chancellor Dollfuss, Chancellor Schuschnigg, President Miklas, and other high officials of the Austrian Government that the German Government kept up constant and unceasing pressure upon the Austrian Government to agree to the inclusion of a number of ministers with Nazi orientation. The English and French ministers in Vienna, with whom I was in constant and close contact, confirmed this information through statements which they made to me of conversations which they had with high Austrian officials."

I shall read other portions of the affidavit as the presentation proceeds, on the question of pressure used against Austria, including terror and intimidation, culminating in the unsuccessful Putsch of July 26, 1934. To achieve their ends the Nazis used various kinds of pressure. In the first place, they used economic pressure. A law of 24 March 1933, a German law, imposed a prohibitive 1,000 Reichsmark penalty on trips to Austria. It brought great hardship to this country which relied very heavily on its tourist trade. For that I cite the Reichsgesetzblatt, 1933, Part I, Page 311, and ask the Court to take judicial notice of that German law.

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The Nazis used propaganda and they used terroristic acts, primarily bombings. Mr. Messersmith's affidavit, Document 1760-PS, from which I have already read, goes into some detail with respect to these outrages. I read again from Page I of the affidavit, the English version:

"The outrages were an almost constant occurrence, but there were three distinct periods during which they rose to a peak. During the first two of these periods, in mid-1933 and in early 1934, I was still in Berlin. However, during that period I was told by high Nazi officials in conversation with them, that these waves of terror were being instigated and directed by them. I found no concealment in my conversations with high Nazi officials of the fact that they were responsible for these activities in Austria. These admissions were entirely consistent with the Nazi thesis that terror is necessary and must be used to impose the avid of the Party not only in Germany but in other countries. I recall specifically that General Milch was one of those who spoke frankly that these outrages in Austria were being directed by the Nazi Party, and expressed his concern with respect thereto and his disagreement with this definite policy of the Party.

"During the wave of terroristic acts in May and June 1934, I had already assumed my duties as American Minister in Vienna. The bomb outrages during this period were directed primarily at railways, tourist centers, and the Catholic Church, which latter, in the eyes of the Nazis, was one of the strongest organizations opposing them. I recall, however, that these outrages diminished markedly for a few days during the meeting of Hitler and Mussolini in Venice in mid-June 1934. At that time Mussolini was strongly supporting the Austrian Government and was strongly and deeply interested in maintaining Austrian independence and sovereignty, and in keeping down Nazi influence and activity in Austria. At that time also Hitler could not afford an open break with Mussolini and undoubtedly agreed to the short cessation of these bomb outrages on the insistence of Mussolini because he Hitler, wished to achieve as favorable an atmosphere for the meeting between him and Mussolini as possible. The cessation of the bomb outrages during the Hitler-Mussolini conversations was considered by me and by the Austrian authorities and by all observers at that time as an open admission on the part of Hitler and the German Government that the outrages were systematically and completely instigated and controlled from Germany."

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Turning to Page 7 of the English version, following the line which reads, "Official dispatch from Vienna" dated July 26, 1934, I quote the following paragraph:

"In addition to these outrages, the Nazis attempted to bring pressure upon Austria by means of the 'Austrian Legion'. This organization, a para-military force of several thousand men, was stationed near the Austrian border in Germany as a constant and direct threat of violent action against Austria. It was without any question sanctioned by the Nazi Government of Germany, as it could otherwise not have existed, and it was armed by them. It was made up of Austrian Nazis who had fled from Austria after committing various crimes in Austria, and by Austrians in Germany who were attracted by the idle life and pay given by the German authorities."

These terroristic activities of the Nazis in Austria continued until July 25, 1934. It is a well-known historical fact of which I ask the Court to take judicial notice that on that day members of the NSDAP, the Nazi Party, attempted a revolutionary Putsch in Austria and killed Chancellor Dollfuss.

At this point I should like to invite your attention to the fact that the Indictment alleges in Count Four, Crimes against Humanity, Paragraph B on Page 26 of the English printed text, that the Nazis murdered amongst others Chancellor Dollfuss. I do not have available an official authenticated account of the details of that Putsch but I think that it will suffice if I briefly recall to the Court what is, after all, a well-known matter of history.

On July 25, 1934, about noon, 100 men dressed in the uniform of the Austrian Army seized the Federal Chancellery. Chancellor Dollfuss was wounded trying to escape, being shot twice at close quarters. The radio building in the center of the town was overwhelmed, and the announcer was compelled to broadcast the news that Dollfuss had resigned and that Dr. Rintelen had taken his place as Chancellor. Although the Putsch failed, the insurgents kept control of the Chancellery building, and agreed to give it up only after they had a safe conduct to the German border. The insurgents contacted the German Minister Dr. Rieth by telephone and subsequently had private negotiations with him in the building. At about 7 p. m. they yielded the building, but Chancellor Dollfuss breathed his last about 6 p. m., not having had the services of a doctor.

It is also a well-known historical fact that the German Government denied all complicity in this Putsch and in this assassination. Hitler removed Dr. Rieth as Minister on the ground that he had offered a safe conduct to the rebels without making inquiry of the

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German Government, and had thus without reason dragged the German Reich into an internal Austrian affair in public sight.

This statement appears in a letter which Hitler sent to Defendant Papen on July 26, 1934. I shall offer that letter a little later.

Although the German Government denied any knowledge or complicity in this Patsy we think there is ample basis for the conclusion that the German Nazis bear responsibility for these events. It is not my purpose, with respect to this somewhat minor consideration, to review the extensive record in the trial of the Austrian Nazi Planetta and others who were convicted for the murder of Dollfuss. Similarly I have no intention of presenting to the Court the contents of the Austrian Braunbuch, issued after July 25. The Court will, I think, take judicial notice.

I should like, instead, to mention a few brief items which seem to us sufficient for the purpose. I quote again from our Exhibit Number 1760-PS, from the Messersmith affidavit, USA-57, on Page 7, the paragraph in the middle of the page:

"The events of the Putsch of July 25, 1934, are too well known for me to repeat them in this statement. I need say here only that there can be no doubt that the Putsch was ordered and organized by the Nazi officials from Germany through their organization in Austria made up of German Nazis and Austrian Nazis. Dr. Rieth, the German Minister in Vienna, was fully familiar with all that was going to happen and that was being planned. The German Legation was located directly across the street from the British Legation, and the Austrian secret police kept close watch on the persons who entered the German Legation.

"The British had their own secret service in Vienna at the time, and they also kept a discreet surveillance over the people entering the German Legation. I was told by both British and Austrian officials that a number of men who were later found guilty by the Austrian courts of having been implicated in the Putsch had frequented the German Legation. In addition, I personally followed very closely the activities of Dr. Rieth, and I never doubted, on the basis of all my information, that Dr. Rieth was in close touch and constant touch with the Nazi agents in Austria, these agents being both German and Austrian. Dr. Rieth could not have been unfamiliar with the Putsch and the details in connection therewith. I recall, too, very definitely from my conversations with the highest officials of the Austrian Government after the Putsch their informing me that Dr. Rieth had been in touch with Von Rintelen, who, it had

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been planned by the Nazis, was to succeed Chancellor Dollfuss, had the Putsch been successful.

"It may be that Dr. Rieth was himself not personally sympathetic with the plans for the Putsch, but there is no question that he was fully familiar with all these plans and must have given his assent thereto and connived therein. "As this Putsch was so important and was a definite attempt to overthrow the Austrian Government and resulted in the murder of the Chancellor of Austria, I took occasion to verify at the time for myself various other items of evidence indicating that the Putsch was not only made with the knowledge of the German Government but engineered by it. I found and verified that almost a month before the Putsch Goebbels told Signor Cerruti, the Italian Ambassador in Berlin, that there would be a Nazi government in Vienna in a month."

I should also like to offer in evidence Ambassador Dodd's diary, 1933-38, a book published in 1941, our Document 2832-PS, and particularly the entry for July 26, 1934; We have the book with the two pages to which I have reference. I should like to offer that portion of the book in evidence as Exhibit USA-58, further identified as our Document 2832-PS.

Mr. Dodd, then Ambassador to Berlin, made the following observations in that entry. First he noted that in February 1934 Ernst Hanfstaengl advised Mr. Dodd that he brought what was virtually an order from Mussolini to Hitler to leave Austria alone and to dismiss and silence Theodor Habicht, the German agent in Munich, who had been agitating for annexation of Austria. On June 18 in Venice, Hitler was reported to have promised Mussolini to leave Austria alone. Mr. Dodd further states, and I quote from his entry of July 26, 1934:

"On Monday, July 23, after repeated bombings in Austria by Nazis, a boat loaded with explosives was seized on Lake Constance by the Swiss police. It was a shipment of German bombs and shells to Austria from some arms plant. That looked ominous to me, but events of that kind had been so common that I did not report it to Washington.

"Today evidence came to my desk that last night, as late as 11 o'clock, the Government issued formal statements to the newspapers rejoicing at the fall of Dollfuss and proclaiming the Greater Germany that must follow. The German Minister in Vienna had actually helped to form the new cabinet. He had, as we now know, exacted a promise that the gang of Austrian Nazi murderers should be allowed to go

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into Germany undisturbed, but it was realized about 12 o'clock that although Dollfuss was dead the loyal Austrians had surrounded the Government Palace and prevented the organization of a new Nazi regime. They held the murderers prisoners. The German Propaganda Ministry therefore forbade publication of the news sent out an hour before and tried to collect all the releases that had been distributed. A copy was brought to me today by a friend.

"All the German papers this morning lamented the cruel murder and declared that it was simply an attack of discontented Austrians, not Nazis. News from Bavaria shows that thousands of Austrian Nazis living for a year in Bavaria on German support had been active for 10 days before, some getting across the border contrary to law, all drilling and making ready to return to Austria. The German propagandist Habicht was still making radio speeches about the necessity of annexing the ancient realm of the Hapsburgs to the Third Reich, in spite of all the promises of Hitler to silence him. But now that the drive has failed and the assassins are in prison in Vienna, the German Government denounces all who say there was any support from Berlin.

"I think it will be clear one day that millions of dollars and many arms have been pouring into Austria since the spring of 1933. Once more, the whole world is condemning the Hitler regime. No people in all modern history has been quite so unpopular as Nazi Germany. This stroke completes the picture. I expect to read a series of bitter denunciations in the American papers when they arrive about 10 days from now."

As I stated before, the German Government denied any connection with the Putsch and the murder of Dollfuss. In this connection, I should like to invite attention to the letter of appointment which Hitler wrote to the Defendant Von Papen on 26 July 1934. This letter appears in a standard German reference work Dokumente der Deutschen Politik, Volume 2, Page 83. For convenience we have identified it as Document 2799-PS, and a copy translated into English is included in the document book. The defendants may examine the German text in the Dokumente der Deutschen Politik, a copy of which is present in my hand, Page 83 of Volume 2.

I ask the Court if it will take judicial notice of this original German typing.

I should like to read this letter which Chancellor Hitler sent to Vice Chancellor Von Papen. I think it will provide us with a

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little historical perspective and perhaps freshen our recollection of the ways in which the Nazi conspirators worked. In considering Hitler's letter to the Defendant Von Papen on July 26, we might bear in mind as an interesting sidelight, the widespread report at that time, and I mention this only as a widespread report, that the Defendant Von Papen narrowly missed being purged on June 30, 1934, along with the Nazi Ernst Roehm and others. The letter from Hitler to Von Papen is as follows:

"Dear Herr Von Papen:

"As a result of the events in Vienna, I am compelled to suggest to the Reich President the removal of the German Minister to Vienna, Dr. Rieth, from his post, because he, at the suggestion of Austrian Federal Ministers and the Austrian rebels, respectively consented to an agreement made by both these parties concerning the safe conduct and retreat of the rebels to Germany without making inquiry of the German Reich Government. Thus, the Minister has dragged the German Reich into an internal Austrian affair without any reason.

"The assassination of the Austrian Federal Chancellor which was strictly condemned and regretted by the German Government has made the situation in Europe, already fluid, more acute, without any fault of ours. Therefore, it is my desire to bring about, if possible, an easing of the general situation, and especially to direct the relations with the German Austrian State, which have been so strained for a long time, again into normal and friendly channels.

"For this reason, I request you, dear Herr Von Papen, to take over this important task, just because you have possessed, and continue to possess, my most complete and unlimited confidence ever since we have worked together in the Cabinet.

"Therefore, I have suggested to the Reich President that you, upon leaving the Reich Cabinet and upon release from the office of Commissioner for the Saar, be called on a special mission to the post of the German Minister in Vienna for a limited period of time. In this position you will be directly subordinated to me.

"Thanking once more for all that you have at one time done for the co-ordination of the Government of the National Revolution, and since then together with us for Germany, I remain, yours very sincerely, Adolf Hitler."

Now let us look at the situation 4 years later, on July 25, 1938, after the Anschluss with Austria. At that time the German officials

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no longer expressed regrets over the death of Dollfuss. They were eager and willing to reveal what the world already knew, that they were identified with and sponsors of the murder of the former Chancellor.

I offer in evidence at this point Document L-273, which I offer as Exhibit USA-59. That document is a dispatch from the American Consul General, Vienna, to the Secretary of State, dated July 26, 1938. Unfortunately, through a mechanical slip, this document which is in English in the original, was not mimeographed in English and is not in your document book. However, it was translated into German, and is in the document book which counsel for the defendants have. I read from a photostatic copy of the dispatch:

"The two high points of the celebration"-here was a celebration-"were the memorial assembly on the 24th at Klagenfurt, capital of the Province of Carinthia, where in 1934 the Vienna Nazi revolt found its widest response and the march on the 25th to the former Federal Chancellery in Vienna by the surviving members of the SS Standarte 89, which made the attack on the Chancellery in 1934."-a reconstitution of the crime, so to say.

"The assembled thousands at Klagenfurt were addressed by the Fuehrer's deputy, Rudolf Hess, in the presence of the families of the 13 National Socialists who were hanged for their part in the July Putsch. The Klagenfurt memorial celebration was also made the occasion for the solemn swearing in of the seven recently appointed Gauleiter of the Ostmark. From the point of view of the outside world, this speech of Reich Minister Hess was chiefly remarkable for the fact that after devoting the first half of his speech to the expected praise of the sacrifices of the men, women, and youths of Austria in the struggle for Greater Germany, he then launched into a defense of the occupation of Austria, an attack on the 'lying foreign press' and on those who spread the idea of a new war. The world was fortunate, declared Hess, that Germany's leader was a man who would not allow himself to be provoked. The Fuehrer does what is necessary for his people in sovereign calm and labors for the peace of Europe, even though provocators 'completely ignoring the deliberate threat of the peace of certain small states,' deceitfully claim that he is a menace to the peace of Europe.

"The march on the former Federal Chancellery,"-referring back to the Putsch of 4 years before-"now the Reichsstatthalterei, followed the exact route and time schedule of

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the original attack. The marchers were met at the Chancellery by Reichsstatthalter Seyss-Inquart, who addressed them and unveiled a memorial tablet. From the Reichsstatthalterei the Standarte"-that is the SS organization which made the original attack and which marched on this occasion 4 years later-"marched from the old Ravag broadcasting center, from which false news of the resignation of Dollfuss had been broadcast, and there unveiled a second memorial tablet. Steinhaeusel, the present Police President of Vienna, is a member of the SS Standarte 89."

Today that original memorial plaque, if the Court please, is rubble, like so much of Nuremberg; but we found a photograph of it in the National Library in Vienna. I should like to offer this photograph in evidence. It was taken on this occasion 4 years later. The Nazi wreath encircles the memorial tablet. A large wreath of flowers with a very distinct swastika Nazi symbol was laid before the wreath. I offer that photograph identified as 2968-PS in evidence. I offer it as Exhibit USA-60. You will find that in the document book. I know of no more interesting or shocking document at which you could look. We call celebrating a murder 4 years later, "murder by ratification."

As that photograph shows, this plaque which was erected to celebrate this sinister occasion reads: "One hundred and fifty-four German men of the 89th SS Standarte stood up here for Germany on July 2d, 1934. Seven found death in the hands of the hangman."

The Tribunal may notice that the number "154" at the top of the plaque is concealed in the photograph by the Nazi wreath surrounding the plaque. I must confess that I find myself curiously interested in this tablet and in the photograph which was taken and carefully filed. The words chosen for this marble tablet, and surely we can presume that they were words chosen carefully, tell us clearly that the men involved were not mere malcontent Austrian revolutionaries, but were regarded as German men, were members of a para-military organization, and stood up here for Germany.

In 1934 Hitler repudiated Doctor Rieth because he dragged the German Reich into an internal Austrian affair without any reason. In 1938 Nazi Germany proudly identified itself with this murder, took credit for it, and took responsibility for it. Further proof in the conventional sense, it seems to us, is hardly necessary.

Next we refer to the program culminating in the Pact of July 11, 1936. In considering the activities of the Nazi conspirators in Austria between July 25, 1934 and November 1937 there is a distinct intermediate point, the Pact of July 11, 1936. Accordingly,

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I shall first review developments in the 2-year period, July 1934-36.

First, we must consider the continued aim of eliminating Austria's independence, with particular relation to the Defendant Von Papen's conversation and activity. The first point that should be mentioned is this: The Nazi conspirators pretended to respect the independence and sovereignty of Austria, notwithstanding the aim of Anschluss stated in Mein Kampf. But in truth and in fact they were working from the very beginning to destroy the Austrian State.

A dramatic recital of the position of Defendant Von Papen in this regard is provided in Mr. Messersmith's affidavit, from which I have already quoted. I quote now from Page 9 of the English copy, the second paragraph, 1760-PS, Exhibit USA-57:

"That the policy of Anschluss remained wholly unchanged was confirmed to me by Franz Von Papen when he arrived in Vienna as German Minister. It will be recalled that he accepted this assignment as German Minister even though he knew that he had been marked for execution in the St. Bartholomew's massacre of 30 June 1934. When, in accordance with protocol, he paid me a visit shortly after his arrival in Vienna, I determined that during this call there would be no reference to anything of importance, and I limited the conversation strictly to platitudes which I was able to do as he was calling on me in my office. I deemed it expedient to delay my return call for several weeks in order to make it clear to Von Papen that I had no sympathy with, and on the other hand was familiar with the objectives of his mission in Austria. When I did call on Von Papen in the German Legation, he greeted me with 'Now you are in my Legation and I can control the conversation.'

"In the boldest and most cynical manner he then proceeded to tell me that all of southeastern Europe, to the borders of Turkey, was Germany's natural hinterland, and that he had been charged with the mission of facilitating German economic and political control over all this region for Germany. He blandly and directly said that getting control of Austria was to be the first step. He definitely stated that he was in Austria to undermine and weaken the Austrian Government and from Vienna to work towards the weakening of the Governments in the other states to the south and southeast. He said that he intended to use his reputation as a good Catholic to gain influence with certain Austrians, such as Cardinal Innitzer, towards that end. He said that

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he was telling me this because the German Government was bound on this objective of getting this control of southeastern Europe and that there was nothing which could stop it, and that our own policy and that of France and England was not realistic.

"The circumstances were such, as I was calling on him in the German Legation, that I had to listen to what he had to say and of course, I was prepared to hear what he had to say although I already knew what his instructions were. I was nevertheless shocked to have him speak so boldly to me, and when he finished I got up and told him how shocked I was to hear the accredited representative of a supposedly friendly state to Austria admit that he was proposing to engage in activities to undermine and destroy that Government to which he was accredited. He merely smiled and said of course this conversation was between us, and that he would of course not be talking to others so clearly about his objectives. I have gone into this detail with regard to this conversation, as it is characteristic of the absolute frankness and directness with which high Nazi officials spoke of their objectives."

And again, reading from the same document on Page 10, beginning at the last paragraph at the bottom of the page:

"On the surface, however, German activities consisted principally of efforts to win the support of prominent and influential men through insidious efforts of all kinds, including the use of the German diplomatic mission in Vienna and its facilities and personnel.

"Von Papen as German Minister entertained frequently and on a lavish scale. He approached almost every member of the Austrian Cabinet, telling them, as several of them later informed me, that Germany was bound to prevail in the long run, and that they should join the winning side if they wished to enjoy positions of power and influence under German control. Of course, openly and outwardly he gave solemn assurance that Germany would respect Austrian independence and that all that she wished to do was to get rid of elements in the Austrian Government like the Chancellor Schuschnigg and Starhemberg as head of the Heimwehr, and others, and replace them by a few 'nationally minded' Austrians, which of course meant the Nazis. The whole basic effort of Von Papen was to bring about the Anschluss.

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"In early 1935 the Austrian Foreign Minister, Berger-Waldenegg, informed me that in the course of a conversation with Von Papen, the latter had remarked, 'Yes, you have your French and English friends now, and you can have your independence a little longer.' The Foreign Minister, of course, told me this remark in German, but the foregoing is an accurate translation. The Foreign Minister told me that he had replied to Von Papen, 'I am glad to have from your own lips your own opinion which agrees with what your Chief has just said in the Saar and which you have taken such pains to deny.' Von Papen appeared to be terribly upset when he realized just what he had said and tried to cover his statements, but according to Berger-Waldenegg, kept constantly getting into deeper water.

"Von Papen undoubtedly achieved some success, particularly with men like Glaise-Horstenau and others who had long favored the Grossdeutschtum idea, but who nevertheless had been greatly disturbed by the fate of the Catholic Church. Without conscience or scruple, Von Papen exploited his reputation and that of his wife as ardent and devout Catholics to overcome the fears of these Austrians tin this respect."

May I inquire if the Court expect to take a short recess?

THE PRESIDENT: Yes. We will adjourn now for 10 minutes.

[A recess was taken.]

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal wishes to make it clear, if I did not make it clear when I spoke before, that if Defense Counsel wish to put interrogatories to Mr. Messersmith upon his affidavit they may submit such interrogatories to the Tribunal in writing for them to be sent to Mr. Messersmith to answer.

FLOTTENRICHTER OTTO KRANZBÜHLER (Counsel for Defendant Doenitz): I do not know whether my question has yet been answered, or by what it has been made known by the President of the Court.

In the testimony of Mr. Messersmith, Doenitz' name was mentioned. It appears on Page 4 of the German version. I should like to read the whole paragraph:

"Admiral Karl Doenitz was not always in an amicable frame of mind. He was not a National Socialist when the National Socialists came to power"...

THE PRESIDENT: This passage was not read in evidence, was it?

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DR. KRANZBÜHLER: No, only the name was mentioned.

THE PRESIDENT: I don't think the name was mentioned, because this part of the affidavit was not read.

DR. KRANZBÜHLER: The name was read, Mr. President.

THE PRESIDENT: Very well, go on.

DR. KRANZBÜHLER: [Continuing.] "Nevertheless, he became one of the first high officers in the Army and fleet and was in complete agreement with the

concepts and aims of National Socialism."

As an introduction to this paragraph, Mr. Messersmith said, in Document Number 1760, on Page 2, the last sentence before the Number 1:

"Among those whom I saw frequently and to whom I have reference in many of my statements were the following..."

Then after Number 16 Doenitz' name appears. My client has informed me that he has heard the name Messersmith today for the first time; that he does not know the witness Messersmith, has never seen him, nor has he ever spoken to him.

I therefore request that the witness Messersmith be brought before the Court to state when and where he spoke to the Defendant Doenitz.

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal has already ruled that the affidavit is admissible; that its probative value will of course be considered by the Tribunal, and the defendants' counsel have the right, if they wish, to submit interrogatories for the examination of Messersmith. Of course defendants will have the opportunity of giving evidence when their turn comes, then Admiral Doenitz, if he thinks it right, will be able to deny the statements of the affidavit.

DR. KRANZBÜHLER: Thank you.

MR. ALDERMAN: I want to call the Court's attention to a slight mistranslation into German of one sentence of the Messersmith affidavit. In the German translation the word "nicht" crept in when the negative was not in the English.

The English statement was:

"I deemed it expedient to delay my return call for several weeks in order to make it clear to Von Papen that I had no sympathy with and on the other hand was familiar with

the objectives of his mission in Austria."

'The German text contains the negative: "Und das sichanderseits nicht mit den Zielen seiner Berufung in Osterreich vertraut war." The "nicht" should not be in the German text.

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The continued existence of Nazi organizations was a program of armed preparedness. The wiles of the Defendant Von Papen represented only one part of the total program of Nazi conspiracy. At the same time Nazi activities in Austria, forced underground during this period, were carried on.

Mr. Messersmith's affidavit on Pages 9 and 10, the English text, discloses the following. Reading from the last main paragraph on Page 9:

"Nazi activities, forced underground in this period, were by no means neglected. The Party was greatly weakened for a time as a result of the energetic measures taken against the Putsch and as a result of public indignation. Reorganization work was soon begun. In October 1934 the Austrian Foreign Minister, Berger-Waldenegg, furnished me the following memorandum, which he told me had been supplied to the Austrian Government by a person who participated in the meeting under reference."

I quote the first paragraph of the memorandum:

"A meeting of the chiefs of the Austrian National Socialist Party was held on 29 and 30 September 1934, at Bad Aibling in Bavaria."

Then, skipping four paragraphs and resuming on the fifth one: "The agents of the Party Direction in Germany have received orders in every Austrian district to prepare lists of all those persons who are known to support actively the present Government and who are prepared closely to cooperate with it. "When the next action against the Government takes place those persons are to be proceeded against just as brutally as against all those other persons, without distinction of party, who are known to be adversaries of National Socialism.

"In a report of the Party leaders for Austria the following principles have been emphasized:

"A. The taking over of the power in Austria remains the principal duty of the Austrian National Socialist Party. Austria has for the German Reich a much greater significance and value than the Saar. The Austrian problem is the problem. All combat methods are consecrated by the end which they are to serve.

"B. We must, on every occasion which presents itself, appear to be disposed to negotiate, but arm at the same time for the struggle. The new phase of the struggle will be particularly serious and there will be this time two centers of terror, one along the German frontier and the other along the Yugoslav frontier."

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That ends the quotation from the memorandum. I proceed with the next paragraph of the affidavit:

"The Austrian Legion was kept in readiness in Germany. Although it was taken back some miles further from the Austrian frontier, it remained undissolved in spite of the engagement which had been taken to dissolve it. The Austrian Government received positive information to this effect from time to time which it passed on to me and I had direct information to the same effect from reliable persons coming from Germany to Vienna who actually saw the Legion."

The fact of the reorganization of the Nazi Party in Austria is corroborated by a report of one of the Austrian Nazis.

I offer in evidence our Document Number 812-PS, as Exhibit USA-61. It contains three parts. First, there is a letter dated August 22, 1939 from Mr. Rainer, then Gauleiter at Salzburg, to the Defendant Seyss-Inquart, then Austrian Reich Minister. That letter encloses a letter dated July 6, 1939 written by Rainer to Reich Commissioner and Gauleiter Josef Burckel.

DR. HANS LATERNSER: (Co-counsel for Defendant Seyss-Inquart): I object to the presentation of the letters contained in Document Number 812. Of course, I cannot object to the presentation of this evidence to the extent that this evidence is to prove that these letters were actually written. However, if these letters are to serve as proof for the correctness of their contents, then I must object to the use of these letters, for the following reason: Particularly, the third document: It is a letter which, as is manifest from its contents, has a certain bias, for this reason, that in this letter it is explained to what extent the Austrian Nazi Party participated in the Anschluss.

It purports, further, to expose the leading role played by the Party group Rainer-Klausner.

From the bias that is manifest in the contents of this letter, this letter cannot serve as prom for the facts brought forth in it, particularly since the witness Rainer, who wrote this letter, is available as a witness. I have discovered he is at present in Nuremberg.

I object to the use of this letter to the extent that it is to be used to prove the correctness of its contents, because the witness who can testify to that is at our disposal in Nuremberg.

TIME PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will hear Mr. Alderman in answer to what has been said. The Tribunal has not yet read the letter.

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MR. ALDERMAN: I think perhaps it would be better to read the letter before we argue about the significance of its contents.

THE PRESIDENT: Are you relying upon the letter as evidence of the facts stated in it?

MR. ALDERMAN: Yes.

THE PRESIDENT: From whom is the letter, and to whom is it addressed?

MR. ALDERMAN: The first letter is from Mr. Rainer who was at that time Gauleiter at Salzburg, to the Defendant Seyss-Inquart, then Reich Minister of Austria.

That letter encloses a letter dated July 6, 1939, written by Rainer to Reich Commissioner and Gauleiter Josef Burckel. In that letter, in turn, Rainer enclosed a report on the events in the NSDAP of Austria from 1933 to March 11, 1938, the day before the invasion of Austria.

I had some other matters in connection with this that I did want to bring to the attention of the Tribunal before it passes upon the admissibility.

THE PRESIDENT: I don't think that the defendant's counsel is really challenging the admissibility of the document; he challenges the contents of the document:

MR. ALDERMAN: Yes. On that, in the first place, we are advised by defendant's counsel that this man Rainer is in Nuremberg. I would assume he is there.

We have also an affidavit by Rainer stating that what is stated in these communications is the truth. However, it seems to us that the communications themselves, as contemporaneous reports by a Party officer at the time, are much more probative evidence than anything that he might testify to before you today.

DR. LATERNSER: I have already said that this letter has these characteristics, that it is biased, that it tends to emphasize and exaggerate the participation of the Austrian Nazi Party on the Anschluss. Therefore, I must object to the use of this letter as objective evidence. It was not written with the thought in mind that the letter would be used as evidence before a court. If the writer had known that, the letter undoubtedly would have been formulated differently, considering his political activity.

I believe, although I am not sure, that the witness is in Nuremberg. In that case, according to a principle which is basic for all trial procedure, the witness should be presented to the Court personally, particularly since, in this case, the difficulties inherent in the question of Messersmith do not here pertain.

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THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal is of the opinion that the letters are admissible. They were written to and received by the Defendant Seyss-Inquart. The defendant can challenge the contents of the letters by his evidence.

If it is true that Gainer is in Nuremberg, it is open to the defendant to apply to the Tribunal for leave to call Gainer in due course. He can then challenge the contents of these letters, both by the Defendant Seyss-Inquart's evidence and by Rainer's evidence. The letters themselves are admitted.

MR. ALDERMAN: May it please the Tribunal, I agree quite fully with the statement that if it had been known that these letters were to be offered in evidence in a court of justice, they very probably would have been differently written. That applies to a great part of the evidence that we shall offer in this case. And I would say that if the photographer who took the photograph of the Memorial Plaque had known that his photographs would be introduced in evidence in a conspiracy case, he probably never would have snapped the shutter.

The letter from Rainer to Burckel indicates that he was asked to prepare a short history of the role of the Party. Perhaps I had better read the covering letter, addressed to the Defendant Seyss-Inquart:

"Dear Dr. Seyss:

"I have received your letter of 19 August 1939, in which you asked me to inform you what I know of those matters which, among others, are the subject of your correspondence with Burckel.

"I do not wish to discuss sundry talks and all that which has been brought to my notice in the course of time by different people. I wish to clarify essentially my own attitude.

"On 6 July 1939 I was asked by telephone by the Reich Commissioner Gauleiter Buerckel if I was in possession of the memorandum of Globus regarding the events of March. I told him that I did not have this memorandum, that I never possessed a single part of it; that I, furthermore, did not then participate in the matter and do not know its content. Because of official requests by Buerckel, I have entrusted him with a report accompanied by a letter written on 6 July.

"If Buerckel now writes to you that certain statements were confirmed by me, I feel obliged to entrust you with a copy each of my copies of those two documents, which were only written in single originals. I shall specially inform Buerckel of this, adding that I have given-apart from those written explanations-no confirmations, declarations, or criticisms

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whatsoever regarding you and your attitude and that I have authored nobody to refer to any statements of mine.

"Since the beginning of our collaboration, I have always expressed and represented forcefully my ideas regarding yourself and my opinion of your personality. This conception of mine was the very basis of our collaboration. The events of February and March have not changed this, especially since I considered the political success of 11 March merely as a confirmation of the intentions and convictions which have equally induced both of us to collaborate.

"As far as Globus is concerned, you are fully aware of his nature, which I judged always and in every situation only by its good side. I believe that you have already talked to Globus about the occurrences between the 11 March 1938 and today, and I am convinced that he will tell you everything that is bothering him, if you will speak to him about this matter, as is your intention.

"With best regards and Heil Hitler! Yours, Friedl Rainer."

And so Rainer writes his report, which is enclosed with this letter, to show that the Party as a whole is entitled to the glory which was excessively ascribed to one person, Dr. Seyss-Inquart. I refer to the third paragraph of the first enclosure, the report to Reich Commissioner Gauleiter Josef Buerckel:

"We saw in March and April how a false picture about the actual leadership conditions developed from this fact which could not be corrected in spite of our attempts to that erect. This was an important factor for the varying moods of Globocnik who hoped especially from you that you would emphasize for Hitler, and also for the public, the role of the Party during the events preceding 12 March 1938. I limited myself to address this verbal and written declaration to Party member Hess, and furthermore to secure the documents from the March days. In addition, I spoke at every available opportunity about the fight of the Party. I did not undertake steps to give just credit to other persons for the glory which was excessively ascribed to one person, Dr. Seyss-Inquart, and I would not do that, primarily because I appear as a beneficiary, and furthermore, because I believe that I would not gladden Hitler by doing so.

"I am also convinced that Dr. Seyss-lnquart did not act crookedly, and furthermore, that Hitler does not want to commit an act of historical justice by special preference of his person, but rather that he is attracted to him personally. It really is of no great account to Hitler if this or that person

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were more or less meritorious in this sector of the great fight of the movement. Because, in the last analysis, by far the greatest part is to be ascribed only to him; he alone will be considered by history as the liberator of Austria. I, therefore, considered it best to accept existing conditions and look for new fertile fields of endeavor in the Party.

"If I should be asked to describe-without personal interest- the role of the Party according to my best conviction, I am ready to do so at any time. For this reason I promised yesterday to submit to you again a short seminary, and to make it available for your confidential use. Of this letter and of this abbreviated description I retain the sole copy.

Heil Hitler! Rainer."

Now, of course, all of these enclosures went to the Defendant Seyss-lnquart, and he had knowledge of the contents of all of them.

It is an historical fact of which the Court will take judicial notice, that Seyss-Inquart was the original Quisling. It so happened that the Norwegian Seyss-Inquart gave his name to posterity as a meaningful name, but all Quislings are alike.

The Tribunal will observe from this that the Rainer report is hardly likely to be tendentious, as counsel says, or to be prejudiced in favor of Defendant Seyss-Inquart's contribution to the Anschluss. It tends, on the contrary, to show that Seyss-Inquart was not quite so important as he might have thought he was. Even so, Rainer gives Seyss-Inquart credit enough.

The Rainer report further tells of the disorganization of the Nazi Party in Austria and of its reconstitution. I now quote the second and third paragraphs of the report, appearing on Pages 3 and 4 of the English text of 812-PS, which is Exhibit USA-61; and I believe it is on Pages 1 and 2 of the original German of the report or Bericht, which is the third part of the document:

"Thus the first stage of battle commenced which ended with the July rising of 1934. The decision for the July rising was right, the execution of it was faulty. The result was a complete destruction of the organization; the loss of entire groups of fighters through imprisonment or flight into the Alt-Reich, and with regard to the political relationship of Germany to Austria, a formal acknowledgment of the existence of the Austrian State by the German Government. With the telegram to Papen, instructing him to reinstitute normal relationships between the two States, the Fuehrer had liquidated the first stage of the battle, and a new method of political penetration was to begin. By order of the Fuehrer the Landes-

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leitung Munich was dissolved, and the Party in Austria was left to its own resources.

"There was no acknowledged leader for the entire Party in Austria. New readerships were forming in the new Gaue. The process was again and again interrupted by the interference of the police; there was no liaison between the formations, and frequently there were two, three, or more rival readerships. The first evident, acknowledged speaker of almost all the Gaue in Autumn 1934 was Engineer Reinthaler (already appointed Landesbauern Fuehrer, leader of the country's farmers, by Hess). He endeavored to bring about a political appeasement by negotiations with the Government with the purpose of giving the NSDAP legal status again, thus permitting its political activities. Simultaneously, Reinthaler started the reconstruction of the illegal political organization at the head of which he had placed Engineer Neubacher."

Next we have secret contacts between German officials, including the Defendant Von Papen, and the Austrian Nazis; the use by the Austrian Nazis of front personalities.

There are two cardinal factors concerning the Nazi organization in Austria which should be borne in mind.

First, although the Fuehrer had, on the surface, cast the Austrian Nazis adrift-as indicated in the document I have just read-in fact, as we shall show, German officials, including Von Papen, maintained secret contact with the Austrian Nazis in line with Hitler's desires. German officials consulted and gave advice and support to the organization of the Austrian Nazis.

In the second place, the Austrian Nazis remained an illegal organization in Austria, organizing for the eventual use of force in a so-called emergency. But in the meantime they deemed it expedient to act behind front personalities, such as the Defendant Seyss-Inquart, who had no apparent taint of illegality in his status in Austria.

Mr. Messersmith relates, in his affidavit, that he got hold of a copy of a document outlining this Nazi program. I quote from Page 8 of Document 1760-PS, USA-57, the following:

"For 2 years following the failure of the July 25 Putsch, the Nazis remained relatively quiet in Austria. Very few terroristic acts occurred during the remainder of 1934 and, as I recall, in 1935 and most of 1936, this inactivity was in accordance with directives from Berlin, as direct evidence to that effect which came to my knowledge at that time, proved. Early in January the Austrian Foreign Minister Berger-

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Waldenegg, furnished me a document which I considered accurate in all respects, and which stated:

" 'The German Minister here, Von Papen, on the occasion of his last visit to Berlin, was received three times by Chancellor Hitler for fairly long conversations and he also took this opportunity to call on Schacht and Von Neurath. In these conversations the following instructions were given to him:

"During the next 2 years nothing can be undertaken which will give Germany external political difficulties. On this ground, everything must be avoided which could awaken the appearance of Germany interfering in the internal affairs of Austria. Chancellor Hitler will, therefore, also for this reason, not endeavor to intervene in the present prevailing difficult crisis in the National Socialist Party in Austria, although he is convinced that order could be brought into the Party at once through a word from him. This word however, he will not give for foreign political reasons, being convinced that ends desired by him may be reached also in another way. Naturally, Chancellor Hitler declared to the German Minister here, this does not indicate any disinterestedness in Austria's independence. Also, before everything, Germany cannot for the present withdraw Party members in Austria, and must therefore, in spite of the very real exchange difficulties, make every effort to bring help to the persecuted National Socialist sufferers in Austria.

" 'As a result, Minister of Commerce Schacht finally gave the authorization that from then on, 200,000 marks a month were to be set aside for this end (support of National Socialists in Austria). The control and supervision of this monthly sum was to be entrusted to Engineer Reinthaler, who, through the fact that he alone had control over the money, would have a definite influence on the Party followers. In this way it would be possible to end most quickly and most easily the prevailing difficulties and divisions in the Austrian National Socialist Party.

" 'The hope was also expressed to Herr Von Papen that the recently authorized foundation of German Ortsgruppen of the National Socialist Party in Austria, made up of German citizens in Austria, would be so arranged as not to give the appearance that Germany is planning to interfere in Austrian internal affairs."'

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The report of Gauleiter Gainer to Reich Commissar Buerckel in July 1939 outlines the further history of the Party and the leadership squabbles following the retirement of Reinthaler.

THE PRESIDENT: Do you think this would be a convenient time to break off until 2 o'clock?

MR. ALDERMAN: Yes, sir.

[The Tribunal adjourned until 1400 hours.]

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Afternoon Session

MR. ALDERMAN: May it please the Tribunal, I had just referred again to the report of Gauleiter Rainer to Reich Commissioner Buerckel in July 1939, which outlines the further history of the Party and the leadership problem following the retirement of Reinthaler.

In referring to the situation in 1935, he mentioned some of the contacts with the Reich Government, that is, the German Government, in the following terms. I quote from Page 4 of the English text of that report, and I believe from Page 4 of the German text of the Rainer report, which is 812-PS, that is Exhibit USA-61: "In August some further arrests took place, the victims of which were, apart from the Gauleiter"-Gau leaders-"also Globocnik and Rainer. Schattenfroh then claimed, because of an instruction received from the imprisoned Leopold, to have been made deputy country leader. A group led by engineer Raffelsberger had at this time also established connection with departments of the Alt-Reich (Ministry of Propaganda, German racial agency, et cetera), and made an attempt to formulate a political motto in the form of a program for the fighting movement of Austria."

And, again, the Rainer report sets forth the situation a little later in 1936. I quote from Page 6 of the English text, and I think Page 5 of the German text:

"The principles of the construction were:

"The organization is the bearer of the illegal fight and the trustee of the idea to create a secret organization, in a simple manner and without compromise, according to the principle of organizing an elite to be available to the illegal Land Party Council upon any emergency. Besides this, all political opportunities should be taken and all legal people and legal chances should be used without revealing any ties with the illegal organization. Therefore, cooperation between the illegal Party organization and the legal political aides was anchored at the top of the Party leadership. All connections with the Party in Germany were kept secret in accordance with the orders of the Fuehrer. These said that the German State should officially be omitted from the creation of an Austrian NSDAP and that auxiliary centers for propaganda, press, refugees, welfare, et cetera, should be established in the foreign countries bordering Austria.

"Hinterleitner already contacted the lawyer Seyss-Inquart, who had connection with Dr. Waechter which originated from

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Seyss-Inquart's support of the July uprising. On the other side, Seyss-Inquart had a good position in the legal field and especially well-established relations with Christian Social politicians. Dr. Seyss-Inquart came from the ranks of the Styrian Heimatschutz"-home defense-"and became a Party member when the entire Styrian Heimatschutz was incorporated into the NSDAP. Another personality who had a good position in the legal field was Colonel Glaise-Horstenau . who had contacts with both sides. The agreement of 11 July 1936 was strongly influenced by the activities of these two persons of whom Glaise-Horstenau was designed as trustee to the Fuehrer.

The Gainer report thus discloses the dual tactics of the Austrian Nazis during this period of keeping quiet and awaiting develops meets. They were maintaining their secret contacts with Reich officials, and using native personalities such as Glaise-Horstenau and Seyss-lnquart. The Nazis made good use of such figures, who were more discreet in their activities and could be referred to as nationalists. They presented, supported, and obtained consideration of demands which could not be negotiated by other Nazis like Captain Leopold.

Seyss-Inquart did not hold any public office until January 1937, when he was made Counsellor of State. But Rainer, describing him as a trustworthy member of the Party through the ranks of this Styrian Heimatschutz, points him out as one who strongly influenced the agreement of July 11, 1936. The strategic importance of that agreement will be considered a little later. Rainer's report, as I have said before, was hardly likely to over emphasize the significance of Seyss-Inquart's contribution.

That the Nazis, but not the Austrian Government, did well to trust Seyss-Inquart is indicated by the next document. I propose to offer in evidence Document 2219-PS as Exhibit USA-62. This is a letter dated 14 July 1939, addressed to Field Marshal Goering. The document is a typed carbon of the letter. It ends with the "Heil Hitler" termination, and it is not signed, but we think it was undoubtedly written by Defendant Seyss-Inquart. It was the carbon copy found among Seyss-Inquart's personal files, and such carbon copies kept by authors of letters usually are not signed. On the first page of the letter there appears a note in ink, not indicated in the partial English translation, reading, "Air Mail, 15 July, 1515 hours, Berlin, brought to Goering's office." The main text of the letter consists of a plea for intercession on behalf of one Muhlmann, whose name we shall meet later, and who, unfortunately, got into Buerckel's bad graces. I shall quote the extract part of the

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document which has been translated into English, and which starts, I believe, on Page 7 of the German text:

"At present in Vienna, 14 July 1939; "To the General Field Marshal "Sir:

"If I may add something about myself, it is the following: I know that I am not of an active fighting nature, unless final decisions are at stake. At this time of pronounced activism" -Aktivismus-"this will certainly be regarded as a fault of my personality. Yet I know that I cling with unconquerable tenacity to the goal in which I believe, that is Greater Germany"-Grossdeutschland-"and the Fuehrer. And if some people are already tired out from the struggle and some have been killed in the fight, I am still around somewhere and ready to go into action. This, after all, was also the development until the year 1938. Until July 1934, I conducted myself as a regular member of the Party. And if I had quietly, in whatever form, paid my membership dues (the first one, according to a receipt, I paid in December 1931) I probably would have been an undisputed, comparatively old fighter and Party member of Austria, but I would not have done any more for the union. I told myself in July 1934 that we must fight this clerical regime on its own ground in order to give the Fuehrer a chance to use whatever method he desired." -I would like to call particular attention to that sentence.- "I told myself that this Austria was worth a mass. I have stuck to this attitude with an iron determination because I and my friends had to fight against the whole political church, the Freemasonry, the Jewry, in short, against everything in Austria. The slightest weakness which we might have displayed would undoubtedly have led to our political annihilation; it would have deprived the Fuehrer of the means and tools to carry out his ingenious political solution for Austria, as became evident in the days of March 1938. I have been fully conscious of the fact that I am following a path which is not comprehensible to the masses and also not to my Party comrades. I followed it calmly and would without hesitation follow it again, because I am satisfied that at one point I could serve the Fuehrer as a tool in his work, even though my former attitude even now gives occasion to very worthy and honorable Party comrades to doubt my trustworthiness. I have never paid attention to such things because I am satisfied with the opinion which the Fuehrer and the men close to him have of me."

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That letter was written to one of the men close to him-Field Marshal Goering. I think that suffices to demonstrate Seyss-Inquart as one whose loyalty to Hitler, a foreign dictator, and to the aims of the Nazi conspiracy, led him to fight for the Anschluss with all the means at his disposal

It is appropriate at this time to offer in evidence a document from the Defendant Von Papen, and to see how he thought the doctrines of National Socialism could be used to effect the aim of the Anschluss. I offer Document 2248-PS as Exhibit USA-63. This document is a letter from Von Papen to Hitler, dated July 27, 1935. It consists of a report entitled, "Review and Outlook 1 Year after the Death of Chancellor Dollfuss." After reviewing the success that the Austrian Government had had in establishing Dollfuss as a martyr, and his principles as the patriotic principles of Austria, Von Papen stated-and I quote the last paragraph of the letter, beginning on Page 1 (Page 146 of the German text):

"National Socialism must and will overpower the new Austrian ideology. If today it is contended in Austria that the NSDAP is only a centralized Reich German Party and therefore unable to transfer the spirit of thought of National Socialism to groups of people of a different political makeup, the answer must rightly be that the national revolution in Germany could not have been brought about in a different way. But when the creation of the people's community in the Reich will be completed, National Socialism could, in a much wider sense than this is possible through the present Party organization-at least apparently-certainly become the rallying point for all racially German units beyond the borders. Spiritual progress in regard to Austria cannot be achieved today with any centralized tendency. If this recognition would once and for all be stated clearly from within the Reich, then it would easily become possible to effect a break-through into the front of the New Austria. A Nuremberg Party Day designated as 'The German Day' as in old times and the proclamation of a National Socialistic peoples' front would be a stirring event for all beyond the borders of the Reich. Such attacks would win us also the particularistic Austrian circles, whose spokesman, the legitimistic Count Dubsky, wrote in his pamphlet about the Anschluss: 'The Third Reich will be with Austria, or it will not be at all. National Socialism must win it or perish if it is unable to solve this task."'

We have other reports from Von Papen to Hitler which I shall offer in evidence presently, showing that he maintained covert

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contact with the National Socialist groups in Austria. It is certainly interesting that from the very start of his mission, Defendant Von Papen was thinking of ways and means of using the principle of National Socialism for national Germans outside the border of Germany. Papen was working for the Anschluss, although he preferred to use the principles of National Socialism rather than rely on the Party organization as a necessary means of establishing those principles in the German Reich.

Next we have some assurance and reassurance to Austria. The German Government did no more than keep up a pretense of noninterference with Austrian groups. It employed the psychological inducement of providing assurances that it had no designs on Austrian independence. If Austria could find hope for the execution of those assurances, she could find her way clear to the granting of concessions and obtain relief from the economic and internal pressure.

I offer Document 2247-PS in evidence as Exhibit USA-64. It is a letter from Von Papen, while in Berlin, to Hitler, dated May 17, 1935.

Von Papen's letter indicated to Hitler that a forthright credible statement by Germany reassuring Austria, would be most useful for German diplomatic purposes and for the improvement of relationships between Austria and German groups in Austria.

He had a scheme for pitting Schuschnigg and his Christian Social forces against Starhemberg, the Vice Chancellor of Austria, who was backed by Mussolini. Von Papen hoped to persuade Schuschnigg to ally his forces with the NSDAP in order to emerge victorious over Starhemberg. Von Papen indicates that he obtained this idea from Captain Leopold, leader of the illegal National Socialists in Austria.

I quote from his letter, starting at the second paragraph of the second page. This is Von Papen writing to "Mein Fuehrer" Hitler: "I suggest that we take an active part in this game. The fundamental idea should be to pit Schuschnigg and his Christian Social forces, who are opposed to a home-front dictatorship, against Starhemberg. The possibility of thwarting the measures arranged between Mussolini and Starhemberg should be afforded to him in such a way that he would submit the offer to the Government of a definitive German-Austrian compromise of interests. According to the convincing opinion of the leader of the NSDAP in Austria, Captain Leopold, the totalitarian principle of the NSDAP in Austria must be replaced in the beginning by a combination of that part of the Christian Social elements which favors the Greater

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Germany idea and the NSDAP. If Germany recognizes the national independence of Austria and guarantees full freedom to the Austrian national opposition, then, as a result of such a compromise, the Austrian Government would be formed in the beginning by a coalition of these forces.... A further consequence of this step would be the possibility of the participation of Germany in the Danube Pact, which would take the sting out of its acuteness due to the settlement of relations between Germany and Austria. Such a measure would have a most beneficial influence on the European situation, and especially on our relationship with England.

"One may object that Schuschnigg will hardly be determined to follow such a pattern, that he will rather in all probability immediately communicate our offer to our opponents.

"Of course, one should first of all explore the possibility of setting Schuschnigg against Starhemberg through the use of go-betweens. The possibility exists. If Herr Schuschnigg finally says 'no' and makes our offer known in Rome, then the situation would not be any worse, but on the contrary, the efforts of the Reich Government to make peace with Austria would be revealed, without prejudice to other interests. Therefore, even in the case of refusal this last attempt would be an asset. I consider it completely possible, that in view of the farspread dislike in the Alpine countries of the pro-Italian course, and in view of the sharp tensions between the Federal Government"-Bundesregierung-"Herr Schuschnigg will grasp this last straw, always under the supposition that the offer could not be interpreted as a trap by the opponents, but that it bears all the marks of an actually honest compromise with Austria.

"Assuming success of this step we would again establish our active intervention in central European politics, which, as opposed to the French Czech, and Russian political maneuvers, would be' a tremendous success, both morally and practically.

"Since there are 2 weeks left to accomplish very much work in the way of explorations and conferences, an immediate decision is necessary.

"The Reich Army Minister"-Reichswehrminister-"shares the opinion presented above, and the Reich Foreign Minister" -Reichsaussenminister-"wants to discuss it with you, my Fuehrer." -Signed-"Papen."

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In other words, Von Papen wanted a strong assurance and a credible assurance of the preservation of Austria's independence. As he put it, Germany Ald nothing to lose with what it could always call a mere effort at peace, and she might be able to convince Schuschnigg to establish an Austrian coalition government with the NSDAP. If she did this, she would vastly strengthen her position in Europe. Finally Von Papen urged haste.

Exactly 4 days later, in a Reichstag address, Hitler responded to Von Papen's suggestion, and asserted:

"Germany neither intends nor wishes to interfere in the internal affairs of Austria, to annex Austria or to conclude an Anschluss."

The British will present a document covering that speech. I merely wanted to use one sentence at this point. It is a sentence quite well known to history.

It is appropriate to take notice of this assurance at this point, and to note that for a complexity of reasons Von Papen suggested, and Hitler announced, a policy completely at variance with their intentions, which had been, and continued to be, to interfere in Austria's internal affairs and to conclude an Anschluss.

There was then a temporary continuance of a quiet pressure policy.

On May 1, 1936, Hitler blandly in a public speech branded as a lie any statement that "tomorrow or the day after" Germany would fall upon Austria. I invite the Court's attention to the version of the speech appearing in the Volkischer Beobachter, SD-that is South Germany-2 to 3 May 1936, Page 2, and translated in our Document 2367-PS.

Without offering that document, I ask the Court to take judicial notice of that statement in that well-known speech.

If Hitler meant what he said, it was only in the most literal and misleading sense, that is, that he would not actually fall upon Austria "tomorrow or the day after tomorrow." For the conspirators well knew that the successful execution of their purpose required for a little while longer the quiet policy they had been pursuing in Austria.

I now offer in evidence our Document L-150, "Memorandum of Conversation between Ambassador Bullitt and the Defendant Von Neurath, on 18 May 1936" as Exhibit USA-65. This document unfortunately again appears in your document books in German. Due to an error, it has not been mimeographed in English. German counsel have the German copies.

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I shall read from it and at the same time, hand to the interpreter reading the German, a marked copy of a German translation. I might read one sentence from the first paragraph:

"I called on Von Neurath, Minister of Foreign Affairs, on May 18 and had a long talk on the general European situation.

"Von Neurath said that it was the policy of the German Government to do nothing active in foreign affairs until the Rhineland had been 'digested.'

"He explained that he meant until the German fortifications had been constructed on the French and Belgian frontiers, the German Government would do everything possible to prevent, rather than encourage, an outbreak by the Nazis in Austria and would pursue a quiet line with regard to Czechoslovakia. 'As soon as our fortifications are constructed and the countries of Central Europe realize that France cannot enter German territory, all these countries will begin to feel very differently about their foreign policies and a new constellation will develop."'

I skip then two paragraphs.

"Von Neurath then stated that no understanding had been reached between Germany and Italy, and admitted that the demonstrations of friendship between Germany and Italy were mere demonstrations without basis in reality. He went on to say that at the present time he could see no way to reconcile the convicting interests of Germany and Italy in Austria. He said that there were three chief reasons why the German Government was urging the Austrian Nazis to remain quiet at the present time:

"The first was that Mussolini had today the greater part of his army mobilized on the Austrian border, ready to strike, and that he would certainly strike if he should have a good excuse.

"The second reason for urging Austrian Nazis to remain quiet for the present was that the Nazi movement was growing stronger daily in Austria. The youth of Austria was turning more and more towards the Nazis, and the dominance of the Nazi Party in Austria was inevitable and only a question of time."

The third reason was that until the German fortifications had been constructed on the French border, an involvement of Germany in war with Italy might lead to a French attack on Germany.

But if Germany was not yet ready for open conflict in Austria, her diplomatic position was vastly improved over 1934, a fact

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which influenced Austria's willingness to make concessions to Germany and to come to terms.

I quote again from the Messersmith affidavit, Page 11 of the English text. That is Document 1760-PS.

"Developments in the fall of 1935 and the spring of 1936 gave Germany an opportunity to take more positive steps in the direction of the Nazification of Austria. Italy, which had given Austria assurance of support of the most definite character against external German aggression and on one occasion, by mobilizing her forces, had undoubtedly stopped German aggressive action which had been planned against Austria, embarked on her Abyssinian adventure. This and the reoccupation of the Rhineland in 1936 completely upset the balance in Europe. It is quite obvious that after Italy had launched her Abyssinian adventure, she was no longer in any position to counter German aggressive moves against Austria."

This weakening of Austria helped to pave the way for the pact of July 11, 1936. On July 11, 1936 the Governments of Austria and Germany concluded an accord. That will be offered in evidence also by the British Delegation.

I merely ask at this point, that the Tribunal take judicial notice of the fact that such an accord was entered into. The formal part of the agreement of July 11, 1936 will also be proved by our British colleagues. For convenient reference, it will be found in the Document which the British will offer, TC-22, and the substance of it is also contained on Pages 11 and 12 of Mr. Messersmith's affidavit, 1760-PS.

Upon the basis of this fight alone, the agreement looked like a great triumph for Austria. It contains a confusing provision to the effect that Austria in her policy, especially with regard to Germany, would regard herself as a German state, but the other two provisions clearly state that Germany recognizes the full sovereignty of Austria and regards the inner political order of Austria, including the question of Austria and National Socialism, as an internal concern of Austria upon which Germany will exercise neither direct nor indirect influence. But there was much more substance to the day's events than appears in the text of the accord. I refer to Mr. Messersmith's summary as set forth on Page 12 of his affidavit, 1760-PS, as follows:

"Even more important than the terms of the agreement published in the official communique, was the contemporaneous informal understanding, the most important provisions of which were that Austria would:

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"(1) Appoint a number of individuals enjoying the Chancellor's confidence but friendly to Germany, to positions in the Cabinet; (2) with the devised means to give the national opposition role in the political life of Austria within the framework of the Patriotic Front; and (3) with amnesty for all Nazis, save those convicted of the most serious offenses."

This amnesty was duly announced by the Austrian Government and thousands of Nazis were released, and the first penetration of Deutsch-National into the Austrian Government was accomplished by the appointment of Dr. Guido Schmidt as Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and Dr. Edmund Glaise-Horstenau as Minister without portfolio.

I now offer in evidence Document 2994-PS, which is an affidavit by Kurt van Schuschnigg, Foreign Chancellor of Austria, executed at Nuremberg, Germany, on 19 November 1945. I offer this as Exhibit USA-66. The defendants have received German translations of that evidence.

DR. LATERNSER: In the name of the accused, Seyss-Inquart, I wish to protest against the presentation of written evidence by the witness Von Schuschnigg for the following reasons: Today, when a resolution was announced, with respect to the use to be made of the written evidence of Mr. Messersmith, the Court was of the opinion that in a case of very great importance it might possibly take a different view of the matter. With respect to the Austrian conflict this is the case, since Schuschnigg is the most important witness, the witness who was affected at the time in his position as Federal Chancellor. In the case of such an important witness, the principle of direct evidence must be adhered to, in order that the Court be in a position to ascertain the actual truth in this case. The accused and his defense counsel would feel prejudiced in his rights granted by the Charter, should direct evidence be circumvented. I must, therefore, uphold my viewpoint since it can be assumed that the witness Von Schuschnigg will be able to confirm certain facts which are in favor of the accused Seyss-Inquart.

I therefore make the motion to the Court that the written evidence of the witness Von Schuschnigg be not admitted.

THE PRESIDENT: If you have finished, the Tribunal will hear Mr. Alderman.

MR. ALDERMAN: May it please the Tribunal, at this point I am simply proposing to offer this affidavit for the purpose of showing the terms of the secret understanding between the German and Austrian Governments in connection with this accord. It is not for

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any purpose to incriminate the Defendant Seyss-Inquart that it is being offered at this point.

DR. LATERNSER: May I add to my motion that the witness, Von Schuschnigg, on 19 November 1945, was questioned in Nuremberg, and that if an interrogation on 19 November was possible, then a short time later-that is now-it ought to be possible to call him before the Court, especially as the interrogation before this court is of special importance.

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will recess now to consider this question.

[A recess was taken.]

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal has considered the objection to the affidavit of Von Schuschnigg and upholds the objection.

If the Prosecution desires to call Von Schuschnigg as a witness, it can apply to do so. Equally if the Defense wishes to call Von Schuschnigg as a witness, it can. apply to do so. In the event Von Schuschnigg is not able to be produced, the question of affidavit-evidence by Von Schuschnigg being given will be reconsidered.

MR. ALDERMAN: May it please the Tribunal, in view of the strategy and tactics of the Nazis' concessions as indicated in the portion of the Messersmith affidavit that I read, substantial concessions were made by Austria to obtain Germany's diplomatic formal assurance of Austrian independence and non-intervention in Austrian internal affairs.

The release of imprisoned Nazis presented potential police problems, and as Mr. Messersmith pointed out in a 1934 dispatch to the United States State Department quoted on Pages 12 to 13 of his affidavit:

"Any prospect that the National Socialists might come to power would make it more difficult to obtain effective police and judicial action against the Nazis for fear of reprisals by the future Nazi Government against those taking action against Nazis even in the line of duty. The preservation of internal peace in Austria was less dependent upon Germany's living up to her obligations under the accord."

Next, Germany's continuing program of weakening the Austrian Government. In the pact of 11 July 1936 Germany agreed not to influence directly or indirectly the internal affairs of Austria, including the matter of Austrian National Socialism.

On 16 July 1936, just 5 days later, Hitler violated that provision. I quote from Document 812-PS, which is Exhibit USA-61, the

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reports of Gauleiter Rainer to Commissioner Turnkey, all of which were forwarded to the Defendant Seyss-Inquart-Page 6 of the English, and I believe, also Page 6 of the German version.

"At that time the Fuehrer wished to see the leaders of the Party in Austria in order to tell them his opinion on what Austrian National Socialists should do. Meanwhile Hinterleitner was arrested, and Dr. Rainer became his successor and leader of the Austrian Party. On 16 July 1936 Doctor Rainer and Globocnik visited the Fuehrer at the Obersalzberg where they received a clear explanation of the situation and the wishes of the Fuehrer. On 17 July 1936 all illegal Gauleiter met in Anif near Salzburg, where they received a complete report from Rainer on the statement of the Fuehrer and his political instructions for carrying out the fight. At this same conference the Gauleiter received organizational instructions from Globocnik and Hiedler."

Then skipping a paragraph I quote further from this report- in the English that paragraph which I am skipping is omitted, so I am skipping a paragraph in the German version:

"Upon the proposal of Globocnik, the Fuehrer named Lieutenant General"-Gruppenfuehrer-"Keppler as chief of the mixed commission which was appointed, in accordance with the State Treaty of 11 July 1936, to supervise the correct execution of the agreement. At the same time Keppler was given full authority by the Fuehrer for the Party in Austria. After Keppler was unsuccessful in his efforts to cooperate with Leopold, he worked together with Doctor Rainer, Globocnik, Reinthaler as leader of the peasants, Kaltenbrunner"-that is the Defendant Kaltenbrunner in this case -"as leader of the SS, and Doctor Jury as deputy leader of the Austrian Party, as well as with Glaise-Horstenau and Seyss-Inquart."

A new strategy was developed for the Austrian Nazis. Mr. Messersmith describes it briefly, and I quote from Page 13 of his affidavit, 1760-PS:

"The sequel of the agreement was the only one which could have been expected in view of all the facts and previous recorded happenings. Active Nazi operations in Austria were resumed under the leadership of a certain Captain Leopold who, as was known definitely, was in frequent touch with Hitler. The Nazi program was now to form an organization through which the Nazis could carry on their operations openly and with legal sanction in Austria. There were formed in Austria several organizations which had a legal basis, but

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which were simply a device by which the Nazis in Austria could organize and later seek inclusion as a unit in the Patriotic Front. The most important of these was the Union of the East Mark,"-Ostmarkische Verein-"the sponsor of which was the Minister of the Interior Glaise-Horstenau. Through the influence of Glaise-Horstenau and pro-Nazi Neustadter-Sturmer, this organization was declared legal by the courts. I made specific mention of the foregoing because it shows the degree to which the situation in Austria had disintegrated as a result of the underground and open Nazi activities directed from Germany."

At this point I offer in evidence Document 2246-PS as Exhibit USA-67, a captured German document which is a report from Von Papen to Hitler dated September 1, 1936. This document is most interesting because it indicates Von Papen's strategy after July ll, 1936 for destroying Austria's independence. Von Papen had taken a substantial step forward with the agreement of July 11. It should be noted incidentally, that after that agreement he was promoted from Minister to Ambassador. Now his tactics were developed in the following terms-I quote the last three paragraphs of his letter of September 1, 1936 to the Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor. Those three paragraphs are all joined as one paragraph in the English text:

"The progress of normalizing relations with Germany at the present time is obstructed by the continued persistence of the Ministry of Security, occupied by the old anti National Socialistic officials. Changes in personnel are therefore of utmost importance. But they are definitely not to be expected prior to the conference on the abolishing of the control of nuances at Geneva. The Chancellor of the League has informed Minister Von Glaise-Horstenau of his intention to offer him the portfolio of the Ministry of the Interior. As a guiding principle"-Marschroute (a German word meaning the route of march)-'I recommend on the tactical side, continued, patient, psychological treatment, with slowly intensified pressure directed at changing the regime. The proposed conference on economic relations, taking place at the end of October, will be a very useful tool for the realization of some of our projects. In discussion with Government officials as well as with leaders of the illegal Party (Leopold and Schattenfroh) who conform completely with the agreement of 11 July I am trying to direct the next developments in such a manner to aim at corporative representation of the movement in the Fatherland Front, but nevertheless refraining from putting National Socialists in important positions for

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the time being. However, such positions are to be occupied only by personalities having the support and the confidence of the movement. I have a willing collaborator in this respect in Minister Glaise-Horstenau." Signature-"Papen."

To recapitulate, this report by Von Papen to Hitler discloses the following plan:

(a) Obtaining a change in personnel in the Austrian Ministry of Security in due course;

(b) Obtaining corporative representation of the Nazi movement in the Fatherland Front;

(c) Not putting avowed National Socialists in important positions yet, but using nationalist personalities;

(d) Using economic pressure and patient psychological treatment with slowly intensified pressure directed at changing the regime.

My next subject is Germany's diplomatic preparations for the conquest of Austria.

The program of the Nazi conspiracy with respect to Austria consisted of weakening that country externally and internally by removing its support from without, as well as by penetrating within. This program was of the utmost significance, especially since, as the Court will remember, the events of 25 July 1934 inside Austria were overshadowed in the news of the day by the fact that Mussolini had brought his troops to the Brenner Pass and posed there as a strong protector of his northern neighbor, Austria.

Accordingly, interference in the affairs of Austria and steady increase in the pressure needed to acquire control over that country, required removal of the possibility that Italy or any other country would come to its aid. But the foreign policy program of the conspiracy for the weakening and isolation of Austria was integrated with their foreign policy program in Europe generally.

I should like, therefore, at this juncture, to digress for a moment from the presentation of evidence bearing on Austria alone and to consider with the Tribunal the general foreign policy program of the Nazis. It is not my intention to examine this subject in any detail. Historians and scholars exhausting the archives will have many years of probing all the details and ramifications of European diplomacy during this fateful decade.

It is instead my purpose to mention very briefly the highlights of the Nazis' diplomatic preparation for war.

In this connection I should like to offer to the Tribunal Document Number 2385-PS, a second affidavit of George S. Messer-

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smith executed on 30 August 1945 at Mexico City. This has been made available to the defendants in German, as well as in English. This is a different affidavit from Document Number 1760-PS which was executed August 28. This second affidavit, which I offer as Exhibit USA-68, consists of a presentation of the diplomatic portion of the program of the Nazi Party. To a considerable extent it merely states facts of common knowledge, facts that many people who are generally well informed already know. It also gives us facts which are common knowledge in the circle of diplomats or of students of foreign affairs. It consists of some 11 mimeographed pages, single-spaced. I read first from the third paragraph in the affidavit:

"As early as 1933, while I served in Germany, the German and Nazi contacts which I had in the highest and secondary categories openly acknowledged Germany's ambitions to dominate southeastern Europe from Czechoslovakia down to Turkey. As they freely stated, the objective was territorial expansion in the case of Austria and Czechoslovakia. The professed objectives in the earlier stages of the Nazi regime, in the remainder of southeastern Europe, were political and economic control and they did not, at that time, speak so definitely of actual absorption and destruction of sovereignty. Their ambitions, however, were not limited to southeastern Europe. From the very beginnings of 1933, and even before the Nazis came into power, important Nazis speaking of the Ukraine freely said that 'it must be our granary' and that 'even with southeastern Europe under our control, Germany needs and must have the greater part of the Ukraine in order to be able to feed the people of greater Germany.' After I left Germany in the middle of 1934 for my post in Austria, I continued to receive information as to the German designs in southeastern Europe. In a conversation with Von Papen shortly after his appointment as German Minister to Austria in 1934, Von Papen frankly stated to me that 'southeastern Europe to Turkey is Germany's hinterland and I have been designated to carry through the task of bringing it within the fold. Austria is first on the program.'

"As I learned through my diplomatic colleagues, Von Papen in Vienna and his colleague Von Mackensen in Budapest were openly propagating the idea of the dismemberment and final absorption of Czechoslovakia as early as 1935."

Then, skipping a short paragraph, I resume:

"Immediately after the Nazis came into power, they started a vast rearmament program. This was one of the primary

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immediate objectives of the Nazi regime. As a matter or fact the two immediate objectives of the Nazi regime when it came into power, had to be and were, according to their own statements frequently made to me: First, to bring about the complete and absolute establishment of their power over Germany and the German people, so that they would become in every respect willing and capable instruments of the regime to carry through its ends; Second, the establishment of a tremendous armed power within Germany in order that the political and economic program in southeastern Europe and in Europe could be carried through by force if necessary, but probably by a threat of force. It was characteristic that in carrying through this second aim, they emphasized from the very outset the building of an overpowering air force. Goering and Milch often said to me or in my presence that the Nazis had decided to concentrate on air power as the weapon of terror most likely to give Germany a dominant position and the weapon which could be developed the most rapidly and in the shortest time."

Skipping to the end of that paragraph, and resuming at the next: "At the same time that this rearmament was in progress, the Nazi regime took all possible measures to prepare the German people for war in the psychological sense. Throughout Germany, for example, one saw everywhere German youth of all ages engaged in military exercises, drilling, field maneuvers, practicing the throwing of hand grenades, et cetera. In this connection I wrote in an official communication in November 1933, from Berlin as follows:

"'...Everything that is being done in the country today has for its object to make the people believe that Germany is being threatened vitally in every aspect of its life by outside influences and by other countries. Everything is being done to use this feeling to stimulate military training and exercises, and innumerable measures are being taken to develop the German people into a hardy, sturdy race which will be able to meet all comers. The military spirit is constantly growing. It cannot be otherwise. The leaders of Germany today have no desire for peace unless it is a peace which the world makes at the expense of complete compliance with German desires and ambitions. Hitler and his associates really and sincerely want peace for the moment, but only to have a chance to get ready to use force if it is found finally essential. They are preparing their way so carefully that there is not in my mind any question but

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that the German people will be with them when they want to use force and when they feel that they have the necessary means to carry through their objects...."'

One further sentence following that I quote:

'military preparation and psychological preparation. were coupled with diplomatic preparation designed so to disunite and isolate their intended victims as to render them defenseless against German aggression."

In 1933 the difficulties facing Germany in the political and diplomatic field loomed large. France was the dominant military power on the continent. She had a system of mutual assistance in the West and in the East.

"The Locarno Pact of 1928, supplemented by the Franco-Belgian Alliance, guaranteed the territorial status quo in the West. Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, and Romania were allied in the Little Entente and each, in turn, was united with France by mutual assistance pacts. Since 1922 France and Poland had likewise been allied against external aggression. Italy had made plain her special interest in Austrian independence."

Nazi Germany launched a vigorous diplomatic campaign to break up the existing alliances and understandings, to create divisions among the members of the Little Entente and the other eastern European powers.

Specifically, Nazi Germany countered these alliances with promises of economic gain for cooperating with Germany. To some of these countries she offered extravagant promises of territorial and economic rewards. She offered Carinthia in Austria to Yugoslavia. She offered part of Czechoslovakia to Hungary and part to Poland. She offered Yugoslav territory to Hungary at the same time that she was offering land in Hungary to Yugoslavia.

As Mr. Messersmith states in his affidavit-that is 2385-PS, on Page 5:

"Austria and Czechoslovakia were the first on the German program of aggression. As early as 1934, Germany began to woo neighbors of these countries with the promises of a share in the loot. To Yugoslavia in particular they offered Carinthia. Concerning the Yugoslav reaction, I reported at the time:

" 'The major factor in the internal situation in the last week has been the increase in tension with respect to the Austrian Nazi refugees in Yugoslavia... There is very little doubt but that Goering, when he made his trip to various capitals in

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southeastern Europe about 6 months ago, told the Yugoslavs that they would get a part of Carinthia when a National Socialist Government came into power in Austria .... The Nazi seed sown in Yugoslavia had been sufficient to cause trouble and there are undoubtedly a good many people there who look with a great deal of benevolence on those Nazi refugees who went to Yugoslavia in the days following July 25.'

"Germany made like promises of territorial gains to Hungary and to Poland in order to gain their cooperation or at least their acquiescence in the proposed dismemberment of Czechoslovakia. As I learned from my diplomatic colleagues in Vienna, Von Papen and Von Mackensen in Vienna and in Budapest in 1935 were spreading the idea of division of Czechoslovakia, in which division Germany was to get Bohemia, Hungary to get Slovakia, and Poland the rest. This did not deceive any of these countries for they knew that the intention of Nazi Germany was to take all.

"The Nazi German Government did not hesitate to make inconsistent promises when it suited its immediate objective. I recall the Yugoslav Minister in Vienna saying to me in 1934 or 1935 that Germany had made promises to Hungary of Yugoslav territory while at the same time promising to Yugoslavs portions of Hungarian territory. The Hungarian Minister in Vienna later gave me the same information.

"I should emphasize here in this statement that the men who made these promises were not only the 'dyed in the wool' Nazis but more conservative Germans who already had begun willingly to lend themselves to the Nazi program. In an official dispatch to the Department of State from Vienna dated October 10, 1935, I wrote as follows:

" 'Europe will not get away from the myth that Neurath, Papen, and Mackensen are not dangerous people and that they are "diplomats of the old school." They are in fact servile instruments of the regime and just because the outside world looks upon them as harmless, they are able to work more effectively. They are able to sow discord just because they propagate the myth that they are not in sympathy with the regime.' "

I find that last paragraph very important and worthy of emphasis. In other words, Nazi Germany was able to promote these divisions and increase its own aggressive strength by using as its agents in making these promises men who on outward appearances were merely conservative diplomats. It is true that the Nazis

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openly scoffed at any notion of international obligations, as I shall show in a moment. It is true that the real trump in Germany's hand was its rearmament and more than that, its willingness to go to war. And yet the attitude of the various countries was not influenced by those considerations alone.

With all those countries, and I suppose with all persons, we are not always completely rational, we tend to believe what we want to believe, and if an apparently substantial and conservative person like the Defendant Von Neurath, for example, is saying these things, one might be apt to believe them, or at least to act upon that hypothesis. And it would be the more impressive if one were also under the impression that the person involved was not a Nazi and would not stoop to go along with the designs of the Nazis.

Germany's approach toward Great Britain and France was in terms of limited expansion as the price of peace. They signed a naval limitations treaty with England and discussed a Locarno air pact. In the case of both France and England, they limited their statement of intentions and harped on fears of communism and war.

In making these various promises, Germany was untroubled by notions of the sanctity of international obligations. High ranking Nazis, including Goering, Frick, and Frank, openly stated to Mr. Messersmith that Germany would observe her international undertakings only so long as it suited Germany's interest to do so.

I quote from the affidavit, Document 2385-PS, Page 4, beginning on the 10th line:

"High ranking Nazis with whom I had to maintain official contact, particularly men such as Goering, Goebbels, Ley, Frisk, Frank, Darre, and others, repeatedly scoffed at my position as to the binding character of treaties and openly stated to me that Germany would observe her international undertakings only so long as it suited Germany's interest to do so. Although these statements were openly made to me as they were, I am sure, made to others, these Nazi leaders were not really disclosing any secret, for on many occasions they expressed the same idea publicly."

France and Italy worked actively in southeastern Europe to counter Germany's moves.

THE PRESIDENT: Would that be a convenient time to adjourn?

MR. ALDERMAN: Yes, sir.

THE PRESIDENT: We will adjourn until 10 o'clock tomorrow morning.

[The Tribunal adjourned until 29 November 1945 at 1000 hours. ]

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