1. The commander-in-chief of the army has ordered the working out of a plan of deployment against Poland which takes in account the demands of the political leadership for the opening of war by surprise and for quick success.
2. The order of deployment by the High Command, "Fall Weiss" authorizes the Third Army Group (in Fall Weiss 8th Army Headquarters) to give necessary directions and orders to all commands subordinated to it for "Fall Weiss."
3. Enclosed are sent:
a. Aims of the operation (Enclosure 1).4. The order of deployment "Fall Weiss" will be put into operation on 20 August 1939; all preparations have to be concluded by this date.
The former deployments "Case West" and "Case East" are valid until 19 August 1939.
5. For the instruction on the tasks due to this order for deployment, the principles of order OKH Genstb d.H.-1 Division (Ib Nr. 2000/36 top secret of 12.19.36) are to be applied.
The instruction can be carried down to the responsible officers of the corps commands to the Division Commanders (G-3) (Ia) and G-4 (Ib) of the divisions and the commandants and staff officers of the Garrison Headquarters. Permission to inform further persons must be requested by names. Communication with the SS-Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler must be instituted only by special order. The order for their commitment is to be prepared.
6. Tenth Corps Command (Gen KdX) and XIII Corps and lo. Div. can perform the necessary reconnaissance in Silesia while observing the appropriate precautionary measures (civilian clothes, motor vehicle, with civilian license number).
7. The whole correspondence on "Fall Weiss" has to be conducted under the classification Top Secret [Chefsache]. This is to be disregarded only if the content of a document, in the judgment of the chief of the responsible command is harmless in every way-even in connection with other documents.
8. For the middle of July a conference is planned where details on the execution will be discussed. Time and place will be ordered later on. Special requests are to be communicated to Third Army Group before 10 July.
9. I declare it the duty of the Commanding Generals, the divisional commanders and the commandants to limit as much as possible the number of persons who will be informed, and to limit the extent of the information, and ask that all suitable measures be taken to prevent persons not concerned from getting information.
Commander-in-Chief of Army Group 31. a. The operation, in order to forestall an orderly Polish mobilization and concentration, is to be opened by surprise with forces which are for the most part armored and motorized, placed on alert in the neighborhood of the border. The initial superiority over the Polish frontier-guards and surprise that can be expected with certainty are to be maintained by quickly bringing up other parts of the army as well to counteract the marching up of the Polish Army.
Accordingly all units have to keep the initiative against the foe by quick acting and ruthless attacks.
b. If the development of the Political situation should show that a surprise at the beginning of the war is out of question, because of well advanced defense preparations on the part of the Polish Army, the Commander-in-Chief of the army will order the opening of the hostilities only after the assembling of sufficient additional forces. The basis of all preparations will be to surprise the enemy.
Case b-is to be prepared in theory by the High Command only so that necessary changes can be quickly carried out.
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Source: Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression Volume IV Office of the United States Chief Counsel for Prosecution of Axis Criminality Washington, DC : United States Government Printing Office, 1946 |