This section on the Geheime Staatspolizei (GESTAPO) includes evidence on the criminality of the Sicherheitsdienst (SD) of the Schutzstaffel (SS). In the Indictment the SD is included by special references as a part of the Ss, since it originated as a part of the SS and always retained its character as a party organization, as distinguished from the GESTAPO, which was a State organization. As will be shown in this section, however, the GESTAPO and the SD were brought into close working relationship, the SD serving primarily as the information-gathering agency and the GESTAPO as the executive agency of the police system established by the Nazis for the purpose of combating the political and ideological enemies of the Nazi regime. This close working relationship between the GESTAPO and the SD was accomplished by the appointment of Himmler, the Reichsfuehrer of the SS, to the position of Chief of the German Police. What is proved in this section with respect to the criminality of the SD applies directly to the case against the SS. The relationship between the SS and the GESTAPO is considered in section 5 on the SS.

A. Development of the Gestapo and the SD.

(1) Development of the GESTAPO. The Geheime Staatspolizei, or GESTAPO, was first established in Prussia on 26 April 1933 by Goering, with the mission of carrying out the duties of political police with or in place of the ordinary police authorities. The GESTAPO chief was given the rank of a higher police authority and was subordinated only to the Minister of the Interior, to whom was delegated the responsibility of determining its functional and territorial jurisdiction (2104-PS): Pursuant to this law, and on the same date, the Minister of the Interior issued a decree on the reorganization of the police which established a state Police Bureau in each government district of Prussia subordinate to the Secret State Police bureau in Berlin. (2371-PS)

On 30 November 1933 Goering issued a decree for the Prussian State Ministry and for the Reichs Chancellor which acknowledged the valuable services which the GESTAPO was able to render to the State and which placed the GESTAPO under his direct supervision as Chief. The GESTAPO was thereby established as an independent branch of the Administration of the Interior, responsible directly to Goering as Prussian Prime Minister. This decree gave the GESTAPO jurisdiction over the political police matters of the general and interior administration and provided that the district, county, and local police authorities were subject to the directives of the GESTAPO (2105-PS). by a decree of 8 March 1934 the regional State Police offices were separated from their organizational connection with the district government and established as independent authorities of the GESTAPO. (2113-PS)

Parallel to the development of the GESTAPO in Prussia, the Reichsfuehrer SS, Heinrich Himmler, created in Bavaria the Bavarian Political police and also directed the formation of political police forces in the other federal states outside of Prussia. The unification of the political police of the various states took place in the spring of 1934 when Hermann Goering appointed Himmler the Deputy Chief of the Prussian GESTAPO in place of the former Deputy Chief, Diels. Himmler thereby obtained unified control over the political police forces throughout the Reich. (1680-PS)

On 10 February 1936 the basic law for the GESTAPO was promulgated by Goering as Prussian Prime Minister. This law provided that the Secret State Police had the duty to investigate and to combat in the entire territory of the State all tendencies inimical to the State, and declared that orders in matters of the Secret State Police were not subject to the review of the administrative courts (2107-PS). On the same date, 10 February 1936, a decree for the execution of said law was issued by Goering as Prussian Prime Minister and by Frick as Minister of the Interior. This decree provided that the GESTAPO had authority to enact measures valid in the entire area of the State and measures affecting that area, that it was the centralized agency for collecting political intelligence in the field of political police, and that it administered the concentration camps. The GESTAPO was given authority to make police investigations in cases of criminal attacks upon Party as well as upon State. (2108-PS)

On 28 August 1936 a circular of the Reichsfuehrer SS and Chief of the German Police provided that as of 1 October 1936 the political police forces of the German provinces were to be called the "Geheime Staatspolizei" (Secret State Police). The regional offices were still to be described as State Police (2372-PS). On 20 September 1936 a circular of the Minister of the Interior commissioned the GESTAPO Bureau in Berlin with the supervision of the duties of the political police commanders in all the States of Germany. (L-297)

The law relating to financial measures in connection with the police of 19 March 1937 provided that officials of the GESTAPO were to be considered direct officials of the Reich and their salaries, in addition to the operational expenses of the whole State Police, were to be borne from 1 April 1937 on by the Reich. (2243-PS)

Through the above laws and decrees the GESTAPO was established as a uniform political police system operating throughout the Reich and serving Party, State, and the Nazi leadership.

(2) Development of the SD. In 1932 the Reichsfuehrer of the SS, Heinrich Himmler, created the Sicherheitsdienst, or SD, as an intelligence service of the SS under the then SS-Standartenfuehrer Reinhard Heydrich. (1680-PS)

On 9 June 1934, the NSDAP issued an ordinance which merged all information facilities then existing within the Party organization into the SD, and the SD was established as the sole Party information service. (1680-PS)

In the course of its development, the SD came into increasingly closer cooperation with the GESTAPO and also with the Reich Kriminalpolizei, the Criminal Police, or KRIPO. The GESTAPO and the KRIPO considered together were called the Sicherheitspolizei, the Security Police, or SIPO. The SD was also called upon to furnish information to various State authorities. On 11 November 1938 a decree of the Reich Minister of the Interior declared that the SD was to be the intelligence organization for the State as well as for the Party, that it had the particular duty of supporting the Secret State Police, and that it thereby became active on a national mission. These duties necessitated a close cooperation between the SD and the authorities for the General and Interior Administration. (1680-PS; 1638-PS)

Through the above laws and decrees the SD was established as a uniform political information service operating throughout the Reich and serving Party, State, and the Nazi leadership.

(3) Consolidation of the GESTAPO and the SD. The first step in the consolidation of the political police system of the State (the GESTAPO) and the information service of the Nazi Party (the SD) took place in the spring of 1934 when Goering appointed Himmler Deputy Chief of the GESTAPO. Heydrich was the head of the SD under Himmler, and when Himmler took over the actual direction of the GESTAPO, these two agencies were in effect united under one command. (1956-PS; 2460-PS)

On 17 June 1936, "for the uniformity of police duties in the Reich," the position of Chief of the German Police was established in the Reich Ministry of the Interior, to which was assigned the direction and protection of all police affairs within the jurisdiction of the Reich. By this law Himmler was appointed Chief of the German Police under Frick, the Reich Minister of the Interior, and was given the right to participate in the sessions of the Reich cabinet as Chief of the German Police. (2073-PS)

On 26 June 1936 Himmler issued a decree providing for the appointment of a chief of the uniformed police and of a chief of the Security Police. This decree divided the German police system into two principal branches:

(a) Ordnungspolizei (ORPO or Regular Police).

(b) Sicherheitspolizei (SIPO or Security Police).

The Ordnungspolizei was composed of the Schutzpolizei (Safety Police), the Gendarmerie (Rural Police), and the Gemeindepolizei (Local Police). The Sicherheitspolizei was composed of the Reich Kriminalpolizei (KRIPO) and the Geheime Staatspolizei (GESTAPO). Daluege was named head of the Ordnungspolizei and Heydrich was named head of the Sicherheitspolizei. Since Heydrich was also head of the SD, he took the new title of Chief of the Security Police and SD. (1551-PS)

On 27 September 1939 by order of Himmler, in his capacity as Reichsfuehrer SS and Chief of the German Police, the central offices of the GESTAPO and the SD, together with the Criminal Police, were centralized in the office of the Chief of the Security Police and SD under the name of the Reichssicherheitshauptamt, Reich Security Main Office, or RSHA. Under this order the personnel and administrative sections of each agency were coordinated in Amt I and Amt II of the RSHA; the operational sections of the SD became Amt III (except for foreign intelligence which was placed in Amt VI); the operational sections of the GESTAPO became Amt IV and the operational sections of the KRIPO became Amt V. Ohlendorf was named the Chief of Amt III, the SD within Germany; Mueller was named the Chief of Amt IV, the GESTAPO; and Nebe was named the Chief of Amt V, the KRIPO. (L-361)

On 27 September 1939 Heydrich, as Chief of the Security Police and SD, issued a directive pursuant to the foregoing order of Himmler, in which he ordered the designation and heading "Reichssicherheitshauptamt" to be used exclusively in internal relations of the Reich Ministry of the Interior, and the heading "The chief of the Security Police and SD" in transactions with outside persons and offices. The directive provided that the GESTAPO would continue to use the designation and heading "Geheime Staatspolizeiamt" according to particular instructions. (L-361)

In 1944 most of the sections of the Abwehr (military intelligence) were incorporated into the various sections of the RSHA and into a new section connected with Amt VI, called the Militaerisches Amt. (2644-PS)

Heydrich was Chief of the Security Police and SD (RSHA) until his death on 4 June 1942, after which Himmler directed the organization until the appointment of the defendant Ernst Kaltenbrunner as Chief of the Security Police and SD. Kaltenbrunner took office on 30 January 1943 and remained Chief of the Security Police and SD (RSHA) until the end of the war. (2644-PS)

B. Organization of the Gestapo and the SD.

B. Organization of the Gestapo and the SD.

(1) Organization of the Gestapo (Amt IV of the RSHA). The headquarters organization of the GESTAPO (Amt IV of the RSHA) was set up on a functional basis. In 1943 it contained five sub-sections.

Section A dealt with opponents, sabotage, and protective service and was subdivided as follows:

A 1 Communism, Marxism and associated organizations, war crimes, illegal and enemy propaganda.

A 2 Defense against sabotage, combating of sabotage, political falsification.

A 3 Reaction, opposition, legitimism, liberalism, matters of malicious opposition.

A 4 Protective service, reports of attempted assassinations, guarding, special jobs, pursuit troops.

Section a dealt with political churches, sects and Jews, and was subdivided as follows:

B 1 Political Catholicism.

B 2 Political Protestantism Sects.

B 3 Other churches, Freemasonry.

B 4 Jewish affairs, matters of evacuation, means of suppressing enemies of the people and State, dispossession of rights of German citizenship. (Eichmann was head of this office).

Section C dealt with card files, protective custody, and matters of press and Party, and was subdivided as follows:

C 1 Evaluation, main card index, administration of individual files, information office, supervision of foreigners.

C 2 Matters of protective custody.

C 3 Matters of the press and literature.

C 4 Matters of the party and its formations, special cases.

Section D dealt with regions under greater German influence, and was subdivided as follows:

D (aus. arb.) Foreign Workers.

D 1 Matters of the Protectorate, Czechs in the Reich, Slovakia, Serbia, Croatia, and the remaining regions of the former Jugoslavia, Greece.

D 2 Matters of the General Government, Poles in the Reich.

D 3 Confidential office, foreigners hostile to the State, emigrants.

D 4 Occupied territories, France, Belgium, Holland, Norway, Denmark.

D 5 Occupied Eastern territories.

Section E dealt with security and was subdivided as follows:

E 1 General security matters, supply of legal opinions in matters of high and State treason and other security matters.

E 2 General economic matters, defense against economic espionage, protection of works and those engaged in guarding.

E 3 Security West.

E 4 Security North.

E 5 Security East.

E 6 Security South.

Section F dealt with passport matters and alien police and was subdivided as follows:

F 1 Frontier police.

F 2 Passport matters.

F 3 Identification and identity cards.

F 4 Alien police and basic questions concerning frontiers.

F 5 Central visa office. (L-219)

Subordinate offices of the GESTAPO were established through out the Reich and designated as Staats Polizeileitstellen or Staats Polizeistellen, depending upon the size of the office. These offices reported directly to the RSHA in Berlin but were subject to the supervision of Inspekteurs of the Security Police in the various provinces. The inspectors were expected to foster cooperation between the Security Police and the central offices of the general and interior administration. (2245-PS)

In the occupied territories the regional offices of the GESTAPO were coordinated with the Criminal Police and the SD under Kommandeurs of the Security Police and SD, who were subject to Befehlshabers of the Security Police and SD who reported to the Chief of the Security Police and SD (RSHA) in Berlin. (1285-PS)

(2) Organization of the SD (Amt III of the RSHA). The headquarters organization of the SD (including only Amt III of the RSHA and not Amt VI, the Foreign Intelligence Branch) was set up on a functional basis. In 1943 it contained four sections.

Section A dealt with questions of legal order and structure of the Reich and was subdivided as follows:

A 1 General questions of work on spheres of German life.

A 2 Law.

A 3 Constitution and administration.

A 4 National life in general.

A 5 General questions of police law, and technical questions of legislation.

Section B dealt with nationality, and was subdivided as follows:

B 1 Nationality questions.

B 2 Minorities.

B 3 Race and health of the people.

B 4 Citizenship and naturalization.

B 5 Occupied territories.

Section C dealt with culture, and was subdivided as follows:

C 1 Science.

C 2 Educational religious life.

C 3 Folk culture and art.

C 4 Press, literature, radio, office for evaluation of material.

Section D dealt with economics, and was subdivided as follows:

D a Reading office, economics, press, magazines, literature.

D b Colonial economics.

D s Special questions and review of material.

D West Western occupied regions.

D Ost Eastern occupied regions.

D 1 Food economy.

D 2 Commerce, handcraft, and transport.

D 3 Finance, currency, banks and exchanges, insurance.

D 4 Industry and Power.

D 5 Labor and Social Questions. (L-219)

Within Germany the original regional offices of the SD were called SD-Oberabschnitte and SD-Unterabschnitte. in 1939 these designations were changed to SD-Abschnitte and SD-Leitabschnitte. Offices of the SD-Abschnitte were located in the same place as the Staatspolizeistellen. SD-Abschnitte located where there were Staats Polizeileitstellen were called "SD Leitabschnitte." Direct orders came from the Chief of the Security Police and SD in Berlin (RSHA) to these regional offices, but they were also subject to the supervision of the Inspekteurs of the SIPO and SD. In the occupied territories the regional offices of the SD were coordinated with the GESTAPO and Criminal Police under Kommandeurs of the SIPO and SD who were subject to Befehlshabers of the Security Police and SD who reported to the Chief of the Security Police and SD (RSHA) in Berlin. (1680-PS, L-361)

(3) Combined Organization of the GESTAPO and SD. The central offices of the GESTAPO and SD were coordinated in 1936 with the appointment of Heydrich, the head of the SD, as chief of the Security Police. The office of Heydrich was called "Chief of the Security Police and SD." (1551-PS)

When the central offices of the GESTAPO and SD, together with the Criminal Police, were centralized in one main office (RSHA) in 1939, the functions were somewhat redistributed.

Amt I of the RSHA handled personnel for the three agencies. Subsection A 2 handled personnel matters of the GESTAPO, A 3 handled personnel matters of the KRIPO, and A 4 handled personnel matters of the SD.

Amt II handled organization, administration, and law for the three agencies. Subsection C handled domestic arrangements and pay accounts, and was divided into two sections, one to take care of pay accounts of the Security Police and the other to take care of pay accounts of the SD, since personnel of the former were paid by the State and personnel of the latter were paid by the Party. Subsection D, under SS-Obersturmbannfuehrer Rauff handled technical matters, including the motor vehicles of the SIPO and SD.

Amt III was the SD and was charged with investigation into spheres of German life. Its subdivisions have heretofore been considered.

Amt IV was the GESTAPO and was charged with combating political opposition. Its subdivisions have heretofore been considered.

Amt V was the KRIPO and was charged with combating criminals. Subsection V D was the criminological institute for the SIPO handling matters of identification, chemical and biological investigations, and technical research.

Amt VI was concerned with foreign political intelligence and contained subsections dealing with western Europe, Russia and Japan, Anglo-American sphere, and central Europe. It contained a special section dealing with sabotage.

Amt VII handled ideological research against enemies, such as Freemasonry, Judaism, political churches, Marxism, and liberalism. (L-185, L-219)

The centralization of the main offices of the GESTAPO and SD was not fully carried out in the regional organization. Within Germany the regional offices of the GESTAPO and SD maintained their separate identity and reported directly to the section of the RSHA which had the jurisdiction of the subject matter. They were, however, coordinated by the Inspekteurs of the Security Police and SD. The Inspekteurs were also under the supervision of the Higher SS and Police leaders appointed for each Wehrkreis.

The Higher SS and Police leaders reported to the Reichsfuehrer SS and Chief of the German Police in each Wehrkreis and supervised not only the Inspekteurs of the Security Police and SD but also the Inspekteurs of the Order Police and Various subdivisions of the SS. (1285-PS)

In the occupied territories the organization developed as the German armies advanced. Combined operational units of the Security Police and SD, known as Einsatz Groups, operated with and in the rear of the Army. These groups were officered by personnel of the GESTAPO, the KRIPO, and the SD, and the enlisted men were composed of Order Police and Waffen SS. They functioned with various army groups. The Einsatz Groups were subdivided into Einsatzkommandos, Sonderkommandos, and Teilkommandos, all of which performed the functions of the Security Police and SD with or closely behind the army. After the occupied territories had been consolidated, the Einsatz Groups and their subordinate parts were formed into permanent combined offices of the Security Police and SD within prescribed geographical locations. These combined forces were placed under the Kommandeurs of the Security Police and SD, and the Offices were organized in sections similar to the RSHA headquarters. The Kommandeurs of the Security Police and SD reported directly to Befehlshabers of the Security Police and SD, who in turn reported directly to the Chief of the Security Police and SD. In the occupied territories, the Higher SS and Police leaders exercised more direct control over the Befehlshabers and the Kommandeurs of the Security Police and SD than within the Reich. They had authority to issue direct orders so long as they did not conflict with the Chief of the Security Police and SD who exercised controlling authority. (1285-ps,Chart Number 19.)

C. Place of the GESTAPO and SD in the Conspiracy.

(1) Tasks and Methods of the GESTAPO. In the basic law of 10 February 1936, the GESTAPO was declared to have "the duty to investigate and to combat in the entire territory of the State, all tendencies dangerous to the State." The decree issued for the execution of said law gave the GESTAPO the authority to make police investigations in treason, espionage, and sabotage cases," and in other cases of criminal attacks on Party and State." (2107-PS, 2108-PS)

In referring to the above law, the Nazi jurist, Dr. Werner Best, commented as follows:

"Not the State in its outward organic appearance but the tasks of the leadership in the sense of the National-Socialist idea is the object of protection." (2232-PS)

The duties of the GESTAPO were described in 1938 as follows, in an order published by the Party Chancery:

"To the GESTAPO has been entrusted the mission by the Fuehrer to watch over and to eliminate all enemies of the Party and the National Socialist State as well as all disintegrating forces of all kinds directed against both." (1723-PS)

In Das Archiv, January 1036, the duties of the GESTAPO were described in part as follows:

"Since the National Socialist revolution, all open struggle and all open opposition to the State and to the leadership of the State is forbidden, and a Secret State Police as a preventive instrument in the struggle against all dangers threatening the State is indissolubly bound up with the National Socialist Fuehrer-State." (1956-PS)

The successful accomplishment of this mission to strike down the political and ideological opponents of the Nazi conspiracy was stated in the official magazine of the SIPO and SD on 1 February 1943 in the following words:

"The Secret State Police by carrying out these tasks, contributed decisively to the fact that the National Socialist constructive work could be executed in the past ten years without any serious attempts of interference by the political enemies of the nation." (1680-PS)

The methods used by the GESTAPO were limited only by the results to be obtained.

"The duties of the political police and the necessary means for their performance are not chosen freely but are prescribed by the foe. Just like the operations of an army against the outward enemy and the means to fight this enemy cannot be prescribed, so the political police also must have a free hand in the choice of the means necessary at times to fight the attempts dangerous to the State." (2232-PS)

The GESTAPO was not restricted to the limitations of written law. The Nazi jurist, Dr. Werner Best, states:

"As long as the 'police' carries out the will of the leadership, it is acting legally." (1852-PS)

The GESTAPO was given the express power to take action outside the law in the occupied territories. The laws pertaining to the administration of Austria and the Sudetenland provided that the Reichsfuehrer SS and Chief of the German Police will take measures for the maintenance of security and order "Even beyond the legal limitation otherwise laid down for this purpose." (1437-PS), 1438-PS)

The actions and orders of the GESTAPO were not subject to judicial review. The decision of the Prussian high Court of administration on 2 May 1935 held that the status of the GESTAPO as a special police authority removed its orders from the jurisdiction of the Administrative Tribunals. The court said that under the law of 30 November 1933 the only redress available was by appeal to the next higher authority within the GESTAPO itself. (2347-PS)

The basic law of 10 February 1936 on the powers of the GESTAPO provided specifically in Section VII:

"Orders in matters of the Secret State Police are not subject to the review of the administrative courts." (2107-PS)

Concerning the power of the GESTAPO to act outside the law, the Nazi jurist, Dr. Werner Best, states:

"It is no longer a question of law but a question of fate whether the will of the leadership lays down the 'right' rules, i.e., rules feasible and necessary for police action-the 'police' law suitable for and beneficial to the people. Actual misuse of the legislative power by a people's leadership-be it a harmful severity or weakness-will, because of the violations of the 'laws of life,' be punished in history more surely by fate itself through misfortune, overthrow and ruin, than by a State Court of Justice." (1852-PS)

The great power of the GESTAPO was "Schutzhaft" - the power to imprison people without judicial proceedings on the theory of "protective custody." This power was based upon the law of 28 February 1933 which suspended the clauses of the Weimar Constitution guaranteeing civil liberties to the German people, including Article 114 thereof, which provided that an abridgement of personal liberty was permissible only by authority of law. (2499-PS)

In April 1934 the Reich Minister of the Interior issued a decree (which was not made public) stating that in view of the stabilizing of the national situation it had become feasible to place restrictions upon the exercise of protective custody and providing for limitations upon its exercise. (L-301, 779-PS)

The GESTAPO did not observe such limitations, and the practice of taking people into protective custody increased greatly in 1934. The GESTAPO did not permit lawyers to represent persons taken into protective custody and, in one instance, counsel were themselves placed in protective custody for trying to represent clients. Civil employees were investigated and taken into protective custody by the GESTAPO without knowledge of their superiors. (775-PS)

As of 1 February 1938, the Reich Minister of the Interior rescinded previous decrees relating to protective custody, including the decree of 12 April 1934, and issued new regulations. These regulations provided that protective custody could be ordered:

"* * * as a coercive measure of the Secret State Police against persons who endangered the security of the people and the State through their attitude, in order to counter all aspirations of enemies of the people and State";

that the GESTAPO had the exclusive right to order protective custody; that protective custody was to be executed in the State concentration camps; and that the GESTAPO, which authorized release from protective custody, would review individual cases once every three months. The Chief of the Secret Police was given authority to issue the necessary regulations. (1723-PS)

The importance of this power of protective custody was set forth in Das Archiv, 1936, in the following language:

"The most effective preventive measure is without doubt the withdrawal of freedom, which is covered in the form of protective custody, if it is to be feared that the free activity of the persons in question might endanger the security of the State in any way. While protective arrest of short duration is carried out in police and court prisons, the concentration camps under the Secret State Police admit those taken into protective custody who have to be withdrawn from public life for a longer time." (1956-PS)

The authority of the GESTAPO to administer the concentration camps was set forth in the decree to the basic law of 10 February 1936. (2108-PS)

Other methods used by the GESTAPO consisted of the dissolution of associations, prohibition and dissolution of assemblies and congregations, prohibition of publications of various kinds and so forth. (1956-PS)

(2) Tasks and Methods of the SD. The task of the SD, after it became the intelligence service for State and Party, was to obtain secret information concerning the actual and potential enemies of the Nazi leadership so that appropriate action could be taken to destroy or neutralize opposition. (1956-PS)

The duties of the SD were stated by the Nazi jurist, Dr. Werner Best, as follows:

"As the intelligence service of the German National Socialist Labor Party, the Security Service has first of all the task of investigating and keeping a watch over all forces, events and facts which are of importance for the domination of the National Socialist idea and movement in German territory. With this task follows that duty laid down by the Reich Minister of the Interior-the duty of supporting the Security Police-which is fulfilled, so far as it goes, under State orders. In support of the tasks of the Security police in securing the ranks of the German people against interference and destruction of any kind, the Security Service has to watch over every sphere of life of the German people with regard to the activities of inimical forces and the result of state and political measures, and to inform continually the competent State authorities and offices about the facts which have come to light. Finally, it has to investigate politically and explore fundamentally the activities and connections of the great, ideological, arch-enemy of National Socialism and the German people, in order thereby to render possible a purposeful and effective fight against it." (1852-PS)

To accomplish this task, the SD created an organization of agents and informants operating out of various SD regional offices established throughout the Reich, and later in conjunction with the GESTAPO and Criminal Police throughout the occupied territories. The organization consisted of several hundred full-time agents whose work was supplemented by several thousand part-time informants. Informants were located in schools, shops. churches, and all other spheres of German life, operating under cover, and reporting any utterances or actions against the Nazi Party, State or leadership. (2614-PS)

The SD had direct and powerful influence in the selection of Nazi leaders. It investigated the loyalty and reliability of State officials, evaluating them by their complete devotion to Nazi ideology and the Hitler leadership. It secretly marked ballots and thereby discovered the identity of persons who cast "No" votes and "invalid" votes in the referenda. (2614-PS, r-142)

The SD worked closely with the GESTAPO. An article in the "Voelkischer Beobachter" published in Das Archiv, January 1936, stated:

"As the Secret State Police can not carry out, in addition to its primary executive tasks, this observation of the enemies of the state, to the extent necessary, there steps alongside to supplement it the Security Service of the Reichsleader of the SS, set up by the Deputy Fuehrer as the political intelligence service of the movement, which puts a large part of the forces of the movement mobilized by it into the service of the security of the state." (1956-PS)

(3) The Place of the GESTAPO and the SD in the Conspiracy. The GESTAPO was founded in April 1933 by Goering to serve as a political police force in Prussia. Goering instructed Diels, the first Deputy Chief of the GESTAPO, that his main task would be the elimination of political opponents of National socialism and the fight against Communism. (2460-PS)

In "Aufbau Einer Nation," published in 1934, Goering said:

"For weeks I had been working personally on the reorganization and at last I alone and upon my own decision and my own reflection created the office of the Secret State police. This instrument which is so feared by the enemies of the State, has contributed most to the fact that today there can no longer be talk of a Communist and Marxist danger in Germany and Prussia." (2344-PS)

So effective had the GESTAPO proven itself in combating the political opposition to National Socialism by the fall of 1933 that Goering took over direct control of the GESTAPO (2105-ps). Goering’s position as Chief of the GESTAPO in Prussia was recognized by Himmler even after he became Chief of the German Police in 1936 (2372-PS). Even as late as December 1938 Goering continued to exercise his direct control over the Prussian GESTAPO. (D-183)

Himmler was named Deputy Chief of the GESTAPO in Prussia in 1934. He used the GESTAPO, infused with new personnel recruited in large part from the SS, to carry out the Roehm purge of 30 June 1934. (2460-PS)

The GESTAPO, through its great power of arrest and confinement to concentration camps without recourse to law, was the principal means for eliminating enemies of the Nazi regime. Diels, the former Deputy Chief of the GESTAPO under Goering, declared:

"* * * From (1934) on the GESTAPO is responsible for all deprivations of freedom and breaches of law and killings in the political field which took place without court verdict. of primary importance among these was the shooting of numerous persons who had been committed to jails by the courts and then shot supposedly because of resistance. Many such cases were at that time published in the papers. For people guilty of immorality such illegal shootings became the rule. As for deprivation of freedom, there was no legal reason any more for protective custody orders after 1934, which had still been the case before that date, since from 1934 on the power of the totalitarian state was so stabilized that the arrest of a person for his own protection was only an excuse for arbitrary arrest-without court verdict and without legal measures for him. the terroristic measures, which led to the development of the pure force system and punished to an increasing degree each critical remark and each impulse of freedom with the concentration camp, took on more and more arbitrary and cruel forms. The GESTAPO became the symbol of the regime of force." (2460-PS)

D. Criminal Responsibility of the Gestapo and SD.

In the remainder of this section the criminal responsibility of the GESTAPO and the SD will be considered with respect to certain crimes against the peace, war crimes, and crimes against humanity which were in principal part committed by the centralized political police system the development and organization of which has previously been considered. In some instances the crimes were committed in cooperation or conjunction with other groups and organizations.

Frequent reference will be made to the phrase, "SIPO and SD." the SIPO and SD was composed of the following organizations, the GESTAPO, the KRIPO and the SD.

The GESTAPO was the largest of these, having a membership of about 40,000 or 50,000 in 1943-45. It was the political police force of the Reich. Much of its personnel consisted of transferees from former political police forces of the States. Membership in the GESTAPO was voluntary.

The KRIPO was second largest, having a membership of about 15,000 in 1943-45. It was the intelligence service of the SS. Membership in the SD was voluntary. (3033-PS)

In common usage, and even in orders and decrees, the term "SD" was used as an abbreviation in the term "SIPO and SD. "Since the GESTAPO was the primary executive agency of the SIPO and SD, and by far the largest, in most such cases the actual executive action was carried out by personnel of the GESTAPO rather than of the SD or of the KRIPO. In occupied territories members of the GESTAPO frequently wore SS uniforms. (3033-PS)

The term "Chef of the Security Police and SD" describes the person who is the head of the GESTAPO, KRIPO and the SD, and of their headquarters office called the RSHA. The "Chief of the Security Police and SD" and the "head of the RSHA" are always one and the same person. The RSHA was a department in the Reich Ministry of the Interior and in the SS. Sometimes organizational responsibility can be established by the fact that the orders in question were issued by or submitted to Amt III of the RSHA (in which case the action concerned the SD), to Amt IV of the RSHA (in which case the action concerned the GESTAPO), or to Amt V of the RSHA (in which case the action concerned the KRIPO).

Although the GESTAPO was the chief executive agency in the political police system, all three organizations contributed to the accomplishment of most of the criminal activities discussed here in after.

E. Crimes of the GESTAPO and SD against the Peace.

Prior to the invasion of Poland by Germany, "border incidents" were fabricated by the GESTAPO and SD for the purpose of furnishing Hitler with an excuse to wage war. (2751-PS)

Early in August, 1939, the plan was conceived by the Chief of the Security Police and SD, Heydrich, to stage simulated border raids by personnel of the GESTAPO and SD dressed as Poles. To add authenticity, it was planned to take certain prisoners from concentration camps, kill them by use of hypodermic injections, and leave their bodies, clad in Polish uniforms, at the various places where the incidents were planned to occur. The Chief of the GESTAPO, Mueller, took a directing hand in these actions, which were staged on 31 August 1939 in Beuthen, Hindenburg, Gleiwitz, and elsewhere.

The leader of the SD agents who made the pretended attack on the Gleiwitz radio station on 31 August, said:

"* * * In my presence, Mueller discussed with a man named Mehlhorn plans for another border incident, in which it should be made to appear that Polish soldiers were attacking German troops. Germans in the approximate strength of a company were to be used. Mueller stated that he had 12 or 13 condemned criminals who were to be dressed in Polish uniforms and left dead on the ground of the scene of the incident, to show that they had been killed while attacking. For this purpose they were to be given fatal injections by a doctor employed by Heydrich. Then they were also to be given gunshot wounds. After the incident members of the press and other persons were to be taken to the spot of the incident. A police report was subsequently to be prepared.

"4. Mueller told me that he had an order from Heydrich to make one of those criminals available to me for the action at Gleiwitz. The code name by which he referred to these criminals was 'Canned Goods.'

"5. The incident at Gleiwitz in which I participated was carried out on the evening preceding the German attack on Poland. As I recall, war broke out on the 1st of September 1939. At noon of the 31st August I received by telephone from Heydrich the code word for the attack which was to take place at 8 o'clock that evening. Heydrich said, 'In order to carry out this attack report to Mueller for Canned Goods.' I did this and gave Mueller instructions to deliver the man near the radio station. I received this man and had him laid down at the entrance to the station. He was alive but he was completely unconscious. I tried to open his eyes. I could not recognize by his eyes that he was alive, only by his breathing. I did not see the shot wounds but a lot of blood was smeared across his face. He was in civilian clothes.

"6. We seized the radio station as ordered, broadcast a speech of three to four minutes over an emergency transmitter, fired some pistol shots and left." (2751-PS; 2479-PS)

These were the "frontier incidents" to which Hitler referred in his speech to the Reichstag on 1 September 1939. (Adolf Hitler, "My New Order," Reynal and Hitchcock, Inc., 1941, p. 687.)

F. War Crimes of the GESTAPO and SD.

(1) The GESTAPO and SD carried out mass murders of hundreds of thousands of civilians of occupied countries as a part of the Nazi program to exterminate political and racial undesirables ("Einsatz Groups"). About four weeks before the attack on Russia, special task forces of the SIPO and SD, called Einsatzgruppen or Special Task Groups, were formed on order of Himmler for the purpose of following the German armies into Russia, combating partisans and members of resistance groups and exterminating the Jews and Communist leaders. In the beginning four Einsatz Groups were formed. Einsatz Group A, operating in the Baltic States, was placed under the command of Stahlecker, former Inspector of the SIPO and SD. Einsatz Group B, operating toward Moscow, was placed under the command of Nebe, the Chief of Amt V (KRIPO) of the RSHA. Einsatz Group C, operating to ward Kiev, was placed under the command of Rasch and later of Thomas, former Chief of the SIPO and SD in Paris. Einsatz Group D, operating in the south of Russia, was placed under the command of Ohlendorf, the Chief of Amt III (SD) of the RSHA.

The Einsatz Groups were officered by personnel of the GESTAPO, the SD and the KRIPO. The men were drawn from the Order Police and the Waffen SS. The groups had complements of 400 to 500 men, and had their own vehicles and equipment. By agreement with the OKW and OKH, the Einsatzkommandos were attached to certain Army corps or divisions. The Army assigned the area in which the Einsatzkommandos were to operate, but all operational directives and orders for the carrying out of executions were given through the RSHA in Berlin. Regular courier service and radio communications existed between the Einsatz Groups and the RSHA.

The affidavit of Ohlendorf, Chief of the SD, who led Einsatz Group D, Reads in part as follows:

"When the German Army invaded Russia, I was leader of Einsatzgruppe D in the southern sector, and in the course of the year during which I was leader of the Einsatzgruppe D, it liquidated approximately 90,000 men, women and children. The majority of those liquidated were Jews, but there were also among them some Communist functionaries.

"In the execution of this extermination program the Einsatzgruppen were subdivided into Einsatzkommandos, and the Einsatzkommandos into still smaller units, the so-called Sonderkommando and Teilkommandos. Usually the smaller units were led by a member of the SD, the GESTAPO or the KRIPO. The unit selected for this task would enter a village or city and order the prominent Jewish citizens to call together all Jews for the purpose of resettlement. They were asked to hand over their personal belongings to the leaders of the unit, and shortly before the execution, to surrender their outer clothing. The men, women and children were led to a place of execution which usually was located beside a deepened antitank ditch. Then they were shot, kneeling or standing, and the corpses were thrown into the ditch. I never permitted the shooting by individuals in group D, but ordered that several of the men should shoot at the same time in order to avoid direct personal responsibility. The leaders of the unit, or especially designated persons, however, had to fire the last shot against those victims who were not dead immediately. I learned from conversations with other group leaders that some of them asked the victims to lie down flat on the ground to be shot through the neck. I did not approve of these methods." (2620-PS)

The contention that these murders were carried out by subterfuge and without force and terror is belied by the eyewitness account of two such mass murders witnessed by Hermann Graebe, who was manager and engineer in charge of the branch office of the Solingen firm of Josef Jung in Sdolbunow, Ukraine, from September 1941 until January 1944. Graebe's interest in the mass executions derived from the fact that in addition to Poles, Germans, and Ukrainians, he employed Jews on the various construction projects under his supervision. He was personally acquainted with the leader of the SIPO and SD who carried out the actions hereinafter described with the aid of SS-men (most of whom wore the SD arm-band) and Ukrainian militia. Graebe negotiated with SS-major Putz, the leader of the SIPO and SD, for the release of about 100 Jewish workers from the action which took place in Rowno on 13 July 1942. The original Letter which exempted these Jewish workers from the action is attached to Graebe's affidavit, which states in part as follows:

"In the evening of this day I drove to Rowno and posted myself with Fritz Einsporn in front of the house in the Bahnhofstrasse in which the Jewish workers of my firm slept. Shortly after 22.00 the ghetto was encircled by a large SS detachment and again about three times as many members of the Ukrainian militia. Then the electric floodlights which had been erected all around the ghetto were switched on. SS and militia details of 4 to 6 members entered or at least tried to enter the houses. Where the doors and windows were closed and the inhabitants did not open upon the knocking, the SS men and militia broke the windows, forced the doors and beams with crowbars and entered the dwellings. The owners were driven onto the street just as they were, regardless of whether they were dressed or whether they had been in bed. Since the Jews in most cases refused to leave their dwellings and resisted, the SS and militia both applied force. With the help of whippings, kicks and hits with the rifle butts they finally succeeded in having the dwellings evacuated. The people were chased out of their houses in such haste that the small children who had been in bed had been left behind in several instances. In the street women cried out for their children and children for their parents. That did not prevent the SS from chasing the people along the road, at double time, and hitting them until they reached a waiting freight train. Car after car was filled, over it hung the screaming of women and children, the cracking of whips and rifle shots. Since several families and groups had barricaded themselves in especially strong buildings, and the doors could not be forced with crowbars or beams, these houses were now blown open with hand grenades. Since the ghetto was near the railroad tracks in Rowno, the younger people tried to get across the tracks and to a small river to be outside of the ghetto. This sector being outside of the floodlights was lighted by signal ammunition. All through the night these beaten, chased and wounded people dragged themselves across the lighted streets. Women carried their dead children in their arms, children hugged and dragged by their arms and feet their dead parents down the road toward the train. Again and again the calls 'Open the door,' 'Open the door' echoed through the ghetto." (2992-PS)

The leader of Einsatz Group D, Ohlendorf, stated in his affidavit that other Einsatz Group leaders required the victims to lie down flat on the ground to be shot through the neck. Graebe describes a mass execution of this kind which he observed carried out under the direction of a man in SD uniform on 5 October 1943 at Dubno, Ukraine, as follows:

"Thereupon in the company of Moennikes I drove to the construction area and saw in its vicinity a heap of earth, about 30 meters long and 2 meters high. Several trucks stood in front of the heap. Armed Ukrainian militia chased the people off the trucks under the supervision of an SS man. The militia men were guards on the trucks and drove them to and from the excavation. All these people had the prescribed yellow badges on the front and back of their clothes, and thus were recognized as jews.

"Moennikes and I went directly to the excavation. Nobody bothered us. Now we heard shots in quick succession from behind one of the earth mounds. The people who had gotten off the trucks-men, women, and children of all ages-had to undress upon the orders of an SS man who carried a riding or dog whip. They had to put down their clothes in fixed places, sorted according to shoes, over and underclothing. I saw a pile of shoes of about 800 to 1,000 pairs, great piles of laundry and clothing. Without screaming or crying these people undressed, stood around by families, kissed each other, said farewells and waited for the nod of another SS man, who stood near the excavation, also with a whip in his hand. During the 15 minutes that I stood near the excavation I have heard no complaint and no request for mercy. I watched a family of about 8 persons, a man and a woman, both about 50 with their children of about 1,8 and 10, and two grownup daughters of about 20 to 24. An old woman with snow-white hair held the one-year-old child in her arms and sang for it, and tickled it. The child was squeaking from joy. The couple looked on with tears in their eyes. The father held the hand of a boy about 10 years old and spoke to him softly; the boy was fighting his tears. The father pointed toward the sky, fondled his hand, and seemed to explain something to him. At that moment the SS-man at the excavation called something to his comrades. The latter counted off about 20 persons and instructed them to walk behind the earth mound. Among them was the family which I had mentioned. I remember very well a girl, blackhaired and slender, passing near me; she pointed at herself and said, '23 years.' I walked around the mound, and stood in front of a tremendous grave. closely pressed together the people were lying on top of each other so that only their heads were visible. Several of the people shot still moved. Some lifted their arms and turned their heads to show that they were still alive. The excavation was already two-thirds full. I estimated that it contained about 1,000 people. I looked for the man who did the shooting. I saw an SS-man who sat at the rim of the narrow end of the excavation, his feet dangling into the excavation. On his knees he had a machine pistol and he was smoking a cigarette. The completely naked people descended a stairway which was dug into the clay of the excavation and slipped over the heads of the people lying there already to the place to which the SS-man directed them. They laid themselves in front of the dead or injured people, some touched tenderly those who were still alive and spoke to them in a low voice. Then I heard a number of shots. I looked into the excavation and saw how the bodies jerked or the heads rested already motionless on top of the bodies that lay before them. Blood was running from their necks. I was surprised that I was not chased away, but I saw there were two or three postal officers in uniform nearby. Now already the next group approached, descended into the excavation, lined themselves up against the previous victims and was shot. When I walked back, around the mound, I noticed again a transport which had just arrived. this time it included sick and frail persons. An old, very thin woman with terribly thin legs was undressed by others who were already naked, while two persons held her up. Apparently the woman was paralyzed. The naked people carried the woman around the mound. I left with Moennikes and drove with my car back to Dubno." (2992-PS)

There are two reports by Stahlecker, the Chief of Einsatz Group B, available. The first report, found in Himmler's personal files, states that during the first four months of the Russian campaign Einsatz Group A murdered 135,000 Communists and Jews, and carried out widespread destruction of homes and villages and other vast crimes. Enclosure 8 to this Stahlecker report is a careful survey of the number of persons murdered, classified as to country, and whether Jew or Communist, with totals given in each instance. This report discloses that the Einsatz Groups frequently enlisted the aid of the local populations in the extermination program. It states:

"In view of the extension of the area of operations and the great number of duties which had to be performed by the Security Police, it was intended from the very beginning to obtain the cooperation of the reliable population for the fight against vermin-that is, mainly the Jews and Communists." (L-180)

With respect to extermination of Jews the report stated:

"From the beginning it was to be expected that the Jewish problem could not be solved by pogroms alone. In accordance with the basic orders received, however, the cleansing activities of the Security Police had to aim at a complete annihilation of the jews. Special detachments reinforced by selected units-in Lithuania partisan detachments, in Latvia units of the Latvian auxiliary police-therefore performed extensive executions both in towns and in rural areas. The actions of the execution detachments were performed smoothly. * * *"

The second report from Einsatz Group A (L-180) reports the extermination of nearly 230,000 persons. with respect to Esthonia, it states in part:

"Only by the SIPO and SD were the Jews gradually executed as they became no longer required for work. today there are no longer any Jews in Esthonia."

With respect to Latvia, the report states in Part:

"Up to October 1941 approximately 30,000 Jews had been executed by these Sonderkommandos. The remaining Jews who were still indispensable from the economic point of view were collected in Ghettos, which were established in Riga, Duenaburg and Libau."

With respect to Lithuania, the report states in part:

"Therefore by means of selected units-mostly in the proportion of 1:8-first of all the prisons, and then systematically, district by district, the Lithuanian sector was cleansed of jews of both sexes. Altogether 136,421 people were liquidated in a great number of single actions. As the complete liquidation of the Jews was not feasible, as they were needed for labor, Ghettos were formed which at the moment are occupied as follows: Kauem approximately 15,000 Jews; Wilna approximately 15,000 Jews; Schaulen approximately 4,500 Jews. These jews are used primarily for work of military importance. For example, up to 5,000 Jews are employed in 3 shifts on the aerodrome near Kauen on earthworks and work of that sort."

With. respect to White Russia, the report states in part:

"In view of the enormous distances, the bad condition of the roads, the shortage of vehicles and petrol, and the small forces of Security Police and SD, it needs the utmost effort to be able to carry out shootings in the country. Nevertheless 41,000 Jews have been shot up to now."

With respect to Jews from the Reich, the report states in part "Since December 1940 transports containing Jews have arrived at short intervals from the Reich. Of these, 20,000 Jews were directed to Riga and 7,000 Jews to Minsk. Only a small section of the Jews from the Reich is capable of working. About 70-80 percent are women and children or old people unfit for work. The death rate is rising continually also as a result of the extraordinarily bad winter. In isolated instances sick Jews with contagious disease were selected under the pretext of putting them into a home for the aged or a hospital, and executed."

Attached as an enclosure to this report is a map entitled "Jewish Executions Carried out by Einsatzgruppe A," on which, by the use of coffins as symbols, the number of Jews murdered in each area covered by Einsatz Group A is shown (Chart Number 4). The map shows thousands of Jews in ghettos, and an estimated 128,000 Jews "still on hand" in the Minsk area. Number of murdered, according to figures beside the coffins, during the period covered by this report, was 228,050.

On 30 October 1941 the Commissioner of the territory of Sluzk wrote a report to the Commissioner General, Minsk, in which the severely criticized the actions of the Einsatzkommandos operating in his area for the murder of all the Jews of Sluzk:

"On 27 October in the morning at about 8 o'clock a first lieutenant of the police battalion No. 11 from Kauen (Lithuania) appeared and introduced himself as the adjutant of the battalion commander of the security police. The first lieutenant explained that the police battalion had received the assignment to effect the liquidation of all Jews here in the town of Sluzk, within two days. The battalion commander with his battalion in strength of four companies, two of which were made up of Lithuanian partisans, was on the march here and the action would have to begin instantly. I replied to the first lieutenant that I had to discuss the action in any case first with the commander. About half an hour later the police battalion arrived in Sluzk. Immediately after the arrival the conference with the battalion commander took place according to my request. I first explained to the commander that it would not very well be possible to effect the action without previous preparation, because everybody had been sent to work and that it would lead to terrible confusion. At least it would have been his duty to inform me a day ahead of time. Then I requested him to postpone the action one day. However, he rejected this with the remark that he had to carry out this action everywhere and in all towns and that only two days were allotted for Sluzk. Within these two days, the town of Sluzk had to be cleared of Jews by all means. For the rest, as regards the execution of the action, I must point out to my deepest regret that the latter bordered already on sadism. the town itself offered a picture of horror during the action. With indescribable brutality on the part of both the German police officers and particularly the Lithuanian partisans, the Jewish people, but also among them White Ruthenians, were taken out of their dwellings and herded together. Everywhere in the town shots were to be heard and in different streets the corpses of shot Jews accumulated. The White Ruthenians were in greatest distress to free themselves from the encirclement. Regardless of the fact that the Jewish people, among whom were also tradesmen, were mistreated in a terribly barbarous way in the face of the White Ruthenian people, the White Ruthenians themselves were also worked over with rubber clubs and rifle butts. There was no question of an action against the Jews any more. It rather looked like a revolution. In conclusion I find myself obliged to point out that the police battalion has looted in an unheard of manner during the action, and that not only in Jewish houses but just the same in those of the White Ruthenians. Anything of use such as boots, leather, cloth, gold and other valuables, has been taken away. On the basis of statements of members of the armed forces, watches were torn off the arms of jews in public, on the streets, and rings were pulled off the fingers in the most brutal manner. A major of the finance department reported that a Jewish girl was asked by the police to obtain immediately 5,000 rubles to have her father released. This girl is said to have actually gone everywhere in order to obtain the money." (1104-PS)

This report was submitted by the Commissioner General of White Ruthenia to the Reich Commissioner for the Eastern Territories on 1 November 1941 with the following comment:

"I am submitting this report in duplicate so that one copy may be forwarded to the Reich Minister. Peace and order cannot be maintained in White Ruthenia with methods of the sort To bury seriously wounded people alive who worked their way out of their graves again is such a base and filthy act that the incidents as such should be reported to the Fuehrer and Reichs Marshal." (1104-PS)

On the same date by separate letter the Commissioner General of White Ruthenia reported to the Reich Commissioner for the Eastern Territories that he had received money, valuables, and other objects taken by the police in the action at Sluzk and other regions, all of which had been deposited with the Reich Credit institute for the disposal of the Reich Commissioner. (1104-PS)

On 21 November 1941 a report on the Sluzk incident was sent to the personal reviewer of the permanent deputy of the Minister of the Reich with a copy to Heydrich, the Chief of the Security Police and SD. (1104-PS)

On 6 November 1942 a secret report submitted to the Reich Commissar for the East concerning the struggle against partisans in the East discloses that destruction of villages continued, and reports the Execution of 1,274 partisan suspects and 8,350 Jews, and the deportation of 1,217 people. this report was forwarded on 10 December 1942 to the Reich Minister for the occupied Eastern territories. (1113-PS)

The report from the prison administrator at Minsk as of 31 May 1943 to the General Commissioner for White Ruthenia states:

"The German, former dentist Ernst Israel Tichauer and his wife Elisa Sara Tichauer, born Rosenthal, were delivered to the Court-Prison by the SD (Hauptscharfuehrer Rube) on 13 April 1943. Since that date, the golden bridgework, crowns and fillings of the received German and Russian Jews were pulled out, respectively broken out by force. This always happened 1-2 hours before the actions in question.

"Since 13 April 1943, 516 German and Russian Jews were liquidated. After careful investigation it was ascertained that gold objects were only taken away during 2 actions, namely on 14 April 43 front 172 and on 27 April 43 from 164 Jews. About 50 percent of the jews had gold teeth, bridges or fillings. Hauptscharfuehrer Rube of the SD was always present in person, and also took the gold objects with him.

"This has not been done before 13 April 1943."

This report was forwarded to the Reich Minister for the occupied Eastern territories on 1 June 1943. (R-135)

Death vans were used by the Einsatz Groups to murder victims by gas. These vans were built by the Saurer Works in Berlin and other firms. The vans were built for the technical section of Amt II of the RSHA, which sent them to the Einsatz Groups in the field. they were first used in the spring of 1942 and continued to be used throughout the war (2348-PS). The method of using the vans is described by Ohlendorf in the following words:

"We received orders to use the car for the killing of women and children. Whenever a unit had collected a sufficient number of victims, a car was sent for their liquidation. We also stationed these cars in the neighborhood of the transit camps to which the victims had been brought. They were told that they would be resettled and had to climb into the cars for that purpose. Then the doors were closed and as soon as the cars started moving the gas would enter. The victims died within ten to fifteen minutes. The cars were driven to the burial place where the corpses were taken out and buried." (2620-PS)

A letter from Becker, the operator of several death vans, written to Rauff, the head of the technical section of Amt III of the RSHA, on 16 May 1942, states:

"The overhauling of vans by groups D and C is finished. While the vans of the first series can also be put into action if the weather is not too bad the vans of the second series (Saurer) stop completely in rainy weather. If it has rained for instance for only one-half hour, the van cannot be used because it simply skids away. It can only be used in absolutely dry weather. It is only a question now whether the van can only be used standing at the place of execution. First the van has to be brought to that place, which is possible only in good weather. The place of execution is usually 10-15 km away from the highways and is difficult of access because of its location; in damp or wet weather it is not accessible at all. If the persons to be executed are driven or led to that place, then they realize immediately what is going on and get restless, which is to be avoided as far as possible. There is only one way left; to load them at the collecting point and to drive them to the spot.

"I ordered the vans of group D to be camouflaged as house trailers by putting one set of window shutters on each side of the small van and two on each side of the larger vans, such as one often sees on farm-houses in the country. The vans became so well-known, that not only the authorities but also the civilian population called the van "death van", as soon as one of these vehicles appeared. It is my opinion that the van cannot be kept secret for any length of time, not even camouflaged.

"* * * I should like to take this opportunity to bring the following to your attention: several commands have had the unloading after the application of gas done by their own men. I brought to the attention of the commanders of those SK concerned the immense psychological injuries and damages to their health which that work can have for those men, even if not immediately, at least later on. The men complained to me about headaches which appeared after each unloading.

"* * * The application of gas usually is not undertaken correctly. In order to come to an end as fast as possible, the driver presses the accelerator to the fullest extent. By doing that the persons to be executed suffer death from suffocation and not death by dozing off as was planned. My directions now have proved that by correct adjustment of the levers death comes faster and the prisoners fall asleep peacefully. Distorted faces and excretions, such as could be seen before, are no longer noticed." (501-PS)

The death vans were not always satisfactory. A telegram from the commandant of the SIPO and SD "Ostland" to the RSHA, Amt II D, on 15 June 1942, states:

"A transport of Jews, which has to be Treated in a special way, arrives weekly at the office of the commandant of the Security Police and the Security Service of White Ruthenia. "The three S-vans, which are there, are not sufficient for that purpose. I request assignment of another S-van (5-tons). At the same time I request the shipment of 20 gas-hoses for the three S-vans on hand (2 Diamond, 1 Saurer), since the ones on hand are leaky already." (501-PS)

The reports of the various Einsatz Groups were summarized at RSHA, and the summaries were then distributed to the various sections interested, particularly Amt III (the SD), Amt IV (the GESTAPO), and Amt V (the KRIPO) (2752-PS). One such report covering the period 1-31 October 1941 is entitled "Activity and Situation Report No. 6 of the Einsatz Groups of the Security Police and the SD in the USSR" (R-102). This report describes in summary form the activities of the various Einsatz Groups during the month of October 1941. The report first discusses the stations and in that regard states:

"During the period covered by this report the stations of the task Forces of the Security Police and the SD have changed only in the Northern Sector.

"The present stations are:

"Task Force A: since 7 October 1941 Krasnowardeisk.

"Task Force B: continues in Smolensk.

"Task Force C: since 27 September 1941 in Kiew.

"Task Force D: since 27 September 1941 in Nikolajew.

"The Action and Special Commandos (Einsatz und Sonder Commandos) which are attached to the Task- Force continue on the march with the advancing troops into the sectors which have been assigned to them." (R-102)

The report next discusses the activities of each Einsatz Group. There is included first a discussion of the Baltic area, next of White Ruthenia, and last of the Ukraine. Under each section the work of the Einsatz Groups in connection with the action taken against partisans, Jews, and communist officials is considered. With respect to the treatment of Jews in the Baltic area the report states in part:

"* * * However, the Estonian Protective Corps (Selbtschutz), formed at the time of the entry of the Wehrmacht, immediately started a comprehensive arrest action of all Jews. This action was under the direction of the task force of the Security Police and the SD.

"The measures taken were:

1. Arrest of all male Jews over 16.

2. Arrest of all Jewesses from 16-20 years, who lived in Reval and environs and were fit for work; these were employed in peat cutting.

3. Comprehensive detention in the synagogue of all Jewesses living in Dorport and its environs.

4. Arrest of the Jews and Jewesses fit for work in Pernau and environs.

5. Registration of all Jews according to age, sex, and capacity for work for the purpose of their detention in a camp that is being prepared.

"The male Jews over 16 were executed with the exception of doctors and the elders. At the present time this action is still in progress. After completion of this action there will remain only 500 Jewesses and children in the Eastern territory. * * *" (R-102)

With respect to partisan activity in White Ruthenia, the report states in part:

"* * * In the village Michalowo, after careful reconnaissance through civilian agents, 8 partisans were surprised in a house by the same Commando of the Security Police and the SD, they were arrested and hanged the next day in this particularly partisan infested village.

"The president of the District Region Soviets in Tarenitsch and his secretary were shot because of their connections with partisans.

"During an action approximately 70 kilometers south of Mogilow, 25 Armenians, Kirghize and Mongols were apprehended with false identification papers with which they tried to conceal the fact that they belong to a partisan group. They were liquidated. * * *" (R-102)

with respect to arrests and executions of communists in White Ruthenia, the report states in part:

A further large part of the activity of the Security Police was devoted to the combating of Communists and criminals. A special Commando in the period covered by this report executed 63 officials, NKVD agents and agitators. * * *" (R-102)

With respect to the action taken against the Jews in White Ruthenia the report states in part:

"* * * All the more vigorous are the actions of the task forces of the Security Police and the SD against the Jews who make it necessary that steps be taken against them in different spheres.

"In Gorodnia 165 Jewish terrorists and in Tschenrigow 19 Jewish Communists were liquidated. 8 more Jewish communists were shot at Beresna.

"It was experienced repeatedly that the Jewish women showed an especially obstinate behaviour. For this reason 28 Jewesses had to be shot in Krugoje and 337 at Mogilew.

"In Borissow 321 Jewish saboteurs and 118 Jewish looters were executed.

"In Bobruisk 380 Jews were shot who had engaged to the last in incitement and horror propaganda [Hetz-und Greuelpropaganda] against the German army of occupation.

"In Tatarsk the Jews had left the Ghetto of their own accord and returned to their old home quarters, attempting to expel the Russians who had been quartered there in the meantime. All male Jews as well as 3 Jewesses were shot.

"In Sadrudubs the Jews offered some resistance against the establishment of a Ghetto so that 272 Jews and Jewesses had to be shot. Among them was a political Commissar.

"MOGILEW

"In Mogilew too, the Jews attempted to sabotage their removal to the Ghetto; 113 Jews were liquidated.

"Wit

"Moreover four Jews were shot on account of refusal to work and 2 Jews were shot because they had sabotaged orders issued by the German occupation authorities.

"In Talka 222 Jews were shot for anti-German propaganda and in Marina Gorka 996 Jews were shot because they had sabotaged orders issued by the German occupation authorities.

"At Schklow 627 more Jews were shot because they had participated in acts of sabotage.

"Witebsk

"On account of the extreme danger of an epidemic, a beginning was made to liquidate the Jews in the ghetto at Witebsk. This involved approximately 3000 Jews. * * *" (R-102)

With respect to partisan activity in the Ukraine the report states in part:

"Although partisan activity in the south sector is very strong too, there is nevertheless the impression that spreading and effective partisan activity are strongly affected by the flight of higher partisan leaders and by the lack of initiative of the subordinate leaders who have remained behind. Only in one case a commando of the Security Police and the SD succeeded in a fight with partisans in shooting the Secretary of the Communist Party for the administration district of Nikolajew Cherson, who was at the time Commissar of a partisan group for the district Nikolajew-Cherson-Krim. * * *" (R-102)

With respect to treatment of Jews in the Ukraine the report states in part:

The embitterment of the Ukrainian population against the Jews is extremely great because they are thought responsible for the explosions in Kiew. They are also regarded as informers and agents of the NKVD who started the terror against the Ukrainian people. As a measure of retaliation for the arson at Kiew, all Jews were arrested and altogether 33,-771 Jews were executed on the 29th and 30th September. Money, valuables and clothing were secured and put at the disposal of the National-Socialist League for Public Welfare (NSV) for the equipment of the National Germans [Volksdeutschen] and partly put at the disposal of the provisional city administration for distribution to the needy population.

"Shitomir

"In Shitomir 3,145 Jews had to be shot, because from experience they have to be regarded as bearers of Bolshevik propaganda and saboteurs.

"Cherson

"In Cherson 410 Jews were executed as a measure of retaliation for acts of sabotage. Especially in the area east of the Dnjepr the solution of the Jewish question has been taken up energetically by the task forces of the Security Police and the SD. the areas newly occupied by the Commandos were purged of Jews. In the course of this action 4,891 Jews were liquidated. At other places the Jews were marked and registered. This rendered it possible to put at the disposal of the Wehrmacht for urgent labor, Jewish worker groups up to 1,000 persons." (R-102)

These reports, circulated among the various offices of the RSHA, brought general knowledge to the entire organization of the program of mass murder conducted by these special task forces of the SIPO and SD. (R-102)

The activities of the Einsatz Groups continued throughout 1943 and 1944 under Kaltenbrunner as Chief of the SIPO and SD. New groups were formed and sent into action in the West (2890-PS). Under adverse war conditions, however, the program of extermination was to a large extent changed to one of rounding up slave labor for Germany. A letter written on 19 March 1943 from the headquarters of a Sonderkommando (section of Einsatz Group C) states as follows:

"It is the task of the Security Police and of the Security Service (SD) to discover all enemies of the Reich and fight against them in the interest of security, and in the Zone of operations especially to guarantee the security of the army. besides the annihilation of active opponents all other elements who, by virtue of their opinions or their past, may appear active as enemies under favorable conditions, are to be eliminated [sind * * * auszumerzen] through preventive measures. The Security Police carries out this task according to the general directives of the Fuehrer with all the required toughness. Energetic measures are especially necessary in territories endangered by the activity of hostile gangs. The competence of the Security Police within the zone of operations is based on the Barbarossa decrees. I deem the measures of the Security Police, carried out on a considerable scale during recent times, necessary for the two following reasons:

"1. The situation at the front in my sector had become so serious that the population, partly influenced by Hungarians and Italians, who streamed back in chaotic condition, took openly position against us.

"2. The strong expeditions of hostile gangs, who came especially from the forest of Bryansk, were another reason. Besides that, other revolutionary groups, formed by the population, appeared suddenly in all districts. The providing of arms evidently provided no difficulties at all. It would have been irresponsible, if we had observed this whole activity with out acting against it. It is obvious that all such measures bring about some harshness. I want to take up the significant points of harsh measures.

"1. The shooting of Hungarian Jews.

"2. The shooting of directors of collective farms.

"3. The shooting of children.

"4. The total burning down of villages.

"5. The "shooting, while trying to escape" of Security Service (SD) prisoners.

"Chief of Einsatz Group C confirmed once more the correctness of the measures taken, and expressed his recognition for the energetic actions.

"With regard to the current political situation, especially in the armament industry in the fatherland, the measures of the Security Police have to be subordinated to the greatest extent to the recruiting of labor for Germany. In the shortest possible time, the Ukraine has to put at the disposal of the armament industry 1 Million workers, 500 of whom have to be sent from our territory daily.

"The work of the field groups has therefore to be changed as of now. The following orders are given:

"1. Special treatment is to be limited to a minimum.

"2. The listing of communist functionaries, activists and so on, is to take place by roster only for the time being, without arresting anybody. It is, for instance, no longer feasible to arrest all the close relatives of a member of the communist party. Although, members of the Komsomolz are to be arrested only if they were active in a leading position.

"3. The activity of the labor offices, respective of recruiting commissions, is to be supported to the greatest extent possible. It will not be possible always to refrain from using force. During a conference with the Chief of the Labor Commitment Staffs, an agreement was reached stating that wherever prisoners can be released, they should be pup at the disposal of the Commissioner of the Labor Office. When searching [Uberholung] villages, resp. , when it has become necessary to burn down a village, the whole population will be put at the disposal of the Commissioner by force.

"4. As a rule, no more children will be shot.

"5. The reporting of hostile gangs as well as drives against them is not affected hereby. All drives against these hostile gangs can only take place after my approval has been obtained.

"6. The prisons have to be kept empty, as a rule. We have to be aware of the fact that the Slavs will interpret all soft treatment on our part as weakness and that they will act accordingly right away. If we limit our harsh measures of security police through above orders for the time being, that is only done for the following reason. The most important thing is the recruiting of workers. No check of persons to be sent into the Reich will be made. No written certificates of political reliability check or similar things will be issued. "(signed) Christiansen." (3012-PS)

The head of the Jewish section in the GESTAPO, and the man directly responsible for carrying out the mass extermination program against the Jews by the GESTAPO, Obersturmbannfuehrer Eichmann, estimated in his report to Himmler on the matter, that 2,000,000 Jews had been killed by shootings, mainly by the Einsatz Groups of the SIPO and SD during the campaign in the East. This did not include the estimated 4,000,000 sent by the GESTAPO for extermination in annihilation camps. (2615-PS)

(2) The GESTAPO and SD stationed special units in prisoner of war camps for the purpose of screening out racial and political undesirables and executing them. The program of mass murder of political and racial undesirables carried on against civilians was also applied to prisoners of war captured on the Eastern front. Warlimont, Deputy Chief of Staff of the Wehrmacht Fuehrungs Stab, states:

"* * * Shortly before the beginning of this campaign [With U.S.S.R.] I was present in a group composed of the Commanders in Chief (with their Chiefs of Staff) of the three Armed Forces, of the Army groups, of Armies, and of the corresponding groups in the Air Forces and Navy. Hitler made an announcement to this group that special measures would have to be taken against political functionaries and commissars of the Soviet army. He said that this would not be an ordinary campaign but would be the clash of conflicting ideologies. He further said that the political functionaries and commissars were not to be considered as prisoners of war but were to be segregated from other prisoners immediately after their capture and were to be turned over to special detachments of the SD which were to accompany the German troops to Russia. He further said that when it was not possible to turn over the political functionaries and commissars to the SD, they were to be eliminated by the German troops." (2884-PS)

The chief of the SD, Otto Ohlendorf, describes this action in the following words:

"In 1941, shortly after the start of the campaign against Russia, an agreement was entered into between the Chief of the Security Police and SD and the OKW and OKH to the effect that the prisoner of war camps on the Eastern front should be opened to Einsatzkommandos of the SIPO and SD so that the prisoners could be screened. All Jews and Communist functionaries were to be taken from the prisoner of war camps by the Einsatzkommandos and executed outside the camps. To my knowledge, this action was carried on throughout the entire Russian campaign. In the other occupied territories and within the Reich-to my knowledge-the GESTAPO had been made responsible for this program in the Russian prisoner of war camps. It was, to my knowledge, carried on throughout the greater part of the war." (2622-PS)

Lahousen, chief of a division in the office of foreign intelligence in the Wehrmacht, states:

"* * * From the start of the campaign against the U.S.S.R. the higher German political and military leadership followed the policy of eliminating Russian commissars and various other types of Russian prisoners of war captured by the Wehrmacht. In June and July 1941 I participated in a conference which concerned itself with the treatment of Russian commissars. * * * Obergruppenfuehrer Mueller was present as representative of the RSHA, and he participated in this matter because, as Chief of Section IV, he was responsible for the carrying out of these measures. Jointly with the SD and the GESTAPO he had the task of instituting the necessary measures for the execution of commissars. * * * In the discussion that followed, Mueller promised in a peculiarly cynical manner that these executions would take place in the future outside the camp, so that the troops would not be obliged to watch them. He promised further a certain limitation in the concept of 'Bolshevistically infected.' This concept and its interpretation had been hitherto left to the discretion of the SD Sonderkommandos. * * * An agreement was concluded between the OKW, the GESTAPO and the SD. Pursuant to this agreement Russian prisoners of war under the control of the OKW were delivered to the GESTAPO and SD for execution. The term 'Sonderbehandlung' in the official documents and way of speaking of the SD was equivalent to 'condemned to death'. "(2846-PS)

On 17 July 1941 instructions were issued by the GESTAPO to commandos of the SIPO and SD stationed in Stalags, providing in part as follows:

"The activation of commandos will take place in accordance with the agreement of the Chief of the Security Police and Security Service and the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces as of 16 July 1941 (see enclosure1). The commandos will work independently according to special authorization and in consequence of the general regulations given to them, in the limit of the camp organizations. Naturally, the commandos will keep close contact with the camp-commander and the defense-officers assigned to him.

"The mission of the commandos is the political investigating of all camp-inmates, the elimination and further 'treatment' "a. of all political, criminal or in some other way unbearable elements among them.

"b. of those persons who could be used for the reconstruction of the occupied territories.

"The commandos must use for their work as far as possible, at present and even later, the experiences of the camp-commanders which the latter have collected meanwhile from observation of the prisoners and examinations of camp inmates. "Further, the commandos must make efforts from the beginning to seek out among the prisoners elements which appear reliable, regardless if there are communists concerned or not, in order to use them for intelligence purposes inside of the camp and, if advisable, later in the occupied territories also.

"By use of such informers and by use of all other existing possibilities, the discovery of all elements to be eliminated among the prisoners, must proceed step by step at once.

"Above all, the following must be discovered: All important functionaries of state and party, especially

Professional revolutionaries

Functionaries of the Komintern

All policy forming party functionaries of the KPdSU and its fellow organizations in the central committees, in the regional and district committees.

All peoples-commissars and their deputies

All former political commissars in the Red-Army

Leading personalities of the state-authorities of central and middle regions.

The leading personalities of the business world.

Members of the Soviet-Russian intelligence

All Jews

All persons who are found to be agitators or fanatical communists. * * *

"Executions are not to be held in the camp or in the immediate vicinity of the camp. If the camps in the general-government are in the immediate vicinity of the border, then the prisoners are to be taken for special treatment, if possible, into the former Soviet-Russian territory. * * *

"In regard to executions to be carried out and to the possible removal of reliable civilians and the removal of informers for the Einsatz-group in the occupied territories, the leader of the Einsatz-Kommando [?] must make an agreement with the nearest State-Police-Office, as well as with the commandant of the Security Police Unit and Security Service and beyond these with the Chief of the Einsatz-group concerned in the occupied territories. * * *" (502-PS)

On 23 October 1941 the Camp Commander of the concentration camp Gross Rosen reported to Mueller, Chief of the GESTAPO, a list of Russian PWs who had been executed the preceding day. (1165-PS)

On 9 November 1941 Mueller issued a directive to all GESTAPO offices in which he ordered that diseased PWs should be excluded from the transport into the concentration camps for execution. The letter began:

"The commandant of the concentration camps are complaining that 5 to 10 percent of the Soviet Russians destined for execution are arriving in the camps dead or half dead. There fore the impression has arisen that the Stalags are getting rid of such prisoners in this way. * * *" (1165-PS)

The affidavit of Kurt Lindow, former GESTAPO official, states:

"* * * 2. From 1941 until the middle of 1943 there was attached to subsection IVAI a special department that was headed by the regierungsoberinspektor, later Regierungsamtmann, and SS-Hauptsturmbannfuehrer Franz Koenigshaus. In this department were handled matters concerning prisoners of war. I learned from this department that instructions and orders by Reichsfuehrer Himmler, dating from 1941 and 1942, existed according to which captured Soviet Russian political Commissars and Jewish soldiers were to be executed. As far as I know proposals for execution of such PWs were received from the various PW camps. Koenigshaus had to prepare the orders for execution and submitted them to the chief of section IV, Mueller, for signature. These orders were made out so that one order was to be sent to the agency making the request and a second one to the concentration camp designated to carry out the execution. The PWs in question were at first formally released from PW status, then transferred to a concentration camp for execution. * * *

"* * * 4. There existed in the PW camps on the Eastern front small screening teams (Einsatzkommandos) headed by lower ranking members of the Secret Police (GESTAPO). These teams were assigned to the camp commanders and had the job to segregate the PWs who were candidates for execution, according to the orders that had been given, and to report them to the Office of the Secret Police (Geheimes Staatspolizeiamt). * * * "(2542-PS)

(3) The GESTAPO and SD sent recaptured prisoners of war to concentration camps where they were executed ("bullet Decree"). In March 1944 the Chief of the Security Police and SD forwarded an OKW order to regional SIPO and SD offices in which the OKW ordered that, on recapture, every escaped officer and nonworking NCO prisoner of war, with the exception of British and American prisoners of war, were to be handed over to the SIPO and SD, with the words "Stufe III". Whether escaped British and American officers and nonworking NCOs, upon recapture, should be handed over to the SIPO and SD was to be decided by the High Command of the Army. In connection with this order, the Chief of the Security Police and SD (RSHA) issued instructions that the GESTAPO Leitstellen should take over the escaped officers from the camp commandants and transport them in accordance with a procedure theretofore in force to the Mauthausen concentration camp. The camp commandant was to be informed that the prisoners were being handed over under the operation "Kugel". On the journey the prisoners of war were to be placed in irons. The GESTAPO Leitstellen were to make half-yearly reports, giving numbers only, of the handing over of prisoners of war. escaped officer and nonworking NCO prisoners of war, with the exception of British and Americans, recaptured by police stations were not to be handed back to the Stalag command. The Stalag was to be informed of the recapture and asked to surrender them with the words "Stufe III". (1650-PS)

On 27 July 1944 an order from the 6th Corps Area Command was issued on the treatment of prisoners of war, which provided that prisoners of war were to be discharged from prisoner-of-war status and transferred to the GESTAPO if they were guilty of crimes, had escaped and been recaptured, or refused to work or encouraged other prisoners not to work, or were screened out by Einsatzkommandos of the SIPO and SD, or were guilty of sabotage. No reports on transfers were required (1514-PS). this decree was known as the "Kugel Erlass" ("bullet Decree"). Prisoners of war sent to Mauthausen concentration camp under it were regarded as dead to the outside world and were executed. (2478-PS; 2285-PS.)

(4) The GESTAPO and SD were responsible for establishing and classifying concentration camps, and for committing racial and political undesirables to concentration and annihilation camps for slave labor and mass murder. The first concentration camps were established in 1933 at Dachau in Bavaria and at Oranienburg in Prussia. The GESTAPO was given by law the responsibility of administering the concentration camps. (2108-PS)

The GESTAPO had the sole authority to take persons into protective custody, and orders for protective custody were carried out in the State concentration camps. (1723-PS)

The GESTAPO issued the orders establishing concentration camps, transforming prisoner of war camps into concentration camps, designating concentration camps as internment camps, changing labor camps into concentration camps, setting up special sections for female prisoners, and so forth. (D-50; D-46.)

The Chief of the Security Police and SD ordered the classification of concentration camps according to the seriousness of the accusation and the chances for reforming the prisoners from the Nazi viewpoint. The concentration camps were classified as Classes I, II, or III. Class I was for the least serious prisoners, and Class III for the most serious prisoners. (1063-A-PS)

Regional offices of the GESTAPO had the authority to commit persons to concentration camps for short periods, at first 21 days and later 56 days, but all other orders for protective custody had to be approved by the GESTAPO headquarters in Berlin. Orders for protective custody issued by GESTAPO headquarters had to be signed by or on behalf of the Chief of the Security Police and SD, at first Heydrich, later Kaltenbrunner. (2477-PS)

The Chief of the Security Police and SD had authority to fix the length of the period of custody. During the war it was the policy not to permit the prisoners to know the period of custody and merely to announce the term as "until further notice". (1531-PS)

The local GESTAPO offices which made the arrests maintained a register called the "Haftbuch." In this register the names of all persons arrested were listed, together with personal data, grounds for the arrest, and disposition. When orders were received from the GESTAPO headquarters in Berlin to commit persons who had been arrested to concentration camps, an entry was made in the Haftbuch to that effect. The reason assigned for the arrest and commitment of persons to concentration camps usually was that, according to the GESTAPO, the person endangered by his attitude the existence and security of the people and the State. Further specifications of grounds included such offenses as that of "working against the Greater German Reich with an illegal resistance organization," "being a Jew," "suspected of working for the detriment of the Reich," "being strongly suspected of aiding desertion," "because as a relative of a deserter he is expected to take advantage of every occasion to harm the German Reich," "refusal to work," "sexual intercourse with a Pole," "religious propaganda," "working against the Reich," "loafing on the job," or "defeatist statements." Sometimes specification of the grounds simply referred to an "action," under which a large number of persons would be arrested and sent to concentration camps. (L-358; L-215.)

On 16 December 1942, Mueller, Chief of the GESTAPO, reported that, in connection with an increase in slave labor required by concentration camps by 30 January 1943 the GESTAPO could round up 45,000 Jews, including invalids, aged, and children. The telegram stated:

"In accordance with the increased recruitment of manpower into the concentration camps, which was ordered by 30 January 1943, the following may be applied in the Jewish sector:

"1. Total amount:45,000 Jews.

"2. Start of transportation 11 January 1943.

"3. Completion of transportation 31 January 1943." (1472-PS)

On 17 December 1942, Mueller issued an order to the Kommandeurs and Inspekteurs of the SIPO and SD and to the directors of the GESTAPO regional offices, in which he stated that Himmler, Reichsfuehrer SS and Chief of the German Police, had given orders on 14 December 1942 that at least 35,000 persons who were fit for work had to be put into concentration camps not later than at the end of January. The order further provided that Eastern or foreign workers who had escaped or broken the labor contracts were to be sent to the nearest concentration camps as quickly as possible, and that inmates of detention rooms and educational work camps who were fit for work should be delivered to the nearest concentration camps. (1063-D-PS)

On 23 March 1943, Mueller issued another directive referring to said directive of 17 December 1942, in which he stated that measures are to be carried out until 30 April 43. More explicit instructions were given as to which concentration camps the slave laborers were to be sent. He said:

"Care has to be taken that only prisoners who are fit for work are sent to concentration camps, and adolescents only in accordance with the provisions issued; otherwise, contrary to the purpose, the concentration camps become overburdened." (L-41)

On 25 June 1943, Mueller issued an order stating that the decrees of 17 December 1942 and of 23 March 1943 had achieved the intended goal. (1063-E-PS)

On 21 April 1943, the Minister of Justice declared in a letter that the RSHA had ordered on 11 March 1943 that all Jews who were released from prison were to be handed over to the GESTAPO for lifelong detainment in the concentration camps at Auschwitz and Lublin. Poles released after an imprisonment of over six months were to be transferred to the GESTAPO for internment in a concentration camp for the duration of the war. (701-PS)

The arrest of Jews and their shipment to annihilation camps was carried out under the direction of Eichmann, head of the section handling Jews in the Gestapo. Eichmann's staff was composed of members of the SIPO, especially the GESTAPO. The Jews were shipped on order of the SIPO and SD to annihilation camps in the East. Eichmann estimated, and so reported to Himmler, that 4,000,000 Jews were killed in the annihilation camps in the East, in addition to the 2,000,000 Jews shot by the Einsatz Groups. The extermination of Jews in the annihilation camps was accomplished mainly after the beginning of 1943, during the time Kaltenbrunner was the Chief of the Security Police and SD. (2615-PS)

(5) The GESTAPO and the SD participated in the deportation of citizens of occupied countries for forced labor and handled the disciplining of forced labor. On 26 November 1942, Fritz Sauckel transmitted a letter to the president of provincial employment offices in which he stated that he had been advised by the Chief of the Security Police and SD (RSHA) under date of 26 October 1942 that during the month of November the evacuation of Poles in the Lublin district would begin in order to make room for the settlement of persons of the German race. The Poles who were evacuated as a result of this measure were to be put into concentration camps for labor so far as they were criminal or asocial. The remaining Poles who were suitable for labor were to be transported without their families into the Reich, there to be put at the disposal of the Labor Allocation Offices to serve as replacements for jews eliminated from the armament factories. (L-61)

During 1943 the program of mass murder carried out by the Einsatz Groups in the East was modified, and orders were issued to round up hundreds of thousands of persons for the armament industry.

"In the shortest possible time the Ukraine has to put at the disposal of the armament industry one million workers, 500 of whom have to be sent from our territory daily. * * * The activity of the labor offices * * * is to be supported to the greatest extent possible. * * * When searching villages, esp. when it has become necessary to burn down a village, the whole population will be put at the disposal of the Commissions by force. * * * The most important thing is the recruiting of workers." (3012-PS)

On 18 June 1941 secret orders were issued from the Chief of the Security Police and SD, signed by Mueller, to prevent the return of Eastern emigrants and civilian workers from the Reich to the East, and to keep them in German war production. Any attempts at refusal to work were to be countered by the GESTAPO WITH the severest measures, arrest and confinement in concentration camps (1573-PS). The Chief of the Security Police and SD had exclusive jurisdiction over labor reformatory camps established under control of the GESTAPO for disciplining foreign workers. (1063-B-PS)

(6) The GESTAPO and SD executed captured commandos and paratroopers, and protected civilians who lynched Allied flyers. On 4 August 1942 Keitel issued an order which provided that the GESTAPO and SD were responsible for taking counter-measures against single parachutists or small groups of them with special missions. Even if such paratroopers were captured by the Wehrmacht, they were to be handed over to the GESTAPO and the SD. (553-PS)

On 18 October 1942, Hitler ordered that all members of Commando units, even when in uniform, or members of sabotage groups, armed or not, were to be exterminated to the last man by fighting or by pursuing them. Even if they wished to surrender, they were not to be spared. Members of such Commandos, acting as agents, saboteurs, etc., handed over to the Wehrmacht through other channels, were to be turned over immediately to the SD. (498-PS)

On 17 June 1944, the Chief of the Security Police and SD, in a Top Secret letter to the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces, stated that he had instructed the Commander of the SIPO and SD in Paris to treat parachutists in English uniform as members of Commando operations in accordance with Hitler's order of 18 October 1942. (1276-PS)

On 26 June 1944, WFST issued an order in which it was stated that enemy paratroopers landing in Brittany were to be treated as commandos, and that it was immaterial whether the paratroopers were in uniform or civilian clothes. The order provided that in cases of doubt enemy soldiers who were captured alive were to be handed over to the SD for examination as to whether the Fuehrer Order of 18 October 1942 was to be applied or not. (532-PS)

Commandos turned over to the SIPO and SD under these orders were executed. (526-PS; 2374-PS.)

The affidavit of Adolf Zutter, former adjutant of Mauthausen concentration camp, states in part:

"* * * Concerning the American Military Mission which landed behind the German front in the Slovakian or Hungarian area in January, 1945, I remember, when these officers were brought to Camp Mauthausen; I suppose the number of the arrivals were about 12 to 15 men. They wore a uniform which was American or Canadian; brown-green color, shirt, and cloth cap. Eight or ten days after their arrival the execution order came in by telegraph or teletype. Standartenfuehrer Ziereis came to me into my office and told me now Kaltenbrunner has given the permission for the execution. This letter was secret and had the signature: signed Kaltenbrunner. Then, these people were shot according to martial law and their belongings were given to me by 1st Sgt. [Oberscharfuehrer] Niedermeyer. * * *" (L-51)

On 10 August 1943, Himmler issued an order to the Security Police stating that it was not the task of the Police to interfere in clashes between Germans and English and American terror flyers who had bailed out. (R-110)

In 1944 at a conference of Amt Chiefs Kaltenbrunner said:

"All offices of the SD and the security police are to be informed that pogroms of the populace against English and American terror-flyers are not to be interfered with; on the contrary, this hostile mood is to be fostered." (2990-PS)

On 12 June 1944 the Chief of the SD-Abschnitte Koblenz stated that the Army had issued a similar order, namely, that German soldiers were not to protect enemy flyers from the populace and that the Army no longer attached value to enemy flyers taken prisoner. (745-PS)

(7) The GESTAPO and SD took civilians of occupied countries to Germany for secret trial and punishment ("Nacht und Nebel Erlass"). On 7 December 1941 Hitler issued the directive, since called the "Nacht and Nebel Erlass" (Night and Fog Decree), under which persons who committed offenses against the Reich or occupation forces in occupied territories, except where death sentence was certain, were to be taken secretly to Germany and surrendered to the Security Police and SD for trial or punishment in Germany. An executive ordinance was issued by Keitel the same date, and on 4 February 1942 the directive and ordinance were published to the police and the SS. (L-90)

In compliance with the above directive, the military intelligence turned over cases, other than those in which the death sentence was probable, to the GESTAPO and the Secret Field Police for secret deporting to Germany. (833-PS)

After the civilians arrived in Germany, no word of the disposition of their cases was permitted to reach the country from which they came, or their relatives. Even when they died awaiting trial, the SIPO and SD refused to notify the families, so that anxiety would be created in the minds of the family of the arrested person. (668-PS)

(8) The GESTAPO and SD arrested, tried, and punished citizens of occupied territories under special criminal procedure and by summary methods. The GESTAPO arrested, placed in protective custody, and executed civilians of occupied territories under certain circumstances. Even where there were courts capable of handling emergency cases, the GESTAPO conducted its own executions without regard to normal judicial processes. (674-PS)

On 18 September 1942, Thierack, the Reich Minister of Justice, and Himmler came to an understanding by which antisocial elements were to be turned over to Himmler to be worked to death, and a special criminal procedure was to be applied by the police to the Jews, Poles, gypsies, Russians, and Ukrainians who were not to be tried in ordinary criminal courts. (654-PS)

On 5 September 1942 an order was issued by the RSHA to the offices of the GESTAPO and SD covering this understanding. This order provided that ordinary criminal procedure would not be applied against Poles, Jews, gypsies, and other Eastern people, but that instead they would be turned over to the police. Such persons of foreign extraction were to be treated on a basis entirely different from that applied to Germans.

"* * * Such considerations which may be right for adjudicating a punishable offense committed by a German are, however, wrong for adjudicating a punishable offense committed by a person of alien race. In the case of punishable offenses committed by a person of alien race the personal motives actuating the offender must be completely eliminated. The only standard may be that German civil order is endangered by his action, and that consequently preventive measures must be taken to prevent the recurrence of such risks. In other words, the action of a person of alien race is not to be viewed from the angle of judicial expiation, but from the angle of the police guard against danger.

"As a result of this, the administration of penal law for persons of alien race must be transferred from the hands of the administrators of justice into the hands of the police. * * *" (L-316)

(9) The GESTAPO and SD executed or confined persons in concentration camps for crimes allegedly committed by their relatives. On 19 July 1944, the Commander of the SIPO and SD for the District Radom published an order transmitted through the Higher SS and Police Leaders to the effect that in all cases of assassination or attempted assassination of Germans, or where saboteurs had destroyed vital installations, not only the guilty person but also all his (or her) male relatives should be shot and the female relatives over 16 years of age put into a concentration camp. (l-37)

In the summer of 1944, the Einsatzkommando of the SIPO and SD at Luxembourg caused persons to be confined at Sachsenhausen concentration camp because they were relatives of deserters and were, therefore, "expected to endanger the interest of the German Reich if allowed to go free." (L-215)

(10) The GESTAPO and SD were instructed to murder prisoners in the SIPO and SD prisons to prevent their release by the Allied armies. On 21 July 1944, the Kommandeur of the SIPO and SD for the District Radom forwarded an order of the Befehlshaber of the SIPO and SD to the effect that it was essential that the number of inmates of the SIPO and SD prisons be kept as low as possible. inmates were to be subjected only to short formal interrogations and then to be sent by the quickest route to concentration camps. Preparations were to be made for total clearance of the prisons should the situation at the front necessitate such action. In the case of sudden emergency precluding the evacuation of the prisoners, they were to be shot and their bodies buried or otherwise disposed of, the buildings to be dynamited, and so forth. In similar circumstances, the Jews who were still employed in the armament industries or in other work were to be dealt with in the same way. The liberation of prisoners or Jews by the enemy was to be avoided at all costs. (L-53)

(11) The GESTAPO and the SD participated in the seizure and spoliation of public and private property. In connection with the program for the mass extermination of Jews and Communist functionaries, the GESTAPO and the SD seized all personal effects of the persons executed or murdered. On the eastern front the victims were required not only to give up all their personal possessions, but even to remove their outer garments prior to being murdered. (2620-PS)

In connection with the program of confiscation of scientific, religious, and art archives and objects, an agreement was entered into between Rosenberg and Heydrich, under which the SD and Rosenberg were to cooperate closely in the confiscation of public and private collections. (071-PS)

(12) The GESTAPO and SD conducted third degree interrogations. On 26 October 1939 an order to all GESTAPO offices from the RSHA signed Mueller, "by order," in referring to execution of protective custody during the war, stated in part:

"In certain cases, the Reichsfuehrer SS and Chief of the German Police will order flogging in addition to detention in a concentration camp. Orders of this kind will, in the future, also be transmitted to the State Police District Office concerned. In this case, too, there is no objection to spreading the rumour of this increased punishment. * * *" (1531-PS)

On 12 June 1942 the Chief of the Security Police and SD, through Mueller, published an order authorizing the use of third degree methods in interrogating where preliminary investigation indicates that the prisoner could give information on important facts such as subversive activities, but not to extort confessions of the prisoner's own crimes. The order stated in part:

"* * * 2. Third degree may, under this supposition, only be employed against Communists, Marxists, Jehovah’s Witnesses, saboteurs, terrorists, members of resistance movements, parachute agents, anti-social elements, Polish or Soviet-Russian loafers or tramps. In all other cases, my permission must first be obtained.

"* * * 4. Third degree can, according to the circumstances, consist amongst other methods, of:

Very simple diet (bread and water)

hard bunk

dark cell

deprivation of sleep

exhaustive drilling

Also in flogging (for more than 20 strokes a doctor must be consulted)." (1531-PS)

On 24 February 1944 the Kommandeur of the SIPO and SD for the district Radom, "in view of the variety of methods used to date in third-degree interrogations and in order to avoid excesses," published an order issued by the BdS Cracow based on regulations in force for the Reich which followed closely the limitations laid down in the above decree of 12 June 1942. (L-89)

G. Crimes of the GESTAPO and SD Against Humanity.

(1) The GESTAPO and the SD were primary agencies for the persecution of the Jews. The persecution of the Jews under the Nazi regime is a story of increasingly severe treatment, beginning with restrictions, then seizure and spoliation of property, commitment to concentration camps, deportation, slave labor, and finally mass murder. The responsibility of the GESTAPO and the SD for the mass extermination program carried out by the Einsatz Groups of the SIPO and SD has already been considered. In this subdivision, the place of the GESTAPO and SD in the development of this persecution will be treated.

Section B of the SD dealt with problems of nationality, including minorities, race and national health, immigration, and resettlement. Section B4 of the GESTAPO, headed by Eichmann, dealt with Jewish affairs, including matters of evacuation, means of suppressing enemies of the people and State, and dispossession of rights of German citizenship. One of the functions of the SD was to furnish information concerning the Jews to the GESTAPO. One of the functions of the GESTAPO was to carry out the Nazi program of persecution of the Jews. (L-185; L-219.)

The GESTAPO was charged with the enforcement of discriminatory laws, such as those preventing Jews from engaging in business, restricting their right to travel, and prohibiting them from associating with gentiles. Violations of such restrictions resulted in protective custody and confinement in concentration camps by the GESTAPO. (L-217; L-152; L-167.)

The Chief of the Security Police and SD ordered the GESTAPO and the SD to supervise the anti-Jewish pogrom staged in November 1938 following the von Rath incident in Paris. As many Jews were to be arrested in all districts as the available jail space would hold. Well-to-do Jews were to be singled out for arrest, and primarily only healthy male adults of not too advanced age. Immediately after completion of the arrests, the competent concentration camp was to be notified in order to provide for speediest transfer of Jews to the camps. (3051-PS)

On 11 November 1938 Heydrich reported to Goering by secret express letter on the results of the action as reported by the GESTAPO. The report stated in part:

"* * * The extent of the destruction of Jewish shops and houses cannot yet be verified by figures. The figures given in the reports:815 shops destroyed, 171 dwelling houses set on fire or destroyed, only indicate a fraction of the actual damage caused, as far as arson is concerned. Due to the urgency of the reporting, the reports received to date are entirely limited to general statements such as 'numerous' or 'most shops destroyed.' Therefore the figures given must have been exceeded considerably.

"191 synagogues were set on fire, and another 76 completely destroyed. In addition 11 parish halls, [Gemeindehauser] cemetery chapels and similar buildings were set on fire and 3 more completely destroyed.

"20,000 Jews were arrested, also 7 Aryans and 3 foreigners. The latter were arrested for their own safety.

"36 deaths were reported and those seriously injured were also numbered at 36. Those killed and injured are Jews. One Jew is still missing. The Jews killed include one Polish national, and those injured include 2 Poles." (3058-PS)

On 31 July 1941 Goering sent the following order to the Chief of the Security Police and SD, Heydrich:

"Complementing the task that was assigned to you on 24 January 1939, which dealt with arriving at a solution of the Jewish problem through furtherance of emigration and evacuation as advantageous as possible, I hereby charge you with making all necessary preparations in regard to organizational and financial matters for bringing about a complete solution of the Jewish question in the German sphere of influence in Europe." (710-PS)

In February or March 1943, according to Gottfried Boley, Ministerialrat in the Reich Chancery, a conference on the solution of the Jewish problem, attended by representatives of the ministries, was called by Kaltenbrunner as Chief of the Security Police and SD. Boley states:

"The meeting was presided over by Eichmann who had charge of Jewish problems in the GESTAPO. In his opening remarks Eichmann referred to former conferences that had taken place in the office of the Chief of the Security Police and SD, and that on this occasion he wished to discuss the matter in a more basic manner. He stated that the Jewish question had to be solved in a quick and proper way. Representatives of the Chief of the Security Police and SD who attended the conference made it clear to those present that the remaining Jews had to be sent forcibly to concentration camps or be sterilized. Those present at the conference must have carried away the impression that the objectives were the extermination of the Jewish people." (2645-PS)

The deportation of Jews into concentration camps was part of the program for slave labor. Jews not fit for work were screened out at extermination centers, such as Auschwitz, and the remainder were taken into concentration and work camps. The orders were issued by Himmler and passed through the Chief of the Security police and SD, Kaltenbrunner (formerly Heydrich) to Mueller, Chief of the GESTAPO, and then to Eichmann for execution. (2376-PS; 1472-PS.)

In Galicia, the deportation of Jews was carried out during the period from April 1942 to June 1943. At the end of that time Galicia had been entirely cleared of Jews. In all, 434,392 Jews were deported from Galicia alone. In connection with the deportations, Jewish property was confiscated, including furniture, clothing, money, dental fillings, gold teeth, wedding rings, and other personal property of all kinds. The Security Police participated in this action along with other police and SS detachments. (L-18)

In Warsaw the Security Police played a responsible role in the segregation of the Jews and placing them in the Ghetto, in the subsequent removal of the Jews to concentration camps, and in the final clearance of the Ghetto. The Ghetto was established in November of 1940. Over 300,000 Jews were deported from it between July and October 1942, and 6,500 more were deported in January 1943. In April and May 1943 the final clearance of the Ghetto was accomplished under the direction of the SS and Police Leader of the Warsaw area, and with units of the SIPO, Waffen SS, Order Police, and some military and Polish police units. Thousands of Jews were killed in the action. About 7,000 were transported to "T. II" where they were exterminated. The remaining 40,000 to 45,000 were placed in concentration camps. (1061-PS)

In Denmark the Kommandeur of the SIPO and SD was ordered in September of 1943 to arrest all Danish citizens of Jewish belief and send them to Stettin by ship and from there to the concentration camp at Theresienstadt. In spite of the protests of the Kommandeur of the SIPO and SD, Kaltenbrunner as Chief of the Security Police and SD gave direct orders to carry out the anti-Jewish action. Eichmann, head of the Jewish section in the GESTAPO, had direct charge of the clearance program. (2375-PS)

In Hungary the deportation of Jews was again carried out by Eichmann. This action took place under direction of the GESTAPO after the German occupation of Hungary in March 1944. About 450,000 Jews were deported from Hungary due to the pressure and direction of the GESTAPO. (2605-PS)

(2) The GESTAPO and the SD were primary agencies for the persecution of the churches. The fight against the churches was never brought out into the open by the GESTAPO and the SD as in the case of the persecution of the Jews. The struggle was designed to weaken the churches and to lay a foundation for the ultimate destruction of the confessional churches after the end of the war. (1815-PS)

Section C2 of the SD dealt with education and religious life. Section B1 of the GESTAPO dealt with political Catholicism. Section B2 with political Protestantism sects, and Section B3 with other churches and Freemasonry. (L-185)

As early as 1934 the GESTAPO enforced restrictions against the churches. An order by the State Police of Düsseldorf prohibited the churches from engaging in public activities, especially public appearances in groups, sports, hikes, and the establishment of holiday or outdoor camps. (R-145)

In 1934 the Bavarian Political Police placed three ministers in protective custody for refusing to carry out the order of the Government to ring church bells on the occasion of the death of Hindenburg. (1521-PS)

The GESTAPO dissolved those church organizations which it considered to have political objectives. In 1938 the GESTAPO at Munich dissolved by order the Guild of the Virgin Mary of the Bavarian dioceses. (1481-PS)

An insight into the hidden objectives and secret methods of the GESTAPO and the SD in the fight against the churches is disclosed in the file of the GESTAPO regional office at Aachen (1815-PS). On 12 May 1941 the Chief of the GESTAPO issued a directive in which he reported that the Chief of the Security Police and SD had issued an order under which the treatment of church politics which had theretofore been divided between the SD and the GESTAPO was to be taken over entirely by the GESTAPO. The SD "church specialists" were to be temporarily transferred to the same posts in the GESTAPO and operate an intelligence service in the church political sphere there. SD files concerning church political opposition were to be handed over to the GESTAPO, but the SD was to retain material concerning the confessional influence on the lives of the people.

On 22 and 23 September 1941 a conference of church specialists attached to GESTAPO regional offices was held in the lecture hall of the RSHA in Berlin. The notes on the speeches delivered at this conference indicate that the GESTAPO considered the church as an enemy to be attacked with determination and "true fanaticism." The immediate objective of the GESTAPO was stated to be to insure that the Church did not win back any lost ground. The ultimate objective was stated to be the destruction of the confessional churches. This was to be brought about by the collection of material through the GESTAPO church intelligence system to be produced at a proper time as evidence for the charge of treasonable activities during the German fight for existence.

The executive measures to be applied by the GESTAPO were discussed. It was stated to be impractical to deal with political offenses under normal legal procedure owing to lack of political perception which prevailed among the legal authorities. The socalled "agitator-Priests," therefore, had to be handled by GESTAPO measures, and when necessary removed to a concentration camp. The following punishments were to be applied to priests according to individual circumstances: warning, fine, forbidden to preach, forbidden to remain in parish, forbidden all activity as a priest, short-term arrest, protective custody. Retreats, youth and recreational camps, evening services, processions and pilgrimages were all to be forbidden on grounds of interfering with the war effort, blackouts, overburdened transportation, etc.

In executing this program close cooperation was required between the GESTAPO and the SD. The study and treatment of the Church in its opposition to the Nazi state was the responsibility of the GESTAPO. The result of this treatment of the Church in the sphere of "religious life" remained the province of the SD. By these means the GESTAPO and the SD carried on the struggle of the Nazi conspirators against the Church.

H. Conclusion.

The evidence shows that the GESTAPO was created by Goering in Prussia in April 1933 for the specific purpose of serving as a police agency to strike down the actual and ideological enemies of the Nazi regime, and that henceforward the GESTAPO in Prussia and in the other States of the Reich carried out a program of terror against all who were thought to be dangerous to the domination of the conspirators over the people of Germany. Its methods were utterly ruthless. It operated outside the law and sent its victims to the concentration camps. The term "GESTAPO" became the symbol of the Nazi regime of force and terror.

Behind the scenes, operating secretly, the SD, through its vast network of informants, spied upon the German people in their daily lives, on the streets, in the shops, and even within the sanctity of the churches.

The most casual remark of a German citizen might bring him before the GESTAPO, where his fate and freedom were decided without recourse to law. In this government, in which the rule of law was replaced by a tyrannical rule of men, the GESTAPO was the primary instrumentality of oppression.

The GESTAPO and the SD played an important part in almost every criminal act of the conspiracy. The categories of these crimes, apart from the thousands of specific instances of torture and cruelty in policing Germany for the benefit of the conspirators, indicate the extent of GESTAPO and SD complicity.

The GESTAPO and SD fabricated the border incidents which Hitler used as an excuse for attacking Poland.

Through the Einsatz Groups they murdered approximately 2,000,000 defenseless men, women, and children.

They removed Jews, political leaders and scientists from prisoner of war camps and murdered them.

They took recaptured prisoners of war to concentration camps and murdered some of them.

The GESTAPO established and classified concentration camps and sent millions of people into them for extermination and slave labor.

The GESTAPO cleared Europe of the Jews and was responsible for sending 4,000,000 Jews to their deaths in annihilation camps.

The GESTAPO and SD rounded up hundreds of thousands of citizens of occupied countries and shipped them to Germany for forced labor, and sent slave laborers to labor reformatory camps and concentration camps for disciplining.

They executed captured commandos and paratroopers and protected civilians who lynched Allied flyers.

They took civilians of occupied countries to Germany for secret trial and punishment.

They arrested, tried, and punished citizens of occupied territories under special criminal procedures which did not accord them fair trials, and by summary methods.

They murdered or sent to concentration camps the relatives of persons who had allegedly committed crimes.

They ordered the murder of prisoners in SIPO and SD prisons to prevent their release by the Allied armies.

They participated in the seizure and spoliation of public and private property.

They were primary agencies for the persecution of the Jews and of the churches.

In carrying out these crimes the GESTAPO operated as an organization, closely centralized and controlled from Berlin headquarters. Reports were submitted to Berlin, and all important decisions emanated from Berlin. The regional offices had only limited power to commit persons to concentration camps. All cases, other than those of short duration, had to be submitted to Berlin for approval. From 1943 to the end of the war the defendant Kaltenbrunner was the Chief of the Security Police and SD in Berlin. The GESTAPO was organized on a functional basis. Its principal divisions dealt with the groups and institutions against which it committed the worst crimes-Jews, churches, communists, and political liberals. Thus, in perpetrating these crimes, the GESTAPO acted as an entity, each section performing its part in the general criminal enterprises ordered by Berlin. It must be held responsible as an entity.

The SD was at all times a department of the SS. Its criminality directly concerns and contributes to the criminality of the SS.

As to the GESTAPO, it is submitted that:

1. The GESTAPO is an organization, in the sense in which that term is used in Article 9 of the Charter.

2. The defendants Goering and Kaltenbrunner committed the crimes defined in Article 6 of the Charter in their capacity as members and leaders of the GESTAPO.

3. The GESTAPO, as an organization, participated in and aided the conspiracy which contemplated and involved the commission of the crimes defined in Article 6 of the Charter.

In 1941, on German Police Day, Heydrich, the former Chief of the Security Police and the SD, said:

"Secret State Police, Criminal Police, and SD are still adorned with the furtive and whispered secrecy of a political detective story. In a mixture of fear and shuddering-and yet at home with a certain feeling of security because of their presence,-brutality, inhumanity bordering on the sadistic, and ruthlessness are attributed abroad to the men of this profession." (Extract from a brochure on Reinhard Heydrich, published in December 1943.)

The evidence as it is submitted, shows that brutality, inhumanity, sadism, and ruthlessness were characteristic of the GESTAPO and that it was and should be declared, a criminal organization, in accordance with article 9 of the Charter.

LEGAL REFERENCES AND LIST OF DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE GEHEIME STAATSPOLIZEI (GESTAPO) AND SICHERHEITSDIENST (SD)

Document Description Vol. Page

Charter of the International Military Tribunal, Article 9......I 6

International Military Tribunal, Indictment Number 1, Section IV (H); Appendix B......I 29,70,71

Note: A single asterisk (*) before a document indicates that the document was received in evidence at the Nurnberg trial. A double asterisk (**) before a document number indicates that the document was referred to during the trial but was not formally received in evidence, for the reason given in parentheses following the description of the document. The USA series number, given in parentheses following the description of the document, is the official exhibit number assigned by the court.

*071-PS Rosenberg letter to Bormann, 23 April 1941, replying to Bormann's letter of 19 April 1941 (Document 072-PS). (USA 371)......III 119

*498-PS Top Secret Fuehrer Order for killing of commandos, 18 October 1942. (USA 501).......III 416

*501-PS Collection of four documents on execution by gas, June 1942, one signed by Dr. Becker, SS Untersturmfuehrer at Kiev, 16 May 1942. (USA 288).....III 418

*502-PS Order, 17 July 1941, entitled "Regulations for the Commandos of the Chief of the SIPO and SD which are to be activated in Stalags". (USA 486).....422

*526-PS Top secret notice, 10 May 1943, concerning saboteurs captured and shot in Norway. (USA 502).....III 434

532-PS Telegram of WFSt, 24 June 1944, concerning treatment of Commandos.......III 437

*553-PS Order signed by Keitel, 4 August 1942, regulating treatment of paratroops. (USA 500)......III 441

*654-PS Thierack's notes, 18 September 1942, on discussion with Himmler concerning delivery of Jews to Himmler for extermination through work. (USA 218).......III 467

*668-PS Letter from Chief of the SIPO and SD and OKW letter, 24 June 1942, concerning prosecution of punishable offenses against the Reich or occupation forces in occupied territories. (USA 504)......III 476

*674-PS Secret letter from President of High District Court of Kattowitz re executions being carried out by Gestapo without judicial processes, 3 December 1941. (USA 505).....III 478

*701-PS Letter from Minister of Justice to Prosecutors, 1 April 1943, concerning Poles and Jews who are released from Penal institutions of Department of Justice. (USA 497)......III 510

*710-PS Letter from Goering to Heydrich, 31 July 1941, concerning solution of Jewish question. (USA 509) III 525

745-PS Letter from Chief of SD, Koblenz, 12 June 1944, concerning enemy aviators who have been shot down......III 543

775-PS Memorandum of Minister of the Interior concerning clarification of police matters, 1935......III 547

779-PS Directive by Frick, regulating "protective custody", 12 April 1934.......III 555

833-PS Instructions by Admiral Canaris, Head of the Abwehr, 2 February 1942, concerning prosecution of crimes against the Reich or occupying forces in the occupied territories......III 600

*1061-PS Official report of Stroop, SS and Police Leader of Warsaw, on destruction of Warsaw Ghetto, 1943. (USA 275)......III 718

*1063-A-PS Order of Chief of SIPO and SD, 2 January 1941, concerning classification of concentration camps. (USA 492).....III 775

*1063-B-PS Letter signed by Kaltenbrunner, 26 July 1943, concerning establishment of Labor Reformatory camps. (USA 492)......III 777

*1063-D-PS Mueller's order, 17 December 1942, concerning prisoners qualified for work to be sent to concentration camps. (USA 219).....III 778

1063-E-PS Copy of Mueller's order, 25 June 1942, concerning increased shipments to concentration camps......III 780

*1104-PS Memorandum, 21 November 1941, enclosing copies of report concerning anti-Jewish action in Minsk. (USA 483).......III 783

1113-PS Report of 6 November 1942 concerning action "Marshfever".......III 792

*1165-PS Letter from Commandant of concentration Camp Gross Rosen, 23 October 1941, and letter of Mueller to all Gestapo offices, 9 November 1941, concerning execution of Russian PW's (USA 244)......III 821

*1276-PS Top secret letter from Chief of SIPO and SD to OKW/WFST, 17 June 1944, concerning Commando operations. (USA 525).....III 855

1285-PS Extract from The German Police, 1943, pp. 81-82.......III 863

1437-PS Law concerning reuniting of Austria with German Reich, 18 March 1938. 1938 Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 262.....IV 17

1438-PS Fuehrer concerning administration of Sudeten-German territory, 22 October 1938. 1938 Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 1453.....IV 17

*1472-PS Copy of telegram from Mueller to Himmler, 16 December 1942, concerning recruiting Jewish labor. (USA 279).....IV 49

*1481-PS Gestapo order, 20 January 1938, dissolving and confiscating property of Catholic Youth Womens Organization in Bavaria. (USA 737).....III 50

*1514-PS Order, 27 July 1944, from 6th Corps Area Command concerning delivery of prisoners of war to secret state police. (USA 491)......IV 53

*1521-PS Report from the Bavarian Political Police to the Gestapo, Berlin, 24 August 1934, concerning National mourning on occasion of death of von Hindenburg. (USA 740)......IV 75

1551-PS Decree assigning functions in Office of Chief of German Police, 26 June 1936. 1936 Reichs Ministerialblatt, pp. 946-948.....IV 106

*1573-PS Order signed Mueller, 18 June 1941, concerning measures to be taken against Emigrants and civilian workers from Russian areas and against Foreign workers. (USA 498).....IV 112

1638-PS Circular of Minister of Interior, 11 November 1938, on cooperation of SD and other authorities. 1938 Reichs Ministerialblatt, p. 1906......IV 142

*1650-PS Directive to State Police Directorates from Chief of SIPO and SD by Mueller, 4 March 1944, concerning captured escaped PWs except British and American PWs. (USA 246)......IV 158

*1680-PS "Ten Years Security Police and SD" published in The German Police, 1 February 1943. (USA 477)......IV 191

*1723-PS Order concerning cooperation of Party offices with the Secret State Police, 25 January 1938, published in Decrees, Regulations, Announcements, 1937, Vol. II, pp. 430-439. (USA 206)......IV 219

*1815-PS Documents on RSHA meeting concerning the study and treatment of church politics. (USA 510)....IV 415

*1852-PS "Law" from The German Police, 1941, by Dr. Werner Best. (USA 499) (See Chart No. 16).....IV 490

1956-PS Meaning and Tasks of the Secret State Police, published in The Archives, January 1936, Vol. 22-24, p. 1942......IV 598

2073-PS Decree concerning the appointment of a Chief of German Police in the Ministry of the Interior, 17 June 1936. 1936 Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 487......IV 703

2104-PS Law on organization of Secret State Police office, 26 April 1933. 1933 Preussische Gesetzsammlung, p. 122.....IV 730

2105-PS Law on Secret State Police of 30 November 1933. 1933 Preussische Gesetzsammlung, p. 413.....IV 731

2107-PS Law on Secret State Police of 10 February 1936. 1936 Preussische Gesetzsammlung, pp. 21-22.....IV 732

2108-PS Decree for execution of Law on Secret State Police of 10 February 1936. 1936 Preussische Gesetzsammlung, pp. 22-24.....IV 732

2113-PS Decree for application of law of 30 November 1933, concerning Secret State Police of 8 March 1934. 1934 Preussische Gesetzsammlung, p. 143.....IV 743

2232-PS Tasks and Means of a Political Police, from German Administrative Law by Hans Frank, pp. 420-430......IV 881

2243-PS Law relating to finance measures in connection with the police, 19 March 1937. 1937 Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 325......IV 924

2245-PS Frick decree of 20 September 1936 concerning employment of Security Police Inspectors. 1936 Reichs Ministerialblatt, pp. 1343-1344.....IV 928

*2273-PS Extract from a top secret report of Einsatz Group A. (USA 487) (See Chart No. 4).....IV 944

*2285-PS Affidavit, 13 May 1945, by two French officers, about shooting of prisoners at Mauthausen. (USA 490).....IV 991

2344-PS Reconstruction of a Nation by Goering, 1934, p. 89.....IV 1065

2347-PS Court decisions from 1935 Reichsverwaltungsblatt, Vol. 56, pp. 577-578, 20 July 1935.......IV 1066

*2348-PS Affidavit of Rauff, Head of Amt II D, RSHA, 19 October 1945. (USA 485).....IV 1068

2371-PS Execution of ordinance for Security of people and state, 28 February 1933. 1933 Reichs Ministerialblatt, Part I, p. 543......IV 1102

2372-PS Unified Designation of offices of Secret State Police in Reich. 1936 Reichs Ministerial Gazette, Part V, pp. 1344-5.......IV 1105

2374-PS Affidavit of Rudolf Mildner, 27 June 1945, concerning treatment of English-American commando groups.......V 1

2375-PS Affidavit of Rudolf Mildner, 16 November 1945, concerning activities of SIPO and SD......V 2

2376-PS Affidavit of Rudolf Mildner, 16 November 1945, concerning treatment of Jews......V 3

*2460-PS Affidavit of Rudolf Diels. (USA 751)......V 205

*2477-PS Affidavit of Willy Litzenberg, 4 November 1945. (USA 518)......V 229

2478-PS Affidavit of Willy Litzenberg, 4 November 1945.....V 230

2479-PS Affidavit of Dr. Rudolf Mildner, 4 November 1945.......V 230

*2499-PS Original Protective Custody Order served on Dr. R. Kempner, 15 March 1935. (USA 232)......V 236

*2542-PS Affidavit of Kurt Lindow, 30 September 1945. (USA 489)......V 286

*2605-PS Affidavit of Dr. Rudolf Kastner, former President of the Hungarian Zionist Organization, 13 September 1945. (USA 242).....V 313

*2614-PS Affidavit of Dr. Wilhelm Hoettl, 5 November 1945. (USA 918).....337

2615-PS Affidavit of Dr. Wilhelm Hoettl, 5 November 1945.....V 338

*2620-PS Affidavit of Otto Ohlendorf, 5 November 1945. (USA 919)......V 341

2622-PS Affidavit of Otto Ohlendorf, 5 November 1945.......V 343

2644-PS Affidavit of Otto Ohlendorf, 5 November 1945.....V 357

2645-PS Affidavit of Gottfried Boley, 14 November 1945.....V 357

*2751-PS Affidavit of Alfred Naujocks, 20 November 1945. (USA 482)......V 390

2752-PS Affidavit of Willy Litzenberg, 8 November 1945.....V 392

2846-PS Affidavit of Erwin Lahousen, 13 November 1945......V 507

2884-PS Affidavit of Walter Warlimont, 14 November 1945.....V 550

2890-PS Extracts from Befehlsblatt of the SIPO and SD.....V 557

*2990-PS Affidavit of Walter Schellenberg, 18 November 1945. (USA 526)......V 694

*2992-PS Affidavits of Hermann Graebe. (USA 494)....V 696

*3012-PS Order signed Christiansen, 19 March 1943, to all group leaders of Security Service, and record of telephone conversation signed by Stapj, 11 March 1943. (USA 190).......V 731

*3033-PS Affidavit of Walter Schellenberg, 21 November 1945. (USA 488).....V 741

*3051-PS Three teletype orders from Heydrich to all stations of State Police, 10 November 1938, on measures against Jews, and one order from Heydrich on termination of protest actions. (USA 240)......V 797

*3058-PS Letter from Heydrich to Goering, 11 November 1938, reporting action against the Jews. (USA 508)......V 854

3343-PS Speech delivered at labor-meeting of Prussian State Council on 18 June 1934, from Speeches and Essays of Hermann Goering......VI 78

3344-PS Extract from Befehlsblatt of the Chief of Security Police and SD, Berlin, 7 September 1942, No. 39, p. 249.....VI 78

*3360-PS Teletype, 12 February 1944, relating to recaptured escaped Eastern laborers. (USA 499).....VI 95

3363-PS Special delivery letter, 21 September 1939, from Chief of Security Police to Chiefs of all detail groups concerning Jewish problem in Occupied zone......VI 97

*3840-PS Statement of Karl Kaleske, 24 February 1946, concerning the elimination of the Warsaw Ghetto. (USA 803).......VI 775

*3841-PS Statement of SS and Polizeifuehrer Juergen Stroop, 24 February 1946, concerning elimination of the Warsaw Ghetto. (USA 804).....VI 776

*3868-PS Affidavit of Rudolf Franz Ferdinand Hoess, 5 April 1946, concerning execution of 3,000,000 people at Auschwitz Extermination Center. (USA 819).....VI 787

D-46 Order designating Herzogenbosch as concentration camp, 18 January 1943......VI 1025

D-50 Order establishing concentration camps at Lublin, 9 April 1943......VI 1027

D-183 Order of Gestapo Office, Darmstadt, 7 December 1938, concerning treatment of articles secured during protest action against Jews......VI 1075

*D-569 File of circulars from Reichsfuehrer SS, the OKW, Inspector of Concentration Camps, Chief of Security Police and SD, dating from 29 October 1941 through 22 February 1944, relative to procedure in cases of unnatural death of Soviet PW, execution of Soviet PW, etc. (GB 277)......VII 74

*D-762 Order of Hitler, 30 July 1944, concerning combating of "terrorists" and "saboteurs" in Occupied Territories. (GB 298)....VII 221

*D-763 Circular of OKW, 18 August 1944, regarding penal jurisdiction of non-German civilians in Occupied Territories. (GB 300).....VII 222

*L-18 Official report, Katzmann to General of Police Krueger, 30 June 1943, concerning "Solution of Jewish Question in Galicia". (USA 277).....VII 755

*L-37 Letter from Illmer, Chief of the SIPO and SD of Radom, to subordinates, 19 July 1944, concerning collective responsibility of members of families of assassins and saboteurs. (USA 506)......VII 782

*L-41 Orders of Mueller, Chief of the Gestapo, 17 December 1942 and 23 March 1943, concerning transfer of workers to concentration camps. (USA 496)....VII 784

*L-51 Affidavit of Adolf Zutter, 2 August 1945. (USA 521).....VII 798

*L-53 Order from Commandant of the SIPO and SD for the Radom District to Branch Office in Tomaschow, 21 July 1944, on clearance of prisons. (USA 291).....VII 814

*L-61 Express letter from Sauckel to Presidents of Landes Employment Office, 26 November of Jews and exchange of Jews in essential employment against Polish labor. (USA 177)....VII 816

*L-89 Top secret letter issued by the Commandant of the SIPO and SD, District Radom, 24 February 1944, concerning intensified interrogations. (USA 507)......VII 868

*L-90 Fuehrer decree, February 1942, concerning prosecution of offenses in Occupied Territory; "First Ordinance" signed by Keitel for execution of the directive; memorandum of 12 December 1941, signed by Keitel. (USA 503)....VII 871

L-152 RSHA Order concerning fraternization of Jews and Aryans, 3 November 1941......VII 903

L-167 Orders of the Reichsminister of the Interior, 24 March 1942, concerning use of public transportation by Jews, and covering letters....VII 917

*L-180 Report by SS Brigade Commander Stahlecker to Himmler, "Action Group A", 15 October 1941. (USA 276).....978

*l-185 Organization plan of the RSHA, 1 January 1941. (USA 484)......VII 996

*L-215 File of orders and dossiers of 25 Luxembourgers committed to concentration camps at various times in 1944. (USA 243).....VII 1045

L-217 Order of Secret State Police concerning camouflage of Jewish businesses, 20 November 1936.....VII 1052

*L-219 Organization plan of the RSHA as of 1 October 1943. (USA 479)...vii 1053

L-297 Law commissioning Secret State Police Bureau with supervision of duties of Political Police commanders in provinces, 20 September 1936. 1936 Reichs Ministerialblatt, p. 1343.....VII 1099

L-301 New ruling on protective custody, from the Archive, April 1934, p. 31......vii 1099

*L-316 HSHA Order of 5 November 1942, signed by Steckenbach, concerning jurisdiction over Poles and Eastern Nationals. (USA 346).....VII 1104

*L-358 Extract from register of arrests by Gestapo in Poland, 1943. (USA 495).....VII 1107

*L-361 Three documents concerning the formation of the RSHA, Himmler, 27 September 1939; Heydrich, 23 and 27 September 1939. (USA 478)....VII 1109

*R-102 Report on activities of The Task Forces of SIPO and SD in USSR, 1-31 October 1941. (USA 470).....VIII 96

*R-110 Himmler order of 10 August 1943 to all Senior Executive SS and Police officers. (USA 333).....VIII 107

*R-135 Letter to Rosenberg enclosing secret reports from Kube on German atrocities in the East, 18 June 1943, found in Himmler's personal files. (USA 289)......VIII 205

*R-142 Memoranda to Koblenz District Headquarters, 22 April 1938 and 7 May 1938, relating to the plebiscite of 10 April 1938. (USA 481).....VIII 243

*R-145 State Police Order, 28 May 1934, at Düsseldorf, signed Schmid, concerning sanction of denominational youth and professional associations and distribution of publications in churches. (USA 745)....VIII 248

Affidavit A Affidavit of Erwin Lahousen, 21 January 1946, substantially the same as his testimony on direct examination before the International Military Tribunal at Nurnberg 30 November and 1 December 1945......VIII 587

Affidavit B Affidavit of Otto Ohlendorf, 20 November 1945, substantially the same as his testimony on direct examination before the International Military Tribunal at Nurnberg 3 January 1946......VIII 596

Affidavit C Affidavit of Dieter Wisplike, 29 November 1945, substantially the same as his testimony on direct examination before the International Military Tribunal at Nurnberg, 3 January 1946.....VIII 606

Affidavit D Affidavit of Walter Schellenberg, 23 January 1946, substantially the same as his testimony on direct examination before the International Military Tribunal at Nurnberg, 4 January 1946......VIII 622

Statement IX My Relationship to Adolf Hitler and to the Party, by Erich Raeder, Moscow, fall 1945......VIII 707

*Chart No. 1 National Socialist German Workers' Party. (2903-PS; USA 2).....VIII 770

*Chart No. 3 Organization of the SS. (USA 445)....VIII 772

*Chart No. 4 Report of Special Purpose Group "A" regarding Jews killed in the Baltic Countries, White Russia and Lithuania. (2273-PS; USA 487).....VIII 773

*Chart No. 5 Position of Kaltenbrunner and the Gestapo and SD in the German Police System. (USA 493)....VIII 774

*Chart No. 16 The Structure of the German Police. (1852-PS; USA 449)...End of VIII

*Chart No. 19 Organization of the Security Police (Gestapo and Kripo) and the SD (1943-1945. (USA 480)......End of VIII