Secret and personal to Marshal Stalin from the United States Government and His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom.(2)
In our conference at Quebec, just concluded, we have arrived at the following decision as to military operations to be carried out during 1943 and 1944.
The bomber offensive against Germany will be continued on a rapidly increased scale from bases in the United Kingdom and Italy. The objectives of this air attack will be to destroy the German air combat strength, to dislocate the German military, industrial, and economic system, and to prepare the way for a cross channel invasion.
A large-scale buildup of American forces in the United Kingdom is now underway. It will provide an initial assault force of British and American divisions for cross channel operations. A bridgehead in the continent once secured will be reinforced steadily by additional American troops at the rate of from three to five divisions per month. This operation will be the primary British and American ground and air effort against the Axis.
The war in the Mediterranean is to be pressed vigorously. Our objectives in that area will be the elimination of Italy from the Axis alliance, and the occupation of that country as well as Sardinia and Corsica as bases for operations against Germany.
Our operations in the Balkans will be, limited to the supply of Balkan Guerrillas by air and sea transport, to minor raids by Commandos, and to the bombing of strategic objectives.
We shall accelerate our operations against Japan in the Pacific and in Southeast Asia. Our purposes are to exhaust Japanese air, naval, and shipping resources, to cut the Japanese communications and to secure bases from which to bomb Japan proper.
Secret and personal to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek from President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill.
In order to vitalize operations in Burma, a command, separate from India, has been set up under Vice Admiral The Lord Louis Mountbatten to operate directly under the Combined Chiefs of Staff. This, we think will be an improvement in organization and further the concept of aggressive operations. Thus, we hope to obtain unity in our combined effort in the forthcoming Burma operations. Unity must be achieved if success is to be attained.
At the conclusion of the conference in Quebec, I hasten to bring to you certain proposals that have been advanced as to operations in your theaters and areas contiguous thereto.
First, to accelerate the buildup of the air freight route into China to provide greatly increased support for your air and ground forces.
Second, the heavy burden now imposed on the lines of communications from Calcutta to Assam requires immediate, increase in their capacity. Instructions have been issued to provide additional river craft and rail transportation facilities which should result in an eventual lift of two hundred thousand tons a month into Assam
Third, to carry out offensive operations in the coming dry season for the capture of upper Burma with a view to increasing the capacity of the air route, and to making possible the reopening, of all overland route to China. The security of these land and air routes is considered of vital imporlanee to the build up of all air offensive based in China. The operations as now proposed take the form of an attack from Assam into Burma via Imphal and Ledo, coordinated with an advaiiee at the same time from Yunnan. These converging attacks are to be facilitated by the employment of long range penetration groups in front of each column similar to those employed by Brigadier Wingate last spring. These columns are to be organized by Wingate. They will include British, American., and Indian contingents, all to be supported and supplied by air.
Fourth, preparations are underway for amphibious operations designed to contribute to flw success of the North Burina campaign, At the same time steps are being taken to provide adequate naval forces to assure our naval supremacy in the Indian Ocean Area. and to interdict, the enemy's sea communications into Rangoon. The precise objective for the amphibian attacks is still under investigation. The decision will not be made until Lord Mountbatten has had an opportunity to consider the various factors on the ground.
(1) Sent to the White House Map Room at Washington as telegram No. BLACK 9, and forwarded on August 25, 1943, to the United States Naval Attaché, Moscow, via Navy channels. It was preceded by the following telegraphic instruction from Roosevelt's Naval Aide (Brown) to the Naval Attaché
"My immediately following message is most secret.
"It should be seen only by ALUSNA, a decoder appointed by him and the Ambassador who is then requested to deliver it to the British Ambassador. If possible it should then be delivered by the British and American Ambassadors jointly to Marshal Stalin. Message should be carefully but closely paraphrased before delivery. Acknowledge receipt and delivery." (J.C.S. Files)
A message drafted from a paraphrase of the telegram here printed was delivered jointly by the British and American Ambassadors at Moscow to the Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union (Molotov) on August 26, 1943, for transmittal to Stalin (Embassy Moscow Files). For the text of the message as delivered to Molotov, see Stalin's Correspondence, Vol. 1, pp. 150-151, Vol. II, P. 86. Back
(2) As received in Washington from Quebec, this passage read "from the President and the Prime Minister". On telephonic instructions from the Assistant to the President's Military Aide (Hammond), the White House Map Room changed the message before dispatch to Moscow to read "from the United States Government and His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom." (Roosevelt Papers) Back
(3) Sent to the White House Map Room at Washington as telegram No. BLACK 11 and forwarded on August 25, 1943, to the United States Naval Attaché, Chungking, via Navy channels. It was preceded by the following telegraphic instruction from Leahy to the Naval Attaché:
My immediately following message is most secret and should be seen only by ALUSNA, a decoder appointed by him and the Ambassador who is then to deliver it to the British Ambassador upon receipt. If possible it should be delivered by the two Ambassadors at the same time to the Generalissimo. Message should be carefully but closely paraphrased before delivery. Acknowledge receipt and delivery." (Roosevelt Papers) Back
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Source: Foreign Relations of the United States The Conferences at Washington and Quebec, 1943 Washington, DC : Government Printing Office, 1970 |